Yet in case of the Soviet force this was the reality as:
- transfer routes (bases->Atlantic)
- tactics (evasion tactics)
- equipment (self propelled imitators)
were wartime restricted (with exceptions - ie Atrina).

This follows the "surge" logic Soviets in general and Soviet Navy in particular used.

While one could disagree with that logic (ie citing the possibility of a surprise attack) it nonetheless existed. If one does not understand this logic one makes the common mistakes in understanding the Soviet forces and the scenarios, under which those would be deployed and thus the the likelly outcomes of such scenarios.
The prime example (other than the nuclear forces we have discussed here already) would be the large, conventional land war in Europe post Ogarkov reforms, where many analysts assumed that, for example, NATO would be capable of conducting the lengthy (30-90 days) re-deployment of forces under REFORGER and that Soviet Navy would be attempting to deny such re-deployment and as such was built for this mission, and through that perception lense the Soviet Navy (including the Naval Aviation assets it had) was analysed.

(I applogise for not citing fully, as I am pressed for time and capability to respond adequately)

1972 dated report :yeah:

From which I get the impression that the report does not account for Victor-II class, which was the first class to have specific noise reduction measures (ie rafting), which were subsequently improved on later classes (such as Victor-III). As such this report may be misguiding when considering 1980s subsurface picture.

Subsequent noise quieting for the Victor class were inadequate. The first boat that was an acoustic challenge to the US was the NATO code-named Akula.

For the purposes of the game as the time periods are set now, the Russian submarine force was quite detectable. --As in freight train loud, and easily picked up by the Q-5.

CCC

Aport and Atrina show otherwise.

Which Akula? Which Victors (IIs and IIIs)? There are significant internal (within the same class) differences there.

p.s. there is a convenient graph here (it counts combat submarines in general):

Depending on the year (ie after Soviets went with noise reduction on the late 2nd and then 3rd generations of submarines) there would be different ammount of "silent" submarines in service (ie 21 Victor-IIIs by 1984, 6 more Victor-IVs by 1992, then the whole Sierra/Akula can of worms). So while there would be submarines which would be fairly loud (the whole first generation, part of the 2nd generation) for the game time line, there would also be fairly quiet ones as well.

The 1972 vintage CIA report presented here reinforces my impression that the US parties at the time (and it appears still) did not (do not) understand the nature of the Soviet ASW development (I can show the significant developments that report misses), nor are aware of Soviet experience. For example the whole Afalina shebang is missed.

p.p.s I can provide a short overview of Soviet noise reduction evolution for the relevant time period.

Other than reading books, how much time have you spent at sea?

Should I view this as appeal to authority?

Though I guess Brakerchase already covered that point here:

I'll take that as a no.

I you have never participated in submarine operations or held a security clearance for such matters, you are very much in the dark, and as such your statements don't reflect reality or in-depth knowledge of the subject matter with no degree of "authority" whatsoever.

Case closed.

Ahh, so it was an appeal to authority.

p.s. it is amusing to see how one who uses "silent" in the "silent service" as cover for his apparent appeals to authority decides that the oponent has no in-depth knowledge of subject when confronted (on the matter of said fallacious argument) or when the oponent does not comment on him having or not having clearance.

case closed indeed.

You keep quoting two 'studies' that are not translated. This seems to be the whole of your experience. You are taking these as the 'writ of god' that that are factual and bullet proof evidence to back up your statements.

While we are the silent service we have and will continue to provide insights that you may be unaware of. We will not give you 'time, place, and methods' knowledge.

No matter how much you try to goad us into telling you something that you frankly do not need to know, I have to tell you that it is not going to happen.

Back to the sound level of Soviet boats in the 80's:

When we talk about loud submarines we are talking about so loud that one boat could mask another acoustic point of interest. It was like trying to listen to classical music softly with a punk band playing next door with the amps turned up to 11.

So in the context of one Victor boat to the other it is like comparing two gravel trucks with bad tires driving by. Yeah, one may be 'quieter' but they both still give you a headache. As was stated before, until the NATO coded Akula got in the water they did not have anything resembling a 'quiet' SSN.

So, does all that mean that in 1984 we should see more Yankees trying to break into the Atlantic?

:D

Sadly I don't remember the numbers, but there should be 20-25 Yankees in service with the Northern Fleet in 1984, so I guess during the war you should see their mass deployment to Atlantic via wartime routes, as well as the older submarines.

I have not been citing studies (or articles or books), I was talking about specific events - operations Atrina and Aport, which gave very different results to, say, Kama. Components of those events, such as K-147's prolonged contact with a USN SSBN was discussed in literature, referenced by other participants of the discussion.

Knowledge of those events (all 3) is commonly viewed as pre-requisite for an educated discussion on Soviet Navy in the Russian community due to their importance.

As to the noise reduction topic - there is a reason why I asked about which boats in the broader class you are talking about, as there was more than 10db difference between early and late boats within the same broad class.

I like how Cold Waters handles SSBNs as a final mission of the campaign. Despite established doctrine, you can see how risk-aversion at the political level could effect things either way (while a very real threat, both sides could have reservations about neutralizing strategic assets and provoking an escalation /possible nuclear exchange).

Yes, I could see the risk-aversion as a valid concern.

I love the exchange of opinions.

My two cents. Some years ago I was reading a CIA paper called "Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters", for the year 1982.

It was really top secret at the time, now is open to the public (not in full).

Since I was researching for the 1982 South Atlantic War, my key interest was about Soviet boats in the South Atlantic. The report was categoric: just a couple of Foxtrot boats in Angola and thats all. No other boats deployed down south in 1982.

The trouble is, I also have a nice picture of K-513 (a NATO Victor II) crew crossing the equator line on 3 Nov 1982. The boat was near Ascension Island, unaware to the US Navy or CIA.

US boats were good. Soviet boats were good too. It is nice the humanity never paid the price to be sure which one was better.

Regards,