SUBSIM Radio Room Forums - Full body scanners yay or nay

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- - Full body scanners yay or nay (https://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?t=159634)

Only if it's known any of you mugs are flyin in the same plane with me. :D

I listened to a longer analysis of the security at the airport in Tel Aviv, on radio. Very convincing, imo. They act by the principle of not trying to find the bomb, but to find the guy smuggling it. that means: more psychological training, more behavior observation (and with greater competence), less technology.

Instead of rushing to spend much money on even more scanners that sooner or later will be bypassed by terrorists, we should learn from the Israeli model, and invest in training and paying security personell according to their standards. It makes much more sense. And their record is better than that of any machine. The West, especially America, is obsessed with too much hightech at the cost of too little HUMINT.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Skybird (Post 1230416)

we should learn from the Israeli model

There is a problem with scalability.

Israel has about 11 million airline passengers per year and the United States has about 700 million airline passengers per year.

Israel has seven airports. The United States has 556 Primary Airports and I don't know how many secondary and smaller airports.

While the numbers of passenger/airport/year are about the same, the logistics involved are not.

According to ACAIS our 20th busiest airport (Fort Lauderdale) alone handles more passengers than all of Israel per year. (http://www.faa.gov/airports/planning...ats/passenger/)

Five of our smallest commercial airports (numbers 552-556) handle more passengers per year, than all seven of Israel's airports.

One can't assume that what works in a small scale can be effective/efficient at a much larger scale.

The best airport security I ever experienced was in South Korea during the Olympics.

The first security check you had to pass through was at the entrance to the airport parking lot.

Second, you never left your luggage until it was screened (outside the terminal).

After check in, you went through the scanners and you were wanded and patted down (different line for genders).

In the skyway just prior to entering the aircraft, you were wanded and patted down.

And you know what? It went fast. Everyone was professional and through. All throughout the airport there were teams of armed guards patrolling and there were cameras everywhere.

There was no profiling. Everyone got the same search and it went smoooooth.

It was the safest I have ever felt in an airport.

I do see no reason why a country with more flight traffic should not train it'S security staff in the Israeli way, just becasue there are more passengers to be checked - these higher passenger numbers are accopmanied by more security staff already now, right? In that docu I listend to they said that in Tel Aviv passnegers should be 3 hours early to undergo all security checks and not miss the plane. In Germany the major hubs currently have waiting times of 2-4 hours, due to the current security status. where is the difference? And if short distance travels via airplane gets discouraged by having such a waiting time, then I would say that this is only a good thing. Professionals got quoted in that docu that they can absolutely imagine that things get done on European hubs like they do it in Israel. Layman that I am i do not see myself in a position to question them on that statement on security's logistic capacity.

A thorough read on the matter:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/...669968,00.html

Quote:

Many believe that a different -- and better -- approach already exists. It too involves inspections, even stringent inspections, with the difference being that more emphasis is placed on the potential perpetrator, on things like suspicious behavior, while his tools become a secondary concern. The Israelis prefer this method, known as profiling, but Europeans see it as a violation of their culture, which for many is inconceivable.

In Europe today, all passengers are required to throw away items like their children's sharp-tipped compasses or walking sticks found in their carry-ons, because the assumption is that everyone is a suspect. The question is: What good has all this done? And where does one draw the line? How many risks can air travelers nowadays endure before deciding to give up flying altogether, for safety reasons?
(...)
In a recent incident in the United Kingdom, the members of a German flight crew, pilots and flight attendants, triggered a security alarm because they were carrying cups of coffee. When they asked security officials whether it would be sufficient to drink a few sips of their coffee, to prove that the liquid did not pose a threat, they were told that regulations required them to either drink up or throw away the coffee.

Drink up? A passenger booked on an Air Berlin flight from Düsseldorf to Kavala, Greece, decided to comply with security officials' requests, removed a bottle of port from his carry-on luggage and, instead of throwing it away, drank the entire bottle at the checkpoint. But then he was not allowed on the flight, because he had become too inebriated.

"It's a classic case," say airport inspectors. In other words, it happens again and again. In another incident, a passenger was carrying a tube of toothpaste that was almost empty. But because it was a 125-milliliter tube and only 100-milliliter tubes are permitted, it was confiscated at the security checkpoint. Why? Because rules are rules.

If a group of Islamists that was discovered in the United Kingdom in 2006 had hatched a terrorist plot to drive the Kuffar, or infidels, to insanity, it would have come a long way. As a result of its foiled plot, the world is now confronted with liquid checks that have little to do with reason or even logic. And if the jihadists had wanted to rob the "Crusaders," they would have been tremendously successful. To this day, passengers at Frankfurt Airport alone are forced to throw away 1.5 tons of liquids every day, "the biggest wave of abandonment of ownership that has ever occurred in the history of postwar Germany," says Horst Lang, who runs the federal police unit at Berlin's Schönefeld.
(...)
Counterterrorism work is primarily the work of police and intelligence agencies, whose job is to keep their eye on potential attackers and trace their connections, infiltrate groups and compare data. Lufthansa CEO Wolfgang Mayrhuber was correct when he said that "not a single terrorist has been caught yet by examining carry-on luggage," and he still is today. The most recent case, the thwarted Detroit bombing, underpins Mayrhuber's remark. Abdulmutallab strolled through the security checkpoint carrying his bomb-making ingredients.
(...)
Despite the fact that airport inspectors have been scrutinizing the clear plastic bags since 2006, not even industry insiders are aware of any inspector ever having discovered liquid explosives. And how could they? To this day, airports still lack the kind of imaging technology in their passenger security checkpoints that would make it possible to detect these substances. Therefore, it makes no difference whether the liquid is kept in carry-on luggage, which is banned, or displayed in clear plastic bags, as required -- or whether it is concealed in a half-liter bottle (banned) or filled into small, 100-milliliter bottles (required). "Only the size is checked," says the chief of security for a German airline, "nothing else."

Naturally, a terrorist could combine the contents of several small bottles after passing through security, perhaps in an airport bathroom. And several attackers could combine the contents of their small bottles to yield even more explosive material.

There is another rule which an official with the Brussels commission, who also happens to be an aviation security expert, describes with two words: "regulatory overkill." Under the rule, anyone flying into Europe from a non-European country with his carry-on luggage containing an item like a bottle of Glenfiddich whiskey, which he purchased in a duty-free shop before takeoff, can enter the EU and leave the airport with the bottle. But what he clearly cannot do is board another plane with the bottle in his carry-on bag, or else the Glenfiddich will end up in the trash first.

This raises an important question: Why shouldn't a terrorist somewhere in the world who has managed to board a plane bound for Germany with liquid explosives in his carry-on luggage detonate his bomb during the plane's approach to a German airport? Or in the terminal? Why should he even attempt to board another flight in Germany?

Besides, many a terrorist will simply ask himself: Why should I pack liquid explosives in my carry-on luggage in the first place when there are so many other, much easier ways to bring down an airliner? The walk-through metal detector is called that for a reason: because it only responds to metal. But would-be bomber Abdulmutallab simply walked through the metal detectors with his powder and liquids attached to his body. The devices beep occasionally for random checks, but that's about the extent of it.
(...)
However, many experts no longer believe in this approach, this method of waiting for the next attack so that a security loophole can then be closed afterwards. The most prominent among those experts is Rafi Ron, the former chief of security at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv.

His mantra is to look for dangerous people first and only then to search for dangerous objects. According to Ron, the basic pattern of attacks has always been the same since 2001. Whether it was shoe-bomber Richard Reid, the London gang with its soft-drink bottles or the Nigerian in the foiled Detroit bombing, all were looking for a gap in security -- which they found.

"It happens again and again, and yet we still don't change our approach to security," says Ron, who swears by the Israeli method. He founded a security company that offers a program designed to enable security officials to detect criminals on the basis of their behavior. He does business with airports in Boston, Phoenix and Miami. In Miami alone, says Ron, close to 300 suspects, including many drug dealers, have been pulled out of airport waiting lines within the last four years. He has also presented his program to German federal police officials in Potsdam outside Berlin, who found it "interesting." The agency is currently examining whether the use of specially trained employees as "active patrols" in airports and train stations could be a promising strategy.

The behaviors Ron's program is designed to detect are related to high levels of adrenaline output, warning signals inspectors can look for, such as perspiration, bulging veins, nervous glances and a few other signs that are only visible to trained eyes.

The approach is called profiling, and it goes hand-in-hand with another idea, also a radical departure from conventional practice at European airports: trusted traveler programs. "Our biggest mistake is to treat all passengers as being equally dangerous. This actually results in a decline in security," says Ron. So why not give so-called "trusted travelers," such as businesspeople with frequent flyer status, the option to register once and undergo a thorough check? These passengers could then pass through a fast lane for all future flights. "We need the time to search for the real suspects," says Ron.
(...)
We need better-trained people for this," he says. And he too believes in the third approach. "What we are doing today is pure show. Instead, we should think about which perpetrators have the potential to commit attacks in aviation."

Newark TSA Security Officer Walked Away from Post

The TSA cameras were not working, the TSA officer left his post.

Quote:

At 5:21 p.m. a man who had been caught on camera loitering nearby walked through the exit lane into the sterile area. By 5:22 p.m. the TSA officer had returned to his podium, and at 5:23 p.m. a bystander was seen telling the TSA officer what happened.

The TSA had to get access to Continental's cameras to figure out what happened. I'm dismayed the Govt has to rely on private enterprise to manage its responsibilities.

I am starting to wonder if this whole thing was not staged.... just wondering

No cameras operating, guy loitering, TSA leaves for one minute, no one can find the guy.......

German TV news today. The Slowakian police smuggled several packages of plastic explosives into the luggage of regular passengers, real explosives, and none of the people knowing it, they all were really civilian, unknowing "victims of circumstance". They wanted to see how many came through at Slowakian airport controls. Many did. Then they collected the exploisves again, and the flights left the country. They just forgot one package. The passenger landed in I think Ireland - and there again the explosives in his luggage were not found. Days later the police stormed his appartment and interrogated the poor fellow for hours , who did not know of nothing, after the Slowakian police had told the Irish police.

The excuse of the Slovakians: it was only the explosives, no fuses.

We need expensive body scanner, and many of them (it also secures jobs in the factories). Yea, sure.:yeah: Body scanners would have prevented this dilletantism demonstrated in two countries.

P.S. I fear this is the trick to cheat the Israeli profilers, too: to smuggle the bomb into the luggage of unsuspicious civilian passengers who indeed do not know of anything, and thus cannot show signs of being nervous. Drug smugglers already do this.

Dogs, I think can do a better job at detecting high explosives, gunpowder, gun oil and such.

Naw I don't like the idea of these high tech scanners.

I'm not here to show them my personal credentials.. :D

But there are other options of traveling...

The only solution to prevent terrorism.. Build a wall around your land and prevent people from entering your country... Shoot anything in your kill zone wall. Then your free... but are you really free?.. I wonder....

What next steps are they going to take after this nonsense scanner? What? Shoving probes up your arse? ;)

I say nay to this crap.. It going to far... :down:

Quote:

Originally Posted by Wolfehunter (Post 1232068)

The only solution to prevent terrorism.. Build a wall around your land and prevent people from entering your country... Shoot anything in your kill zone wall. Then your free... but are you really free?.. I wonder....

And the Timothy Mc Veigh's? or the Major Hasan's?

You can NEVER be safe from terrorism. :nope:

Not that I am considering Hasan a terrorist.

Nobody can be safe from a lone killer like McVeigh but there wasn't a group or organization that put him up to it either.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Platapus (Post 1232414)

And the Timothy Mc Veigh's? or the Major Hasan's?

You can NEVER be safe from terrorism. :nope:

Not that I am considering Hasan a terrorist.

Exactly my point.. If your nation is about freedom... then there are risks... Even criminals have a level of rights.. May not be right but hey...

Ether practice freedom or become fanatics under a police state.

The way I see it soon you all be wearing GPS dog tags or anal probs.... :hmmm: Big brother is watching.. :yeah:

Quote:

Originally Posted by Wolfehunter (Post 1233579)

Ether practice freedom or become fanatics under a police state.

Just curious, why are the two extremes the only choices?

Quote:

Originally Posted by August (Post 1233582)

Just curious, why are the two extremes the only choices?

Because nothing is normal anymore... if there was ever such a thing... :D

Could there be a middle ground? Maybe... I haven't seen it.. Too much chaos.