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About the ONLY way I could see Germany beating the USSR in WW2 would have been to take Moscow before the first winter (as it was the massive, central transportation and logistical hub) AND THEN rearm and reuse captured POWs under a new Russian general against Stalin. Then you might have been able to avoid the enormous costs of local guerillas, gain greater civilian cooperation and output, and aquire sufficient military manpower to take that enormous country. But that didn't quite fit with the Nazi view of Russians, despite urgent efforts by some Army officers to get the million-plus willing POWs on the field against Stalin. As others have said, that's a good thing for the rest of us! Except the Russians. And the Eastern Block. |
What cost the eastern front in real terms was Hitler trying to micro
manage his armies against a prestige target instead of a strategic one. two thrusts one to moscow and one to the caucuses. instead of marching entire armies across each others supply routes paralyzing both in support of sixth army. and leave in late spring not late summer. |
In keeping with Predavolk's argument I posit that the U-boats couldn't have done anything to win the war. The war was won by Russia.
Now, if the Japanese had attacked Russia instead of America, then they might have won as the forty or so divisions used in the counteroffensives around Moscow would not have been available and Moscow, being the rail hub for the entire country, would have crippled Soviet war efforts if it fell. |
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I agree that the U-Boats couldn't win the war, nor could the Germans beat the Russians without help (from defecting Russians or a major offensive from the Japanese). Russia was too big, her man power was too great, and her industrial might was too widely spread (and her T-34s, perhaps more than any other weapon except nukes, were a war winner). |
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khalkhin_Gol This was a rather important conflict because it convinced the Japan that the Army plan to seize the Siberia for oil was rather unrealistic and that they should turn their marks to the South East Asia. When Sorge found out about it and reported it back to USSR in late 1941, it allowed the Soviets to move the Far East forces to relieve Moscow. Quote:
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The Nomonhan incident that Ijozic links to above was only the largest and last of a series on Russo-Japanese combats in Manchuria and the Soviet Maritime province. The Japanese defeat there was so total that the Army absolutely rejected offensive war against the Soviet Union after 1939. Besides, the attack on Europe's Pacific possessions and America was strategically driven by the need for resources, particularly oil and there was none known to be in the eastern Siberia.
After the disaster at Nomonhan, Japan bent over backwards to accomodate the Soviets, there was never any realistic prospect of them attacking out of Manchuria or Korea. They had nothing to gain but much to lose. As an aside, Khalkan Gol was the river near which the border war was fought for and that gave its name to the series of battles fought in the summer of 1939. The Japanese referred to it as the Nomonhan Incident for the name of the nearest town and the aim was to advance Manchurian territory into Mongolia, then a Soviet client state. For some specific details of Japanese-Soviet relations at that time see Target Tokyo by Gordon W. Prang and Nomonhan by Alvin Coox. Good Hunting |
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