Woof1701 |
02-14-07 11:58 AM |
Quote:
Originally Posted by Captain Nemo
Quote:
Originally Posted by jasonsagert
Captain Nemo I agree that in restrospect, the fact that Donitz sent u-boat crews to sea during 44' seems like possible (if not total) negligence on his part. But, in your assessment, what are you taking into consideration? Simply historical hindsight?
What other issues/pressures/justifications could have existed for his actions? I can't believe that it was as simple as, "Meh, I know they have no chance, but I'm sending them anyway".
As I stated in my previous post, I thought one of the justifications was to keep enemy forces tied down with fighting the u-boats--even if they were sacrificed.
I don't know. I'm curious about your and others opinions about this.
J
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Yes it is easy to make judgements in retrospect. You're right in your view that part of the strategy was to keep the Allied surface fleet tied up escorting convoys so that the Allies couldn't redeploy them in other theatres of war. Hitler was also paranoid about an Allied invasion of Norway hence several u-boats were deployed in those waters and the Barents Sea to attack arctic convoys. Donitz privately thought that an Allied invasion of Norway was unlikely and the deployment of u-boats in the arctic a waste of u-boat resources. The Mediterranean was another area where Hitler insisted on keeping a force of u-boats to help Rommel in North Africa. In fact they made very little impact. It was Donitz's view that the North Atlantic was where all u-boats should be deployed to have the maximum effect on convoys and supplies to Britain. At no time during the war was the level of u-boats in the North Atlantic to Donitz's satisfaction because of Hitler's insistence that they should be deployed elsewhere.
To a degree I think Donitz was a yes man and dedicated Nazi so even though he knew that sending out u-boats towards the end of the war meant sending thousands of sailors to the bottom he did it to appease Hitler.
Nemo
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Difficult to judge. In my opinion if Dönitz had been a dedicated Nazi and a yes man, there would have been some things differently.
First of all Dönitz always tried to stay away from Berlin as much as possible, since he saw himself more as a soldier than a politician, and thus saw his duty to stay close to his men and do his job.
Second. You normally try not to say "NO" to a man like Hitler too often, because it may get you killed. In my opinion he often tried to walk a thin line to improve his men's conditions and equipment. This obviously included giving his consent to things he didn't support. Nevertheless he opposed Hitler in several occasions when it came to military issues. With little effect though. In contrast his sparring partner Göring was just filling his own pockets, creeping up Adolf's ass and was inebt at commanding the Luftwaffe and even jealous and uncooperative if he had to support either the Wehrmacht or the Kriegsmarine.
Third: By Mid 1944 it didn't matter on what front you were fighting if you were German. The Allies had air superiority, were advancing on the South from Italy, West from France and East from Russia towards Germany, and the supply of raw materials was at an all-time low. It's remarkable, that there were enough resources left to even put boats to sea at all. Some Luftwaffe squadrons couldn't even lift off for lack of fuel.
Fourth: He was practically the only high-ranking officer who had the men following him dedicatedly till his death in 1982.
Fifth: Dönitz was made FdU by Admiral Raeder, after serving as a cruiser captain and having served on uboats in WWI. What made him ideal for the job was the fact that he had a concept for building up a uboat force and a tactic to defeat the convoy system. Most other high ranking officers including Raeder and Göring were politically active with the NSDAP long berfore Hitler came to power.
If you see Dönitz as a dedicated Nazi you also have to see every major military leader as Nazi.
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