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A survey made by some Swedish expert says there will not be any military response but the Swedish MoD was not so certain on that point. This expert group think that Sweden will, like Finland, be attacked in cyberspace. Edit One of the rules to become a member is that the country who seek membership isn't in conflict within the country or with another country...If Russia attack Sweden..Sweden will then be in conflict with another country and can thereby not become a member of NATO End edit Markus |
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https://beta.dw.com/en/opinion-in-ke...tin/a-61788787 |
Danish Ekstra Bladet wrote:
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A little bit about Blue Spear.
https://www.thenationalnews.com/worl...killer-threat/ Quote:
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https://www.rochester.edu/newscenter...lained-512642/ Quote:
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I have the feeling he used this as an excuse to invade the country Markus |
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So there's a majority in Sweden now to apply for a Nato membership.
I say a membership that would have come if not now but later. The last 10 years or so the Swedish military has rebuild some of it's equipment so it can handle NATO stuff. JAS 39 Gripen has been altered with so it today can be refueled in air. Swedish Helicopters has been altered so they can carry Nato weapons Swedish Subs has been altered so they can carry Nato weapons Then there's all these joint exercises both in and outside Sweden. Markus |
^ Both Sweden and Finland, and imho especialyl Finöland, are strong active assets. They do not just benefit from NATO - but NATO benefits form them as well. This is the kind of new members being brought in that I strongly welcome: members that are not just netto takers, but netto givers (in combat power in thios cvonext". The same principle should have been applied to EU memberships, but has not. Weak new members weaken the whole. Stronger new members strengthen it all.
An opinion piece and imo very correct analysis of the writings on the wall that point beyond the war in the Ukraine. I know the book he refers to, "The Sleepwalkers", and I often got reminded of it in the past 12-18 months already when following the daily political and economic news. ----------- The outlines of a global multi-crisis are emerging: war, hunger, energy shortages, inflation. The West struggles to maintain control - with an uncertain outcome. For the economy to flourish, a robust international regulatory framework is needed. Without reliable political conditions, the foundations on which stable business models can flourish are lacking. We are witnessing what happens when an international order begins to unravel. In economic terms, we are facing a nasty scenario: food shortages, energy shortages, inflation, weak economic momentum, debt crises, plus the increasingly noticeable consequences of climate change - the outlines of a global multi-crisis are emerging. It is hitting poor developing countries particularly hard. But the risk of recession is also growing in prosperous Western economies, where prices are skyrocketing. The immediate trigger of this crisis is the Russian attack on Ukraine. But the fact that Vladimir Putin dared to wage this war at all is the result of an unstable international order. He obviously assessed it as so weak that he did not expect much resistance. Now, cut gas supplies, oil boycotts, failed grain exports and severed supply chains are weighing on the well-being of citizens. An end to the impositions is not in sight for the time being. At least the West is doing its best to keep the situation under control. Under Germany's chairmanship, the governments of the G-7 countries will be meeting in various constellations in the coming week: On Wednesday, the finance ministers and central bank chiefs will meet, as will the development aid ministers, and on Friday, the health ministers. There is certainly enough to discuss. Among other things, the seven major Western countries want to provide Ukraine with enough money to prevent it from going bankrupt in the middle of the war. The deceptive thing about an international order is that it is hardly noticed as long as it is stable. Things go on as usual. Citizens go about their lives. The economy goes about its business. Sure, there are crises and minor conflicts now and then, but on the whole, a reliable framework protects against a slide into chaos. The outbreak of World War I was preceded by five decades of prosperity and security. A handful of major European powers had agreed on principles of balance. Otherwise, they relied on industrial development, open borders and stable public finances, underpinned by the universally accepted gold standard. On the eve of the outbreak of war in 1914, it was inconceivable to many that this system could collapse in a murderous and senseless conflict. Accordingly, the states of Europe drifted like "sleepwalkers" into military disaster, as historian Christopher Clark put it in his book of the same name. When the war was over, the British economist John Maynard Keynes clairvoyantly described that his contemporaries were living through an epochal break. His essay "The economic consequences of peace" published in 1919, begins with a melancholy look back at the period between 1870 and 1914, the era that today's historians call the first globalization. Keynes was aware that this "extraordinary epoch of economic progress" had come to an end and that nothing comparable would come again soon. The reason for Keynes' pessimism lay primarily in the realization that the international political order of the prewar period had finally ceased to exist. And that a new order was not on the horizon. Under these conditions, the instability of the 1920s and 1930s produced a world economic crisis that resulted in international economic strife, fierce social tensions and political radicalization, especially in Germany. It was the prelude to World War II. After the war, the United States assumed the role of international regulatory power for the western part of the world. They created a network of institutions that lasted for a long time and continued to exist even after the Iron Curtain was lifted in 1989/90. As the only remaining world power, America - and to a lesser extent its Western allies - now acted as pillars of the international political framework within which the second globalization could flourish. In 2001, China, massively supported by Washington, became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and in 2011, so did Russia. A habituation to international stability as the normal case set in. Setbacks, such as Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, were not interpreted as signs of a dissolution of the regulatory framework, but as slips. Most European states, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, cut back on their defense spending, while economic relations, even with problematic states like China and Russia, continued to expand without much awareness of the problem. Because the international order was taken for granted, globalization brought about a primacy of the economy. Corporations grew into powerful global players, some of which employ more people than some EU states have inhabitants. The fact that states and international institutions ultimately formed the foundation on which economic exchange could flourish receded into the background. It was the great time of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Behind the events, at which top managers, heads of state, scientists, activists and celebrities come together once a year in the Swiss Alps without protocol constraints and a large entourage, was ultimately the belief that the world's problems could be alleviated through direct exchange between the powerful, the rich and the influential. Fruitful informal networks between great personalities were to be created, beyond states and institutions. This was not wrong. But the reality in which we now live is different. It is now once again a matter of sheer, raw power. The main actors have long since returned to being states. Russia is brutally breaking international law. Many other states beyond the West, including the billionaire nations China and India, are not prepared to draw a clear line or even pledge support. The USA, the G7 and the West as a whole may no longer be powerful enough to guarantee the previous international order. If the remaining remnants of this order perish, then the political foundation on which the economy was able to flourish in past decades will also be history. It therefore seems completely out of step with the times when a top manager like VW CEO Herbert Diess recently called at a Financial Times event for the EU to do everything it can to bring the Ukraine war to a swift negotiated end so that we can return to a world of open markets and free trade. Back to business as usual? The scandalous thing about Russia's war is not only the destruction of lives, cities and countryside, but also the total disregard for any limits set by international law. If such conduct leads to success, the world will become even more unsafe. The foundation on which the economy also stands would finally crumble. For the economy, this means that it will hardly be able to avoid following the primacy of politics, not the other way around, as has been the case in German foreign policy in recent decades. Law and freedom are higher values than sales and profits. And yet, large corporations are decisive players in the concert of powers. This gives rise not only to social but also to political responsibility. They will have to assume them - the West cannot do without this support. The author Henrik Müller is Professor of Economic Journalism at the Technical University of Dortmund. Previously, Müller, who holds a doctorate in economics, worked as deputy editor-in-chief of manager magazin. Müller is also the author of numerous books on economic and monetary policy topics. Every week, he provides SPIEGEL with a pointed outlook on the most important economic events of the week. Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version) To complement Cristopher Clark's book, I also recommend Stefan Zweig's "Die Welt von Gestern" (The World of Yesterday). Both books complement each other excellently, one rather factually sober-analytical, the other focusing on the lived experience of the mood of that time - and both together are so important. The bridge to the present may be David Engels' book, "Was tun?" (Que Faire?: Vivre avec le déclin de l'Europe), already a bitter step beyond just a stocktaking, and an unfortunately all too well justified swan song to Europe, which forced the author already to bitter autobiographical consequences. |
Russia plans to send up to 2,500 reservists to the war in Ukraine, trained now at training centers in the Voronezh, Belgorod and Rostov regions - General Staff
I give them 10 days at most, the battle of Donbas is over |
Sweden's governing party drops its long opposition to the country joining the Nato alliance in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
The news came hours after Finland formally announced it was seeking to be part of the alliance. Russia - whose war in Ukraine has sparked the moves - has warned the expansion of Nato would be a mistake. Nato chief Jens Stoltenberg says the doors are open for both countries to join, describing the potential change as "historic" On the ground, Russia's offensive in the eastern Donbas region has lost momentum, according to UK military assessment. Meanwhile, Ukraine has won the 66th Eurovision song contest - in a symbolic show of public support following the country's invasion. https://i.postimg.cc/6qWh0bqx/03b151...ad43a0c958.jpg |
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