Just teasing Jim.

Oh I realised that...I should have put a smiley up :salute:

I'd have said that it was more:

There were warning signs, many warnings signs, but Browning ignored them all and dropped the paras right on top of the hornets nest.

I also wouldn't be so dismissive of the writings of Sun Tzu, and his ideas that have been practiced for over two millennia. Senior generals of the American civil war took their theories from the French general Antoine-Henri Jomini who was a keen studier of The Art of War, and it's on the Marine Corps recommended reading program, and essential reading for military intelligence and the CIA. Not bad for someone who died before the Roman Empire was created. :03:

I'm not being dismissive of Sun Tsu's writings, just with the idea that the Germans laid a trap for the Allies in Holland. There was no attempt on their part to "appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak" a similar suggestion was "pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance". They were completely surprised by the offensive.

Well, I can't disagree with that, both sides were just as surprised as each other. Although certainly the encouragement of arrogance could be laid at the feet of Browning, and whilst the German army were certainly not perceived as inferior, it was arrogance, bullishness or some sort of failure which made Browning ignore the intelligence that was placed in front of him and the concerns raised by all around him. I guess we will never truly know.

In their revisionist book on the battle of Midway, Shattered Sword, the authors Parshall and Tully seem to infer that adopting Sun Tzu's tactics may have been Admiral Yamamoto's undoing at the battle of Midway. Japanese naval strategy was influenced from it's very inception by Oriental philosophies on the conduct of war, which emphasized the value of deception and indirect approaches. However, at Midway, the Japanese encountered a problem where subtlety was a dangerous luxury. If ever a situation demanded brute concentration of force, Midway was it. By spreading the Japanese fleet over half the Pacific, it just invited defeat in detail, especially when much of Yamamoto's mail was being read by Nimitz and company.

Either that or it was an incorrect interpretation of Sun Tzu on Yamamoto's part that led to his downfall.

Same arrogance and bullishness was seen throughout the rest of the war. For example in December when the Allies were surprised by Germany's offensive through Ardennes forest. Bletchley Park got reports of enemy concentrations in Ardennes sector but these reports were not taken seriously. Allied high command knew that a possible attack might be underway but mostly ended up believing Germans were building a new defensive force.

That behavior probably stemmed from the confidence allied forces gained from the fast advance through France and a belief that the Germans were mostly beaten.

Market Garden was a strategic disaster.

It relied on the wrong assumption that the Normandy drops worked so well.

Well they didn't, it was mens bravery, and not on the plan itself, Normandy drops were way off.

I could understand strategically why it was important, but they commited too few resources. Lets just drop light infantry, and hope for the best....

I think Market Garden set the war back, IMHO. Complete misaalocation of resources for political reasons, not tactical.

Securing Antwerp, sure it woulda worked, if you commited more than light infantry paratroopers, and "allied" forces who arrived to late to matter.

American Paras got screwed in this, and bad choices from command stain the legacy they made as warriors.

We love the airborne, thank you all.

:doh:

Ummm...I think the British and Polish paras got a tad more screwed, at least the American paras were able to link up with XXX Corps, the British and Polish were stuck at Arnhem, the 'bridge too far'.

A good point, although I'd ponder if the Japanese knew that the US were reading Yamamotos mail whether they would have used it to their advantage in a deceptive movement. Still, Yamamoto was fighting a war he did not want to fight, so it's hard to understand his mindset when figuring out a plan for the battle.

The break-out from France was a deceptively fast process, once the Falais pocket had been closed, so it's easy to see how overconfidence might have occurred in the Allied forces, although certainly from a strategic point of view, the Wehrmacht was on its last legs, but it still had bite, as the bloody battles of the Ardennes proved.

A thousand pardons. Not minimizing anyones roles, just saying as a whole it was a disaster.

I spoke on Americans, because that is what I know. I know our boys landed, undermanned and under equipped, fighting tanks.

We did our best.:-? (we failed to reach Arnhem to relieve them)

Arnhem, yeah.:down:

If allied control did not overbite, then that would not have happened.

Market garden failed when it forced paras to fight tank regiments, under the guise of fighting old men and boys,.

I wish not to minimize anyones role in the operation, it was a joint op, my apologies.

I uploaded the short "this is what happened on that day" videos from Close Combat: Last Stand Arnhem awhile back. Gives a decent overview of what happened.
Lookie here:
http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL3BFD4A44D8AAAA35

A good overview from a fine game. :yep:

I also recommend 'Arnhem Doctor' by Stuart Mawson, a good account of the chaos of Arnhem from a field medic, gives a good view of one section of the battle and how cut off from each other they were.

You own it?

I'll keep that in mind. Market Garden is one of those events that interests me a lot. :yep:

Sadly no, but I have (somewhere) The Longest Day which is a fantastic game, if a little reluctant to work on modern OS's.

Likewise. :yep:

Damn, so I'm stuck playing with Crècy, who I might say passed out once in the middle of
a game when he was drinking VAT69. :nope:

Think you mean Close Combat 5: Invasion Normandy? Longest Day is the remake of
Invasion Normandy which should work just fine on modern OS'. :hmmm: