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An excellent point. On the other hand if he could have sunk all three of our carriers he would have had free reign at least for awhile. But then we would have sent a handful of subs to patrol the area around Midway, potentially sinking every supply ship he could have sent, which would have tied up destroyers as kaibokans didn't have the range to make the trip.
Either way it wouldn't have been easy for him, even if he had pulled it off. |
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The IJN had no Higgins boats, no amphibious tractors and hadn't even conducted any practice landings or drills in preparation. They had no experience in such an amphibious landing against a well entrenched defense, as Midway was. Wake Island was not nearly as heavily entrenched/defended and we know how difficult that was for the Japanese. I could go on and on, even listing the numbers of troops, artillery and heavy weapons at each side's disposal, but my typing isn't currently up to the task right now. |
Of the 'grand decisive engagement' doctrine -in other words, the intentions of Yamamoto - I am very aware. Also, of the historical meaning of this battle, as it was his intention to wipe out most of the american CV force, it not all of it, and eventually the opposite happened.
What I was left pondering is: did the japanese really care one bit about the island itself, other than being just a purpose for drawing in the american fleet? |
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BTW, for anyone interested in this amazing piece of historical literature (Shattered Sword: The True Story of the Battle of Midway), I started a thread about it some time ago at the UBI forum. |
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