It is really amazing that the Japanese took the leap. I think that their leaders at the time really believed that they would be able to secure the resources that they would need for a protracted war. I believe that they believed their own propaganda that Americans were lazy and had no stomach for a fight. They didn't think that the Americans had the stamina for extended submarine patrols. They didn't believe that the American public would tolerate the kind of losses that they would attempt to inflict.

Any objective assement of the Pearl Harbor attack must conclude that the Japanese would have been much better off had they continued the attack. They would have destroyed the fuel and weapons depots. They would have destroyed the repair facilities and drydocks. This would have driven the entire fleet, including submarines, to the West Coast at least temporarily. That would add at least 2500 miles to any attempt to patrol in Empire areas. Any submarine patrols into Empire areas would have had to come form Alaska, or beyond the Malay Barrier. Midway would have become untenable, much as Wake Island and Guam. It would have fallen quickly, followed very quickly by the Hawaiian Islands, before the US could bring its industrial base to bear.

At the very least, the war would have been much longer, 2-6 years possibly. In all likelihood Britain would have continued to insist upon defeating Germany first, then engaging Japan. The Brits and the Russians would have been more heavily involved, if they had been able to survive against the Germans as well as a possible Japanese incursion across Central Asia.

It really is sobering to realize that just a few more bombs in the "right" places could have completely altered the outcome of the war.

Respectfully Submitted;
CDR Resser

In my opinion, there would not have been such a grand march to war if there had been no Pearl Harbor. For years we had successfully kept ourselves out of harms way while British and Russian armies confronted Germany like a pair of bookends. Japan controled China with nothing more than a wimper from us. We had just barely returned from a depression that had gripped much of our economy for the previous decade. We had no desire to throw our hat into the ring. The devastating attack at Pearl pushed us into it. I believe if Japan would have nibbled at our heels we would have shook our leg and kept right on walking. To take such a bite as Japan accomplished warranted our only reaction. Confront the adversary, to both Japan's and Gremany's demise.

Japan was, in fact, allied with Germany and Italy formally through the Tripartite pact of September 1940.

In coordination with Germany's invasion of Russia in June 1941, Japan could/should have attacked Russia out of Manchuria (with extremely experienced and capable Japanese Army units) and simultaneously from the sea with Naval and Amphibious forces against the major port of Vladivostok and the Kamchatka peninsula. The logistical supply lines across the Sea of Japan would be ridiculously short and totally secure and the lines further North across the Sea of Okhotsk almost equally so. Irkutsk, the major Russian city in Siberia would be only 5-600 miles inland and would very likely have fallen before Winter began. Russia would have been incapable of sustaining defensive operations on both their western and eastern fronts, and would have fallen/surrendered by the beginning of 1942, or at the absolute latest mid-1942 following a second combined Spring offensive by both the Japanese and Germans.

In the West, Russia's defeat would have left the door open for the Germans to move on through the Caucasus (OIL) and across Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. Rommel, reinforced with men/material no longer needed for Germany's Eastern Front against Russia, would undoubtedly have quickly defeated British forces in North Africa and seized Cairo/Egypt not later than mid-1942 and linked up with German forces coming from the North and East. (MidEast OIL).

THe UK would have had no choice but to sue for peace, which Hitler would have undoubtedly accepted with no occupation of the British home islands. The U.S. (American popular opinion) would have no reason to get involved. Even if the UK did not officially 'surrender', they would have had no independent ability to launch any counter offensive against the Germans in Europe or MidEast or Africa.

Japan could then turn at its leisure, beginning in mid 1942 and definitely no later than Fall of 1942 and with virtually no resistance, to seize the Indonesian Oil and other resources, bypassing the Phillipines for the time being, so long as the US behaved and did not interfere. Even if the US did somehow generate public support for doing so and actually moved to offer resistance to the Japanese Southern thrust, the Japanese would have had totally secure 'interior' supply lines from/across Russia.

Finally, the Germans and Japanese at least theoretically could have energized the Russian industrial production capacity to build up and prepare for any future conflict (World War III ???) with the US.

I think that there were two ways that Japan could have at least prolonged, if not won the war in the Pacific*

There were two areas where the IJN was SERIOUSLY lacking during WWII: Signals Intelligence/cryptographic security, and Anti-Submarine Warfare.

Both of those aren't glamorous, especially in a culture that prides itself on military honor, but both were absolutely VITAL to the defeat of the U-Boats in the Atlantic.

Realistically, improving their SIGINT probably wouldn't have helped the IJN very much. US subs just didn't transmit as much as the Ubootwaffe, and the US SIGABA machine was much more secure than even the 4 rotor naval Enigma. I doubt any nation could have broken it consistently, even with machine assistance.

One area they could have made a difference is to improve their own communications security. I'm not sure that it ever occured to them that we were reading their mail most of the time. Surely, though, someone at some point must have realized that the US being at the right place at the right time so often had to be more than coincidence.

If the Japanese tighten up their signal security, we are deprived of a lot of intelligence. One of the ways the US Navy was so successful is that they used the signals intelligence from FRUPAC to guide the subs to areas where there were likely to be ships. Deprive the US of that benefit, and fewer ships get sunk.

Another area where they could have really made a difference is in ASW tactics and technology: If the US fleet boats had to run up against an opponent like the combined UK/CANADA/US forces in the Atlantic, especially after 1943, they would have taken much greater losses.

Imagine fleet boats having to deal with very long range aircraft equipped with 10 or 3 CM radar, armed with acoustic guided torpedoes like the FIDO, and radar equipped escorts with good SONAR and weapons like Hedgehog and Squid.

If US subs get sunk at a rate similar to that of the U-Boats in the Atlantic, then it takes much longer and much more resources to effectively choke Japan.


*Ultimately, the atomic bomb comes into the picture which ends the war.

if japan had of adopted a doctrine of pulling their best pilots out of the war after so many missions to train new pilots in air combat it might have offset the disaster of their doctrine of "fly till you die".

If japan had of abandoned much earlier the strict code of entry to military leadership academies, flight school, and command school. they may have had the personal acailable to replace combat losses.

If japan had of consolidated their weapons procurement procedures and supplied the armies with consistent weapons across all units and consolidated the vastly duplicated naval and air force structure into a single service and done the same with ship building and aircraft construction they may have made a difference. prime example is the musashi and yamato class battle ships. compelete and total waste of treasure and manpower.

If japan had not relied so heavily on dispersed weapons productions basically based around the cottage industry model reserves of ammunition and weapons may have have been higher.

if japan had of adopted a early war convoy policy it would have renderd the effect of the US submarine service much smaller than it was

if japan had of taken a stronger control and emphasis over the merchant fleet

if japanese submarines had of been utilized to interdict american supply ships instead of primarly searching for warships.

if japan aircraft design doctrine had of shifted from unarmoured dueling style aircraft to a more keep the pilot alive model.

japanese commanders invariably when given a choice opted for a tactical victory sacrificing strategic objectives. pearl harbor was a prime example. tactically a massive success strategically a total and complete failure on numerous levels the highest being the total miss on the oil depot.

and last and most important if japan had of ditched that idiotic samurai mentality...

OOOOOOO a reflection thread! Great idea!
 

Yes, the Japanese showdown mentality was their undoing. But the principle problem they had was ignorance. Their insular society had very few people who were familiar with America at all, aside from Yamamoto, who had the famous quote about awakening the sleeping giant.

But we had our own showdown strategy of getting all the capital ships of both nations together and duking it out to victory. Little did we know about the Japanese mastery of night battles (we didn't practice at night at all--might have a collision and give some ships boo-boos). We knew nothing about their advanced torpedoes or brilliance in execution thereof. See what the crew of the Houson has to say about all that!

If Japan had known us as well as they should, they would have known the phrase "Remember the Maine!" and another one similarly "Remember the Alamo!" Best not give those Yanks anything to remember. So Pearl Harbor is out. Let them attack Japan if they be so bold. Another bonus is that Pearl harbor put the means of significant American defeat safely on the bottom of the harbor with very little loss of life. Another aspect they did not understand was to power of the isolationist movement of the time, Americans completely willing to let the rest of the world go to hell, secure in the knowledge that if we left them alone, none of that mayhem would affect us. The Japanese could have used that, had they known it was available for their exploitation.

Just like the Japanese, we had a "big ship party" strategy. Had that happened, we would have taken casualties that made Pearl Harbor look like a USO dance. The Japanese would have chosen a night action, they would have unleashed several hundred Long Lance Type 93 torpedoes and we simply would have been anihilated with 10,000 dead at least. Now reflect on our attitude toward the comparitively few casualties in Iraq and imagine the reaction of the isolationist American public of the time to that! It was the symbolism of the Pearl Harbor attack, coupled with emulation of reactions to the Alamo and the Maine that galvanized American reaction. Without that rallying point and with a much more humiliation defeat for no particular purpose, there's a chance we would have pulled in our claws and called for our Mommy.

There is also a chance that the same thing would have happened. Once engaged, the Japanese had two good years of victory after victory and then it was the not so graceful swan dive for them.

I believe they were not capable of dealing with the Russians in a land battle. The Russians were methodical and covered all their bases while they just mopped the field with their enemies. The Japanese were impulsive and tactical, rather than strategic. Their strength played directly into Russian strategy. I suspect it would have been a repeat of Marshall Zhukov's earlier spanking.

Great thread here!

What-if scenarios are not just based on what the Japanese could have done - but also the state of things and the reaction.

What if the major carrier elements of the USN had been moored in Pearl during the attack? Had they been catastrophically crippled like our battleship force was, the war in the pacific would have been entirely different. The ONLY reason that we responded with carrier forces is because thats all the heavy firepower we had left. The navy brass at the time still felt that heavy warships (BB's and CA's) were the "backbone" of the fleet and would be the major combatants in the coming future conflict. Make no mistake, naval planners in the 30s were planning on having to face the Japanese.

The idea of Carrier warfare for the US was not borne of great inspiration, it was developed out of dire need. This is not to say that even the loss of our carriers as well as the rest of our surface navy would have insured a Japanese victory, but it would have extended the war tremendously.

Where the German blunders were either broadly tactical on a large scale (such as base location for the Luftwaffe) or strategic (such as the Western Invasion) - the Japanese made the mistake that the CSA in the Civil War made. They didn't really have any strategic vision - no long term goal other than to expand in whatever direction presented itself. Other than the attack on the Phillipines and the attempt to take Midway (which was folly - whether we had Ultra or not!), they really never focused on attacking the US after Pearl Harbor. Instead they looked for whatever target of opportunity could be exploited. This is what led to the creation of ABDA, which the Japanese promptly ran all over. ABDA was a polyglot collection of various naval vessels that was to defend certain areas. The only reason ABDA was smashed was it was in the way.

The Coral Sea battle is a perfect example - it was designed to defend against, and possibly eliminate Australia from the war. While I have nothing against my Aussie friends, its not like Australia was the big dog on the block in the Pacific. The Japanese saw an opening tactically they thought they could exploit. But expansion without a goal is reckless - and Coral Sea set the Japanese up for defeat at Midway.

The other thing that cost Japan was its "death before dishonor" and fanatical devotion to Hirohito. While I normally dont draw "modern" parallels - the rank and file military were told that upon their deaths they would immediately be in heaven due to their service to the Emperor. This was told to not just kamikaze pilots, but the army and navy as well - be it banzia charges or the human torpedo's that were created. This not only is a horribly ineffective waste of manpower, but it creates a "no retreat" policy that did not allow the Japanese to withdraw and consolidate along a truly defensible perimeter in the pacific. This is also told to the extremist who are encouraged to blow themselves up with as many civvies as they can so they can go to "heaven" and get a bunch of "pure girls" to enjoy eternity with.... Just something people should think about on occasion.

Lastly, the foolishness of not insuring a land corridor up the coast to where they could just sail raw materials across a small body of water instead of leaving their supply lines vulnerable to the enemy is insanity. Especially when our subs started really hurting them. They had the ability to secure a northern corridor, they just never thought of it. With them, it was Attack Attack Attack until they had wasted their strength. Once that was done, the war was over for them.

Actually the Japanese did have a strategic vision. They just didn't stick with it.;)

Japanese planners never envisaged a total defeat of the Western powers. Their intention was to strike a series of coordinated blows securing the resources of south Asia and establishing a defensive perimeter around them. This perimeter, extending well into the western Pacific Ocean, would be developed into a barrier of bases and fortified islands impregnable to amphibious assault. Behind that shield, the Imperial Navy would wait to launch javelin thrusts at counterattacks from any direction, making up for inferior numbers by use of interior lines and superior ships.

Japan, in short, proposed to fight the Pacific war as it had fought China and Russia. Limiting the conflict by escalating it's material and moral costs beyond what the Western powers, America in particular were willing to pay. The strategy was, oddly enough, based on American rationality. Americans were businessmen, not samurai. It was believed that they would calculate costs and benefits, and then come to terms with the harsh realities created by Japanese arms.

The problem came when the initial victories came much quicker and more cheaply then expected. The perimeter idea was expanded beyond the southern resource areas and the western Pacific to include the New Hebrides, the Aleutians, Midway, and then came the inevitable strategic overreach and disaster which ensued. :ping:

Excellent point torplexed - I missed seeing that!

So did the Japanese. :arrgh!:

Actually the defensive perimeter strategy even if it had been followed to the letter had fatal weaknesses. The island bases were usually too far apart to support each other, and the US was after 1943 able to bring such massively superior force to bear on each, that it ensured that any objective could be isolated and overwhelmed before Japanese naval forces could counterattack as planned. This vexing problem cropped up for the Japanese again and again during Nimitz's drive though the Gilberts and Marshall islands. The lessons the Americans learned at Tarawa set the pattern. Plus, with the exception of Truk and Rabaul the Japanese were never able to materially equip their bases to the degree needed to resist direct amphibious assault. Those few bases that were well fortified were just bypassed and left to wither on the vine.

Japan's naval bias
 

It also seems that the Japanese were too highly specialized in their navy. While their navy was argrably the finest in the world, their army wasn't up to the standard as evidenced by their battle with Marshall Zhukov in Manchuria. I believe they did not develop the land-based supply lines because it would have required use of a skill they did not have: an army which could control large areas in several countries in SE Asia with sufficient security to establish supply lines.

I don't recall any land battles where the Japanese were particularly imaginative, using feint, movement, misdirection, you know, actual military strategy to win a battle. My impression is that they were like a 1970's Big Ten College football team: three yards up the middle and a cloud of dust. Brawn vs brawn. When the other team throws a pass or runs a sweep it's all over.

I'll agree with that!

If anyone reads anything about the campaign in Burma, they'll see that, once it got over it's inferiority complex, the Anglo-Indian army ran rings around the Japanese.

May I quote the best British general of WW2?

Bill Slim certainly put that lesson into practice during the Meikteila campaign - the result? The total defeat of the Japanese in Burma and their largest land defeat of WW2.

My 2p

Mike.:cool:

For the most part I agree with the posible exception of Malaysia. :hmm: The Japanese Army did a pretty good job of bamboozling the British in the Malaysian/Singapore campaign. By continually turning the British flanks through the supposedly impentrable jungle they managed to bounce the road-bound Commonwealth forces from the Thai border back to Singapore in less than 70 days. Far less then even the Japanese General Staff had predicted. Then the Japanese won Singapore as much by bluff as strength. They were actually outnumbered by the British forces surrounded at Singapore. But short on supplies, out of room and with a civilian populace to worry about the British general chose to surrender. However, British miscalulations in that campaign is probably the element most responsible for their defeat there. (Such as 'fortress' Singapore having no guns that faced landward!)

Overall though the Japanese Army was lagging behind the times. Especially in equipment. A decade of fighting In China provided combat experience, but it also fostered a false illusion of military superiority. The Chinese were ill-equipped, poorly-led and divided. Their only real advantage was the sheer size of China and it's poor infrastructure which slowed the Japanese advance. However, China became the ruler by which the Japanese measured their martial success.

The clash with the Soviets in 1939 that Rockin Robbins mentioned should have been an eye-opener. The future Marshal Zhukov who was to make life so miserable for the Germans in the future gave the Japanese Army a bloody nose on the Manchurian border. They should have seen then that bayonets and banzai charges were not going to be a match for modern mechanized warfare. Instead the defeat was glossed over. Japan may have changed it's strategic direction from north to looking south. But the outdated infantry heavy tactics stayed the same.

Axis cooperation
 

One thing that has always surprised me is the lack of cooperation between Germany and Japan during the war. Although Germany was always bailing out the Italians when they couldn't get the job done, their attitude to Japan seems to have been "you have your little war over there and we have our big war over here and let's just not attack each other." Yes, they sent a couple of U-Boats that way, but the Japanese never seem to have realized how to use any kind of submarine.

It seems like timing of different actions in both spheres could have helped, such as having the Japanese tie up Russian armor in Manchuria or Siberia whilst Germany takes advantage of the diversion. Japanese weren't Aryans. I'll bet that colored their entire strategy process.

Add to that the fact that the Japanese resisted/ignored Nazi pressure to conduct anti-semitic, anti-jewish actions in the Far East....They did create the Shanghai 'ghetto' with admittedly very difficult living conditions, but the Jews there were not interred in concentration camps nor, as demanded by the Nazi's, sent off for extermination. Some think that it was a dislike of the Nazi Aryan superiority philosophy, because as you correctly and logically point out, the Japanese would not be included in the Aryan Uber-Race elite. Couple that with the fact that the Japanese, themselves, 'knew' that it was the Japanese race which was superior to all others. Odd bedfellows, to say the least.

With regard to Japanese potential for military success against Russia in the Far East had they inititated same in 1941, as I suggested in my initial "What-IF" scenario, I agree that the Japanese were not prepared for large-scale mechanized operations on a wide front; however, as we all know, it took everything the Russians had to just barely avoid defeat by resisting and slowing down that first German assault in June-December '41, and later to defend in '42 and ultimately counterattack (Stalingrad, for example, as the turning point). Many of the Soviet forces were comprised of Eastern Divisions/conscripts...none of which would have been available had they been already engaged against the Japanese in the Far East (even if they were occupied in 'successful' tactical or strategic actions in that region...I won't digress much here, but in Soviet military doctrine, they have a level of "Operational" warfare/art between "Tactical" and "Strategic").

In a nutshell, the weakening/lessening of available Soviet Forces facing the Germans resulting from a Japanese 1941 offensive agaisnt Russia, I think, would have easily tipped the scales in Germany's favor and enabled a German victory not later than summer '42.

Just my humble 'what-if' guess, of course.... which is the name of the game in this thread, after all...:)