British naval doctorine and pride

[Incubus]

I have a question- I have heard that one reason England didn't invest as heavily into submarines/ASW warfare early on was because British naval doctorine considered the concept of a submarine attack 'dishonorable'. I'm not really sure this is true or not.

I'm puzzled because it seems baffling how the submarine can be proven to be excellent for its intended role (sinking merchants) and through the use of inferior tonnage, manpower, and survivability still inflict amazing results. The sheer number of merchants sitting in the bottom of the atlantic is a testament to that. Sure the Allies beat the Germans, but I wonder how many lives were lost unecessarily, due to pride and misguided concepts of 'fairness' in warfare.

Tom Clany mentions this disparity of fairness in warfare in one of his books, comparing it to a man clubbing a baby seal. Sinking a merchant is kind of similar- usually the merchant doesn't have a chance. Just sucks for the Allies they were so crazy about battleships/surface vessels they didn't deal with it sooner.

Speaking of battleships, I find it really amusing how fixated so many nations were on them, when even in WWII they weren't terribly decisive (with a number of exceptions, many were sunk in port, succumbed to airpower, or simply rusted in the harbor, too fuel-guzzling and risky to send them under way without air support/adequate intelligence) and there were a surprising FEW battleship vs battleship fights despite the impressive number of warships that nations boasted.

My theory is that because battleships are so big and heavily armed, they seem good. I dunno, maybe there's something symbolic about it (phallic?). Battleships may 'seem' cool, but compare how many battleships are still sailing today vs the number of submarines, and time will demonstrate which is the better boat. :|\\

[Safe-Keeper]

I suppose you're right that it has to do with "giving the enemy a chance" (remember the old quote about how "no nation would use a submarine even if it could be made to work by some miracle"*?), and I think it goes for other types of action, too.

And though the aversion to use submarines may seem unsound today, if it was considered a "no-no" back then, I don't blame them. It's slightly similar to the Cluster Bomb debate (http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5fmjga?opendocument) today - yes, they may be hugely effective, but they kill lots of civilians even after the conflict, and it's not exactly "fair" to the enemy to release them from the high altitudes they drop them from. I suppose the Royal Navy in the 40's Britain might have felt the same way about submarines?

What's "fair" in war is an ongoing debate even today. Are cluster bombs OK? Land mines? Torture? Chemical Weapons? White Phosphorous? Bombing of hospitals occupied by hostile Army units? All may (note emphasis) give you an advantage, but they are all controversial and under heavy debate.

*Not verbatim.

[bigboywooly]

What you have to remember is that the first world war wasnt long gone and up until then Submarines hadnt been used to any effect
Even then the Uboats were targeting warships at the start till they switched tactics
The uboat menace wasnt considered a real threat but large surface units were
They spent most of their time just cancelling each other out though - tying up huge resources in port in case the other left for sea

From Britains point of view the battleship was a show of power and IMHO something they could have used to stop any country invading them from the sea
as they had stopped every other invasion attempt in recent history

The Germans use of aircraft at the start of the war to such a deadly effect made that theory no use at all
With such large ships becoming sitting ducks

Plus I think the British and Americans underestimated the progress of uboats and overestimated their own advances in detecting them

In the short space of the WW2 the aircraft rose to be king

[Cdre Gibs]

THE RETURN OF THE BIG GUN !

The Summer 1988 edition of Warship World contained a small item of information whose significance might have passed unnoticed. It was reported that Vickers, FMC and Oto Melara were co-operating to design a tri-national 155mm naval gun intended for the NFR9O, the proposed standard NATO frigate for the next generation of warships.

On the face of it this appears to be no more than a logical standardisation with NATO's main artillery calibre, with the heavier shell giving a useful bonus for shore bombardment, but it appears curiously at odds with the recent trend to smaller calibres with high rates of fire in order to combat attacks from aircraft, missiles and fast patrol boats. For example, the USN Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates were designed with a 76 mm gun and the new Canadian Patrol Frigate is intended to use the 57 mm Bofors as its main gun armament. Even more drastically, later versions of the RN's new Type 23 frigate will not be fitted with the 4.5 in gun and will therefore be relying on armament of no more than 30 mm calibre (plans which did not, of course, happen).

The significance of the proposed 155 mm gun almost certainly lies in a number of lines of recent technical development which could well be brought together in the near future to restore the big gun to a more prominent role in naval armament.

The Decline of the Anti-Ship Missile?

This might appear to be a provocative headline, but the simple fact is that the current pre-eminence of the anti-ship missile is under increasing threat. Defences in the form of decoys, quick-reaction AA missiles and radar directed rapid fire close-in weapon systems of 20 to 40 mm calibre are increasingly being fitted to major warships. It is arguable just how effective these will be in battle but they should certainly account for a fair proportion of attacking missiles.

This will cause serious problems for attacking warships since, because of size, weight and cost constraints, most ships only carry a limited amount of anti-ship missiles(26 being the highest I can find). It is highly probable, therefore, that in a future action of any magnitude ships, having fired off their missiles, wilI find themselves with an enemy still to fight and only one or two guns to fight with. The same could also apply, albeit to a lesser extent, to anti-aircraft missiles. It is presumably for this reason that the USSR has developed the formidable new high velocity rapid fire 130 mm gun first fitted to the Sovremennyy' class destroyers.

New Ammunition Developments

Positive steps leading to the possible resurgence of the big gun are all concerned with sophisticated new ammunition developments involving advanced guidance and control systems and measures to increase range.

The first guided shell in service is the US Army's Copperhead, which can be fired from standard 155 mm artillery and homes in on any target which is being illuminated by a laser of the appropriate type. An equivalent naval version for the USN's 5inch gun has also been developed. The benefit of such ammunition for precision shore bombardment is obvious, with laser-equipped naval gunfire support forward observers put ashore in advance to illuminate pinpoint targets. However, the need to keep a laser accurately pointing at the target greatly reduces the potential of this system for anti-aircraft and especially anti-ship purposes.

The French Navy has been working on infra-red homing projectiles for its 100 mm gun, but lR is an unreliable guidance method in poor weather. A better choice is millimetre-wave radar, which is more reliable, sturdier and cheaper. An early application is Marconi's Merlin; a homing anti-tank round which can be fired from a standard 81 mm mortar (since cancelled). A system capable of picking out a tank from above should have few difficulties in coping with naval requirements.

Steering guided shells towards the target has caused some problems. Copperhead has extending fins which use up a lot of space in the body and therefore lead to a very large and cumbersome projectile. Rocket assisted shells, which have been in existence for many years in unguided form, could be steered by means of jetevators which deflect the rocket efflux. The most interesting possibility for unpowered shells has been developed by Raytheon and consists of lines of tiny explosive charges along the body of a conventional looking shell, which are triggered as required to alter the flightpath of the projectile. This system has been demonstrated successfully with shells of only 40 mm calibre. Finally, the range of 155 mm artillery shells has been increased sharply by the introduction of ERFBBB (extended range full bore base bleed) ammunition. This is a large-capacity shell of excellent aerodynamic form which contains a small quantity of combustible material in the tail, not to act as a rocket but to smooth the airflow behind the shell. When fired from 45-calibre artillery this projectile ranges to over 21 nautical miles; slightly further than the USS Iowa's formidable 16 in guns can reach and over 9 nm further than the RN's current 4.5 in gun.

Prospects for the Future


Sooner or later it is likely that all of the developments described above will be brought together to create long range homing ammunition which will transform the importance of the naval gun. Anti-aircraft shells might have rocket assistance, to be ignited as soon as the target is detected by the shell's sensor. Anti-ship missiles would carry a heavier explosive charge instead. The advantage of using the standard 155 mm calibre is obvious in terms of both spreading development costs and achieving greater destructive power per shell in order to justify the cost of the guidance and control systems. Also in existence are 155 mm nuclear projectiles, which apart from other uses would make highly effective long-range depth charges for use against enemy ballistic missile submarines. A single-barrel automatic naval gun mount, capable of 15-20 rpm, would probably weigh around 50 tons; about the same as the twin 4.5 in mounting fitted originally to the Leander class frigates. With a 55 calibre barrel a range of at least 24 nm could be expected, about the same as Exocet MM38 fitted to many of our warships.

Weighing up the Advantages

What would be the advantages over existing missile systems? These can be summed up as volume of fire, rate of fire and cost. It is obvious that provision could easily be made for each ship to carry several hundreds of rounds of ammunition, which with modern mechanical shell-handling techniques could be fired at a rapid rate.

More importantly, as each shell would have its own self-contained homing system it would not need to be steered on to the target by ship -mounted systems, merely fired on a ballistic course which would be followed until the target was detected. The rate of engagement of fresh targets would therefore only be limited by the ability of the ship's fire control system to re-aim the gun after each shot. This has obvious advantages when dealing with large numbers of attacking aircraft or missiles. In the anti-ship role the shells would clearly be more difficult to destroy than conventional ASMs, particularly as several could be fired in rapid succession at each target.

The cost saving would be in two areas; after the initial development costs, the production of this type of ammunition should be relatively cheap, and the warship itself would not need any special guidance systems or related equipment other than a fire control radar and ballistic computer.

The successor to the Type 23 frigate might therefore have much simpler and cheaper weapon systems with a main armament (apart from its
helicopter) of one 155 mm gun, probably backed up by a 30 mm CIWS for last-ditch defence. While losing the very long range of the Type 23's
Harpoon anti-ship missiles (which may not in any case be very practical because of targeting problems), such a ship would be far better
equipped to cope with an extended naval action, with 'raids' by large numbers of aircraft or missiles and of course with shore bombardment tasks.
It should also be considerably cheaper.

The Battleship Returns

If such developments were to occur, it is interesting to speculate on the implications for warship design. If taking hits from guided shells became unavoidable, then armour protection for vital systems would be an obvious response. This would tend to push up ship size. It would also put an upward pressure on gun calibre in order to defeat the armour and damage the larger ships, which in turn would lead to increased armour thickness and so on. Now what did we do with those battleships?

[Hybris]

Return of the Battleships... The Iowa's might make a come back tour!:lol::lol::lol::lol::lol:

But on the whole subs being "dishonorable" all I have to say is All is fair in love and war. Because in any war innocent will die its unavoidable and so therefore really not be taken in consideration should it?

[Safe-Keeper]

Interesting article, Gibs.

It'll be interesting to see how that plays into the stealth technology advances. I don't exactly consider battleships to be hard to detect.

But on the whole subs being "dishonorable" all I have to say is All is fair in love and war.Apparently. Even when it's the US and Israel - two beacons of freedom and democracy - fighting their enemies.

Because in any war innocent will die its unavoidable and so therefore really not be taken in consideration should it?I hope that was sarcasm. But then again, you never know.

[Hybris]

To tell you the truth in places like the middle east that maybe the only expection to "not attacking civilian targets" that I can go with otherwise minimize the nocoms without hamppering yourself.

I get a feeling that I'm not making much sense here am I?

[kylania]

My theory is that because battleships are so big and heavily armed, they seem good. I dunno, maybe there's something symbolic about it (phallic?). Battleships may 'seem' cool, but compare how many battleships are still sailing today vs the number of submarines, and time will demonstrate which is the better boat. :|\\

I don't think really it was a matter of "ooh big!" as much as the battleships and ships of the line before it had always been the deciding factor in naval warfare until WWII. There really wasn't much of anything obvious at the time to indicate that things had changed since WWI.

That war turned so many of the "traditional" tactics of war upside down. Tanks as a main ground weapon rather than infantry in trenches. Smaller units (covettes, destroyers vs submarines) being the main naval battles since many of the larger ships were taken out rather early and quickly. Airplanes being 3-5x as fast and powerful as the WWI planes and used for all aspects of warfare, especially in the war at sea. Even the introduction of jets! Advancements in cryptography, electronic warfare, detection systems, weapon systems and many other changes that completely undid and redefined modern warfare. So much changed in those few years.

[Immacolata]

And perhaps it changes again now. Smart weapons have become so smart they fool themselves. Or the enemy fools them. Smart weapons can deliver surgical strikes, but what if you don't know where to cut? As Iraq and Afghanistan shows, you need grunts on the ground again. With guns. No one has yet figured out how to stop a projectile. Its either get out of the way or hope your armor can withstand the impact.

[VoodooPriest]

I have a question- I have heard that one reason England didn't invest as heavily into submarines/ASW warfare early on was because British naval doctorine considered the concept of a submarine attack 'dishonorable'. I'm not really sure this is true or not.

I'm puzzled because it seems baffling how the submarine can be proven to be excellent for its intended role (sinking merchants) and through the use of inferior tonnage, manpower, and survivability still inflict amazing results. The sheer number of merchants sitting in the bottom of the atlantic is a testament to that. Sure the Allies beat the Germans, but I wonder how many lives were lost unecessarily, due to pride and misguided concepts of 'fairness' in warfare.

Tom Clany mentions this disparity of fairness in warfare in one of his books, comparing it to a man clubbing a baby seal. Sinking a merchant is kind of similar- usually the merchant doesn't have a chance. Just sucks for the Allies they were so crazy about battleships/surface vessels they didn't deal with it sooner.
[...]


I think the allies didn't invest in subs so heavily because they really didn't need them that much. Germanys strategy was to cut off britain from supplys to starve them till they had to surrender. This is something britain just couldn't do to germay as germanys supply-routes were mostly land-based. So there was just no need for britain to invest in anti-merchant naval-warfare.

[NealT]

I believe there was a program on the Military or History channel on this not all that long ago. Service in submarines was considered 'dirty work' and left to the 'lessor sorts' for the Brits as I recall. The more 'nobel' work was on Battleships and other surface vessels.

[DanBiddle]

Yes, but don't forget that the Brits still used midget submraines to attack the Tirpitz, a 'sneak' attack I suppose, and the Royal Navy did use submarines quite a lot, especially for more 'cloak and dagger' operations in the Med such as landing commandoes. Despite the official accounts of 'dishonourable' submarines, the Royal Navy did use them when it was advantageous.

[mookiemookie]

What you have to remember is that the first world war wasnt long gone and up until then Submarines hadnt been used to any effect
Even then the Uboats were targeting warships at the start till they switched tactics


:huh: U-boats sunk almost 13 million tons of allied and neutral shipping in WW1.

While that isn't a lot percentage wise, consider the "fear factor" and the disproportionate amount of allied resources devoted to the U-boat threat.

Clay Blair goes into a lot of the reasons behind why the Brits were slow to really do anything about ASW in Hitler's U-Boat War (the first one). Disadvantages of convoying, underestimating the actual threat U-boats posed (or correctly estimating it, depending on which side of that argument you stand on), the sticky politics of waging unrestricted submarine warfare...etc

I'd recommend picking up that book for an in depth discussion of it. The first 100 pages or so go into a lot of detail regarding WW1 and the run-up to WW2

[TarJak]

What you have to remember is that the first world war wasnt long gone and up until then Submarines hadnt been used to any effect
Even then the Uboats were targeting warships at the start till they switched tactics

:huh: U-boats sunk almost 13 million tons of allied and neutral shipping in WW1.

While that isn't a lot percentage wise, consider the "fear factor" and the disproportionate amount of allied resources devoted to the U-boat threat.

Clay Blair goes into a lot of the reasons behind why the Brits were slow to really do anything about ASW in Hitler's U-Boat War (the first one). Disadvantages of convoying, underestimating the actual threat U-boats posed (or correctly estimating it, depending on which side of that argument you stand on), the sticky politics of waging unrestricted submarine warfare...etc

I'd recommend picking up that book for an in depth discussion of it. The first 100 pages or so go into a lot of detail regarding WW1 and the run-up to WW2

WWI Subs may not have been used in the same numbers as they were in WWII but their effect was marked. The sinking of the Lusitania on its own has been quoted as receiving much of the credit for promting the US to join the war. I'd say submarines certainly had an impact on WWI albeit nowhere near as great as the submarine forces of WWII.

I agree Clay Blair's book has some interesting insights into the military doctrine of all side. it must be said that Hitler and Raeder certainly underestimated the impact that submarines would have on the war and this is highlighted by Donitz' frustration in not being able to field as many boats as he would have liked at any time during the war. Much of this was due to the prevailing attitudes that big warships would be war winners.

As far as the British opinion at the start of the war there was significant division within the RN about ASW and their response was largely driven by the time it took to overcome those divisions.

[horsa]

Interesting debate on the notion of morality in war.
have a question- I have heard that one reason England didn't invest as heavily into submarines/ASW warfare early on was because British naval doctorine considered the concept of a submarine attack 'dishonorable'

It must be remembered that European warfare in 1914 was regarded as a legitimate extension of politics with its own rules and notions of honour. It wasn't just a British thing. Four years of escalating slaughter, hatred and bitterness changed peoples perceptions from ideas of limited warfare to the ugly reality of Total War.

The British actually had more submarines than Germany at the start of WW1. Significantly they were seen ( by both sides) as another type of warship designed to attack warships.

It seems quaint now that the Uboats were initially used against British merchants as a reprisal for their naval blockade of Germany’s maritime trade. Incredibly there were “rules” for how this should be done. Amongst other things, the merchant was to be correctly challenged and identified, and evacuated of its crew, before sinking it by gunfire from the uboat. This requirement meant that Uboat attacks were always made surfaced. The British then retaliated with the “ungentlemanly act “ of installing small guns on its merchants. This forced more of the Uboats to attack submerged with torpedoes, leading increasingly to the loss of merchant crews. Significantly there were more “international incidents” caused by missidentified neutrals. The Germans maintained that the British had only themselves to blame for the loss of “innocent seamen” because they had “escalated” the conflict. Later, the drift into total unrestricted Uboat warfare came about because even passenger liners were perceived as carrying contraband goods ( ie war related supplies).