Somes notes about the Imperial Japanese Navy

[Danelov]

With the inminent "Entry in service" of SHIV and to prepare to entry in theme, some notes about your next "enemy" , the Imperial Japanese Navy.

The IJN was one of the more youngers Navy of the world by 1941, founded by 1871 and following the best model in the world at this time: the Royal Navy.

Japan is a country with very limited availability of raws materials and minerals and the first tentatives of expansions to obtain resources were directed by natural spots near of home:

-The Peninsule of Korea
-China

With this last the younger IJN had started his "Bapteme of Fire" following a few years latter a scalations of tensions with the Imperial Russian forces.
That give place shortly to the Russian-Japanese war by 1904 with a big victoy for the Japanese forces, after battles like Tsushima or Port Arthur .That was also the consagration of the first great japanese Admiral: Heihachiro Togo , the father of the modern IJN.
His insignia ship at Tsushima, the battleship "Mikasa" is still today preserved a Yokosuka.

Other names followed latter to build little a little a wonderfull Navy ,names like Adm Hiraga(creator of the "Yubari" and the excelents "Furutaka","Kako","Aoba and "Kinugasa")and specially the well know Adm Isoruku Yamamoto , CO of IJN fleet from 1939.

THE IJN OF 1941

By 1941 the IJN was the third Navy of the world.
Some remarkable features of the IJN in this time:

-The best Carrier based aviation, deployed in 9 ships(Akagi,Kaga,Soryu,Hiryu,Shokaku,Zuikaku,Ryujo ,Hosho,Zuiho).A 10th carrier was near to entry service, the Shoho, transformation of one submarine depot ship.

The carries were organized in Divisions commanded by very skilled High Rank Officers,specialist in aviation, like Adm Yamaguchi or Ozawa.Less prepared in the theme operations of naval aviation, the Admiral Nagumo, but he had the support,conseils and organisation of two excelents officers, Genda and Fuchida.
As observers of the other countries, the IJN had watched in details the results of the attacks by British planes to Taranto and the results of Matapan.Strategical speaking the IJN carrier force had not egal enemy by 1941.

The training and formation of the pilots was considered also the better worldwide by 1941 utilising also some of the best products of the Japanese aircraft industrie of the time

-Mitsubishi A6M2 "Zero"
-Nakajima B5N2 "Kate"
-Aichi D3A1 "Val"

Also forming parts of the Air Dispositive of IJN , several Kokutais land based of bombers ,fighters and recco planes and floatplanes.
To mention also, the top quality of weapons utilised by the IJN Aviation , torpedos ,cannons
bombs,etc

-Excelent destroyers like the class "Fubuki","Kagero" ,and latter "Yugumo" and "Akizuki" class.
The IJN was specially skilled in the utilisation of destroyer torpedo tactics ,a lot of USN,Australian and British ships had payed the price,specially in the Salomons.
Also to mention, a natural disposition and training to performed well directed night attacks and ambushs.
Excelent optics in the IJN ships , many times enemy forces were sighted before the radar of this last can detect the presence of IJN ships aproaching.Commanders of IJN Destroyers Divisions were also some of the best of the world ,mens like Raiso Tanaka, a "crack" in the famous"Tokyo Express" of the Salomons.

-The battleship line of IJN was considered one of the most formidable in the world.This force included the Kongo class(Kongo,Kirishima, Hiei and Haruna -this ships are more near to be considered as Battlecruisers), Fuso class(Fuso and Yamashiro),Ise Class(Ise and Hyuga),
Nagato class(Nagato and Mutsu) and the formidables Yamato class(Yamato and Musashi, the third example was converted in the supercarrier "Shinano") .
Standard main battery was the 356mm, 406mm in the Nagato´s and 460mm in the Yamato´s

-A good balanced force of cruisers. Heavy cruisers of the IJN were more of a match for many allied ships, "Chokai" class for example, also the force usually was commanded by very skilled Admirals , like Mikawa in Savo Battle.

-Good submarines with incredible performances in range.Some class carried a recco floatplane like the "Glenn" ,and lattter the proyected "Seiran" for the type I-400.Many had carried pocket submarines in the attacks of Pearl Harbour, Madagascar,Diego García,Australian ports,etc.The only bombing operations realised over US territory were done by IJN submarine based floaplanes and cannon fire(also were utilised the explossives ballons).Torpedos of the Long Lance series were the better of the world, with incredible range, speed and explossive effect. One of the most famous torpedo attacks by IJN submarine was the attack by the I-19(Commander Takaichi Kinashi) the 15-09-42 sinken with a salvo the USN Carrier CV-7 Wasp(three torpedos),the destroyer O'Brien DD-415 and damaging with the last torpedo the Battleship North Carolina BB-55.
IJN submarines had also operated in the Indian ocean and in the Atlantic.I-8,I-30,I-29 and I-52 had making operations transport to the french port of Brest.And of course ,this submarines were very wellcome by his colegues of the Kriegsmarine.
Were builded only three submarines of the gigantic I-400 class; this type was tasked to performed a proyected attack to the Panama Canal, utilising for that his complement of 3 "Seirans" bombers each,armed with specials torpedos to destroy the excluses.The IJA(Imperial Japanese Army) had also builded some submarines but utilised only as transports.

THE WEAKEST POINTS OF THE IJN

The IJN strategic line had proyected as main target a definitive battle with his enemie(s) some part near of the Marshall Islands. A battle style Jutland , with dozens of big battleships firing
colossal salvos of shells to destroy the enemy.This target was searched the whole war ,but the USN Admirals like Nimitz were experimented and previsors to avoid and eviting this type of encounter.
Only at Leyte this oportunity come near of be real ,after Halsey had make a serie of strategic mistakes and Kurita was under inmense pressure to arrive a decission and had a clear vission of his very favorable tactical position .

The fleet was builded mainly allround of this objetive. For example subs strategic was the interception of the recco or advanced forces of the enemy or previous damaged warships.Enemy traffic attack was secondary. And that was a great mistake by the IJN , with the USN vulnerable supply line crossing the inmense Pacific.Only one torpedo was allowed to destroy a enemy cargo or tanker.Several USN supply ships damaged by one torpedo,avoid destruction, exactly for this order. This tactic were latter revised but that was too late.

The principes of IJN were fixed allround of a OFFENSIVE force , few attention was gived to the defense ; that is something including in the caracter and temperament of the Japanese
militars generations of this time and his code of conduct.

The results of that , a very weak antisubmarine capacity of IJN. Subchasers were builded very latter in the war after the catastrofic losses in warships and merchant fleet by USN submarines.Destroyers were equipped with a limited number of depth charges , the place was reserved to reinforce AAA or other "really"offensive weapons.Asdic and hydrophones were quite good initially, but near of obsolete after the development of USN submarine tactics by 1943.The programme of construction of Escort Destroyers, like the "Matsu" or "Tachibana" class or the development of IJN AS planes were also too late to change the situation.Convoys were organized latter in the war, specially between Korea-China and Japan ,Philippines-Japan.By early 1942 many ships had sailed independently and the ships losses were minimal by USN submarines.The big chronical problem of the deficient american torpedos had saved in this periode many Japanese cargos and tankers.But the situation start to change drastically by latter 1942 and early 1943.From this periode the IJN start to study the possibility or organisation of convoys , specially tankers and troop transports.But the things were not so easy ,few escorts ships , not destroyers available for escort and the antagonism Army-Navy by the Japanese was too prononced and sometimes a really obstruccion and obstacle.

The AAA of the IJN like many others Navys of this periode was weak, the main AA MG was the 25mm ,a good weapon but only four were carried for example in a "Kagero" class destroyer.The AA battery was improved after the initial operations and by 1945 ,after lossing the umbrella of his carrier fighter protection, the IJN ships were a forest of AAA mounts placed in each space available.Inutil to say , that had augmented the weight of the ships in alarmants proportions.

Optics were excelent in telemeters and other equipment of this nature , but in modern combat is not enough and the radar development was very slow.The first two IJN ships with radar, were utilised in the Midway operation of June 1942.

Many of the planes of the IJN were prived absolutly of armour and protection of vitals parts.
Yes, there were very fast with incredible climb rate and maneuvrablity but also very vulnerable.

The Naval Aviation after the losses in the Battles of Coral Sea,Midway,Santa Cruz.Eastern Salomons,Salomons campaign,etc had few reserves of good trained pilots. The programme of training was accelerated in Japan but the performances and quality of the new pilots was drastically reduced.The apogee of this situation were the catastrofic carrier aviation losses by Ozawa carriers in the Battle of Mariannas in June 1944.

The losses of so many fleet tankers by USN submarines by early 1944 had forced the IJN to utilise the not refined oil of Tarakan to powered his fleet.This oil ,very pure,utilised directly in the boilers ,without refination was also extremely inflamable and volatil.He was the direct responsable of the losses of two of the main carriers of the Ozawa fleet en the Mariannas, Tahio and Shokaku, boths hits by USN submarines.The torpedo hits were not initially fatal for the ships,but shortly, the effect of the gases of the oil exiting of the ruptured fuel tanks had gived way to a serie of incontrolled explossions and furious fires, destroying and sinking both carriers.

The forces or Task Forces were directed at sea , by the Commander of the operation aboard usually of one battleship , like Yamamoto in the Battleship" Yamato" in Midway.That was the traditional form of direct the operations ,but this mode was not always effective,specially for combined great fleets. Radio transmission in a battleship or carrier are far of be ideal at sea to command a so big force, like this one deployed by Yamamoto at Midway.Nimitz had always directed the operations from Pearl Harbour giving his orders to his subordinates like Fletcher or Spruance aboard of the carriers and utilising for that the much more powerfull radio ground instalations.

Few flexibility , a lot of orders in the plans of operations IJN were too rigid ,too complicated, depending of a exact time syncronisation between forces with few possibilities of individual initiatives and taking also few count of possible problems or unwaited situations.Also Nimitz no had fall in this mistake; when he had self considered to not have a clear view of the situation, he had give the initiative to his operatives commanders.

Utilised several times by the IJN the tactic of placing a decoy ,a small force, a small carrier with few destroyers for example(like Eastern Salomons), to attract the USN forces and then engaged with a big strike of a carrier division placed near in ambush or a battleships-cruisers division at night.Operative range circle of IJN Air Groups was always greater as the USN Airgroups(Japanese planes were much less heavy)and more IJN planes can be prepared in the deck of ther carrier in preparation for a strike.(light planes need less lenght to take off from the carrier).

Like the British with the Kriegsmarine , the USN intelligence know the next moves of the IJN.The first desciprage codes were obtained from a sunk IJN submarine,early in the war.
After the death of Yamamoto by the P-38s based at Guadalcanal , the IJN had started to change his security codes.That was a mistake of Washington, partial justified by the sentiments againts the detested Yamamoto still too fresh in the memory of US citizens,autorities and medias after Pearl Harbour.
The order was gived to intercept the plane of Yamamoto and the advantage to know the japanese codes was loss.


I hope that can help you to have a vission of the IJN in your next SHIV.

[Henry_pl]

Probably we're going to see tonnage results never seen before in SH3 :p

I remember my patrols from SH1- FISHING , FISHING, FISHING :yep:

Lots of unescorted merchants, sometimes in groups of 4-5, and off course- sampans;) (just wonderin how is it going to look like- shooting a pile of wood with a deckgun:lol:)

[Immacolata]

Great read. My biggest concern is that of the japanese destroyer's quality in submarine warfare. I'd be pretty bored if most of my engagements in SHIV is taking free pot shots at unarmed and unprotected merchants. Were the japanese ASW team as good as the atlantic? And if they were not, isn't this going to make SHIV feel like "easy mode" compared to SH3? Lots of free apples for the picking isn't my idea of a good game. There has to be a challenge.

[Danelov]

My biggest concern is that of the japanese destroyer's quality in submarine warfare. I'd be pretty bored if most of my engagements in SHIV is taking free pot shots at unarmed and unprotected merchants. Were the japanese ASW team as good as the atlantic? And if they were not, isn't this going to make SHIV feel like "easy mode" compared to SH3? Lots of free apples for the picking isn't my idea of a good game. There has to be a challenge.


Umm, yes really a good theme.No, definitively the IJN ASW team cannot be compared with the allieds in efficience in final results.

The USN loss 52 submarines in WWII , and 45 in action againts the IJN. Not really a brillant "balance" results in more of three years of combat for the IJN antisubmarine forces.

"Easy mode" ,difficult to say, the challenge in the early times for the USN was to obtain some results of his terrible torpedos.Also the fuel theme can be a serious problem in the Pacific, with sometimes so such enorme distances to go to the operative area and back.And same to find some target in this inmense War scenery.

[Immacolata]

Somehow it appears to me like we have set up a game of shooting fish in a barrel. The pacific theatre seems less appealing than the Atlantic if the odds of destruction is a joke. Of course there could be hidden a new game of frustration if you experience your fish bouncing off the enemy ships time after time.

But I hope Ubi will provide some kind of satisfactory replacement for SH3s many breathless moments where you are going deeper and deeper to avoid the punishment of angry destroyers. I assume the IJN did use destroyers for ASW as well?

54 subs lost doesn't sound like a lot compared to the losses of the Kriegsmarine. But how many subs did USN commit?

[edit] Ah, I found an article about the submarine force here. Less typos, as well :) It is worth a read. 288 or so was commissioned, so 52 means it wasn't a complete turkey shoot. Also the IJN did up the escorting during the war, but as with everything else concerning the war against the US, they didn't have the luck nor the power to do something about it.

RESULTS OF THE AMERICAN PACIFIC SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN OF WORLD WAR II (http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=107155)

[Danelov]

To the 45 USN submarines losses against the IJN we can also added ,3 Dutch submarines

K VII the 18-02-42 by IJN planes
K XVI the 25-12-41 by the IJN submarine I-66
O-20 the 20-12-41 by the IJN destroyer Uranami

And the Royal Navy submarines

HMS Porpoise the 19-01-45 by IJN planes
HMS Stratagem the 22-11-44 by IJN destroyer

In all 50 allied submarines destroyed by the IJN in WWII.

[Capt. D]

The following link has some very good comments regarding the pacific, our subs and Japanese ASW.

http://www.valoratsea.com/losses1.htm

The US Sub force had the highest mortality rate of all services. 1 out of 5 submariners were killed. 3,505 men lost their lives.:cry:

We had a very good policy, however, in regard to our sub operations - hence "Silent Service":D

A Quote from the above site:
"They (Japanese) were prone to accept the most nebulous evidence as positive proof of a sinking, and being sure of a kill, they were off about their business, to let the submarine surface and thank God for the Japanese superiority complex. While 48 submarines were lost in combat operations, and of these, not more than 41 were directly due to to enemy action, the Japanese, at the end of hostilities, furnished us with with information which showed a total of 468 positive sinkings of our submarines. The U.S. Navy, by a wise policy of total censorship of submarine operations, encouraged the enemy in their belief of their anti-submarine successes. When we failed to announce the successful attacks of our submarines, the enemy naturally assumed that the submarines never got home to report them."

Despite what is said here, I do not believe any skipper thought he was invincable and approached every target with the thought "we can't be touched" and on the surface went full speed ahead towards the ship they were after. Yes the Japanese anti submarine tactics were not up to ours yet one had to keep in mind - it only takes one well placed depth charge and it's over.

Happy Hunting :ping:

[Capt. D]

Another good read from same site:

Summary of
U.S. Submarine
Operations in WWII
by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
http://www.valoratsea.com/ejking4.jpg
The following is an excerpt of the third and final report of United States Navy operations in World War II by Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, detailing the actions and results of American submarines at war with Japan in the Pacific.

http://www.valoratsea.com/ussratonfde.jpg
U.S. NAVY AT WAR
1941-1945
OFFICIAL REPORTS TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THIRD AND FINAL REPORT
by
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King,
Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, DC

8 December 1945
TO: The Honorable James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
On 1 March of this year I presented to you my second annual report of the progress of our naval operations and the expansion of our naval establishment during the preceding year. Since the terminal date of my second report major hostilities on all fronts have terminated victoriously for the nations allied against the Axis powers, and I transmit to you herewith my third and final report of operations of the United States Navy in World War II. This report covers the period 1 March 1945 to 1 October 1945. The Navy built and manned by the united efforts of this country continued to carry the action to the enemy, engaged him by sea and air, maintained control of the essential lanes of sea communication and transported men and supplies over all oceans to all theaters. The significant role of amphibious operations in this war was strikingly portrayed in the capture of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, which were the outstanding operations of this type during the last months of the war. They exemplify the teamwork of all services which brought victory on both the European and Pacific fronts. For the officers and men of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, I am happy to report, at the end of the war, that the missions and tasks assigned all of them, singly and collectively, have been successfully accomplished.
Ernest J. King
Fleet Admiral,
U. S. Navy, Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations

Submarine Operations
SUBMARINE warfare was an important factor in the defeat of the Japanese. With the end of hostilities, it is now possible to reveal in greater detail the splendid accomplishments of the submarines of the Pacific Fleet and the Seventh Fleet. Our submarines are credited with almost two thirds of the total tonnage of Japanese merchant marine losses, or a greater part than all other forces, surface and air, Army and Navy combined. Of the total number of Japanese naval vessels sunk, our submarines are credited with almost one third*.
ATTACKS ON MERCHANT SHIPPING
Our submarines, operating thousands of miles from their bases and deep within enemy-controlled waters, began their campaign of attrition on Japanese shipping immediately following the attack on Pearl Harbor, and continued to fight with telling effectiveness until the Japanese capitulated. During the early part of 1942, while our surface forces were still weakened by the Japanese initial attack of 7 December 1941, submarines were virtually the only United States naval forces which could be risked in offensive operations. Although the number of submarines available at the start was so small that the 1500 ton fleet- type class was augmented by older types, submarine attacks produced immediate and damaging results, which were greatly needed at the time. They made it more difficult for the enemy to consolidate his forward positions, to reinforce his threatened areas, and to pile up in Japan an adequate reserve of fuel oil, rubber, and other loot from his newly conquered territory. Their operations thus hastened our ultimate victory and resulted in the saving of American lives. Sinking of enemy merchant ships rose from 134 ships totaling 580,390 tons in 1942 to 284 ships totaling 1,341,968 tons in 1943. Then in 1944, when submarine coordinated attack groups reached the peak of their effectiveness, the merchant fleet of Japan suffered its worst and most crippling blow-492 ships of 2,387,780 tons were sunk or destroyed in submarine torpedo and gun attacks. The figures given above, which are based on evaluated estimates, include only ships of 1000 tons and larger. It should be borne in mind that our submarines sank or destroyed, chiefly by gunfire, large numbers of smaller vessels, particularly during the latter part of the war, when few large enemy ships still remained afloat. In 1945, because of the tremendous attrition on Japanese shipping by our earlier submarine operations and the destructive sweeps by our fleets and carrier air forces, enemy merchantmen sunk by submarines dropped to 132 ships totaling 469,872 tons. The advance of our forces had further driven Japanese ships back to the coast lines and shallow waters of Japan and the Asiatic mainland. Our submarines followed the Page 202 enemy shipping into these dangerous waters and made many skillful and daring attacks, such as the one in April when TIRANTE entered a patrolled anchorage in Quelpart Island to blow up a 10,000 ton tanker and two 1,500 ton escort vessels, which were peacefully lying at anchor. Further south, persistent submarine patrolling plus air sweeps had, by the end of March, stopped almost all enemy traffic along the sea lanes of the East Indies and the coast of Indo-China. For a time, Japanese shipping continued to ply in the East China and Yellow Seas, but the invasion of Okinawa in April soon made the East China Sea untenable to the Japanese. Causing heavy damage, our submarines were very active during April and May in the Yellow Sea and along the east and south coasts of the main Japanese islands. In June the landlocked Sea of Japan was penetrated in force. The submarines had excellent hunting, and in a series of coordinated attacks did tremendous damage to the remnants of the Japanese merchant fleet. One of the intruders, BARB even landed a party on the coast of Honshu, and successfully blew up a bridge and the speeding train that was crossing it. By the end of the war, the Japanese merchant fleet was virtually nonexistent.
ATTACKS ON NAVAL VESSELS
While United States submarines were effectively eliminating the Japanese merchant fleet, they were also carrying out damaging attacks on Japanese naval units. During the course of the war, the following principal Japanese combatant types were sent to the bottom as a result of these attacks: Battleship 1 Carriers 4 Escort Carriers 4 Heavy Cruisers 3 Light Cruisers 9 Destroyers 43 Submarines 23 Minor combatant vessels and naval auxiliaries (including 60 escort vessels) 189 Details of these sinkings will be found in Appendix A. While the loss of the heavier naval units was critical to the Japanese, especially as the strength of our surface fleet increased, the surprisingly high losses of enemy destroyers and escort vessels to submarine attack are particularly noteworthy. Our submarines, refusing to accept the role of the hunted, even after their presence was known, frequently attacked their archenemies under circumstances of such great risk that the failure of their attack on the enemy antisubmarine vessel placed the submarine in extreme danger of loss. So successful, however, were these attacks that the Japanese developed a dangerous deficiency of destroyer screening units in their naval task forces, and their merchant shipping was often inadequately escorted.
SPECIAL MISSIONS
Among the special missions performed by submarines were reconnaissance, rescue, supply and lifeguard duties. An outstanding result of effective submarine reconnaissance was the vital advance information furnished our surface and air forces prior to the Battle for Leyte Gulf, information which contributed materially to that victory. Our submarines in a number of instances rescued stranded personnel and performed personnel evacuation duties, notably from Corregidor. The supplies and equipment delivered by submarines to friendly guerrilla forces in the Philippines did much to keep alive the spirit of resistance in those islands. When our air forces came into positions from which they could intensify their attacks on Japanese-held territory, United States submarines were called upon to carry out lifeguard operations to rescue aviators forced down at sea in enemy waters. Sometimes assisted by friendly aircraft, which provided fighter cover and assisted in locating survivors, and sometimes operating alone, our submarines rescued more than 500 aviators during the course of the war. Fifty-two United States submarines were lost from all causes during the war, forty-six due to enemy action, six due to accidents and stranding. These losses were due to continued penetration deep within the enemy zone of defense, far from our bases, and, until the last phase of the war, far beyond the areas where our surface ships and aircraft could operate. Because of the nature of submarine operations and the general necessity of submarines operating alone, the personnel loss in most instances was the entire ship's company. As heavy as were the losses in submarine personnel and equipment, submarine training and building programs supplied replacements so effectively that our submarine force at the end of the war far exceeded its pre-Pearl Harbor strength-and was the most powerful and effective in the world. The Japanese capitulation found our submarines on station searching for the remnants of the Japanese Navy and merchant marine, and on the alert to rescue downed aviators off the coast of Japan. Submarines of the Pacific Fleet have been commanded by Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, Jr., since February 1943. Rear Admiral James Fife, Jr., has commanded the Seventh Fleet submarines, including a number of British and Dutch submarines, since December 1944. No account of submarine warfare in the Pacific would be complete without mention of the splendid contribution of the submarines of our Allies. These craft, operating in the southwest Pacific, contributed materially to the destruction of Japanese naval and merchant shipping, and inflicted losses over and above those previously listed.
CONCLUSION
In my previous reports, I have touched upon the effective cooperation between our Allies which has been of such fundamental and signal importance in accounting for the success of our combined undertakings. This cooperation has continued and been extended in the period since my last report. I have spoken before of the full measure of cooperation and support rendered by the ground, air and service forces of the Army in a partnership of accomplishment, which neither Navy nor Army could have carried out singly. For that cooperation, undiminished throughout the war, and to the wholehearted support from the great body of citizens who performed the countless and varied tasks which made up our war effort, I reaffirm my appreciation. Just as the Navy depended upon its sister services and upon the multitude of activities which produced the implements of war, so also did the Navy rely for success upon the Reserves and the Regulars, the men and women who constituted its mutually supporting elements-the Fleet, the Shore Establishment, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard and the Seabees-each of which contributed its full share to victory. The end of the war came before we had dared to expect it. As late as August 1943 strategic studies drawn up by the British and United States planners contemplated the war against Japan continuing far into 1947. Even the latest plans were based upon the Japanese war lasting a year after the fall of Germany. Actually Japan's defeat came within three months of Germany's collapse. The nation can be thankful that the unrelenting acceleration of our power in the Pacific ended the war in 1945. The price of victory has been high. Beginning with the dark days of December 1941 and continuing until September 1945, when ships of the Pacific Fleet steamed triumphant into Tokyo Bay, the Navy's losses were severe. The casualties of the United States Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard reached the totals of 56,206 dead, 80,259 wounded, and 8,967 missing. Many of these gallant men fell in battle; many were lost in strenuous and hazardous operations convoying our shipping or patrolling the seas and skies; others were killed in training for the duties that Fate would not permit them to carry out. All honor to these heroic men. To their families and to those who have suffered the physical and mental anguish of wounds, the Navy includes its sympathy in that of the country they served so well. It is my sincere hope-and expectation-that the United States will hereafter remain ever ready to support and maintain the peace of the world by being ever ready to back up its words with deeds.




Happy Hunting:ping:

[Immacolata]

Oh My God. Mind to format that brick of text a bit? I grow myopic just staring at it.

[Sailor Steve]

One thing that has gone unsaid so far in discussing "turkey-shoots" and "fish in a barrel" is the actual tonnage scores of U.S. submarines. Compared with the U-boats, the American record seems pretty poor. This is primarily because those four or five unescorted merchants didn't alway follow the same routes and could be pretty hard to find. Also, real submarine captains didn't bravely follow the convoy until they had destroyed it; the usual tactic was fire off all the torpedoes and immediately start looking for an escape route. For one thing, japanese merchants carried depth charges, and while they had on sound gear they could still get lucky on that first pass. And sometimes a convoy would get lucky and find themselves heading in the same direction as a cruiser task force, and so you might have four or five merchants escorted by two light cruisers and six destroyers. Also, there were a lot of smaller escort vessels, and oddly sometimes merchants might be assigned as 'escorts'.

So it wasn't all fun and games; it was just a different kind of war. Find a copy of Silent Hunter-you know, the one that started this series-it's still played by a lot of people and is the basis for the longest-running online submarine campaign: Pacific Thunder.
http://www.subsowespac.org/

[anthrax]

I have to disagree on a number of points.

Jap battleships, excluding the the Yamato class all faired pretty poorly. Lots of them sank with very few torpedo hits. (Fuso?, Kongo). Kongo class ships were pretty much battle cruisers.

Jap cruisers significatly went over the washington naval treaty limits and couldn't really be compared apples to apples to US cruisers. The japanese tactics put emphasis on night time torp attacks. Japanese cruiser were equiped with up to 16 24" long lance torpedo tubes. However, these torp had their draw backs. With 16 large explosive tubes stored high in the hull. Quite a few japanese cruisers' torpedos cooked off when hit in combat causing large amounts of damage to the midship superstructure.

Japanese ships also due to the emphasis on night time fighting with large optics tended to have huge pagoda style superstructure. This added alot of weight and reduced stability.

Japanese ships also tended to emphasis firepower and torpeado load. The Fubiki class DD and the Mogami CL/CAs all had strutural issues becuase of the desire to put the most guns and torps on the lightest hull.

Japanese Fire control fallen behind techonlogical improvements quickly. The US and british made significant advances in fire control over the war. With Radar directed main battery , radar directed AA. In the late war ship to ship fights, it was pretty lopsided.

[cmdrk]

Here is some interesting reading,

RESULTS OF THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN SUBMARINE CAMPAIGNS OF WORLD WAR II - Michel Thomas Poirier Commander, USN 20 Oct 1999

Link: http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/history/wwii-campaigns.html

[Danelov]

Quote by anthrax:

"Jap battleships, excluding the the Yamato class all faired pretty poorly. Lots of them sank with very few torpedo hits. (Fuso?, Kongo). Kongo class ships were pretty much battle cruisers.

Jap cruisers significatly went over the washington naval treaty limits and couldn't really be compared apples to apples to US cruisers. The japanese tactics put emphasis on night time torp attacks. Japanese cruiser were equiped with up to 16 24" long lance torpedo tubes. However, these torp had their draw backs. With 16 large explosive tubes stored high in the hull. Quite a few japanese cruisers' torpedos cooked off when hit in combat causing large amounts of damage to the midship superstructure.

Japanese ships also tended to emphasis firepower and torpeado load. The Fubiki class DD and the Mogami CL/CAs all had strutural issues becuase of the desire to put the most guns and torps on the lightest hull.

Japanese Fire control fallen behind techonlogical improvements quickly. The US and british made significant advances in fire control over the war. With Radar directed main battery , radar directed AA. In the late war ship to ship fights, it was pretty lopsided."

This IJN BBs were older ships, with the exception of the Yamato class all other classes were builded between 1915(Kongo class),1917 (Fuso class),1918(Ise class),1921(Nagato class).
The battleships or battlecruisers of the Kongo class, inspired by the British proyects, were the more olders ships in the battleline and Hiei was desmilitarized in 1929 following the treatry of Washington.Was latter reactivated , the Kongos were utilised mainly for the escorts of the Carriers divisions ,taking full advantage of his high speed.But despite his age the class performed quite well in WWII:

Admiral Kondo's Kirishima at Guadalcanal in the night of the 14-11-42 and without radar , had gived a hard punishment to the brand new South Dakota, and this one was saved "in extremis" by the BB Washington; the radar of South Dakota had gived little help to avoid the 27 hits of different calibers and the heavy damaged sustained.The South Dakota was send latter to New York for repairs and was 62 days out of service. Not so bad this combat results for a so old battlecruiser like Kirishima fighting two battleships in the same night and without radar.The IJN loss this day the DD Ayanami and the Kirishima,damaged and unable to go out of the combat area before sunrise was finally scuttled at 03.30 hours.The USN loss the DD Walke,DD Preston and the DD Benham.
The Hiei was engaged, damaged and loss the 13-11-42 at the first Battle of Guadalcanal and this old battlecruiser was also finally scuttled by his crew near Savo Island after several air attacks of the planes based at Henderson Field; the IJN loss this night also the DD Yudachi , the USN the CL Atlanta, the DDs Cushing,Monssen ,Aaron Ward and also loss this day by a IJN submarine the CL Juneau.
The Kongo was sunk by the USN submarine Sealion near Formosa(one of the three BBs loss by submarines in WWII)and the last, the Haruna was sunk near Kure in July 1945 after the attack of carrier planes.

Fuso and Yamashiro of Admiral Nishimura were engaged in the Surigao straits battle of the 25-10-44 by very superior forces , Admirals Oldendorff and Kinkaid had six battleships,3 heavy cruisers,,2 light cruisers, 15 destroyers and several squadrons of PT boats.Nishimura had the Fuso,Yamashiro,the heavy cruiser Mogami and 4 destroyers.The desproportion of forces is evident and the work was really easy for the USN, nothing of glorious here.Despite the superiority ,the CA Mogami and the destroyer Shigure survived the battle.Yamashiro had taked in the battle 4 torpedos and hundert of hits of the Battleships, Cruisers of the USN and sank with ViceAdmiral Nishimura and Counteradmiral Shinoda at the 04.19.Fuso was hit by two torpedos and also several artillery hits and sunk at 03.38.In this battle the USN force launch 122 torpedos and more of 4500 shells of 406,356,203 and 152mm.This one was the last battle between battleships in the history.

Washington and London Naval Treaty were violated many times and not only by the IJN , the Kriegsmarine with the Pocket battleships for example, the Bismarck class, and also for the USN , the ships were near of the estipulated weight as new , but after sometime in service,and with the reinforcement of AAA and others were out of the fixed numbers.

Yes, there were structural problems ,specially in early designs and wartime emergency transformations, but the IJN was forced to assume this risk under the pressure of the war situation.This situation was also finded in other beligerants ; German ships for example ,had chronical problem of lost the stern after damage by torpedos or hits( Prinz Eugen,Lutzow, Bismarck had lost the stern near the surface in the sinking process, Graf Spee sunk in one piece, minus stern,etc.

[Saukko]

I had this picture on my harddrive, showing the damage of USS South Dakota after the battle of Guadalcanal.

http://img149.imageshack.us/img149/1128/southdakotadamageay0.th.jpg (http://img149.imageshack.us/my.php?image=southdakotadamageay0.jpg)

[Torplexed]

Hmmm. Think of all the decent carriers and escort ships the Japanese could have built with the material and effort they sank into the 2 Yamato class battleships they did launch. Not to mention the wasted effort in trying to finish one uncompleted one as a carrier (Shinano)and then having it sunk while undertow to be fitted out. Japan did build some very good carriers. The Shokaku and Taiho class were excellent. Unfortunately for them the battleship mentality won out.

[John Pancoast]

I had this picture on my harddrive, showing the damage of USS South Dakota after the battle of Guadalcanal.

http://img149.imageshack.us/img149/1128/southdakotadamageay0.th.jpg (http://img149.imageshack.us/my.php?image=southdakotadamageay0.jpg)

:) I grew up in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, where parts of this ship were (are ?) laid out in a huge park/memorial.

It was very interesting.

[Danelov]

Hmmm. Think of all the decent carriers and escort ships the Japanese could have built with the material and effort they sank into the 2 Yamato class battleships they did launch. Not to mention the wasted effort in trying to finish one uncompleted one as a carrier (Shinano)and then having it sunk while undertow to be fitted out. Japan did build some very good carriers. The Shokaku and Taiho class were excellent. Unfortunately for them the battleship mentality won out.


In this year of 1944 the central problem was not the carriers availability ,the problem was the pilots.Despite the pressure in the aircraft industrie by the terrible losses by the USN submarines and all this raw materials taking the way to the bottom of the sea, the planes were more easy available ,A6M5s for example , but the pilots , and specially pilots for carriers , that was a terrible lacking aspect for the IJN.
In the best of the situations the pilot can performe a fair take off of the carrier but for the return was forced to land at some land base; near impossible to expect a carrier landing by this so few trained pilots.
Before the operations in the Mariannas by Jun 1944 Admiral Ozawa had fixed a short training programme for his pilots ,but he was obliged to cancelled this one to avoid more losses in accidents.
And by the Battle of Leyte Ozawa had only some 135 planes in his carriers.
Carrier Katsuragi and others of the class Unryu were near of entry in service by 1945 ; the problem, no pilots for his future air groups, same for the Hybrid Ise and Hyuga , no floatplane fighter pilots available to give a minimum of Air Groups to this Hybrid Battleship-Carriers for the Leyte operation.Shinano never received a assigned Air Group and finally was decided to convert this one in a transport of Okha flying bombs with alternative as support carrier.And yes, his conversion had taked a lot of time,work and efforts.
Yes, the mentality battleship in IJN was very strong, and quite contradictory by one Navy showing the good demostrations of all possibilities of carrier aviation.Certainly all this materials and time utilised in the Yamato class could have better utilised in escorts or subchasers , but the construction of this Battleship was something of very symbolic and prestigious for Japan and the future consequences of the lack of a real effective antisubmarine force were impossible to imagine in early 1940-1941.

[Torplexed]

I agree. Japan would have had to pump up it's pilot training programme to make use of additional carriers. Which would have meant dropping some of their very rigorous standards for pilots. They also had a bad habit of keeping veteran pilots at the front until killed or wounded, instead of rotating them back to help train the green recruits.

More escorts wouldn't have helped them either because escorting merchants was considered disdainful and unhonorable duty by most Japanese naval officers. That's a mentality issue they also would have had to address along with the material one.

In any case, the war probably would have ended the same way. Japan just didn't have the resources to take on a major industrial power ten times it's size.

[Danelov]

[quote=Torplexed]
In any case, the war probably would have ended the same way. Japan just didn't have the resources to take on a major industrial power ten times it's size.

Certes, technical speaking Japan was defeated in the latter 1943, but the problem was how can ended this war.The militar factions at the power under Togo were at the direction of the nation, and the words defeat, armistice or rendition was something impossible to admite, assimile or consider,under the code of bushido, save the face,and the mentality of this time. CO Yamamoto was very concient of the perspective of loss the war , and his idea before his death was to arrive a some type of armistice to avoid the complete destruction of Japan in short time.The japanese troops were deployed in thousand of different spots, tiny islands, selvage spots ,in Manchurie, Burma, etc , how can arrived to control so many areas and arrived to fix a possible honourable rendition or something other in this style ?

In Europe the things were more easy , the territory was mainly continental and of relative easy access. Also here , Germany was defeated soon as early 1944 , after the catastrofic defeats at Stalingrad, Kursk,the landings at Sicilia-continental Italia and the loss of North Africa. The next operations by the German militar forces were to protect home and retard the inevitable longtime as possible, and all that at the cost of the live of more millons of people.The intentions of the Germans and this stage of the war was to try to change the course of the conflict, arriving at some kind of peace with the British and Americans ,and then all together to fight the Russian, with Germany in the middle as "arbitre". They were the spoirs of Hitler, the S.S. and some generals of the Wehrmacht.

[Steeltrap]

Great read. My biggest concern is that of the japanese destroyer's quality in submarine warfare. I'd be pretty bored if most of my engagements in SHIV is taking free pot shots at unarmed and unprotected merchants. Were the japanese ASW team as good as the atlantic? And if they were not, isn't this going to make SHIV feel like "easy mode" compared to SH3? Lots of free apples for the picking isn't my idea of a good game. There has to be a challenge.

This is a point I have made in a number of threads. When it comes to the threat level posed by the various ASW forces, the Pacific is a cakewalk compared with the Atlantic. Why?
- the distances are HUGE, so there are plenty of places where there simply is nothing to threaten you (mind you, there's also nothing there, so we're talking a lot of time spent simply getting to/from ops).
- Japanese were ad-hoc about their convoy formation. Important ships - especially troop transports - woiuld be escorted, but there were plenty of single ships or small (5 or fewer) groups with little/no escort.
- many escort vessels were not actually directly part of the IJN (the organisation of this arm of forces is somewhat confusing!).
- Japanese were well behind in significant technologies (especially radar - surprise attacks from the air were very rare - and sonar). This gave American subs substantial advantages compared with the situation in the Atlantic where the escorts had the better technology.

That doesn't mean the sim can't/won't be fun, but don't expect the sort of situation you've faced in the Atlantic. 52 boats is plenty for those on board, but really quite small in comparison with the U-Boats (even in straight % terms). Read some of the excellent books on the subject by those who were there - especially Dick O'Kane on Wahoo and Tang - and compare them with the experiences of U-Boat aces and you'll soon get the idea as to the differences. One item of interest, for example, is that the Pacific often contained thermal layers and subs regularly dived below them and secured from GQ and motored off even while an escort remained on the surface looking for them!! Compare that with the descriptions of Allied ASW efforts by Peter Cremer in U-333....a different world.

[dize]

well well, what should i say. ofc im looking forward to sh4 very much, as every ww2 sim enthusiast. seing the "easyness" of the upcomming subexperience, compared to the atlanitc war, i can only again express my disappointment about the fact that they would not do a sh3 finishing expansion, which would iron out alle the shortcommings of the current sh3. yes i know about gw etc, but these are just mods, who cant deal with the negs, hidden in the hardcoded gamefiles.