Fish
08-06-06, 09:57 AM
http://www.sacbee.com/content/opinion/debate/story/14287313p-15107035c.html
F. Michael Maloof
It may be time to consider engaging the Syrians in helping to seek a settlement in what has become one big mess in the Middle East.
The United States looks upon Syria as a supporter of terrorism. It does, from Hamas, Hezballah, al-Qaeda to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command.
Without Syria, Hezbollah cannot receive the arms, missiles and other resources it gets from Iran to wage war against Israel.
While we undertook regime change in Iraq by invading it, the United States cannot take similar action in every country it dislikes. However, there is good reason to believe that recent U.S. policy toward Syria actually has driven it closer to Iran and Hezballah.
This was no more apparent than just prior to U.S. action in Iraq in March 2003.
Months prior to that occasion, the Syrians sought to open a backchannel with policymakers in the office of the secretary of defense. The request came through my office. In exchange, the Syrians requested U.S. assistance in economic infrastructure development. In the interim, the Syrians even offered to stage U.S. troops to go into Iraq as an unconditional basis to avoid a U.S. attack. Those offers were turned down.
By offering a backchannel, the Syrians suggested that there was information that would be shared with the United States that it would not provide publicly. Indeed, the Syrians were asked whether Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had been sent into Syria prior to U.S. action.
The response, from no less than one of Syrian President Bashar Assad's top advisers, was that publicly Syria would deny their existence in Syria. However, if the backchannel were created, "there would be a lot we could talk about."
According to sources with direct access to the Syrians, there are elements in Syria that seek reform and are pro-American. The offer of a backchannel suggested that such a prospect may exist.
However, there never was a Bush administration follow-up to the offer. Instead, then Secretary of State Colin Powell in May 2003 made a trip to Syria and publicly confronted and admonished President Assad. He accused Syria of harboring Saddam Hussein's escaped leadership and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
The admonition received a Syrian response similar to what the United States used to receive from the Chinese when publicly raked over the political coals. The Chinese would refuse any further discussion on topics of substance. Eventually, the United States sought quiet diplomacy at the policy level with the Chinese, which has had some positive results.
The Syrian response to the Powell confrontation was predictable.
Syria turned to Iran to improve its already good relations.
I'm not an apologist for Syria. In fact, an Aug. 31, 2004, Boston Globe article quoted two anonymous congressional committee sources as saying that I was under investigation for attempting to overthrow the Syrian government for my prewar efforts. Unfortunately, U.S. policymakers in the days leading up to U.S. action in Iraq and afterward left to the Central Intelligence Agency any initiatives to Syria.
CIA jealously coveted its own exclusive backchannel to Syria. Consequently, CIA made every effort to scuttle the Syrian initiative of opening a backchannel to U.S. policymakers.
This had become apparent when CIA rejected a Syrian initiative months prior to U.S. action in Iraq to present Saddam Hussein's unconditional terms. Once rejected, CIA then subverted an eleventh-hour Syrian initiative to present the same terms to U.S. policy-makers through my office.
CIA was so upset with this attempt that it even accused a number of us in the office of the under secretary of defense for policy of attempting to run a "rogue" operation to bypass CIA. That wasn't true, since CIA was informed of all steps. Informing CIA, however, helped elements within CIA more interested in doing damage to the Bush administration to scuttle that attempt.
The Syrians interested in working closer with the United States saw for themselves CIA's scuttling efforts. In turn, the Syrians then decided to close down its own channel with CIA.
In October 2003, then-CIA Director George Tenet went to Syria to attempt patching up the CIA-Syrian channel. It did not succeed.
In November 2003 Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. It effectively imposed U.S. sanctions on Syria. On May 11, 2004, President Bush signed an Executive Order implementing provisions of the sanctions.
The whole idea was to get the Syrians out of Lebanon. It finally happened after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on Feb. 14, 2005, in which the United States accused Syria of involvement. The United Nations continues to investigate.
But that is where U.S. policy toward Lebanon ended. It failed to bolster the fledging Lebanese government or back the Christian Lebanese who had always been the Bush administration's most ardent supporters.
In part, the reason for U.S. inaction was due to the continued presence of Lebanon's Syrian-backed but Christian President Emile Lahoud. This inaction resulted in Iran filling the power vacuum through its Hezbollah proxy.
The Bush administration has ostracized Syria and painted it as an international pariah. Nevertheless, the Syrians again have offered to help find a diplomatic solution to the latest crisis.
Already, U.S. policy-makers and congressional leaders publicly are rejecting the offer.
Perhaps we could inject some creative diplomacy. Call the Syrians on their offer and see if they can produce by weaning themselves from supporting terrorists and Iran and staying out of Lebanon.
If they can, we offer the Syrians the economic infrastructure assistance they sought from the United States in early 2003. It even could help bring about the reforms Syria's president has been promising for a long time.
Nothing ventured, nothing gained. This approach may just prevent a larger explosion in the Middle East.
They say you catch more fly's with sugar as with vinegar.
F. Michael Maloof
It may be time to consider engaging the Syrians in helping to seek a settlement in what has become one big mess in the Middle East.
The United States looks upon Syria as a supporter of terrorism. It does, from Hamas, Hezballah, al-Qaeda to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command.
Without Syria, Hezbollah cannot receive the arms, missiles and other resources it gets from Iran to wage war against Israel.
While we undertook regime change in Iraq by invading it, the United States cannot take similar action in every country it dislikes. However, there is good reason to believe that recent U.S. policy toward Syria actually has driven it closer to Iran and Hezballah.
This was no more apparent than just prior to U.S. action in Iraq in March 2003.
Months prior to that occasion, the Syrians sought to open a backchannel with policymakers in the office of the secretary of defense. The request came through my office. In exchange, the Syrians requested U.S. assistance in economic infrastructure development. In the interim, the Syrians even offered to stage U.S. troops to go into Iraq as an unconditional basis to avoid a U.S. attack. Those offers were turned down.
By offering a backchannel, the Syrians suggested that there was information that would be shared with the United States that it would not provide publicly. Indeed, the Syrians were asked whether Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had been sent into Syria prior to U.S. action.
The response, from no less than one of Syrian President Bashar Assad's top advisers, was that publicly Syria would deny their existence in Syria. However, if the backchannel were created, "there would be a lot we could talk about."
According to sources with direct access to the Syrians, there are elements in Syria that seek reform and are pro-American. The offer of a backchannel suggested that such a prospect may exist.
However, there never was a Bush administration follow-up to the offer. Instead, then Secretary of State Colin Powell in May 2003 made a trip to Syria and publicly confronted and admonished President Assad. He accused Syria of harboring Saddam Hussein's escaped leadership and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
The admonition received a Syrian response similar to what the United States used to receive from the Chinese when publicly raked over the political coals. The Chinese would refuse any further discussion on topics of substance. Eventually, the United States sought quiet diplomacy at the policy level with the Chinese, which has had some positive results.
The Syrian response to the Powell confrontation was predictable.
Syria turned to Iran to improve its already good relations.
I'm not an apologist for Syria. In fact, an Aug. 31, 2004, Boston Globe article quoted two anonymous congressional committee sources as saying that I was under investigation for attempting to overthrow the Syrian government for my prewar efforts. Unfortunately, U.S. policymakers in the days leading up to U.S. action in Iraq and afterward left to the Central Intelligence Agency any initiatives to Syria.
CIA jealously coveted its own exclusive backchannel to Syria. Consequently, CIA made every effort to scuttle the Syrian initiative of opening a backchannel to U.S. policymakers.
This had become apparent when CIA rejected a Syrian initiative months prior to U.S. action in Iraq to present Saddam Hussein's unconditional terms. Once rejected, CIA then subverted an eleventh-hour Syrian initiative to present the same terms to U.S. policy-makers through my office.
CIA was so upset with this attempt that it even accused a number of us in the office of the under secretary of defense for policy of attempting to run a "rogue" operation to bypass CIA. That wasn't true, since CIA was informed of all steps. Informing CIA, however, helped elements within CIA more interested in doing damage to the Bush administration to scuttle that attempt.
The Syrians interested in working closer with the United States saw for themselves CIA's scuttling efforts. In turn, the Syrians then decided to close down its own channel with CIA.
In October 2003, then-CIA Director George Tenet went to Syria to attempt patching up the CIA-Syrian channel. It did not succeed.
In November 2003 Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003. It effectively imposed U.S. sanctions on Syria. On May 11, 2004, President Bush signed an Executive Order implementing provisions of the sanctions.
The whole idea was to get the Syrians out of Lebanon. It finally happened after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on Feb. 14, 2005, in which the United States accused Syria of involvement. The United Nations continues to investigate.
But that is where U.S. policy toward Lebanon ended. It failed to bolster the fledging Lebanese government or back the Christian Lebanese who had always been the Bush administration's most ardent supporters.
In part, the reason for U.S. inaction was due to the continued presence of Lebanon's Syrian-backed but Christian President Emile Lahoud. This inaction resulted in Iran filling the power vacuum through its Hezbollah proxy.
The Bush administration has ostracized Syria and painted it as an international pariah. Nevertheless, the Syrians again have offered to help find a diplomatic solution to the latest crisis.
Already, U.S. policy-makers and congressional leaders publicly are rejecting the offer.
Perhaps we could inject some creative diplomacy. Call the Syrians on their offer and see if they can produce by weaning themselves from supporting terrorists and Iran and staying out of Lebanon.
If they can, we offer the Syrians the economic infrastructure assistance they sought from the United States in early 2003. It even could help bring about the reforms Syria's president has been promising for a long time.
Nothing ventured, nothing gained. This approach may just prevent a larger explosion in the Middle East.
They say you catch more fly's with sugar as with vinegar.