WW2 Wasteful operations

[STEED]

My List as follows –

German, Kursk 43 and the Ardennes 44

British, Arnhem 44

American, Peleliu 44

Canada, Dieppe 42

Soviet, Seelow Heights 45

Western Allies, Cassino 44 (The first three)

Japan, Pearl Harbour 41

[Bort]

Dieppe was almost certainly the most pointless, basically an insane massacre, that everyone knew would fail. :down:

[Abraham]

I would add:

The Battle of El Alamein; as bloody as your average WW I battle and totally unnecessary since the Allies were landing one week later 1.500 miles in Rommels back near his logistic base (Operation TORCH). Whether the battle would be won or lost or fought at all, the result was the same: Rommel would have been forced to withdraw. The Allies knew this of course, but a 'pure' British victory in the disasterous year 1942 was a political necessety to strengthens Churchill's negotiating position at the Conference of Casablanca. (Roosevelt had the Battle of Midway!).

The six months clearing of an irrelevant and doomed German Army in Tunesia (Dec. 1942 till May 1943).

The invasion of Sicily without blocking the German retreat route over the street of Messina (could otherwise have been a solid victory).

The invasion of Italy (Salerno) instead of France in 1943.

The attack on the Hürtgen Woods in Jan. 1945.

Actually the list is almost endless, but in my opinion the decision to knock Italy out of the war in 1943 instead of making France participate in 1943 is the worst.

[STEED]

The attack on the Hürtgen Woods in Jan. 1945.

Yes that has my vote nearly forgot that one.

[TLAM Strike]

Japan: Operation Ten-Go

[Abraham]

Japan: Operation Ten-Go
Ten go?
Which means in normal English? :D

[Torplexed]

Ten-Go was the Yamato's final, fatal sortie towards the US landings on Okinawa.

[TLAM Strike]

Japan: Operation Ten-Go
Ten go?
Which means in normal English? :D One word (albeit a Japanese word)
Yamato

Edit; Beat me to it Torpelexed :D

[Torplexed]

My addition to the list would be the Japanese invasion of eastern India in 1944 and the battles of Kohima and Imphal. Might have been fruitful in drawing away Allied troops from other fronts in 1942...but by '44 what was the point?

[Kapitan]

the two wars them selves.

[TLAM Strike]

Another PTO battle.

The Japanese Invason of Kiska and Attu.

[Kapitan]

American day bombing in germany.

[AG124]

I read a book once that seriously suggested that the Germans would have benefited from sacrificing the Scharnhorst and Gneisneau to take over some of the Caribbean islands (don't remember the specifics). The author really couldn't understand why the idea was never thought of in WWII. :roll:

[Kapitan]

If the germans had done that then they could have based FW200 condors and other long range bombers there and bombed the east coast.

[STEED]

American day bombing in germany.

But wasn't the targeting of specific industries, like ball bearing plants, a success?

Yes at a high price.

[Kapitan]

Could have done the same job at night as the RAF did.
would have saved alot of men

[TLAM Strike]

Could have done the same job at night as the RAF did.
would have saved alot of men
Not necessarily remember the Luftwaffe’s air defenses were all geared towards night attackers. When the USAAF began daylight bombing all the Luftwaffe’s Bf109s and Fw190s that were needed for offensive operations (Guarding the bombers and CAS aircraft) were suddenly relegated to defending Berlin. So no they could not have bottled up the Luftwaffe’s daylight fighters with nighttime raids.

If the germans had done that then they could have based FW200 condors and other long range bombers there and bombed the east coast. Don't forget their was a large USN force based on the east coast just for something like this (centered around the USS Wasp CV-7 and several Battleships) I think that any Caribbean Island invaded would have been subject to massive USAAF and USN attack from Carrier planes and land based bombers followed by the USMC.

[Kapitan]

More than likely but the germans showed that blitzkrieg can destroy a country in mere weeks even the french lost within weeks.

So what chance has a few battle ships a tinpot carrier a hand ful of planes and marines going to do ?

by the time they re group germany could re fortify that island sending uboat convoys to defend it and supply it.

[TLAM Strike]

So what chance has a few battle ships a tinpot carrier a hand ful of planes and marines going to do ? A couple of Tinpot Carriers and a hand full Marines held midway! I bet the German Marines (did they even have them) or more likely the German Army never experienced a pounding like the Japanese experienced on some of their island fortresses. The Caribbean is in such a range that US land based bombers could come off the factory lines, get fueled up and bomb them, the Germans have basically nothing to counter them no Fighters with adequate ferry range, no carriers to deliver them, any freighter delivering them would be subject to US submarine and air attack, so no air cover of the island. In other words any Fw-200 bombers would be there undefended.

by the time they re group germany could re fortify that island sending uboat convoys to defend it and supply it. Then less U-Boats to attack North Atlantic Convoys, also the USN has its own submarines from the East Coast and from the Panama Canal to conduct ASW (yes US Subs did ASW patrols in the Atlantic) around any German island base to cut off supplies.

[Torplexed]

Another PTO battle.

The Japanese Invason of Kiska and Attu.

I agree. Another wasteful battle was the US-Canadian operation to take 'em back. ;)

[TLAM Strike]

Another PTO battle.

The Japanese Invason of Kiska and Attu.

I agree. Another wasteful battle was the US-Canadian operation to take 'em back. ;)I think that if the USSR allowed us to use Kamchatka to invade the Kurils it would have been worth it as a staging area and bomber base.

[Torplexed]

Yeah...that would have nasty shock to the Japanese.... having us on their northern doorstep. Even with the Kurile Islands lengendary bad weather it would have too close for comfort as a bomber base. Stalin probably figured we wouldn't leave after the war so he would have never agreed. :-? As it was we kept Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands under US administration until 1972.

[Kapitan]

TLAM i dont think russia would have let you use kamchatka seeing as some bombers did land there and in russia, and the soviets took them away for "questioning"

[Torplexed]

Russia did allow the US Eighth Air Force use a quartet of airbases near Poltava in the Ukraine for 'shuttle' bombing missions in 1944.

Using these Ukrainian air bases, 'Operation Frantic' was designed to help deliver the knockout blow to the Nazi war machine while minimizing the severe losses experienced by Allied air forces in daylight bombing campaigns over Germany. In theory, it allowed American bombers to reach targets deeper in Germany, divert Luftwaffe air support away from Normandy, and provide additional cover for battles on the Soviet's western front. American strategists also hoped that the operation would forge closer ties with the USSR and encourage the ever-wary Stalin to allow access to Siberian air bases for use against Japan.

Of course, after the Luftwaffe plastered the American bombers on the ground in a night raid the accusations and recriminations began. :-?

[The Avon Lady]

Operation Flapjack (http://news.yahoo.com/s/usatoday/20060331/pl_usatoday/boyspancakebreakfastdelayedtheendofwwii).

[Abraham]

Russia did allow the US Eighth Air Force use a quartet of airbases near Poltava in the Ukraine for 'shuttle' bombing missions in 1944.

Using these Ukrainian air bases, 'Operation Frantic' was designed to help deliver the knockout blow to the Nazi war machine while minimizing the severe losses experienced by Allied air forces in daylight bombing campaigns over Germany. In theory, it allowed American bombers to reach targets deeper in Germany, divert Luftwaffe air support away from Normandy, and provide additional cover for battles on the Soviet's western front. American strategists also hoped that the operation would forge closer ties with the USSR and encourage the ever-wary Stalin to allow access to Siberian air bases for use against Japan.

Of course, after the Luftwaffe plastered the American bombers on the ground in a night raid the accusations and recriminations began. :-?
Interesting story, Torplexed.
I vaguely rememberd some of it but didn't know about the Luftwaffe night raid.

[GunnersMate]

Operation Mercury (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Crete)

[TLAM Strike]

:ping:
I think we could add the USN's submarine defense of Midway Is. 1 failed attack, 1 aground, the rest just sat back and watched. :down:

[Happy Times]

Winter War. In the 105 day operation to invade Finland, USSR lost 250.000- 500.000 men killed, some 800 planes and over 2000 tanks. Finland lost some 23.000 men.

[TLAM Strike]

The Allied defense of the Indian Ocean and Oceania in WWII. 1 Carrier, 1 Battleship, 1 Battlecruiser, 7 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 1 AMC, 23 merchant and other ships sunk (probaly more that I'm forgetting), Singapore, Malaya and Dutch East Indies captured, with very little damaged done to the Japanese. :o

[Torplexed]

The Allied defense of the Indian Ocean and Oceania in WWII. 1 Carrier, 1 Battleship, 1 Battlecruiser, 7 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 1 AMC, 23 merchant and other ships sunk (probaly more that I'm forgetting), Singapore, Malaya and Dutch East Indies captured, with very little damaged done to the Japanese. :o

Ahhh. But think of all the cocky overconfidence it instilled. ;) They originally expected a tougher fight. Even the Japanese themselves later blamed their subsequent overextension and defeats on the 'Victory Disease' they caught in early 1942.

[Abraham]

@ Torplexed:
You're just pointing out the consequences, he?
You're not suggesting that losing so much so fast was a shrewd plan by the Allies, I hope!
:D

[TLAM Strike]

Abraham the person who thought up that cunning plan was none other than 25 star General Zapp Brannigan!

http://img45.imageshack.us/img45/1364/biozappt8mc.jpg

"You see, Killbots have a preset kill limit. Knowing their weakness, I sent wave after wave of my own men at them, until they reached their limit and shut down."

"Men, you're lucky men. Soon you'll all be fighting for your planet. Many of you will be dying for your planet. A few of you will be forced through a fine mesh screen for your planet. They will be the luckiest of all."

[STEED]

Abraham the person who thought up that cunning plan was none other than 25 star General Zapp Brannigan!

http://img45.imageshack.us/img45/1364/biozappt8mc.jpg

"You see, Killbots have a preset kill limit. Knowing their weakness, I sent wave after wave of my own men at them, until they reached their limit and shut down."

"Men, you're lucky men. Soon you'll all be fighting for your planet. Many of you will be dying for your planet. A few of you will be forced through a fine mesh screen for your planet. They will be the luckiest of all."

:rotfl: :rotfl: :rotfl: :rotfl: :rotfl:

[Torplexed]

Of course it was all part of a plan. Why else would the British have built a Gibraltar like-fortress at Singapore with the guns only facing out to sea? Like Churchill said: 'a battleship launched without a bottom.' ;)

Actually the Japanese spent much of the early part of 1942 overwhelming second line troops and tiny colonial garrisons that had been stripped of much to their heavy weapons to fight the war in Europe. I wasn't until Guadalcanal and New Guinea when they got chewed up by well dug in and reinforced Allied troops that they really got a taste of what was to come.

[Smaragdadler]

...
The attack on the Hürtgen Woods in Jan. 1945.
...


The whole campaign in the Hürtgenwald actualy lasted from 14. September, 1944 as the U.S. 9th Infantry Division entered the Hürtgen Forest (as part of the effort to secure the southern flank of Hodges attempt to break the Stolberg Corridor) - till 10 February (when the Schwammenauel dam was finally taken by American forces, removing the threat of the Germans flooding the forest). This makes it roughly five months. US loses: 24.000 combat casulities and 9000 out because of illness. Kind of a mini 'eastern front'-experience for the Amis. For shure one of the longest and most bloddy battles in WW2...

http://www.5ad.org/hurtgen_joe.htm

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/art/P-P/wwii-prints/Final_Stages/sm_Tanks.jpg

[STEED]

The battle of the Hurtgen Forest was not needed; just one of those battles that had no real goal.

[Smaragdadler]

The battle of the Hurtgen Forest was not needed; just one of those battles that had no real goal.

It seems more that it has fallen in a memory hole because of the Ardennenschlacht. That is the part the 'winner' like more to talk about. But in the last few years it has become more attention.


The Huertgen Forrest: The Necessary Battle

by: Craig Bayer

This paper was awarded the Loyola University History Award for Outstanding History Senior Thesis for the 2001-2002 Academic Year.

http://www.imagestation.com/picture/sraid78/p41c3e220f24779fd2737bc243ed7eaf5/fb29e5e3.jpg

World War II histories about the European theater spend much of the time talking about the D-Day invasion, Operation Cobra, Market Garden, The Battle of the Bulge, and the final surrender of Nazi German. These events all occurred between June-September 1944 and December-May 1944-1945. Very little time is spent on the events that occurred between September and December of 1944.
[...]
It was during the months of September to February that the Battle of the Huertgen Forest occurred. 2 The Huertgen Forest, a wooded area of 50 square miles sits on the border of Belgium and Germany about 5 miles south of the city of Aachen. Not much has been written about the events that took place in the forest and there are several reasons. Operation Market Garden overshadowed the beginning of the battle and the Battle of the Bulge overshadowed its end. American forces did most of the fighting in the Huertgen and British historians, who wrote many of the post war histories, spent little if any time concentrating on the Huertgen. In fact, very few American historians have written about it either, and when they do, they are highly critical about the decision to attack into the forest. Most of the books on the subject concluded that the American commanders made a huge mistake by entering the forest and should have bottled it up and gone around it. They are right, when they argue that the forest itself has very little strategically value. However, what makes the forest important is the Roer River. More important than the Roer River are the dams that control the river’s flow. The only way the Americans could capture the dams was to enter the forest. Without control of those dams, the Allies could not move over the Roer River because the Germans could blow up the dams, cutting off any American troops that had crossed it. Therefore, two out of three of the Allied Army groups would have troops that would not be able to cross the river into Germany.
[...]
When Holitzinger encountered the Siegfried Line, he and his men found that most of the pillboxes and the defenses were unmanned. General Collins, on reading this report, felt that if they attacked the Siegfried Line now, they could easily break through it, before the Germans had time to reorganize from their hasty retreat from France and adequately began to defend their homeland. General Collins requested permission from General Hodges to form a reconnaissance group to probe the defenses of the Siegfried Line. The group was not going in to scout the area; it was going to attempt to break through the Siegfried Line. Collins hoped that if he were successful, he would be given more troops and supplies to advance his attack into Germany.
[...]
Collins planned to move into the Stolberg Corridor, an area between the city of Aachen to its north and the Huertgen Forest to its south. The goal was to try and break the Siegfried Line before the Germans had time to man it.
During World War I, General Pershing had major problems with German troops attacking his flanks out of the Argonne Forest. Well aware of Pershing’s problem, Collins was adamant on making sure his flanks were protected. To secure his flank Collins decided to move troops to the north and take the hills surrounding Aachen. He briefly flirted with the idea of invading the city but decided that it would be better just to surround it and wait for the XIX Corps to catch up. Aachen held no real significant military importance, but it was where Charlemagne was born and had once been the capital of the Holy Roman Empire, the first Reich. Losing the birthplace of the First Reich would be a demoralizing blow to Hitler and the Nazis. To protect his right flank Collins would move troops into the northern part of the Huertgen Forest. The goals would be to capture some of the northern towns and keep the Germans in the forest. Collins could then be sure that his flanks would be protected. This is how the battle of the Huertgen Forest began.
[...]
Because of low fuel, General Collins ordered his troops to stop west of the Roer River until more supplies could arrive. That was assuming his troops were able to make it that far, which they did not. Had his troops had enough gas, it would have been a disaster to cross the Roer River without controlling the Roer River dams, especially the Schwammenauel and the Urft. If Collin’s troops crossed the Roer and the Germans destroyed the dams, the Americans on the east bank would have been completely cut off and could have been wiped out by the Germans. The dams were a crucial factor that was overlooked, not just by Collins, but by just about everybody involved in the process. It was just like the hedgerows of Normandy. No one considered them in the planning of the attack.
[...]
General Collins would send the 1st Infantry Division to take the foothill surrounding Aachen and have the 9th Infantry Division capture the northern part of the Huertgen Forest. The 3rd Armored Division would then be free to attack the Siegfried Line. Intelligence estimated that the Germans had only 7000 men defending the area, mainly from the 105th Panzer Brigade and the 116th Panzer Division. The German commander in charge of the defenses at the Stolberg area was General Brandenberg. He believed that the Americans would concentrate their attack on the city of Aachen.
[...]
Their initial success was due to the Germany’s miscalculation of the American objectives. However, as the fighting continued, it became more and more obvious to General Brandenberg that the American attack was not towards Aachen and more likely towards Stolberg.
[...]
The Germans sent in the 7th Army Group to stop the attack. On 17 September the 12th Division of the 7th German Army group counterattacked the American 3rd Armored Division in the town of Stolberg, where the Americans took heavy losses and were halted in their tracks. On September 18, Collins had the 3rd Armored Division retreat. The Germans laid an all out attack on the Americans and the fighting was brutal. The Americans had managed to gain a foothold in the northern part of the Huertgen Forest and the hills around Aachen, but the main objective had failed. The Americans’ initial success was due to the fact that the Germans believed the main American attack would focus on Aachen and had left the Stolberg Corridor and the Huertgen with minimal defenses. When the Germans realized their mistake they were able to counterattack and throw the Americans off base. By 13 September more German reinforcements had also begun arriving in the forest to further improve the defense. The ill supplied Americans were inexperienced and did not know how to fight against pillboxes. Their training at home had not taught them the techniques they would need to survive in the wooded areas.
[...]
Even if it had achieved its goals, the first attack into the forest was a complete failure because the Americans were not going after the Roer River dams.
[...]
After General Collin’s failure to break through the Stolberg Corridor, there was no question as to why American troops should attack into the Huertgen Forest. There were Germans in the forest and Hodges wanted them cleared out. He ordered General Collins to make his main attack into the forest and move towards the Roer River. Between 6 and 9 October the 9th Infantry Division was reinforced with new troops and began its attack. Their goal was to capture the towns of Germeter, Vossenack, and Schmidt. With its high grounds and large network of roads, the Americans decided that if they controlled Schmidt they would be able to move through the whole forest. The town of Schmidt is also directly north of the Schwammenauel Dam and is the perfect spot for launching an attack to capture it.
[...]
The Americans were making the right attack for the wrong reasons. The Americans often underestimated the Germans’ will to defend the forest. Hitler came to this conclusion after meeting with his Generals: “In subsequent discussions about which terrain might be relinquished with least impunity, it was decreed that holding in Aachen sector was paramount. The Allies must not be allowed to cross the Roer River. In Particular, the Germans were to maintain at all cost bridgeheads west of the Roer at Juelich and Dueren.”13
The Germans knew the value of the forest and they were going to try their hardest to protect the dams. As the Americans were planning their second attack, the Germans were busy reinforcing the forest. The Germans now had 5000 men plus an additional 1500 in reserve.
For the new attack into the forest, the Americans would deploy aircraft and artillery to accompany the infantry assault. When the attack began again the Allied bombers dropped ordinance on German targets and then the American artillery opened fire. While this method of attacking with airpower and artillery normally destroys the enemy, it had little effect on the Germans, who were extremely well dug in. All it really did was alert the Germans that an attack was imminent, and gave them a general idea where the attack would occur. Thus, when the infantry moved forward to attack, the Germans were waiting. Troops were cut down by German pillboxes, held up by barbwire and mines, and decimated by German snipers. By the middle of October the Ninth Infantry Division had suffered 4000-4500 casualties and had gained 3000 meters, while the Germans suffered about 3800 casualties.
The Germans knew how to defend the forest.
[...]
The Germans knew that if the Americans crossed the Roer River and moved towards the Rhine, they probably would discover the forces Hitler was massing for the Ardennes Offensive. General Omar Bradley would later conclude “Had we secured them (the dams) early in November and pushed across the Roer, the enemy would never dared counterattack us in the Ardennes.”16
German Field Marshal Walter Model was brought in to command most of the German forces in the Huertgen. Model had served in World War One, where he had been wounded twice. During World War II he had been credited with saving the German Army on the eastern front numerous times and raised from the rank of Corps Commander to Army Commander. Hitler was already beginning to plan a massive offensive and needed to buy time. Model was thought to be a great defensive General, and seemed to be a perfect fit for the forest.
[...]
While Model was busy organizing the defense of the forest, the Allied commanders were trying to decide their next course of action. The big question among themselves was whether they should they continue attacking German troops and try and end the war quickly, or wait until after the winter months when the weather would grow more favorable to attack. If Eisenhower waited, he could use the time to secure his supply lines and give his troops much needed rest, yet in doing so he would give the Germans time to develop new weapons and dig in deeper and deeper. Though the town of Aachen had fallen on October 21st, the Siegfried Line remained intact everywhere else.
[...]
For a plan like this to succeed, the Allies must control the Roer River dams. Patton’s attack from Metz through the Saar would be fine, but the First and Ninth Armies would have to cross the Roer River in order to reach the Rhine. Montgomery’s troops in the north would also have to cross the Roer. The first time that the dams are mentioned by an American in writing is late September.
[...]
General Omar Bradley, judging from his statement on the attack on Schmidt, seemed to be well aware of the dams by at least the beginning of November.
[...]
Both General Eisenhower and General Bradley conclude that they knew about the dams and that it was the goal of the attacks made in November to get them. Some have been skeptical of the generals and argue that they are just revising history to make it look like they saw the importance of the dams early on, but in reality they did not discover them until much later in the campaign.
[...]
Field Orders are not supposed to give a reason for an attack; they are simply an order to attack. There was no point of making a plan to take the dams without controlling Schmidt. Once Schmidt was taken a new field order would have been given to take the dams. The first object was to take Schmidt.
In the United States Army’s official history about the Siegfried line campaign, Charles MacDonald writes that on 20 October SHAEF headquarters became well aware of the dams when a German prisoners explained that the Germans were prepared to blow them up to stop an American crossing over them.22 The American Command had indicated the first firm appreciation of the genuine value of the Roer River dams to the Germans when on 11 November both First and Ninth Army had directed no advance beyond the Roer except on army order.
[...]
By late November, tactical air headquarters had begun to dispatch reconnaissance flights over the dams almost daily. By judging all of the sources, it can be concluded that the American commanders probably realized the threat the dams posed by the end of October. All of the attacks into the forest from the beginning of November to the end of February were made with the dams in mind.
[...]
After the July attempt on Hitler’s life, Hitler began to take more and more control of the German armed forces. Hitler believed that the Germans would lose the war if they kept defending the Siegfried Line and then if it fell, the Rhine River. Germany needed an attack that would halt the Americans and British in the west and give him time to reinforce troops in the east. The plan was for Germans to march through the Ardennes Forest all the way to Antwerp, separating the American and British forces and denying the Allies a port that they could use to escape. The Americans never anticipated such a move because the German Army did not have the resources to carry out such an attack. The German Generals also thought the attack would not succeed. Had they gotten their way, they would have attacked at Aachen and the Huertgen.
[...]
It is hard to guess what would have happened if the Germans had attacked Aachen and moved back into the forest. It was not a strategy that would have won the war, but it might have prolonged it for a time. However the Germans did not attack Aachen, they attacked through the Ardennes. Their attack was not as strong as Hitler wanted, because the Germans had put so much effort into the forest.
[...]
In the Aachen sector alone, at least five Panzer or Panzer like divisions had been reduced severely in strength and their rehabilitation dangerously delayed. One parachute and at least six Volks Grenadier Divisions, the latter originally scheduled to have been spared active commitment before the counteroffensive, had been similarly effected. The Siegfried Line fighting had also delayed use in the Ardennes of two corps headquarters and two assault gun brigades.37
It can be concluded that the fighting in the forest probably slightly limited what the Germans could send to the Ardennes offensive, but the goal of fighting in the forest was not to eliminate German troops, it was to capture the Roer River dams.
[...]
Towards the end of January the Allies had finished taking back the land the Germans had recaptured in their ill-fated Ardennes offensive. During the Battle of the Bulge, V and VII Corps had been busy holding their positions. SHAEF had put all of its offensives on hold while the bulk of its resources were used defeating the Germans in the Ardennes. Both Corps had to be content with holding their positions. Now that the Bulge had been contained the attack on the dams could commence. However something had changed between December and January. V Corps commander General Gerow had been given a promotion to become head of the Fifteen Army Group.
[...]
A more cynical view would be that SHAEF was fed up with Gerow’s lack of progress in the forest and found a pleasant way of getting rid of him without demoting him. The new commander of V Corps was General Huebner. As the Allies regained the offensive it became crucial that they control the Roer River dams. Eisenhower decided to begin the new attack against Germany with the goal of reaching the Rhine River. Once they were at the Rhine, plans could be made for crossing it, and moving into the heart of Germany.
[...]
Since the First and the Ninth armies had not broken free by the end of the year, the Ninth Army was given to Montgomery. He would be in charge of making the main thrust across the Roer and to the Rhine. Montgomery’s plan was to hold the Ninth Army back while he sent in the rest of the 21st Army Group to attack the Germans. While they were engaging the Germans, the Ninth Army could cross the Roer into Germany with little or no resistance. The fate of the 21st Army Group hinged on the capture of the Roer River dams in the Huertgen Forest, because if they were not captured the Ninth could not cross, and the rest of Monty’s troops would be forced to fight the Germans alone.
[...]
The Battle of the Hurtgen Forest lasted from 13 September to 10 February, roughly five months. The Americans were forced to put the 1st, 4th, 8th, 9th, 28th, 78th, and the 83rd Infantry Divisions, the 505th and the 517th parachute regiments, the 2nd Ranger Battalion, and the 5th and 7th Armored Divisions into the forest. They suffered 24,000 combat casualties along with 9,000 cases of diseases like trench foot and combat fatigue. The Germans were forced to employ eight divisions in the forest fighting, and it is estimated that they took slightly fewer casualties than the Americans. If the battle is examined by the casualty reports, it could be considered a failure. It took the Americans five months to control a forest, and the fighting cost them more casualties than the Germans. However, in Huertgen, the objective was not a war of attrition, it was to capture the dams, and the objective was completed. The first attempt to break through the Siegfried Line during Market Garden failed and the Americans needed to cross the Roer River to get to the Rhine. To do this they would have to fight through the forest to capture the Roer River dams. There is a lot of criticism about the planning, and some of it is justified. It was not until November, after a month and a half of fighting, that the American commanders realized what was their real objective should be. Once they did, they still had to deal with Germans who were determined to give their lives to protect the Fatherland. They would fight to the last man, no matter what the odds, to defend Germany. After the October campaign into the forest failed, Eisenhower could have waited until after the winter to begin Allied attacks into Germany. This would have allowed him to secure the supply lines and give the troops time to rest. However, he would have also given the Germans more time to prepare for the oncoming attack, and their counterattack in December would have been much stronger. So the Americans attacked even though the troops were tired and they were low on supplies. Eisenhower had to attack and he needed to control the Roer River for his plan of a broad attack along all German fronts. Maybe this was not that best strategy, but it was the one that was used and the control of the Roer River dams was essential. Some would argue that if the capture of the Roer River dams was so essential, why did the Americans also spend time fighting in the middle of the forest. The first two attacks on the town of Schmidt failed because the Germans controlled the northern sections of the forest. They were able to use the high ground they controlled to observe the American troops movement and call down artillery on them. They controlled all the roads in the northern part of the forest and could move troops to reinforce the southern part. VII Corps’ march through the middle of the forest was necessary to capture Schmidt and the Roer River dams. The Americans could not have simply attacked the southern part of the forest. They tried twice and failed. The Americans could have attempted to bottle up the forest and move south of the Roer River, but because Eisenhower wanted a broad attack, going south of the Roer was out of the question.
The battle of the Huertgen forest seems to underlie a huge problem that the American Army faced. The Americans continued to ignore the effects of terrain on their plans. Most of the attack plans were made far from enemy lines without having someone there to observe what the troops were going up against. This is quite evident in the Thanksgiving Dinner incident when the commanders ordered that the men be served hot meals, not realizing that they had to remain in their foxholes at all times or face the wrath of German artillery. “None of the brass ever came forward to our positions; we were too far up front for them,” remarked soldier John Chernitsky.41
The Americans were not used to fighting in the forest and their training at home did not prepare them for what they would face. They had not been taught about fighting in the woods: things like hugging a tree instead of diving for the ground when artillery was coming your way. By the end of October a five-page report was issued to the troops, which explained how to fight in the woods, but there should have been more training. The new troops that were coming into the forest were often replacing casualties. Instead of whole units being replaced, individuals were added to units, as they were needed. This was a very unproductive practice.

My partner and I were assigned to the extreme left flank as an outpost there. By now it was dark and we took turns on watch. When dawn arrived, we discovered that we and the GIs in the adjacent hole had been left alone—evidently the company had moved out and forgotten us. Replacements meant so little that we were never really integrated into the unit with the rapid turnover in squads and platoons from the terrific casualties being sustained in the Huertgen. 42 Soldier Jerry Alexis

The problems with training and replacements were not specific to the Huertgen Forest, but the whole war. However, they were a factor in the high casualty rates.
One of the reasons that the Huertgen Forest is not well know is because the American Generals spent little time talking about it. In his book Crusade in Europe, General Eisenhower had this to say about the Huertgen Forest: “Nevertheless, progress was slow and the fighting intense. On the right flank of this attack the First Army got involved in the Huertgen Forest, the scene of the most bitterly contested battles of the entire campaign. The enemy had all the advantages of strong defensive country, and the attacking Americans had to depend exclusively on infantry weapons because of the thickness of the forest. The weather was abominable and the German garrison was particularly stubborn, but Yankee doggedness finally won. Thereafter, whenever Veterans of the American 4th, 9th,and 28th Divisions referred to hard fighting they did so in terms of comparison with the Battle of the Huertgen Forest, which they placed on top of the list.”43
General Omar Bradley also has little to say about the affair in his autobiography A General’s Story: “What followed over the next several weeks was some of the most brutal and difficult of the war. The battle—known as the Huertgen Forest—was sheer butchery on both sides. In three weeks, Collins advanced a mere six miles in miserable weather at a terrible cost.”44
This is not much information from the commander of the European theater and the commander of the 12th Army Group. The main reason is that they had little to do with the planning of the attacks in the forest. Hodge, Gerow and Collins did most of it. The only time they were really concerned about the fighting is when the lack of control of the dams prevented them from moving forward into Germany. General Joe Collins does talk about the battle in detail in his autobiography, Lightning Joe: “While it took two weeks, October 7-21, for the 1st and the 30th Divisions to capture Aachen, it required until December 9 for the VII Corps to clear the Hurtgen Forest, an essential preliminary to the seizure of the Roer dams, which in turn would determine when the Roer was safe to cross.”45
Collins argues that in order to take the Roer River dams he would have to go through the forest, and he concludes with the observation: “Costly as was the Aachen-Stolberg-Hurtgen battle to the First Army in casualties, ammunition, and equipment, it cost the Germans far more, and forced Rundstedt to deploy divisions, tanks, and gasoline intended for the Ardennes counteroffensive, weakening that supreme German effort and the subsequent defense of the Rhine.”46
While the American Commanders have always defended the Huertgen as a necessary battle, most historians have not. The main reason is the comparisons that can be made to the Vietnam War. “The same terrible war [Vietnam] of attrition, with no apparent strategically purpose, save that terrible “body count” had commenced. It was Hurtgen’s Death Factory all over again”, writes Charles Whiting, author of The Bloody Forest. 47 In his book, Citizen Soldiers, Stephen Ambrose remarks, “The forest they held, for which they had paid such a heavy price, was worthless. The battle did not shorten the war by one minute.”48 Charles Whiting also comments, “Here is the true story of the ill-conceived, ultimately useless, six-month long Hurtgen Campaign…of thousands of American soldiers that died, and the generals who refused to give up long after their objective had lost real meaning.”49 These are the same arguments that people make about the Vietnam War. There are some similarities between the Huertgen and Vietnam. There was similar terrain and because of it, the Americans had trouble moving around. In Vietnam and the Huertgen, the Americans would fight enemies who were outnumbered and out-manned, but would sacrifice anything to protecting their homeland. Despite these comparisons, the Huertgen was no Vietnam. After a rough start, the Americans formed a clear objective and went about the task of completing it. It was not the best situation for making an attack, but the Americans had no choice. In the end they completed their objective, and the Allies were able to cross the Roer River and defeat Germany.

http://www.loyno.edu/history/journal/Bayer.htm


Both German and American troops fighting here had to share these deplorable conditions: exposed to incessant enemy fire, fighting daily without relief, receiving little support from their own artillery, drenched in frequent rain, and without the possibility of changing clothes. Forsaken as they were they had no choice but to hold out and die in hopeless resignation. Oddly enough, one-half of the Americans who fought here had German - American ancestry which meant that three quarters of all the combatants in the Hurtgen Forest were either German or of German origin.

http://www.5ad.org/hurtgen_joe.htm



October 22, 1995 issue of "The Arizona Republic" newspaper
Steve Wilson wrote the following article

One of the longest, bloodiest and least publicized battles of World War II was fought in the dense fir trees along the German - Belgian border called the Hütgen Forest.

Thirty thousand Americans were killed or wounded in six months of fighting that began in September 1944 and lasted far into the bitter winter. Thousands more were disabled by combat fatigue and exposure. An estimated 12,000 Germans were killed.

"Whoever survived Hütgenwald must have had a guardian angel on each of his shoulders, " wrote Ernest Hemmingway, who covered the battle for Collier's magazine.

One soldier who got out alive is retired Major Gen. John F. Ruggles of Phoenix, 86. He was then a Lieutenant Colonel serving with the 22nd Infantry Regiment.

Last year (1994) to mark the battle's 50th anniversary, Ruggles organized an effort among veterans of the Regiment to place a monument in the forest.

It's a very different monument. Unlike other World War II tributes, this one doesn't honor our own soldiers. This one honors an unheralded act of humanity by a 23 year old German Infantry Lieutenant.

Ruggles wasn't interested in media attention last year, and the monuments dedication received no news coverage in this country. But a friend recently convinced him that others would like to hear the story, so last week he talked about it.

On November 12, 1944, Lt. Friedrich Lengfeld was commanding a beleaguered German rifle company. Like most units on both sides, he had suffered heavy casualties.

Early that morning, a wounded American could be heard calling from the middle of a German minefield in a no man's land separating the combatants.

"Help me" the man cried. His unit had withdrawn , however, and no U.S. troops were close enough to hear.

Lengfeld ordered his men not to shoot if Americans came to rescue the man. But none came. The soldiers weakening voice was heard for hours.

"Help me" he called, again and again. At about 10:30 that morning, Lengfeld could bear the cries no longer. He formed a rescue squad, complete with Red Cross vests and flags, and led his men toward the wounded American.

He never made it. Approaching the soldier, he stepped on a land mine, and the exploding metal fragments tore deeply into his body. Eight hours later Lengfeld is dead. The fate of the American is unknown.

Much of this story, unpublished in any American books on the war, is based on the eyewitness account of Hubert Gees, who served as Lengfeld's communications runner.

Speaking at the monument's dedication in Germany last October, Gees said : " Lieutenant Lengfeld was one of the best soldiers of the Hütgen Forest. He was an exemplary company commander, who never asked us to do more than he himself was ready to give. He possessed the complete confidence of his soldiers.

Ruggles said Lengfeld's sense of duty went far beyond the call. " You can't go to any greater extreme than to give your life trying to rescue someone you are fighting as your enemy in war " he said. " Compare that to the indifference most people feel about each other today."

The bronze and concrete monument is believed to be the only one placed by Americans in a German military cemetery. In both German and English, the plaque reads :

Here in the Hütgen Forest, on Nov. 12, 1944, Lt. Friedrich Lengfeld, a German officer, gave his life while trying to save the life of an American soldier lying severely wounded in the 'Wilde Sau' minefield and appealing for medical aid."

To the young Lieutenant, the voice crying out that day did not come from an enemy. Nor from an American, nor a stranger. It came from a human being in need. Something inside Lengfeld compelled him to act - a feeling so strong and enduring not even the madness of war could block it.

In the heavy silence of the German forest, where thousands upon thousands met death, that glorious impulse for life is now honored.



Ehrenfriedhof Hürtgen. Memorial Lt. Friedrich Lengfeld.

http://forum.axishistory.com/files/02_cem_hurtgen.jpg

IN MEMORY
OF
LIEUTENANT FRIEDRICH LENGFIELD
2nd Co,. Fues. Bn., 275th Inf. Div.

Here in Huertgen Forest on November 12, 1944,
Lt. Lengfield, a German officer, gave his life
while trying to save the life of an American
soldier lying severely wounded in the “Wilde Sau”
minefield and appealing for medical help.

PLACED AT THIS SITE ON OCTOBER, 7, 1994.

THE
TWENTY SECOND UNITED STATES
INFANTRY
SOCIETY – WORLD WAR II

“Deeds not Words”

[TLAM Strike]

On a slighty more amusing note:

Japan: Battle off Samar (http://www.combinedfleet.com/btl_sam.htm)
4 Battleships (Including Da Yamato her self), 6 Cruisers, 2 Lights, and 11 Destroyers give chase to 6 CVEs, 3 DDs, 3 DE with 12 more CVEs, 6 DDs, and 4 DE near by. At the end only 1 CVE was sunk with three damaged (and 2 DDs and 1 DE sunk) and the IJN 3 CAs short and 3 a limping.

:o So much for so very little. :nope:

[Abraham]

@ Smaragdadler:
Very good reading indeed. The battle story as well as the personal story. Thanks for sharing this information; I appreciate!
:up:

[joea]

Could have done the same job at night as the RAF did.
would have saved alot of men

Read your histroy again, the RAf lost a lot of planes too. The night bombing was much less accurate at least through the early part. At least both night and day bombing forced the LW to divert a lot of resources.

[joea]

Smaragdadler

Let me join the others in thanking you for the read.

[Smaragdadler]

Thank you all. :)

For those who have an interest, I would recomend to read the whole article. I have just copied and pasted the parts in which the author talks about the 'grand strategy' of the campaign.

http://www.loyno.edu/history/journal/Bayer.htm
http://www.5ad.org/hurtgen_joe.htm

[Type941]

My List as follows –

German, Kursk 43 and the Ardennes 44

British, Arnhem 44

American, Peleliu 44

Canada, Dieppe 42

Soviet, Seelow Heights 45

Western Allies, Cassino 44 (The first three)

Japan, Pearl Harbour 41

Germany, 1940 - when their planes got massacred in Holland by the only country that actually used air defences with brains when the war begun

Britain, France 1940 - the Heroic withdrawal blown up by propoganda to hide the fact of horrendous ass kicking suffered from the germans and inability to fight, but ability to avoid seriously testing the forces of germans who were much less strong they they were made out to be later (again, to justify the losses to the public)

Bombing campaing - by Germany and Allies. 200000+ dead in Drezden, 60000+ in England during those raids, but the worst is the absolute acceptance that killing women and children was a-ok. And to top it off, all evidence points out that it was so damn inaccurate, that it was basically export of explosives, not bombing. I believe a guy in bomber command did a study previously, and estimated that only 1 in 4 bombs or something would hit within 8km of target. And target was a circle of 16km. So you get the idea of accuracy. Later allies justify that in end of 44 german production went down significantly, but hide the fact it was more due to loss of France iron ore and oil from Romania. I also read that bombing of Hamburg destroyed a lot, but in few months it was back to 80% of efficency. Talk about demoralizing. Anyway, glad it's no longer considered a doctrine to bomb civilian people. IMHO one of the worst tactical disgraces of the war. POintless, costly to civilians, and beared no real impact on determination of the enemy to fight (the main reason to kill civilians was to demoralize them - you all know how great that worked in GB, when it only made people more resolved in anger towards the germans)

hmm... Obviously the whole Italy campaing past Anzio (or whatever the place was called, near Rome). They landed on the beach and got bogged down for months. 1million men were held up there for long long time in Italy by 400 thousand germans. Surely those men would have been much more useful elsewhere. Thank Churchill for his thought of Italy being the soft underbelly of Europe. It was all Alpine ridges and sh*t actually - when it came to getting into germany through it. France would have made so much more sense.


Of course Finish campaign for Soviet Union. A disgrace, military. I won't touch the political side. Up to 1m dead against a determined but doomed opponent? And the best part was that USSR had probably the most advanced army at the time in the world, objectively speaking. Not to mention possesion of the best tank the world for sure.


Norway campaign - complete stupidity and waste of time by the Allies again, who needed to win something.



Oh, this war was full of stupid moves.

[August]

Oh, this war was full of stupid moves.

It's very easy for us to call something stupid when we have the advantage of 60 years of hindsight. It's not so easy when one has the fog of war to contend with.

[STEED]

All wars to date have good and bad operations so many factors play there part from the man in the field to the man behind his desk.

[joea]

Type 941 brought up some good points, though I disagree with a few things. First agree (as I said on the D-day 43 thread) Italy was a mistake, though not Sicily perhaps. Bombing cities for the sake of bombing cities, ok but I disagree there was no effect. First, the LW did have to divert planes form other fronts and resources to fight this. Second, while the RAF went for area bombing, the US (at first to be sure) tried precision bombing. Sad thing is the RAF proved themselves capable of hitting precision targets, even at night and the US ended up (especially against Japan) area bombing. Yes German production went up, thanks to Speer. Still, it is a fact new weapons like the type XXI were delayed, rail transport was wrecked, synthetic oil (late again I agree) was interrupted, and the quality of construction as well I believe in main by the strategic bombing. Anyway, the western Allies were not the only ones to target civilian populations.

[Type941]

hehe, i was gonna mention the precision thing. I've got a book here about it that has about 10 pages of references after each chapter and talks extensively about this bombing 'accuracy'. As I said, remember the 16km 'dot' and the 8km area around it - hitting something within it was considered 'accurate'!... So imagine you bombing a factory producing tanks. You end up bombing a cow field 20km away. That would be considered a 'success'. ;) So that's that.

but US was in fact going for precision bombing, but they had some key weaknesses too: they believe in huge superiority of their equipment for example (specificaly, 2 best examples are their bombing aim and tank aim that allowed to shoot on move - neither actually worked). So here's the story. US bombed factories that produced friction bearings, used in like 80% of all german equipment. And best part was it was produced in one town in Germany. IN theory, had US bombed that place to the end, it would have halted the whole bloody army! But it didn't happen.. Why? The germans later said 'had they been able to continue bombing those bearing factories...' and the key word is 'had they been able'. Because they weren't so successful. They lost THOUSANDS of airplanes! Germans air defence was damn good. So it did few raids on the city making friction bearings, and that was the end of it. It's a fact - bombers of WW2 were grossly inaccurate, even the later versions. It's also a fact that so much more people died in WW2 from conventional bombing rather than Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombs.

Here's a few notes on how inefficient the bombing was made by allies (that germans were equally ineffective when it comes to GB is a common wisdom and that needs no alterations ;))

I will first reiterate the point. 2 events conincided. In 2nd half of 1944 was the time when German economic indicators went into decline. That's when the bombing intecified and its credited heavily for it. But that's not really true, in fact it's completely different fact was responsible for decline. In September 1944 Germany lost its key source for Iron ore in France and Oil in Romania. This would obviously have an impact on production of anything related to oil and iron ore! And remember, while it was demoralizing, a demoralized german worker is not necessarily a less productive german worker! In US war report they estimated that in cities without bombing about half of population (57%) wanted to surrender. In those that were bombed, it was about 64%. Hardly a huge differnence. That's a US source.

Also don' forget - more than 4/5 of bombs dropped on germany in WW2 were dropped past January 1944 (yes, allies too late realized they needed much more bombs to make impact!). Also it was a failure because about 2/3s of bombs were dropped on civilians, and only 1/3 on military targets.

Another reason the whole bombing till 1944 was a disaster in terms of achieved goals was because only in December 1943 the P51 became available for the brits as an escort fighter for the Lancasters. And it took them so bloody long because they figured out too late that the unreliable engine that came with Mustang needed to be replace by if I remember correctly, a very good Merlin.

So bombing took place for 3 years and was complete waste. Only in 1944 it seemed to make an impact but by that time Germany was losing the war anyway, and the bombings became so intensive and concentrated that of course it finally started to show results. But it was not in any way a key to winning the war. On contrary, people on the ground, slugging it out in bloody fights were the ones deciding it.

BTW, the Normandy landing plans begun in 1942 (COSSAC plan) and were subsequintly changed many times (from the very flawed to something that could have potential of working).


OOOOPS. SORRY for the Long and Boring post guys. :)

[joea]

Ok 941, I concede some of your points, let me correct you the P-51 was used as an escort by the US for the B-17s not the Brit's Lancs which always went in unescorted. I'd like to know your sources btw, at least you seem to have some I am working from memory here better go search something.

I also thought of something, I am sure use of forced (slave) labour was a factor in decreasing quality. I agree the scale was too big perhaps, but I still think the Luftwaffe was forced to pull back from other fronts because of the bombing and I still am certain new weapons were delayed because of the bombing, like the XXI. Agree about Romania and France, but I mentioned synthetic oil in my post...now the question I have is how important, potentially and in reality synthetic oil was. :hmm: Attacks on rail transport is almost tactical also.

[Type941]

Oh, here's the stats for US precision bombiing of the bearings factory (in Schweinfurt!)

The US 8th Airforce launched 291 bombers at the factory. 228 managed to arrive to the target. 62 were shot down. 168 were seriously damaged. 17 beoyond repair. Less than 3rd of original strike force was capable of 2nd sortie. If the same ratio continued (and it was very stable for any bombing compaing) you don't really see the 8th surviving after 2-3 raids, period. And that would have led to lack of bombers to deploy elsehwere. Hence - the failure of bomber. :)

[Abraham]

Imagine a small elite bomber force of British and American bombers (like the Pathfinders)...
Imagine no grandiose air force dreams of winning the war without an invasion...
Imagine no strategic (carpet) bombing but precision attacks (as far as the word goes) and a genuine support of the invasion and West European ground campaign...
Imagine a shift in 1942 from bomber production towards maritime patrols (same airframes)... We all know how efficient they are, don't we?
Imagine an even bigger shift in 1943 towards building transports, C-47 Dakota's, C-54's etc...
Imagine fuel and ammo being flown from Britain straight towards the forward racing armoured colums of Patton and Montgomery...
Imagine Operation MARKET (the airborne component of MARKET GARDEN) being able to land the British 1st, the US 82nd and the US 101 and the Polish Airborne Brigade in one lift on one day and support them accordingly...
Imagine peace in December 1944.

I try to make the point that the Allies were building bombers till the very last months of the war, but were hampered by a lack of maritime patrols in 1942 and 1943 and were short of transport/cargo planes during 1944 and 1945.
Just because there was a strong believe in air force circles that bombers could do the job single handed!

[Type XXIII]

On a slighty more amusing note:

Japan: Battle off Samar (http://www.combinedfleet.com/btl_sam.htm)
4 Battleships (Including Da Yamato her self), 6 Cruisers, 2 Lights, and 11 Destroyers give chase to 6 CVEs, 3 DDs, 3 DE with 12 more CVEs, 6 DDs, and 4 DE near by. At the end only 1 CVE was sunk with three damaged (and 2 DDs and 1 DE sunk) and the IJN 3 CAs short and 3 a limping.

:o So much for so very little. :nope:

Actually, it was even more for just as little. The Battle of Samar was just the main Japanese strike force attacking the American landing fleet. The whole battle is called the Battle of the Leyte Gulf and was the largest naval battle in history (assuming Herodotes exaggerated the Battle of Salamis, which he probably did.) In the whole battle, including the bombing and sub attacks the Japanese encountered on the way to the battle, and the decimation of both the diversionary force and the secondary strike force, the Japanese lost 1 CV, 3 CVLs, 3 BBs (including Yamatos sister ship Musashi), 9 cruisers, 9 DDs, one tanker and a submarine.

The US Navy, on the other hand, lost 1 CVL, 2 CVEs, 2 DDs, 1 DDE, a torpedo boat and three subs.

[Type941]

I try to make the point that the Allies were building bombers till the very last months of the war, but were hampered by a lack of maritime patrols in 1942 and 1943 and were short of transport/cargo planes during 1944 and 1945.
Just because there was a strong believe in air force circles that bombers could do the job single handed!

Every country in WW2 had its own failures. But in general, it's inability to use Armour properly (US was perfect example - they built a fast and reliable tank that could not do squat against germans, until the brits put a decent gun into it! - all because they believed tanks were there to make breaches in enemy lines, and not fight other tanks - as result they were often anihilated by superior german 75s and 88s). UK believe in the bomber and never thought bomber needed protection. ONe key area where germans were smarter and successful was when they realized that armor without air support was useless. Amerians and British realized that like in... 44.

Example of perfect waste is the Omaha. British designed a whole bunch of special equipment vehicles that when landing, cleared the shores from mines, and carred personnel, plus carried a gun to quite the germans flaks. Americans and eisenhower thought they knew better and ended up with 'saving private ryan opening scene'. So yes, many blunders there.

IT all came down to countries using a new radical idea of use of tank and bomber and everyone believe in it so badly, that they were taught the hard way. The theories were by Fuller and Doughet (If I got the names right). First would say that tanks would devliver huge punches to the enemy lines overrunning them and striking the soft rear, command posts, etc. It didn't mention that this varies due to terrrain (especially in Normandy, Britaany, etc) and that tanks were not perpetual machines. They needed fuel. WRONG. The second one implied that bomber would always get through. Always. It was so powerful, it would destroy everything. AS we saw it was inaccurate and extremely susseptive to AA fire (when escorts were employed like P51s, it got better). And ALL countries in WW2 adhered to these strattegies, and anyone diverting to traditional stuff was basically scorned (Monty for instance).

Another thing why operations failed was that defeating enemy in mechanised warfare didn't mean complete destruction. The routers always retreated FASTER than attackers. WHy? BEcause they could leave behind slow equipment. Something attackers could not do. France 44 and North Africa are perfect examples, but perhaps best is Russia. Huge army, Hitler advanced so far, but never fully defeated. they just ran away faster. That's a classic piece of WW2 but often ignored. Yet is very significant.

[Konovalov]

Another thing why operations failed was that defeating enemy in mechanised warfare didn't mean complete destruction. The routers always retreated FASTER than attackers. WHy? BEcause they could leave behind slow equipment. Something attackers could not do. France 44 and North Africa are perfect examples, but perhaps best is Russia. Huge army, Hitler advanced so far, but never fully defeated. they just ran away faster. That's a classic piece of WW2 but often ignored. Yet is very significant.

Trade space for time theory.

[TLAM Strike]

...that tanks were not perpetual machines. They needed fuel. WRONG. Tanks need nothing but men.

"Out of commission, become a pillbox. Out of ammo, become a bunker. Out of time, become heroes."- Daskal, The Beast

[Kapitan]

What use is a tank that has no fuel or ammo 100 miles from the front line?

personaly id just leave it.

[Type941]

...that tanks were not perpetual machines. They needed fuel. WRONG. Tanks need nothing but men.

"Out of commission, become a pillbox. Out of ammo, become a bunker. Out of time, become heroes."- Daskal, The Beast

poetic. not true. :P Who needs a pilbox in italy when the fighting is in Bavaria!

[joea]

Imagine a small elite bomber force of British and American bombers (like the Pathfinders)...
Imagine no grandiose air force dreams of winning the war without an invasion...
Imagine no strategic (carpet) bombing but precision attacks (as far as the word goes) and a genuine support of the invasion and West European ground campaign...
Imagine a shift in 1942 from bomber production towards maritime patrols (same airframes)... We all know how efficient they are, don't we?
Imagine an even bigger shift in 1943 towards building transports, C-47 Dakota's, C-54's etc...
Imagine fuel and ammo being flown from Britain straight towards the forward racing armoured colums of Patton and Montgomery...
Imagine Operation MARKET (the airborne component of MARKET GARDEN) being able to land the British 1st, the US 82nd and the US 101 and the Polish Airborne Brigade in one lift on one day and support them accordingly...
Imagine peace in December 1944.

I try to make the point that the Allies were building bombers till the very last months of the war, but were hampered by a lack of maritime patrols in 1942 and 1943 and were short of transport/cargo planes during 1944 and 1945.
Just because there was a strong believe in air force circles that bombers could do the job single handed!

No one suggest another way to defeat the Luftwaffe? After all especially for daylight bombing they had to respond. Again the Brits did not have nightfighters. You guys are ignoring the effect of first off of the long range figher escorts, and second Type941 you still have not acknowledged the DELAY in new weapons production.

Abraham: I disagree with your definition. Strategic bombing =/ carpet bombing. It's the type of target chosen and the goal ... not the precision again. Don't tell me Allied or Soviet artillery (a good friend of mine from Belgrade told me his Mom lived through ans Allied air rad as well as Soviet artillery and Katysha bombardment in 44 in support of the Partisan's liberation of the city) not to mention Caen or Berlin itself at the end were examples of precision bombardment because they were tactical?

That said, I agree with reorienting the Allied air effort and the fact the real IMHO gains were less than the resources put into the strategic forces.

Great debate even if you guys are wrong. :-j

[Abraham]

@ joea:
The Allied Bombing Offensive was led by people who desperately wanted to proof - at whatever human cost - that bombers could win the war single handed.
Since war is a waste of human and material resources anyway, a leader has the duty to use his forces as economically as possible.
To support my earlier post: Coastal Command had to beg for long range patrols (like B-24 Liberators), the VIIIth USAAF used (and lost) them (and their pilots) by droves. Lancasters could have been perfect long-range maritime patrols, but were used - in great numbers - exclusively by Bomber Command.
Every attemp to give priority to urgent targets was met by fierce opposition from Spaatz and - especially - Harris, who maintained that the Allied Bomber Offensive, however disgusting it was - was the quickest way to end the war. Even Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander had to beg to get the support of the strategic bombers for the preparation of the invasion; again the argument being used is that it "distracted from the speedy end of the war".

My point: Grand scale strategic bombing became so intoxicating that it hindered the general war effort.

[Type941]

@ joea:
The Allied Bombing Offensive was led by people who desperately wanted to proof - at whatever human cost - that bombers could win the war single handed.


Spot on.
---

joea - the delay in weapons... well, Germany towards 44 virtually had no control over the skys in western europe. only place luftwaffe was actually strong was in eastern front. So delay in weapons there was, but the focus on bomber and not on fighers was a mistake too. Not to mention lack of docrine which forced air force to be used with ground forces.

It's like you are missing a bit the main point: the docrine allies used was just inferior to germany, and so it took them many failures to get something done right. Usualy by just overwhelming the germans.

PS. I doubel checked the figures on effectivenes. It was 120 allied soldiers that were equivalent to german 100, and figure for soviet soldier was 200 to 100.

[Bertgang]

Wasteful for Italy: joining the war without any good reason, out of Mussolini's wrong hope to be called "winner" without fighting.

After that, our invasion of Greece, an insane disaster.