Hitler would've won the war if. . .

[Sir Big Jugs]

He wouldn't have made so many costly mistakes!

Do you agree?

[Oberon]

If you include employing some totally idiotic yes men as tactical advisors (*cough* Goering *cough*) and listening to them instead of the people who knew what they were talking about (Rommel, Guderian, Doenitz) and let them do their jobs instead of constantly interfering with their strategy, then yeah...he would have had a slightly easier time of it.
Hitler knew his politics alright...but he knew jack**** about war.

[STEED]

Hitler lost the war on 22nd June 1941 He tried to kill the golden goose that laid the golden egg.

[Type XXIII]

The attack on the Soviet Union was inevitable. The politics of the NSDAP, the rhetoric about Lebensraum and so on, plus the fact that Stalin's Soviet Union posed, or would soon pose a serious threat to Germany. It is likely that, if Hitler hadn't attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviet Union would have attacked Germany in 1942 or later, if Stalin considered it to be to his advantage.

Some other alternate timelines to consider:

- Italia doesn't invade Greece. Germany does not have to save the Italian's butt there, and Operation Barbarossa starts earlier. Moscow falls before winter and the Russians are forced to retreat beyond the Urals. They are not beaten yet, but seriously weakened.

- Battle of Britain is won by Germany for some reason. (Focus on airfields and industry instead of civil population, even more ships sunk in the atlantic :arrgh!:, the evacuation of Dunkerque fails or, I'm getting slightly nationalist here, Blücher is not sunk in the Oslo fjord, the king and government of Norway is captured, and Nortraship is never established.) Britain surrenders.

[STEED]

the Soviet Union would have attacked Germany in 1942 or later, if Stalin considered it to be to his advantage..

Rubbish no evidence what so ever.

[Kapitan]

Stalin would never have enterd the war if he could unless germany was weakend.

But stalin did have one thing to his advantage even if his weapons and men were inferior that one thing was weather.

[STEED]

Stalin would never have enterd the war if he could unless germany was weakend.

But stalin did have one thing to his advantage even if his weapons and men were inferior that one thing was weather.

And the lack of a road net work.

[Kapitan]

That too and not to mentioned the already fortified houses from the revolution.

[Type XXIII]

the Soviet Union would have attacked Germany in 1942 or later, if Stalin considered it to be to his advantage..

Rubbish no evidence what so ever.

There does exist indications that Soviet High Command was at least considering the possibility, and drafting plans for an attack on Germany. Of course, unless the competence of the lower Soviet commanders had been raised somehow, it would have failed miserably.

[U-214]

Some other alternate timelines to consider:

- Italia doesn't invade Greece. Germany does not have to save the Italian's butt there, and Operation Barbarossa starts earlier. Moscow falls before winter and the Russians are forced to retreat beyond the Urals. They are not beaten yet, but seriously weakened.

- Battle of Britain is won by Germany for some reason. (Focus on airfields and industry instead of civil population, even more ships sunk in the atlantic Arrgh!, the evacuation of Dunkerque fails or, I'm getting slightly nationalist here, Blücher is not sunk in the Oslo fjord, the king and government of Norway is captured, and Nortraship is never established.) Britain surrenders.

I agree on both.Britain is the most critical factor IMHO,because without Britain to use as base of operations,i doubt that USA would be in position to invade the occupied Europe.

Being a Greek,i must also support the theory of the 7 precious weeks which delayed the operation Barbarossa.To quote Keitel:

during the Nuremberg trials after WWII, Hitler's Chief of Staff Field Marshall Keitel stated that "The unbelievable strong resistance of the Greeks delayed by two or more vital months the German attack against Russia; if we did not have this long delay, the outcome of the war would have been different in the eastern front and in the war in general, and others would have been accused and would be occupying this seat as defendants today".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Italian_War#German_intervention

There is a similar statement of gratitude from the Russian General Zhukov towards Greece,but can't find it right now.

[STEED]

There does exist indications that Soviet High Command was at least considering the possibility, and drafting plans for an attack on Germany.

Prove it.

Stalin’s winter war with Finland was a bloody mess. Poland was not a text book operation. And after the German forces swept in to Western Europe and took it in six weeks flat. On seeing that Stalin would dare not cross the border.

[kiwi_2005]

He wouldn't have made so many costly mistakes!

If he didn't attack the Soviet Union, i think Stalin would of backed hitler up or just turned a blind eye at everything, Hitler also made a mistake of making war against the USA after Japan decleared war on the US. Hitler had no reason to declear war against the US did he?. He should of just let Japan fight its own war. If hitler won the war he would of attacked Japan next anyways.
Once he took over poland hitler should of laid low for a few years. But he was bent on ruling europe.

[micky1up]

ive listened to many opionions on hitlers decisions looking back he made so good changes to battle plans and some god awfull ones i submit that there a too many variables in any confict to sit back with hindsight and say this or that choice was wrong Steed and i have had many arguments on these topics there are occasions when the normal rules of war go right out of the window such as Rorke's Drift wher e the advantage clearly lay in zulu hands but the battle went the other way. steeds argument that hitlers attack on russia would have ended the same way what ever may have happened i reject the what if factor is too big if that was true germany initial attack on the french belgium frontier would have failed french and english forces where close to there supply lines and had more than adequate air and ground support more tanks and troops yet they failed to stop germany who where inferior in numbers and supplies , yes the generals play numbers game but i submit that the human factor ourweighs the normal mathmatics of how many tanks guns and planes you have anyway we wil never truly know because i dont think we will ever see such wars again more the pity i think france and germany need another kicking to show them how much they should value brittish efforts

[STEED]

hitler should of laid low for a few years. But he was bent on ruling europe.

Hitler was getting on in years and his health was getting worst a cock tail of drugs did not help one bit.


(In the Autumn of 41 Hitler asked Keitel to draw up plans to invade Afghanistan and Pakistan) this bit of info came from a book, but never the less this would not have surprised me.

[joea]

Some other alternate timelines to consider:

- Italia doesn't invade Greece. Germany does not have to save the Italian's butt there, and Operation Barbarossa starts earlier. Moscow falls before winter and the Russians are forced to retreat beyond the Urals. They are not beaten yet, but seriously weakened.

- Battle of Britain is won by Germany for some reason. (Focus on airfields and industry instead of civil population, even more ships sunk in the atlantic Arrgh!, the evacuation of Dunkerque fails or, I'm getting slightly nationalist here, Blücher is not sunk in the Oslo fjord, the king and government of Norway is captured, and Nortraship is never established.) Britain surrenders.

I agree on both.Britain is the most critical factor IMHO,because without Britain to use as base of operations,i doubt that USA would be in position to invade the occupied Europe.

Being a Greek,i must also support the theory of the 7 precious weeks which delayed the operation Barbarossa.To quote Keitel:

during the Nuremberg trials after WWII, Hitler's Chief of Staff Field Marshall Keitel stated that "The unbelievable strong resistance of the Greeks delayed by two or more vital months the German attack against Russia; if we did not have this long delay, the outcome of the war would have been different in the eastern front and in the war in general, and others would have been accused and would be occupying this seat as defendants today".
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greco-Italian_War#German_intervention

There is a similar statement of gratitude from the Russian General Zhukov towards Greece,but can't find it right now.

Agree with you, might want to check your PM dude. :up:

[CCIP]

I agree also, actually, as a Russian. Although the invasion of Greece was just one of the many larger-or-smaller factors surrounding the failure of Barbarossa, it really did buy time. Although I don't really agree with the theory that the Russian weather beat Hitler - it was a factor; and time is never NOT a factor. The Balkans, generally speaking, are a forgotten area of the war that likely had much bigger consequences than people give it credit for.

Otherwise, Hitler's errors are just too many. For starters, he should have just learned to keep his focus on one front of war. It's stupid beyond all reasons that in a post World War I world, he led Germany into another multi-front war.

[SubSerpent]

I think his BIGGEST mistake was declaring war on the USA. Had he not done this, then the USA would not have entered the war when it did and Britian would have fallen to Germany. As long as the USA kept sending transports to Britian and food to Britian the Germans had no chance to win. Also, the USA got the bomb before all and would have used it on Germany just the same as they did to Japan if not used it even more so. Germany was crushed by nothing more than sheer power from the allies and their whole war got beat back with a broom all the way to Berlin. Hitler showed his true cowardly self in the end and shot himself for being the worlds biggest loser. Not quite sure which death penalty he would have suffered had they caught him alive and which nation would have been the ones to administer it. Perhaps there would have been a firing squad comprised of British, American, French, Jews, Polish, Russians, etc.. each to aim at him where they wished and simply let loose on him. Anyways, he was a dead man from the moment he decided to invade Poland and declare war on the world. Had Germany won the Japanese would have come in and stomped the crap out of Germany.

[CCIP]

I don't think the US would have stayed out of the European war for very long once it was attacked by Japan. Roosevelt wasn't about to let Hitler get away; of course there would be a delay and a need for some tricky manuevering not to touch off opposition at home if Hitler didn't just declare war, but it would happen eventually.

Regardless, even if the US did not go to fight Germans directly in open war, it was already providing so much help to Britain that its' contribution could be considered vital.

Noone would argue that US wasn't key in Allied victory, but I don't think Hitler's puzzling declaration of war had made very much difference in the end. America's going to war was, ultimately, to the country's great advantage, not to mention removing Hitler. The US has gained a lot of say in the world by virtue of being a winner - and at a relatively low "price". Arguably, they're the only ones that actually 'won' in WWII (it was at best a pyrrhic victory for Britain and the USSR)!

[TLAM Strike]

Not quite sure which death penalty he would have suffered had they caught him alive and which nation would have been the ones to administer it. Perhaps there would have been a firing squad comprised of British, American, French, Jews, Polish, Russians, etc.. each to aim at him where they wished and simply let loose on him. No I think the hung all the war criminals at the end of the European war. Plus I think the death penalty would have been letting him off easy. Although I kinda like the idea of taking one of his own gas chambers and using that...

But back on the subject, if Germany had not declared war on the USA I doubt it would have really mattered since the UK was at war with Japan and the USA was at war with Japan, I would not have been surprised if the US just started sending troops to protect the UK (because it might uhh... get invaded by Japan... :shifty: ) kind of like we did with Iceland. It would have come down to invading a country that is under the protection of a nation you are not officially at war with.

[The Avon Lady]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there! :smug:

[kiwi_2005]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there


For that you win this! :yep:
http://i31.photobucket.com/albums/c387/mischazion/Avonsmouse.jpg

[The Avon Lady]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there


For that you win this! :yep:
http://i31.photobucket.com/albums/c387/mischazion/Avonsmouse.jpg
Me wants! :rock:

[mog]

Realistically, Hitler could never have invaded and conquered Great Britain, and nor could he ever have won in the east, especially while the Allies were supplying the Soviets.

[Abraham]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there! :smug:
Actually Hitler was fighting God's chosen people (not: holy people) and therefor doomed to failure.

[The Avon Lady]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there! :smug:
Actually Hitler was fighting God's chosen people (not: holy people) and therefor doomed to failure.
All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.

I don't want to go off on a tangent but define "holy".

[U-214]

@ joea

Pls Check your PMs

Regards

[U-214]

CCIP wrote:
I agree also, actually, as a Russian. Although the invasion of Greece was just one of the many larger-or-smaller factors surrounding the failure of Barbarossa, it really did buy time. Although I don't really agree with the theory that the Russian weather beat Hitler - it was a factor; and time is never NOT a factor. The Balkans, generally speaking, are a forgotten area of the war that likely had much bigger consequences than people give it credit for.


The question about the russian weather is one of the biggest in WWII history.I really don't know what would be the conseguences of a swifter attack.For sure,i don't beleive that the Germans could occupy all Russia.Also,the Russian reserves from the asiatic part of Russia were much more accustomed to harsh climate than the German troops.I do think that the Germans MAYBE could have taken Moscow (they arrived to Tula if i m not mistaken,about 20km outside Moscow).It is known that the Germans had terrible problems with their heavy equipment,which was the heart of their war machine and success.Maybe the war would have lasted longer,maybe Russia would sign a truce,who knows.

Anyway,it seems that the Germans had much confidence on themselves in case of better weather.I encountered this by luck:

Italy's entry into the war has been nothing but a disaster for us. If the Italians hadn't attacked Greece and needed our help, the war would have taken a different course. We could have anticipated the Russian cold by weeks and conquered Leningrad and Moscow. There would have then been no Stalingrad.

Leni Riefenstahl in conversation with Adolf Hitler, 30 March 1944
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3768/is_200510/ai_n15957576

For those who don't know,Riefenstahl was the mediatic mastermind behind Hitler's film propaganda,staging the party rallies etc
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leni_Riefenstahl

[Kapitan]

Where my stepdad has moved to in the far north (Murmansk region) it is winter 9 months of the year, it is also one of the most strategic places of importance to capture, capture that you have the entire russian navy almost.

[joea]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there! :smug:
Actually Hitler was fighting God's chosen people (not: holy people) and therefor doomed to failure.
All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.

I don't want to go off on a tangent but define "holy".

I agree with that! For a change. :yep:

U-214, back at ya with a PM.

[The Avon Lady]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there! :smug:
Actually Hitler was fighting God's chosen people (not: holy people) and therefor doomed to failure.
All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.

I don't want to go off on a tangent but define "holy".

I agree with that! For a change. :yep:
What?

That evil is doomed to failure?

Or that you don't want to go off on a tangent? :)

Or both? :P

[STEED]

The question about the russian weather is one of the biggest in WWII history

To quote Hitler "We only got to kick in the door and the whole rotten system will come crashing down"

Hitler only planed a lightning attack and believed it would be all over before winter, so there was no planning for winter clothing. Another one of many mistakes.

i don't beleive that the Germans could occupy all Russia.Also,the Russian reserves from the asiatic part of Russia were much more accustomed to harsh climate than the German troops.

True how the heck could German troops do that, which they tried and failed it always comes down to logistics. The Soviet army in the north and centre was decimated and their numbers were replaced from Eastern Russia and Siberian winter troops.

I do think that the Germans MAYBE could have taken Moscow (they arrived to Tula if i m not mistaken,about 20km outside Moscow

Sorry no impossible first they had to deal with the Kiev pocket after dealing with Kiev and getting back on course they stood no chance. Some 90,000 Soviet troops in Moscow and ready to defend Moscow to the last bullet. German tanks few in number broken down and in need of repair, and of course the winter weather.

It is known that the Germans had terrible problems with their heavy equipment,which was the heart of their war machine and success.Maybe the war would have lasted longer,maybe Russia would sign a truce,who knows.

The Germans were only one third mechanise and they relied on horses to move their equipment, bad planning again Russia had a lack of a road net work. The weather in spring and autumn turn the ground into quagmire and the Germans got bogged down and in winter equipment broke down. As for Stalin coming to some sort of peace with Hitler that went right out the window after German troops failed to take Moscow.

Anyway,it seems that the Germans had much confidence on themselves

Far too much they fail in the planning stages of Barbarossa

Italy's entry into the war has been nothing but a disaster for us/conquered Leningrad and Moscow. There would have then been no Stalingrad.

Italy should had stayed out they were useless waging war / Leningrad was not a prime target for Hitler, Moscow was.

[micky1up]

yet again steed you deal in absolute's " theres no way " well im afraid many battle's in history have hung on the smallest things like i said according to your rules gemany shouldnt have been able to defeat france and the belgians and the BEF they had more supply's men tanks adequate air support so how did germany accomplish that? by your rule that the combatant with the better logistics win every time ! no so my friend classic example a fleet crossing 8000 miles to retake the falklands against land based air support and entrecnched soildiers by your rules the uk shouldnt have been able to do that but it did because morale tactics and training can overcome large obsticals , another example warterloo napoleon had more men more supplies yet he failed to defeat wellington why? theres more to the equation than more men more tanks more supplies = win

[STEED]

yet again steed you deal in absolute's " theres no way " well im afraid many battle's in history have hung on the smallest things like i said according to your rules gemany shouldnt have been able to defeat france and the belgians and the BEF they had more supply's men tanks adequate air support so how did germany accomplish that? by your rule that the combatant with the better logistics win every time ! no so my friend classic example a fleet crossing 8000 miles to retake the falklands against land based air support and entrecnched soildiers by your rules the uk shouldnt have been able to do that but it did because morale tactics and training can overcome large obsticals , another example warterloo napoleon had more men more supplies yet he failed to defeat wellington why? theres more to the equation than more men more tanks more supplies = win

Not my rules facts. I suggest you start reading about the Eastern Front and understand it. ;)

In the case of 1940 Hitler's army had been tested in Poland and they used a new method of war fare Blitzkrieg and a very daring plan to come through the Ardennes. And any way it was only us the British who put up a real fight unlike the French.

In the case of Waterloo Napoleon won a tactical victory until Blucher came on the scene and turn it around.

[joea]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there! :smug:
Actually Hitler was fighting God's chosen people (not: holy people) and therefor doomed to failure.
All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.

I don't want to go off on a tangent but define "holy".

I agree with that! For a change. :yep:
What?

That evil is doomed to failure?

Or that you don't want to go off on a tangent? :)

Or both? :P

Both. :rotfl:

[Abraham]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there! :smug:
Actually Hitler was fighting God's chosen people (not: holy people) and therefor doomed to failure.
All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.

I don't want to go off on a tangent but define "holy".
I would define "holy" as: without sins.

And I would not mind to go off on a tango with you...
:D

[I-25]

Hitler would have won the war if G-d would have let him.

But G-d didn't.

So Hitler didn't.

So there! :smug:
Actually Hitler was fighting God's chosen people (not: holy people) and therefor doomed to failure.
All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.

I don't want to go off on a tangent but define "holy".

Lets not forget uncle Bush :rotfl:

[TLAM Strike]

I don't want to go off on a tangent but define "holy".

From the "Dictonary of TLAM. Volume 2"...

Holy (one of dem words that discribe some'in) Something with holes in it.

Example: The Old Testment is a holy book because it has some plot holes in it.

[Abraham]

I don't want to go off on a tangent but define "holy".

From the "Dictonary of TLAM. Volume 2"...

Holy (one of dem words that discribe some'in) Something with holes in it.

Example: The Old Testment is a holy book because it has some plot holes in it.

Do you know what the definition of a hero is? Someone who gets other people killed.
Conclusion: a hero is somebody who makes others holy...
:rotfl:

[TLAM Strike]

I don't want to go off on a tangent but define "holy".

From the "Dictonary of TLAM. Volume 2"...

Holy (one of dem words that discribe some'in) Something with holes in it.

Example: The Old Testment is a holy book because it has some plot holes in it.

Do you know what the definition of a hero is? Someone who gets other people killed.
Conclusion: a hero is somebody who makes others holy...
:rotfl:
Reminds me of another line she said:

"Knew a man who had a hole clean through his whole shoulder, once. Used to keep a spare hankie in there."
-Zoë

:D

[micky1up]

STeed old friend you dont seem to get the point your too ridged in the idea that whatever could have happened germany couldn't have beaten russia , in fact you made my point in the napoleon part what if grouchy had joined napoleon insted of aimlessly following the prussians ? all im saying that there are to many variable's in how an battle is won to say in different circumstances that germany could never have won , you seems to reject any speculation out of hand that things could have turned out differently . napoleon was beaten fair and square by a much inferior force , all that i really am saying that sometimes no matter how much of an advantage u have in suplies and men logistics and weaponry you will at some stage get a spanking history is repleat with stories of stronger bigger more advanced armys losing because u can for definte caculate who is going to win or lose on the strength of logistics numbers and indeed as shown weather


p.s indeed to reinforce my point every book and documentery ive seen and read written and presented by proven experts in military history have all said that the russian campaign was a close run thing in 1941 ,42 and indeed the the point when germany really lost it was kursk up til that point much of the campaign had went germanys way

[STEED]

STeed old friend you dont seem to get the point your too ridged

micky1up the fact is Germany could never win the war in Russia have a read of this and your see why -
Failure Of Logistics In "Operation Barbarossa" And Its Relevance Today
by MAJ Loganathan
Why this topic?
One might wonder why 'Operation Barbarossa" was chosen when there is a more recent example of a successful campaign carried out by the Americans in the Gulf War. The reason is very simple - Gulf War logistics is a success story whereas logistics during the German invasion of Russia in 1941 code-named "Operation Barbarossa" is a prime example (although some 50 years ago) of how logistics played a major role in the failure of the German invasion. While it is good to learn how actions done correctly can lead to success, it is equally worthwhile to learn how actions carried out without good planning and considerations can lead to utter failure. Moreover, the Gulf War is only a good example for nations with interests spanning vast areas of the globe. For most, the threat is in close proximity.

Introduction
The art of logistics during combat is a highly complex, often misunderstood, operation. It can mean the difference between success or failure on the battlefield. Campaigns at the operational level have repeatedly demonstrated that commanders often fail to allocate sufficient resources to logistics. Along the same lines, there is often a lack of appreciation for the tremendous demand borne of combat operations carried out over significant distances. Leaders have over-extended their lines of communication and moved beyond sustainment to the detriment of combat effectiveness. The result: defeat. The German invasion of Russia in 1941, known as "Operation Barbarossa", serves as a prime example.

Scope
While there are many reasons for the failure of the German invasion in 1941, my intent is to show how logistics contributed to that failure. Some of the main logistical problems faced during the operation and the reasons for such problems will be highlighted. This essay will only focus on "Operation Barbarossa" from the time of invasion in Jun 1941 to the point of the first German defeat in Dec 1941. This paper will then examine some of the crucial lessons learnt from that operation. But first, a brief mention would be made on the operational plan as envisaged by Hitler and his generals.

"Operation Barbarossa" - The Operational Plan
The German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 code-named "Operation Barbarossa" was by far the greatest in scale not least for the sheer size of the battlefield, but also because of the numbers who fought there. The frontier at the opening of hostilities was nearly 1600 km long with a depth fighting area of almost 1000 km. In all, 162 divisions of ground troops - approximately 3 million men - were involved.1 Hitler conceived the invasion of the Soviet Union as a gigantic pincer movement which was as follows: Army Group South commanded by Rundstedt comprising 4 armies and First Panzer group was to drive on to Kiev and the Driper Valley, and to envelop and destroy all Russian forces between the Pripet Marshes and the Black Sea. Bock's Army Group Centre - 2 armies and 2 Panzer groups - would advance from Poland to force a break - through towards Smolensk, and then capture Moscow. Leeb's Army Group North - 2 armies and 4th Panzer group - was to swing Northeast towards Leningrad.
The attack succeeded initially beyond the Germans' greatest hopes. Within two weeks, Soviet frontier defences were crushed and the German tank forces penetrated deep into Russian territory. Stalin, the paramount leader of Soviet Union, had gone into a profound psychological depression. Despite numerous losses, by Oct 1941, the Red Army regained its composure and fought back such that by Dec 1941, the Soviet troops launched a successful counter offensive to defeat the Germans before they could reach Moscow. Hitler envisioned a typical blitzkrieg campaign of not more than four months' duration, but this was not to be the case. What, then, went wrong?2

Logistics Problems and Failures in the Campaign
In Strategy For Defeat, William Murray states that the superficial attention that the OKH (German Army General Staff) and OKW (Armed Forces High Command) paid to the logistics of sustaining the Wehrmacht inside Russia was one of the most glaring defects of the pre-invasion strategy.3 The German Army entered into the campaign with full confidence of total victory within months. Because of this falsely engendered belief, there had been no forethought, no proper planning to equip the armed forces with modern strategic weapons, winter clothing, ammunition and therefore they faced a whole host of logistical problems.4
Logistics planning was overly optimistic and totally unrealistic and planning factors were often determined by capability rather than actual requirements. For example, although the number of armoured divisions available for "Operation Barbarossa" had more than doubled from 15 in May 1940 to 32 in June 1941, the number of vehicles had only increased by a third from 2574 to 3332.5
Similarly, full wartime production was not in effect before the invasion. For a campaign of such magnitude, German factories were operating on a single shift basis and the under-utilisation of German industrial capacity resulted in shortfalls in essential combat materials. Production consistently lagged behind consumption. The Germans had been involved militarily in Norway, Belgium, France and the Balkans prior to the invasion of Soviet Union, resulting in major equipment shortfalls and damages. For a force which depended on machines for its offensive capability and its survival as none had depended to the same extent before, these were crippling defects. Many of the deficiencies had been foreseen and, as often as not, side-stepped or ignored on grounds of economy or because Hitler and many of his commanders had deluded themselves into believing the war would be won long before winter took its toll.
Transport assets within a theatre are major factors in campaign planning, both tactical and logistical. Being a key element in logistics, it can severely restrict operations. In Sinews of War, James Huston has highlighted that in a theatre of operation, a single authority, identical with the command authority should be responsible for logistics.6 This is again precisely what the German logistics system lacked - unity of command. The transportation responsibilities were split between the Chief of Transport (rail and inland waterways) and the Quartermaster-General (motor transport). This made an already bad situation worse. The German motor vehicle production could replace neither normal wear and tear nor keep up with combat losses.7
As a result, the Wehrmacht conducted a major demotorization programme, procuring horses and wagons to offset the critical truck shortage. The transport of supplies became more dependent on horse, than motorised power. During 'Operation Barbarossa", the Wehrmacht relied on more than 625 000 horses.
Although the Germans committed themselves to a strategy that favoured rapid movement over long distances, heavy reliance was made on horses, which were used to pull everything from field kitchens to artillery pieces.8
Logistics assets must be manoeuvrable. Support units must be sufficiently agile and mobile. But when a German division entered the fighting, it did so with 162 different types of soft skin vehicles, among the 21 major groupings of which it was composed. Most of these groupings had 17 different types of lorries within a unit establishment of 33 vehicles. The artillery regiment had 445 vehicles on establishment and there were 69 different types of lorries.9
The problem of spares for these many and often unusually different types of machines can best be imagined. The lack of standardisation and the limited supply of spare parts was exacerbated by the lack of maintenance units within the invasion force. Heavy maintenance units remained in Germany or Poland based on the incorrect assumption of no requirement due to the short duration of the campaign.
By August 1941, the motorised supply system was exhausted. Ammunition and fuel, both of which were previously under-estimated were in limited supply. The reason was because the planning requirements were inaccurately based on the transportation capability rather operational consumption. Commanders were unable to exploit tactical advantage because of severe shortages of fuel and ammunition and as such resupply could not keep pace with advances. Tactical operations were curtailed for weeks waiting for resupply from the rear.
Food was another essential commodity that was in critical short supply. It was never an important priority to Hitler. When in late 1941, Hitler was told of the shortage in transport and that the system was only able to supply the armies in the field with one of the most urgent priorities and to choose between warm clothing, food and ammunition, Hitler chose ammunition. Shortfalls in the ration resupply system resulted in 'slaughter' platoons being formed within divisions as an expedient measure. Commanders in the field relied on foraging local livestock to feed the soldiers and this continued until such time when shortages resulted in troops eating their units' horses.
The Germans discovered that most roads in Russia, except only a few main highways, were turned into impassable mud tracks following even moderate rainfall. Therefore, railway, the only other main source of communication was heavily depended upon. This too was grossly inadequate. Not only were the main lines few in number and the branch line system poor, but the whole railway network used a broader gauge than that of Western European. This incompatibility between German and Russia rail systems brought about a tremendous strain upon the small amount of rolling stock which the German Army was neither able to seize nor to adapt. In winter, the railway life-line often failed and in the sector of the Army Group Centre, to quote just one example, only 9 out of 27 trains which were required daily to sustain the Front completed the journey.10
The Russian winter is one main reason often cited by historians for the failure of the German offensive. No provision was made for extremely cold temperature in Russia which at times was as low as -40o F. Vehicle engines froze, artillery and rifles were rendered useless by frozen lubricants. Grease, oil and other lubricants with cold resistant properties were needed to keep vehicles and guns in action as the normal issues were found ineffective. While the Germans did not have these, the Russians in contrast had developed them years before.

One critical failure was that no provision was made for cold weather clothing, as it was assumed that the campaign would be over before the onset of winter. Troops resorted to stuffing newspaper into summer uniform to keep warm. It was estimated that 14,000 amputations resulted from frostbite during the winter and the impact on the morale of the soldiers can be imagined.
By October 1941, Hitler's lines of communication stretched from 800 km initially to about 1600 km eventually. As the invasion advanced, the lines of communication became unmanageable and unable to satisfy continuing logistics demands. Front line units were soon operating on a hand-to-mouth existence. Stretched to its limit, the state of the German supply lines created a logistical nightmare. Conditions rapidly became sub-human, supply systems failed and it was more a question of surviving than of fighting.
On 6 Dec 1941, after 168 days of continuous combat and within 30km of Moscow, the most modern and powerful armed force in the world was nearly exhausted. They were half-starved and half-frozen; out of fuel and ammunition. The overstretched 1,600km supply lines, exacerbated by severe transportation and weather problems, had proven to be grossly ineffective. The result was the Wehrmacht's inability to sustain the battle. Despite their precarious condition, the disciplined Wehrmacht tried desperately to reach Moscow. During the final stage, Stalin's Red Army counter-attacked, forcing a hasty retreat of Hitler's forces. Although the war was to continue a few more years, this failure, as the first German defeat in the Russian war, had a devastating impact on the Germans.
The Wehrmacht's greatest resupply failures can be summarised as follows: a) its inability to sustain the force; b) excessive long lines of communications, c) over dependence on rail roads, d) severe shortfall in motor transport capability, and e) untrafficable roads causing a total collapse of the supply system resulting in diversions of supplies, hoarding and total lack of confidence in the supply system as resupply could not sustain the battle.

Lessons Learnt
The account given above has examined logistics support in 'Operation Barbarossa" and found that logistics constrained the war effort and contributed significantly to German failure. The Wehrmacht was not prepared logistically to project combat power deep into Russia and as seen above, had much difficulty deploying to the theatre. These problems clearly constrained early combat operations and resulted in long term waste and inefficiency that limited a larger or more successful effort.
What then are the lessons that can be learnt?
Though the nature of conflict has changed drastically since World War Two, some of the lessons will still be relevant if examined in light with more recent battles in mind. Some of the more significant lessons include:
a. Adequate planning and preparations under the tranquillity of peace is the key towards sustainability. The lesson learnt is the need for proper planning and adequate stockpiling of reserves and resources during peacetime, to prevent a shortage or cut-off of supplies during wartime.
b. Logistics considerations belong not only in the highest echelons of military planning during the process of preparation for war and for specific wartime operations, but may well become the controlling element with relation to timing a successful operation. Conflicts will not succeed without the pragmatic considerations of subsistence, ammunition, repair parts, fuel and transport.
What appears to be an apparent capability on a Commander's map board is brought face to face with an often harsh reality when logistical considerations are factored in.
c. The campaign will keep us mindful of the importance of logistics in military history and of the necessity to use a balanced and mature judgement when moving with the offensive posture on the battlefield. A fine line must be discerned and then drawn between reckless proposals and boldness - that line is established by logistical acumen.
d. There is a need for a single command to oversee the allocation of scarce logistics resources especially transport and ammunition. The failure to do so will have drastic consequences. In comparison, one of the main reasons for the success of logistics in the Gulf War was the effective centralised planning and allocation of resources by the central command.
e. Logistics support must be tailored according to the operating principles of the Army. If the emphasis is on fast moving battles fought by the armour, then the logistics support must be realistic and bold enough to support the needs.
f. Logistics can be a force multiplier; however, if not controlled, it can be the Achilles' heel of an operation. Combat forces deployed to a theatre without the required logistics structure to support will experience reduced combat effectiveness and low troop morale.


Conclusion
"Operation Barbarossa' provides graphic evidence that today's operational commander must thoroughly forecast, plan and allocate resources for adequate logistics support. Analysing the operation in retrospect, it can be concluded that German invasion was doomed to failure from the beginning. The failure to integrate logistics planning with strategic and tactical planning resulted in the invasion force reaching its culmination point short of the campaign's objective. As Hitler pushed his Army further to Moscow, the Army became over extended, and the campaign was lost.



ENDNOTES
1. Lucas, James. War on the Eastern Front, 1941 - 1945, P.V11
2. Fugate, Bryan. Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 P.85
3. Murray, Williamson. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaftte, 1933 - 1945, P.107
4. Lucas, James. Op.Cit, P.11
5. 1bid. P.8
6. Huston.A. James. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775 - 1953, P.665
7. Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallestein to Patton, P.145
8. Fugate, Bryan. Op.Cit, P.101
9. Lucas, James. Op.Cit, P.8
10. 1bid. P.87

Bibliography
1. Taylor, AJP. The Second World War - An Illustrated History. Hamish Hamilton Publishers, 1975.
2. Fugate, Bryan. Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front. 1941, Presidio Press, 1984.
3. Lucas, James. War on the Eastern Front, 1941 - 1945, Jane's Publishing Company, 1979.
4. Murray, Williamson. Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933 - 1945, Air University Press, 1983.
5. Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallestein to Patton, Cambridge University Press, 1977
6. Huston.A.James. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775 - 1953, 1966.
MAJ LOGANATHAN is currently S4, 3SIB. He completed the Singapore Command and Staff Course in 1996. He obtained a BA (Hons) degree in History from the NUS in 1988.
Last updated: 18-Jul-2005

[micky1up]

steed of course everything written down on paper is the truth and exactly what went on i could show u text that say completely the opposit written by equally quallified authors u have to take a more balanced view because one author say this is correct it dosent make it so! all i am saying is that germany had the capability to win had the conditions in there command structure and supply problem areas been adressed your saying they could never had won full stop ! that is called absolutism and very few of the authors even in the pages u have shown above would subscribe to that kind of thinking

[STEED]

I debate this on another forum and all say it was a dead duck great debates on the eastern front. ;)

[Abraham]

Interesting link to the article of Loganathan, Steed. :up:

Leadership requires taking in lessons from the past and applying then for to future of a country.
The whole attack on the Sovjet Union was certainly proof of Hitlers complete lack of strategic leadership. Hitler got more raw materials per month during the Molotov - Von Ribbentrob Treaty then after conquering large parts of the Sovjet Union (at higher expenses). So he was basically fighting for and losing stuff he already got without a fight.
Furthermore he started this ideology-inspired fight knowing - but neglecting - that behind his back Britain was far from beaten and political and material support in the States for Britain was growing.
All this less then 25 years after Germany had lost a devastating two front war.
A. Hitler must have been a Braniack.

The deeper answer to the topic question is more philosophical. It's a question of political systems, i.e. tyranny versus democracy to prevent anarchy, the classic Greek way.
While a dictator may provide strong leadership his total power contains the seeds for his downfall. Dictators tend to become over-self confident, which makes them vulnerable for making mistakes. But who stops a dictator from making mistakes. Dictatorship doesn't provide for that scenario. That's why tyrannies often end in anarchy.
Enters democracy with it's checks and balances...

Democracy is the long term winner. Anytime, anywhere.

[STEED]

Democracy is the long term winner. Anytime, anywhere.

I agree with that one :up:

[joea]

Well, here is one dissenting view (I don't his guys arguments, but it gives one something to think about) on Germany's best chance to win.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/
Interesting read.

[Type941]

He wouldn't have made so many costly mistakes!

Do you agree?

If he wouldn't have wasted time with building mk1 and mk2 tanks, or properly equipped them, or used sloping armor from early war, or the 37mm pak guns were actually accounting for fact that other tanks had armour thicker than they could penetrate, or that war was about commanders judged on success not ability to carryout stupid orders, a lot of things would have been different,....

Had Hitler not spend tonnes of steel on armor for westwall, but for tanks, he could have had more of them as well. A lot in WW2 is about Germany actually having ****ty equipment until it got too late. Really.

[STEED]

And one more never ever wake Hitler up even if the Allies landed in Normandy, to late they landed.

[TLAM Strike]

A lot in WW2 is about Germany actually having ****ty equipment until it got too late. Really. Not all of it was ****ty some was just well made junk like all those Bolt Action rifles they used. See why the US really turned the war in Europe around? ;) With the M1 we could simply shoot way faster, also the Garand was hard to reload with half a clip so troops with them would just expend the remaining rounds so the enemy got a few “bonus” rounds shot at them. You just got to love a gun that encourages its shooter to fire more rounds than necessary to hit the target. :up:

Plus that ‘PING’ sound the Garand makes when the spent clip is ejected is scientifically proven to hurt the ears of Fascists. :-j

[Type941]

A lot in WW2 is about Germany actually having ****ty equipment until it got too late. Really. Not all of it was ****ty some was just well made junk like all those Bolt Action rifles they used. See why the US really turned the war in Europe around? ;) With the M1 we could simply shoot way faster, also the Garand was hard to reload with half a clip so troops with them would just expend the remaining rounds so the enemy got a few “bonus” rounds shot at them. You just got to love a gun that encourages its shooter to fire more rounds than necessary to hit the target. :up:

Plus that ‘PING’ sound the Garand makes when the spent clip is ejected is scientifically proven to hurt the ears of Fascists. :-j

You still can't repute the fact that it took about 2 to 3 allied soldiers to kill a German one. Now that's embarassing. Even more so was the fact that France was military superior to Germany when the war started.

Just reading about the forts in Fermont. The coolest thing is misinterpretation of Maginot Line. IT's been built precisely to force Germany to invade through Belgium, and french would fight germans there in offensive strategy, but sadly the military thought in France took different turn. However the forts they build with defences and all were bloody impossible to breakthrough, had they been used as intended (to support troop mobilazations behind lines and hold enemy for few weeks) lots of things would have been different.

I don't think the rifle americans used was much decisive on big scale. The germans as mentioned, were much more effective in useing the equiment they had.

Also, another fact rarely mentioned in traditional history books, is that a huge majority of casulties in WW2 was NOT caused by bullets. It was caused by shellfire. And germans had their shells somewhat much beter at causing damage. :ping: In WW1, the majority of casulties on contrary, were caused by bullets.


And here's another fact. Germans Mk1 and Mk2 tanks that they had when war started, were armored WORSE than the Renault tanks french had in WW1. So much for the myth of mechanized army of the Nazis! :|\

[STEED]

True the Panzer 1 and 2 were rubbish and long out of date by 1940.

[Type941]

never mind using 100hp engines to move tanks weing 6-10 tonnes...


Than there was the whole 'let's use the czech tanks' phaze. :) Oh there really was a lot of things that is little told about how actually flawed the german machine was.

[TLAM Strike]

A lot in WW2 is about Germany actually having ****ty equipment until it got too late. Really. Not all of it was ****ty some was just well made junk like all those Bolt Action rifles they used. See why the US really turned the war in Europe around? ;) With the M1 we could simply shoot way faster, also the Garand was hard to reload with half a clip so troops with them would just expend the remaining rounds so the enemy got a few “bonus” rounds shot at them. You just got to love a gun that encourages its shooter to fire more rounds than necessary to hit the target. :up:

Plus that ‘PING’ sound the Garand makes when the spent clip is ejected is scientifically proven to hurt the ears of Fascists. :-j

You still can't repute the fact that it took about 2 to 3 allied soldiers to kill a German one. Now that's embarassing. I'm not quite sure what you mean by that. Do you mean that there was a 3 to 1 kill ratio in favor of the Germans or did the Allied soldiers just gang up on a lone German. A single guy is very hard to elimnate compaired to a group.


Also, another fact rarely mentioned in traditional history books, is that a huge majority of casulties in WW2 was NOT caused by bullets. It was caused by shellfire. And germans had their shells somewhat much beter at causing damage. :ping: In WW1, the majority of casulties on contrary, were caused by bullets. You are forgetting supression fire. A gun with a higher rate of fire allows you to pin your enemy down allowing you to take him out with indirect fire weapons (shells) or CAS. ;)

[Type941]

obviously i mean the efficiency.

[SubSerpent]

He might have won had he shaved off that ridiculous mustache. He looks like he's got a little vagina on his face! :rotfl:

[Type XXIII]

All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.


History shows us that good always wins eventually because it is the victorious who write history. :hmm:



Anyway, concerning my claims earlier this thread, I've done some slightly better research and found out my sources were rather thin. (Secondary online sources quoting a revisionist essay.) :damn:

Still, it is an interesting theory, and I still belive, as most of Hitler's generals, that a war between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia was inevitable.

And concerning Mauser K98k vs. M1 Garand.

They are different rifles, representing different doctrines. American infantry doctrine was based around the riflemen, while the German infantry doctrine was based more around the machine gun team.

The Garand might be better than the Mauser for suppressive fire, but that doesn't matter much, when the Germans are supported by a MG42.

You can't really say which one is better, as both doctrines have their advantages and disadvantages. The American doctrine is the one that has survived, but that is because of technological improvement as well as its efficiency.

[micky1up]

oh right ok good vs evil one dictator against another here stalin was just as mad and dangerous as hitler i think the words you were looking for was nessessary good as opposed to nessesary evil

[U-552Erich-Topp]

Stalin was more mad and evil than Hitler. In Hitlers words "If you want to know who is the most evil dictator, look to the North (Russia - Stalin). With 27 million of Stalins' own people murdered during his reign, he sure tops Hilter on that one.

[CCIP]

Stalin was more mad and evil than Hitler. In Hitlers words "If you want to know who is the most evil dictator, look to the North (Russia - Stalin). With 27 million of Stalins' own people murdered during his reign, he sure tops Hilter on that one.

That's a pretty unintelligent approach I think. It's like trying to say "Who's worse - Charlie Manson or Ted Bundy", or something like that. You'd be falling into Stalin's own trap of "A million is just a statistic".

The bottom line on Stalin is that, given the choice between Hitler and him, Stalin was the far lesser evil both for the Soviet people and the wider world.

[The Avon Lady]

All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.

History shows us that good always wins eventually because it is the victorious who write history. :hmm:
An overly repeated quote which is gibberish.

[joea]

All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.

History shows us that good always wins eventually because it is the victorious who write history. :hmm:
An overly repeated quote which is gibberish.

Yes agree again. Real history is written by academics who go into archives and do hard research anyway, not by subsimmer geeks on the net. :doh: (Including yours truly, even if I got a MA in history).

[joea]

bla bla bla "justify my hero" bla bla

[Abraham]

bla bla bla "justify my hero" bla bla
???

[joea]

Just a comment on what IMO are stupid comparisons between murderous dictators. Every time someone (around here it seems to be Stalin vs. Hitler) tries to point the finger at one it often is to make the other look better, or at least not as bad. Bit cheeky to alter the quote but hey I know a lot of the posters here well enough with previous statements to know who is who.

[Abraham]

Bit cheeky to alter the quote...
"You took the words right out of my mouth." (Paradise by the Dashboard Lights) :D

[STEED]

Stalin was more mad and evil than Hitler. In Hitlers words "If you want to know who is the most evil dictator, look to the North (Russia - Stalin). With 27 million of Stalins' own people murdered during his reign, he sure tops Hilter on that one.

Thats a dumb comment due to Stalin was longer in power than Hitler.

Stalin 1924 - 1953
Hitler 1934 - 1945

[Type XXIII]

All evil is at some point or another doomed to failure.

History shows us that good always wins eventually because it is the victorious who write history. :hmm:
An overly repeated quote which is gibberish.

Yes agree again. Real history is written by academics who go into archives and do hard research anyway, not by subsimmer geeks on the net. :doh: (Including yours truly, even if I got a MA in history).

First of all, that exact quote can't be overly repeated, since I made it up. :P Of course, others have said the same thing with different words before me.

Secondly, it is not gibberish. Even if those academics are doing the hard research, it is their perceptions of history that is accepted as history. And those perceptions is influenced by their idea of 'good' and 'bad', and by those archives that you mention, which is the documents that have survived, and, in many cases, are written by the victorious.

I'm not saying that historians are making up or concealing events, but that their interpretations of those events are necessarily based on the historioans' personal experiences. History is a soft science, and nothing can be proven beyond all doubt.

[August]

You still can't repute the fact that it took about 2 to 3 allied soldiers to kill a German one. Now that's embarassing.

But it says nothing about the fighting skill of either side. 3 to 1 is the historical standard casualty ratio for attackers vs defenders when they're closely matched in military competence and skill.

Offensive operations are always more costly for the attacker, who must advance into prepared killing fields against defenders who fight from the relative safety of fortified positions and can move up reinforcements to plug holes wherever they're needed.

[joea]

First of all, that exact quote can't be overly repeated, since I made it up. :P Of course, others have said the same thing with different words before me.

Secondly, it is not gibberish. Even if those academics are doing the hard research, it is their perceptions of history that is accepted as history. And those perceptions is influenced by their idea of 'good' and 'bad', and by those archives that you mention, which is the documents that have survived, and, in many cases, are written by the victorious.

I'm not saying that historians are making up or concealing events, but that their interpretations of those events are necessarily based on the historioans' personal experiences. History is a soft science, and nothing can be proven beyond all doubt.

Simply put, I agree but it does not follow that the "losers" were "right" (whatever that means) as some people who repeat that are trying to make "their" side look better. Another example, Cold War revisionism started in the USA, and based on new interpretations to show (according to this school) the Cold War was provoked and drivine by the US with the USSR in a reactive role. Agree or not, this came out of one of the main protagonists, who ended up winning, albeit at a moment (late 60s and early 70s) when the US had lost in Vietnam. Today the field is in flux, can't really say what trends will emerge, 10, 20 or 50 years from now.

[Konovalov]

Simply put, I agree but it does not follow that the "losers" were "right" (whatever that means) as some people who repeat that are trying to make "their" side look better. Another example, Cold War revisionism started in the USA, and based on new interpretations to show (according to this school) the Cold War was provoked and drivine by the US with the USSR in a reactive role. Agree or not, this came out of one of the main protagonists, who ended up winning, albeit at a moment (late 60s and early 70s) when the US had lost in Vietnam. Today the field is in flux, can't really say what trends will emerge, 10, 20 or 50 years from now.

Excellent comments. :yep: This thread has made for some interesting reading. :up:

[Abraham]

Exactly, the statement that the Victorious write the history is a half-truth.
There are many historians who try to serve science by civing a critical look at both the actions and plans of victor and vanguished. Furthermore after personal interests and human emotions have moved to the background there are historians from the vanquished side who add to the body of historical views, not to mention reformists who usually pop up after 20 or 30 years...

[scandium]

Exactly, the statement that the Victorious write the history is a half-truth.
There are many historians who try to serve science by civing a critical look at both the actions and plans of victor and vanguished. Furthermore after personal interests and human emotions have moved to the background there are historians from the vanquished side who add to the body of historical views, not to mention reformists who usually pop up after 20 or 30 years...

Its a half-truth that necessarily contains a grain of truth ;) The problem with interpreting history, which one must do to write about it, is that it is largely a subjective matter.

For instance, take the situation in Iraq. There are many factions involved on the Iraqi side (some of which seem to be fighting each other as much or more than the coalition) yet they collectively tend to get lumped together as "insurgents" or "terrorists", or more colourfully, as "Islamo-Fascists", "Beheaders", or "Homicide Bombers" (depending on whichever euphamism is currently in vogue). Each term has different connotations. If you're simply an Iraqi patriot whose had family killed or some other wrong you feel the need to right by picking up a gun to fight the invader with, then you're probably simply an "insurgent". Depending on the outcome of the war you'll likely be remembered in two very different ways.

If the "insurgents" and "terrorists" win our Iraqi patriot may be fortunate enough to go down in history as a patriot who fought off, at enormous odds technologically, militarily, etc, an invasion by the world's Super Power and its allies. You're then a hero.

If, on the other hand, the coalition triumphs and the insurgency is stamped out, then you will not be remember as a hero. The history texts future Iraqis are schooled in will paint you as a terrorist who defied the new Iraqi government by bringing arms to bear against it. You will be a remembered as a terrorist and a traitor.

[Oberon]

I knew this would come round to Iraq eventually :-?

[scandium]

I knew this would come round to Iraq eventually :-?

Its an historical event we are seeing unfold day by day ;)

[Oberon]

Indeed...can't help but wonder what my children will be reading about it though...who would have thought fifty-sixty years ago that Russia would be a partner with the US, and that most of us would be watching television on Japanese sets.

[SUBMAN1]

Wow - Speculation at its finest. From lack of subs, to lack of bombers, to incorrectly trying to turn ME-262's into bombers, to discounting a jew who was trying to tell him how to build the bomb, to the bomber that could deliver that bomb to the US of A...The list is endless.

The short answer is, like all wars in history, it is the screw ups you make that cost you the war and Hitler made plenty of screw ups.

-S

[Abraham]

Actually everybody screws up in war. The party that wins the final Victory is the one who screwed up less than the looser. That's what war's about in my view.
:D

[Bertgang]

Usually, the stronger side wins: so, little hope for Germany and Japan (and Italy, if it has to be counted) to win against quite all other countries on the planet.

The big mistake was simply to make a world war in such conditions; really difficult to have a good outcome that way.

[STEED]

History is written by the winners, so to balance that out read some books by the losers. :hmm:

[CCIP]

History is written by the winners, so to balance that out read some books by the losers. :hmm:

Curiously, this popular myth has actually been very much disproven by Germany in the 20's and early 30's - German historians (directly supported by the German foreign service) had at the time embarked on a campaign to present German involvement and causes of World War I less negatively and elicit sympathy from the west for the hardships that the Treaty of Versailles has brought upon them - and had actually succeeded. Although later revisions have tried to turn the War Guilt back on Germany, the more widespread opinion has ever since remained more or less sympathetic. :hmm:

[STEED]

;)