Topside torpedoes

[John Pancoast]

I can't remember; what year did the u-boats stop carrying these ?

[Aktungbby]

I can't remember; what year did the u-boats stop carrying these ?these what?

[FUBAR295]

these what?

External Torpedoes.

[Jimbuna]

I can't remember; what year did the u-boats stop carrying these ?

Hi John if you'd asked me the other night on Discord I would have still had access to my reference materials but as is typical, I moved them into the loft this morning.

Sooooo iirc it was early to mid 44 when the Allies gained air supremacy which meant U-Boats could not stay surfaced long enough to charge their batteries, not to mention the long process of loading torpedoes.

For a more precise answer I'd suggest having a look over at https://uboat.net/

[John Pancoast]

Hi John if you'd asked me the other night on Discord I would have still had access to my reference materials but as is typical, I moved them into the loft this morning.

Sooooo iirc it was early to mid 44 when the Allies gained air supremacy which meant U-Boats could not stay surfaced long enough to charge their batteries, not to mention the long process of loading torpedoes.

For a more precise answer I'd suggest having a look over at https://uboat.net/

Thanks Jimbuna.

[Jimbuna]

Thanks Jimbuna.

No problem and iirc the TypeII, XXIII and XXI were the only boats designed not to carry externals.

[John Pancoast]

No problem and iirc the TypeII, XXIII and XXI were the only boats designed not to carry externals.




:up:

[Aktungbby]

the question intrigued me so I did some serious pervitin induced:rock: homework over breakfast. Nothing is particularly extant on torpedo storage other than it was dangerous, time consuming and only suited to calm waters; which the winter Atlantic was decidedly not! :hmmm: they key to the myriad aspects of the issue was the closing of the Mid-atlantic Gap. Only low maintenance G7a eels could be carried externally as every other type (G7e's ZaunK's, Foxers ) required high battery maintenance-new fact for me! I'll be more authentic in SH-V!!:O: Also, torpedos in the external containers were susceptible to depth-charge attacks and were often damaged. No astute commander following such an attack would risk the amount of time 'hazarding his vessel' against the futility of a defunct eel lugged inside the pressure hull. For certain, the type XI's wouldn't have wasted the always precious fuel-consuming weight on its capacity for 10 eels stored topside As mid ocean Milch-cow resupply subs got scarcer Ten boats of this type were commissioned:


U-459 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-459), commissioned 15 November 1941, scuttled 24 July 1943
U-460 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-460), commissioned 24 December 1941, sunk 4 October 1943
U-461 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-461), commissioned 30 January 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
U-462 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-462), commissioned 5 March 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
U-463 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-463), commissioned 2 April 1942, sunk 15 May 1943
U-464 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-464), commissioned 30 April 1942, scuttled 20 August 1942
U-487 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-487), commissioned 21 December 1942, sunk 13 July 1943
U-488 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-488), commissioned 1 February 1943, sunk 26 April 1944
U-489 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-489), commissioned 8 March 1943, sunk 4 August 1943
U-490 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-490), commissioned 27 March 1943, sunk 12 June 1944 :rock:

The Mid-Atlantic Gap is a geographical term applied to an undefended area beyond the reach of land-based RAF Coastal Command (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAF_Coastal_Command)antisubmarine (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-submarine_warfare) (A/S) aircraft during the Battle of the Atlantic (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Atlantic) in the Second World War (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II). It is frequently known as The Black Pit, as well as the Atlantic Gap, Air Gap, Greenland (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenland) Gap, or just "the Gap". This resulted in heavy merchant shipping losses to U-boats (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U-boat). The gap was eventually closed in May 1943, as growing numbers of VLR Liberators (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-24_Liberator#Antisubmarine_and_maritime_patrols) (Very Long Range models) and escort carriers (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escort_carrier) became available, and as basing problems were addressed. Increasing availability of escort carriers (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escort_carrier) reduced the hazard of the Gap. After a crisis in March which nearly had Churchill and the Admiralty abandon convoys altogether, the Mid-Atlantic Gap was finally closed in May 1943, when RCAF VLRs became operational in Newfoundland, by which time the Battle of the Atlantic was largely won.



Given the decisive 'Black May' of 1943: 18 Uboats lost w/o corresponding damage to allied merchant vessels in the Atlantic; with 43 total due to losses in other theatres, 14 (most from all powerful aircraft) causing loss of experienced crews: especially the junior officers also intended as the next generation of kaleuns, the 'jig was up' in the first semester of '43. Wanze, foxer, Zaunkönig, and radar vulnerable schnorkels could not undo May '43. Döenitz stopping the Uboat campaign pulled all his boats on the 24th of the 'merry' month of May....for the allies-FIDO, Johnny Walkers 'creeping attacks', Liberator B-24's, and escort carriers! von C's ON WAR Rule one: "In all things be 'very strong"; two:"whenever possible increase firepower(numeric superiority-not just technical superiority; three: " Never count on your opponent doing what your plan call for him to do....":doh: for Germany all 3 rules met with: "war is simple but sometimes the simple thing is hard!" My bet is, externally stored U-boat eels began declining in June 1943 when Doenitz resumed his futile efforts...saving the Reich a few RieichsMarks for the Russian front:yep: ...pending further investigations of course!

[John Pancoast]

the question intrigued me so I did some serious pervitin induced:rock: homework over breakfast. Nothing is particularly extant on torpedo storage other than it was dangerous, time consuming and only suited to calm waters; which the winter Atlantic was decidedly not! :hmmm: they key to the myriad aspects of the issue was the closing of the Mid-atlantic Gap. Only low maintenance G7a eels could be carried externally as every other type (G7e's ZaunK's, Foxers ) required high battery maintenance-new fact for me! I'll be more authentic in SH-V!!:O: Also, torpedos in the external containers were susceptible to depth-charge attacks and were often damaged. No astute commander following such an attack would risk the amount of time 'hazarding his vessel' against the futility of a defunct eel lugged inside the pressure hull. For certain, the type XI's wouldn't have wasted the always precious fuel-consuming weight on its capacity for 10 eels stored topside As mid ocean Milch-cow resupply subs got scarcer Ten boats of this type were commissioned:


U-459 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-459), commissioned 15 November 1941, scuttled 24 July 1943
U-460 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-460), commissioned 24 December 1941, sunk 4 October 1943
U-461 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-461), commissioned 30 January 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
U-462 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-462), commissioned 5 March 1942, sunk 30 July 1943
U-463 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-463), commissioned 2 April 1942, sunk 15 May 1943
U-464 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-464), commissioned 30 April 1942, scuttled 20 August 1942
U-487 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-487), commissioned 21 December 1942, sunk 13 July 1943
U-488 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-488), commissioned 1 February 1943, sunk 26 April 1944
U-489 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-489), commissioned 8 March 1943, sunk 4 August 1943
U-490 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_submarine_U-490), commissioned 27 March 1943, sunk 12 June 1944 :rock:





Given the decisive 'Black May' of 1943: 18 Uboats lost w/o corresponding damage to allied merchant vessels in the Atlantic; with 43 total due to losses in other theatres, 14 (most from all powerful aircraft) causing loss of experienced crews: especially the junior officers also intended as the next generation of kaleuns, the 'jig was up' in the first semester of '43. Wanze, foxer, Zaunkönig, and radar vulnerable schnorkels could not undo May '43. Döenitz stopping the Uboat campaign pulled all his boats on the 24th of the 'merry' month of May....for the allies-FIDO, Johnny Walkers 'creeping attacks', Liberator B-24's, and escort carriers! von C's ON WAR Rule one: "In all things be 'very strong"; two:"whenever possible increase firepower(numeric superiority-not just technical superiority; three: " Never count on your opponent doing what your plan call for him to do....":doh: for Germany all 3 rules met with: "war is simple but sometimes the simple thing is hard!" My bet is, externally stored U-boat eels began declining in June 1943 when Doenitz resumed his futile efforts...saving the Reich a few RieichsMarks for the Russian front:yep: ...pending further investigations of course!







I also seem to recall that pressures at depth messed with them too.

[Aktungbby]

I can't remember; what year did the u-boats stop carrying these ?

I also seem to recall that pressures at depth messed with them too.I read
up on that too in the course of composing my post; but that had been solved-scandal notwithstanding- prior to the period involved with your question or Jimbuna's time frame. Essentially, I'm interested in finding any actual 'eel' manifest of a June '43 non-ace skippered U-boat outbound for the Gap....'twould shed much insight on the question.

[John Pancoast]

I read
up on that too in the course on comprising my post but that had been solved-scandal notwithstanding prior to the period involved with your question or Jimbuna's time frame. Essentially I'm interested in finding any actual 'eel' manifest of a June '43 non-ace skippered U-boat outbound for the Gap....'twould shed much insight on the question.




I think Blair mentioned some info. in his book, but my second volume fell apart recently.

[KriegsMarine]

these what?

I guess it's gotta be the year of 1943, maybe after the Black May.

[Aktungbby]

A LITTLE REQUIRED READING:yep:: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1599&context=etd (https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1599&context=etd) pg. 65! DRUMBEATER HARDIGAN ONLY CARRIED 15 EELS ON HIS TYPE IXB U-123 ON EACH OF TWO PATROLS (7 & 8)TO THE AMERICAN COAST. pg. 147-148: With torpedoes, Hardigan bagged eight ships on each patrol, and three with deck gun fire: a poor performance of an average of two + eels per victim. It gets you a knights cross but does not win wars. It is noteworthy that for whatever reason, only 15 were carried on the 6, 000+ mile voyages
23 December 1941 – 9 February 1942 (Previous to black May 1943) out of a possible 22 maximum; (the IXD could carry 24.) Type IXs had six torpedo tubes (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torpedo_tube); four at the bow and two at the stern. They carried six reloads internally and had five external torpedo containers (three at the stern and two at the bow) which stored ten additional torpedoes. The total of 22 torpedoes allowed U-boat commanders to follow a convoy and strike night after night. KALEUN HARDIGAN WAS 16 STORED EELS SHORT OVER TWO PATROLS: AT HIS 2 EEL PER SHIP 'KILL' RATE, EIGHT MORE ALLIED SHIPS WERE NOT SUNK. REINHARD HARDIGAN DIED AT AGE 105....OBVIOUSLY HE MADE FEW MISTAKES, IE NOT CARRYING A LOT OF TOP SPARES G7a'S IN OPERATION DRUMBEATER.....:hmmm: :salute:

[Kapitän]

Standing B.d.U. Order No.305, from 3 May 1943 states:


1. Type VII B, C, D - None
2. Type IX B, C - Normally, none - IX C only with Special Patrol Order, 2 Upper Deck Containers with 2 Torpedoes
3. Type IX D - 12 Upper Deck Containers with 12 Torpdoes

[John Pancoast]

Standing B.d.U. Order No.305, from 3 May 1943 states:


1. Type VII B, C, D - None
2. Type IX B, C - Normally, none - IX C only with Special Patrol Order, 2 Upper Deck Containers with 2 Torpedoes
3. Type IX D - 12 Upper Deck Containers with 12 Torpdoes

Thanks !

[Aktungbby]

My bet is, externally stored U-boat eels began declining in June 1943 when Doenitz resumed his futile efforts...saving the Reich a few RieichsMarks for the Russian front:yep: ...pending further investigations of course! I guess it's gotta be the year of 1943, maybe after the Black May.

Standing B.d.U. Order No.305, from 3 May 1943 states:


1. Type VII B, C, D - None
2. Type IX B, C - Normally, none - IX C only with Special Patrol Order, 2 Upper Deck Containers with 2 Torpedoes
3. Type IX D - 12 Upper Deck Containers with 12 Torpdoes TAAAA daaaa! :arrgh!: is there a web site for that order?

[Kapitän]

TAAAA daaaa! :arrgh!: is there a web site for that order?




http://www.uboatarchive.net/index.html

[Aktungbby]

thanx!

[FUBAR295]

If you go to http://www.uboatarchive.net/BDU/BDUKTB30323.htm and on page 330 the following shows up on Doenitz's KTB for May 1 to 15, 1943.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

VI. General: Provision of upper deck containers: On 30.4 the order was given to omit upper deck containers when fitting out all boats operating in the North Atlantic. This order was necessitated by the gradually increasing number of cases where, when the boats were depth-charged or bombed, especially at fairly great depths, the upper deck containers were cracked or started leaking, or were swamped and thus very gravely endangered the boat, especially the Type IX which carries 8 deck containers. It is suspected that this has been the cause of the loss of many boats. The following orders are now in force for the provision of upper deck containers: 1) Type VIIb, c, d - none. 2) Type IXb, c - normally none. Type IXc is to take 6 upper deck containers with 6 torpedoes when special orders are given, but only on operations in the south. 3) Type IXd - 12 upper deck containers with 12 torpedoes. Thus, the upper deck cargo for IXc boats operating in the
south has been reduced from 8 to 6 torpedoes to reduce the danger to the boat if containers should spring a leak.
In connection with the foregoing order Ob.d.M. made the following decision regarding new construction of upper deck containers. i) Containers on all boats in commission will not be replaced if they have proved faulty. ii) New construction Type VIIc will be equipped with stronger iron upper deck containers as already planned, also, as before, the loading gear for use at sea. iii) New construction Type IXc will be equipped with 6 upper deck containers built of light metal, but possessing greater stability; Type IXd will carry 12 containers. iv) Type IXb and c boats putting to sea without upper deck containers will not have their ballast redistributed, but will carry some 5 tons less fuel. v) Type Xb will be issued with 6 upper deck containers as before, but they are only to be put on board if special orders are given.

http://www.uboatarchive.net/BDU/U-505TableMargin.gif

[John Pancoast]

If you go to http://www.uboatarchive.net/BDU/BDUKTB30323.htm and on page 330 the following shows up on Doenitz's KTB for May 1 to 15, 1943.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

VI. General: Provision of upper deck containers: On 30.4 the order was given to omit upper deck containers when fitting out all boats operating in the North Atlantic. This order was necessitated by the gradually increasing number of cases where, when the boats were depth-charged or bombed, especially at fairly great depths, the upper deck containers were cracked or started leaking, or were swamped and thus very gravely endangered the boat, especially the Type IX which carries 8 deck containers. It is suspected that this has been the cause of the loss of many boats. The following orders are now in force for the provision of upper deck containers: 1) Type VIIb, c, d - none. 2) Type IXb, c - normally none. Type IXc is to take 6 upper deck containers with 6 torpedoes when special orders are given, but only on operations in the south. 3) Type IXd - 12 upper deck containers with 12 torpedoes. Thus, the upper deck cargo for IXc boats operating in the
south has been reduced from 8 to 6 torpedoes to reduce the danger to the boat if containers should spring a leak.
In connection with the foregoing order Ob.d.M. made the following decision regarding new construction of upper deck containers. i) Containers on all boats in commission will not be replaced if they have proved faulty. ii) New construction Type VIIc will be equipped with stronger iron upper deck containers as already planned, also, as before, the loading gear for use at sea. iii) New construction Type IXc will be equipped with 6 upper deck containers built of light metal, but possessing greater stability; Type IXd will carry 12 containers. iv) Type IXb and c boats putting to sea without upper deck containers will not have their ballast redistributed, but will carry some 5 tons less fuel. v) Type Xb will be issued with 6 upper deck containers as before, but they are only to be put on board if special orders are given.

http://www.uboatarchive.net/BDU/U-505TableMargin.gif









:yeah:

[FUBAR295]

Just a side note, this is used by the mod "Just Following Orders" or "JFO" which makes a difference in how you approach things, because of those orders. It shows just how thoroughly they research their material for use. A great mod that I think should be used.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

[John Pancoast]

Just a side note, this is used by the mod "Just Following Orders" or "JFO" which makes a difference in how you approach things, because of those orders. It shows just how thoroughly they research their material for use. A great mod that I think should be used.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295


I downloaded it a long time ago, just haven't got around to trying it yet. Thanks for the tip.

[FUBAR295]

John, it is a must for me, as one who keeps a real full KTB, does both manual and Weapons Officer targeting ( depends on what is going on ), and try to follow orders coming from BdU. Keeps the SH3 interesting, at least for me.

Try figuring out some of those orders and implement them, it can be interesting.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

[John Pancoast]

John, it is a must for me, as one who keeps a real full KTB, does both manual and Weapons Officer targeting ( depends on what is going on ), and try to follow orders coming from BdU. Keeps the SH3 interesting, at least for me.

Try figuring out some of those orders and implement them, it can be interesting.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295




Sounds good, once I get this campaign over I'll give it a try ! Though fishing season and summer is around the corner too.....

[FUBAR295]

My bet is, externally stored U-boat eels began declining in June 1943 when Doenitz resumed his futile efforts...saving the Reich a few RieichsMarks for the Russian front:yep: ...pending further investigations of course!

You were close on the date, and looks like 30 April 1943 is the time the orders went out and mentioned in Doenitz KTB on 7 May 1943. Gold star for you. :salute:

I always find reading Doenitz's KTB interesting as there are some gems of information in there if you care to look for them.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

[Aktungbby]

I always find reading Doenitz's KTB interesting as there are some gems of information in there if you care to look for them.
The information is interesting but what strikes home is the consistent undertone of chaos and less than victory even in the daily reports. The Kreigsmarine is not winning at all; it is knee-jerk responding to the allied effort-particularly the air power- against which there is no solution.... In police work this is reactive not proactive. To win a global strategic war ya gotta be proactive and make the allies respond (knee-jerk) futilely to what you are doing to them. Minor tactical propaganda bright spots wll not carry the day. From may '43 of particular interest: The gaps caused by a rapid succession of convoy attacks in the North Atlantic during March had to be closed rapidly, as a large number of boats were needed to intercept the then widely scattered convoys. The IXc boats putting out in March and the steady stream of VIIc boats leaving port in April were able to make good this deficiency. b) Attacks on convoys during the past two months have definitely shown that Type IX boats are very vulnerable to bombing or depth charge attacks by reason of their more complicated structure. Comparative losses in the Atlantic give the following picture: Losses:
Type IX Type VIIc March: 5 7 2 of these during attack on convoy 4 of these during attack on convoy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - April: 7 and 1 boat that struck a mine 4 5 of these during attack on convoy 2 of these during attack on convoy - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - The ratio of Type IX to Type VIIc boats is 1 - 3. Hence the losses of Type IXc boats are much heavier, now that enemy defences in the North Atlantic have been strengthened, and operations are only justifiable if chances of success are proportionally increased. c) The expectation of better opportunities in the North Atlantic which led to the order for operations there being issued on 6.4 has not been borne out by the final information reports for March and April made by boats in the Cape Town, Natal - Freetown and Caribbean area. Attacks made on convoys by U 510, 169, 515 showed that great successes are possible because of favorable anti-submarine conditions (few naval escorts with convoys and they lack experience). Thus despite less shipping in these areas chances are actually no less than in the North Atlantic. It has therefore been decided: Type IXc boats leaving French ports are to be detailed to remote western or southern operational areas. Boats of the same type from home ports will still make their first operational trip in the North Atlantic. In short: the bigger badder IX types (with 33% more torprdoes??!!) are removed from the principle zone of conflict- the mid Atlantic convoy routes....and as in the post above only carrying 66% of their intended torpedo loads any way. (15 0f 22) Or as I pointed out with Hardigan (post#8) and his 15 eels as the prima facia example: 8 ships will not be sunk and he was an exceptionally proactive ace kaleun. Von C's rule 2: "whenever possible increase firepower" is kaput by '43; no victory at sea is feasible.:yep:

[John Pancoast]

[COLOR=palegreen]The information is interesting but what strikes home is the consistent undertone of chaos and less than victory even in the daily reports. The Kreigsmarine is not winning at all; it is knee-jerk responding to the allied effort-particularly the air power- against which there is no solution.... In police work this is reactive not proactive. To win a global strategic war ya gotta be proactive and make the allies respond (knee-jerk) futilely to what you are doing to them. Minor tactical propaganda bright spots wll not carry the day.

I agree completely with your thoughts; some of the ideas Doenitz et al came up with make one shake their head at their obvious silliness and no chance of success and that's not just from a hindsight point of view nor the usual "It was Hitler's fault, if he'd only listened to me" so common in memoirs.
"Chaos" is a perfect description for it. Always seems to be a "What should we do? ?" aspect, followed by a "I don't know" to many decisions.

Partly it's because Germany was so outclassed in manpower, industry, and technical areas but just as much because Doenitz was just plain "out Admiraled".

That's not meant to be braggadocio; more of what seems to be fact.

[John Pancoast]

Just a side note, this is used by the mod "Just Following Orders" or "JFO" which makes a difference in how you approach things, because of those orders. It shows just how thoroughly they research their material for use. A great mod that I think should be used.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

Have an installation question about this mod. In reading the instructions about editing the menu.ini file, it seems he's saying you must use the items listed in the gui he used for the relevant .ini editing.
I.e., OLC this and that.tgas. (convoy map, etc.).

I have the FLB .tga equivalents in my current install; can I use those still with the needed to do so .ini editing of course, instead of the OLC ones the author lists ?
If not, which makman gui version is he referencing to get the .tga files from ?

[FUBAR295]

Have an installation question about this mod. In reading the instructions about editing the menu.ini file, it seems he's saying you must use the items listed in the gui he used for the relevant .ini editing.
I.e., OLC this and that.tgas. (convoy map, etc.).

I have the Fubar .tga equivalents in my current install; can I use those still with the needed to do so .ini editing of course, instead of the OLC ones the author lists ?
If not, which makman gui version is he referencing to get the .tga files from ?

If you have those items already installed , I would think then, you would need to change the location to OLC. According to the directions :

It is important that the location of the files (data/Menu/OLC/) remain unchanged as that directory is used to update the orders using the new executable file (see Section 4.2.2.1).

Its been a while since I installed this and went back to look at the file. I believe the .exe for JFO will look for and place the needed information on the drop downs so I would think the .ini needs to be pointing to OLC file.


Trust this helps.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

[John Pancoast]

If you have those items already installed , I would think then, you would need to change the location to OLC. According to the directions :

It is important that the location of the files (data/Menu/OLC/) remain unchanged as that directory is used to update the orders using the new executable file (see Section 4.2.2.1).

Its been a while since I installed this and went back to look at the file. I believe the .exe for JFO will look for and place the needed information on the drop downs so I would think the .ini needs to be pointing to OLC file.


Trust this helps.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295


Yes, I was wondering about that. I'll make a OLC path jsgme folder with the tgas I already have and give it a try, thanks.

[FUBAR295]

If not, which makman gui version is he referencing to get the .tga files from ?

Not sure as I do not use this.

In looking at the .exe for JFO in is dated 03/03/2013 and looking at Makman Gui's It appears that version 3.4 or earlier would be your choice.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

[John Pancoast]

Not sure as I do not use this.

In looking at the .exe for JFO in is dated 03/03/2013 and looking at Makman Gui's It appears that version 3.4 or earlier would be your choice.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

Thanks, in doing some more digging I came across a post where rude warrior says he's using Magui F.
Think I'll download that and pull the needed .tga files from it vs using the one's I already have.

[John Pancoast]

Or maybe the JFO executable provides the needed files. Lots of testing to come. :hmmm:

[FUBAR295]

John, sorry for not be better help as it was a while ago I set JFO up and the details fail to come to memory. But the effort will pay off in keeping SH3 challenging.

One thing I did do was set up a different JFO file for GWX, NYGM and WAC.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

[Aktungbby]

Partly it's because Germany was so outclassed in manpower, industry, and technical areas but just as much because Doenitz was just plain "out Admiraled".

That's not meant to be braggadocio; more of what seems to be fact.That would be von C's rule 1::yep: "In all things be very strong."...starting with good geography ie: don't be 'twixt the British Empire to the West and the Russian Empire to the East; seeking "a Teutonic place in the sun" from 1914 to 1945...with a 20 year armistice to grow more expendible cannon fodder. We live in the chaos of the 20 th century's still no wiser(gotterdammerung) and are in WW 2.5 with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea all at the same time.... thanks fer nuthin' Wilhelm II.:Kaleun_Salute: :hmmm:

[John Pancoast]

John, sorry for not be better help as it was a while ago I set JFO up and the details fail to come to memory. But the effort will pay off in keeping SH3 challenging.

One thing I did do was set up a different JFO file for GWX, NYGM and WAC.

Good hunting,
FUBAR295

Not a problem ! I don't think it will be to difficult to figure out. Yes, just reading the read me has me looking forward to trying it out.

[John Pancoast]

That would be von C's rule 1::yep: "In all things be very strong."...starting with good geography ie: don't be 'twixt the British Empire to the West and the Russian Empire to the East; seeking "a Teutonic place in the sun" from 1914 to 1945...with a 20 year armistice to grow more expendible cannon fodder. We live in the chaos of the 20 th century's still no wiser(gotterdammerung) and are in WW 2.5 with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea all at the same time.... thanks fer nuthin' Wilhelm II.:Kaleun_Salute: :hmmm:

Or as the saying goes, "A man's got to know his limitations" :D

[Aktungbby]

I think Blair mentioned some info. in his book, but my second volume fell apart recently. You should see my dogeared, margin-notes crammed copy of Clausewitz ON WAR I've got Blair's two volume on kindle-saves wear, tear and space on my stressed out military-book shelves. Considering Germany's generals utilized this book : On War is an unfinished work. Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835.(a little like Lucy Custer writing about George Armstrong C.; and perpetuating a myth to earn a living in widowhood :hmmm:??!!) His 10-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in the Prussian state (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prussia). On War is formed by the first three volumes and represents his theoretical explorations. It is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_strategy) ever written, and remains both controversial and influential on strategic thinking (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_thinking). On War is a work rooted solely in the world of the nation state (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nation_state)...It has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_I) and Second World Wars (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_World_War), but it seems rather that Clausewitz (who did not actually use the term "total war") had merely foreseen the inevitable development that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic wars. These wars resulted (though war's evolution has not yet ended) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state (thus "total war"). Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times." who knows, maybe von C.'s wife is the real culprit; and not der Kaiser Wilhelm....:hmmm:

[LGN1]

Hi,


it's interesting that the order to remove the deck torpedoes is based on the vulnerability of the canisters during depth-charge attacks and not on the danger of loading them.


Best, LGN1