On the recent two crashes of Boeings 737 Max [Archive]

Skybird

03-24-19, 03:00 PM

Latest theory is about blowback, meaning that the plane gained so much speed that the airstream hitting the ailerons defeated the hydraulic pressure of the system trying to move them - the plane than practically is uncontrollable and cannot be saved by pilot input if it does not by lucky events loose speed again before the hydraulic system suffered unrepairable damage already.

That speed could have been accumulated due to chnaged geometry due to bigger engine size - with the whole design not having been properly tested and the MCAS having been an improper attempt to fix it with - a not properly tested software solutionb that additionally was not properly advertised to avoid cetifcaiton delays and so was not properly included in pilot instructions.

A report in Der Spoiegel today said a former Boeing engineer said that the pressure was immense and worse than ever before when some years ago Americna airlines planned to buy Airbus A320 Neos. Boeing needed a quick reply to counter that threat and the result weas that they did this re-engineering project, but in less than half of th etime that itr would have needed if all internal security rpoutines by Boeing would have been followed. In other words: Boeing broke its own standards and security orutines, and lied about it to the authorities. Also, cockpit modernisation steps that would have been in demand were left out, due to time pressure.

When I red about it it reminded me of the problems of fighter pilots in WWII vintage aircraft who may have dived so fast unto their targets that they could not pull in time anymore since they had left the speed envelope inside which they could still move the flaps and ailerons with the stick. Battle of Britain 2 was a simultaion simulating this effect - it was terrifying at times.

When the blowback thing is true, the whole design of the aiframe is in question , and just some addings to the code of the MCAS most likely cannot fix it. And after 300+ people dead and two planes lost under identical conditions of malfunctioning.

It looks very much as if Boeing made a big, huge pile of self-made poo on its doorstep. It could turn out to become much more hurting for Boeing than the A380 that led Airbus into a dead end. First airlines have called for cancellation of their orders - and its no big guess that they will go with the A320Neo instead.

Rockin Robbins

03-25-19, 09:14 AM

Latest theory is about blowback, meaning that the plane gained so much speed that the airstream hitting the ailerons defeated the hydraulic pressure of the system trying to move them - the plane than practically is uncontrollable and cannot be saved by pilot input if it does not by lucky events loose speed again before the hydraulic system suffered unrepairable damage already.

What caused the pilot not to be able to be recovered was the trim system being too powerful, exerting forces too great for pilots to overcome, even at normal flying speeds. This has been a possibility during the entire 737 series manufacture, over 30 years.

In the event of a trim overrun, the stabilizer trim cutout switch is and has been in the same exact location all that time. Throwing that switch results in immediate recovery of the pilot's ability to fly the plane, as shown in the flight previous to the fatal crash, where a third pilot in the jump seat evaluated the problem and knew what to do. As blancolirio said in the video I posted, it was the addition of the pilot in the jump seat that made the difference.

The plane can be flown safely. Now it's up to Boeing to ensure that it always is. Pilot error can crash any plane. This was clear pilot error. The question is "was the pilot error a predictable consequence of Boeing's or the airline's procedures, and what must be changed to keep this from happening again?"

From Boeing's standpoint, the trim system is too powerful. The trim system is more powerful than any possible pilot input. A pilot should be able to overcome the trim by using stick position only, thereby buying the time to analyze the problem in a stress-free mindset.

Secondly, with two angle of attack sensors outside the fuselage, hooking only one of them to the MCAS system just makes no sense. Error handling is absolutely essential to the functioning of any system and unquestioningly accepting the word of a malfunctioning sensor with no backup is an obvious failing.

Then the decision to have two systems, the light indicating autopilot/angle of attack sensor disagreement and the cockpit angle of attack display as optional equipment is also obviously faulty.

The kicker is that Boeing already advised pilots that MCAS malfunctions should be treated as a trim overrun situation and the stabilizer trim cutout switch should be switched off. Simple simulator runs should have revealed the fact that in an MCAS malfunction, the pilot is simply too busy trying to save his and his passengers' lives to think clearly.

The information you need to know to understand this situation is in the video I provided. It is self-validating, from a professional pilot who knows his business.

Rockstar

03-25-19, 01:04 PM

Rockin Robbins

03-25-19, 01:48 PM

So the 737 has been around since '68 and the MAX since 2016. I imagine the number of 737max flights emanating from more used and well known airlines in western nations far far outweigh the number of flights from airlines out of Indonesia and Kenya. Yet from these lessor known third world countries come two crashes not very far apart from one another. Who the hell is responsible for signing off on these pilot qualifications which allows them to fly the plane?
Interviews with American 737 pilots has shown that a decent number of them also would be taken by surprise MCAS malfunction. There might be better response by most, but I don't think that would mean nobody dies.

One advantage the American and European pilots would have is their airline companies' emphasis on lots of simulator practice. Those simulators are great for studying rare malfunctions and getting proficient at handling them. I doubt the Indonesian and Kenyan airlines have such resources.

Skybird

03-25-19, 02:34 PM

As was reported repeatedly by now, trainign on changede MCAS was not conducted by Boeing to save time and to not oput cetification in danger. If they would have trained it, it would have delayed certification.

The Blowback theory I mentioned is NOT just trim overriding pilot inpout. That is a possible issue in itself. It was deliberatekly desc ribed over here that the blowback theory, accpording to the meaning of the term as it is usually used, indeed means that the floight attitude of the plane is such that airspeed over the wings is so high that it defeats internal hydraulic system pressure - the system cannot move the ailerons and rudder anymore.

We talk abotu two different explanation theories ther,e RockingRobbins. Possible hthat they also mutually fed back on each other.

I just repeat what was written in two quite insightful German article two days ago. The one was authored by a former Boeing engineer, the other by a German Luftwaffe pilot. Both described the Blowback thing identically. They did not say it was like this - they just say it could have been like this, and that the flight behaviour of both planes seem to speak for it.

Boeiong has had a striong itnerest to bypass usuall secirotyplannings ans the time they need, the pressure, said the engineer, was immense, and the worst he had ever experienced in his career. I woul,d assume th econmic oressure to poush the 737Max still out, is still existent, even more so right now. So I would not enteriley trust in Boeing theories alone that thus are suspicious of trying to paint the picture such that a simple solution like ansoftweare update alone can brign the aircraft off the ground again. Even after the second crash they wanted to fly on and it was external fact finding that forced them to stop. Boeing, government Perntagon are way too close in this. Eisenhower, anyone? ;)

Rockstar

03-25-19, 03:02 PM

Indeed this is a very unfortunate accident and I suppose it could be a technical, design, political or economic issue with the aircraft or maker. But if history is any judge it leans towards pilot error.

Skybird

03-25-19, 03:49 PM

Pilot error? No, that would be cheap. It is not one acident, but two, and they both seem to have run the same way, and Boeing seems to bare a devastating ammount of respinsi8blity for having provked them: by making quesitoinbable design decisions, by violating iut sown estlbisahed security routiones, schmees and timetables, by not properly adressing the chnaged geometry of the comolete airframe due to the bigger engines that had to be moved forward - and in order to avoid further delays in certification due to proper pilot training, denying that there would be any need to train pilots and thus pilots being left in th eunknown about vital chnages in handling procedures.

That is not just accidental - that is criminal.

The pilot can only use knowledge they have been provided with. And Boeing seems to have not provided them with what was needed. To accelerate the certification process. To catch up with Airbus soaring list of orders.

Airbus today sold 300 more to China. Severla carriers said they ask for comepnsations from Boeing, or even cancellation of their preorders.

The responsible decision makers at Boeing who designed this obviously overly rushed timetable during developement - quoted Boeing engineer said they (the engineers and designers) had to complete the task of designing the Max model in less than half as many years than such a task usually would be planned for - must see prison from inside for many, many years to come. They killed over 300 people.

Not "pilot error". Its "manager error", or better: manager betrayal of the certification authorities.

Really. To me its not two accidents here that happened, and it is not the pilots who are guilty here, they are just the pawns that some higher beings want so sacrifice now to save their own reputation. Its a crime what has happened.

But maybe Boeing is just too big to fail - or too big to be held responsible. If they would face indeed punitive sentencing, which effectively triples the sentence volumes, the financial damages nevertheless would make the bones even of a giant like Boeing crackling. And that would be somethign a government would not like to happen.

Rockstar

03-25-19, 04:21 PM

A day earlier on Oct. 28, the same plane had experienced similar problems to those seen on the flight that crashed, but managed to resolve them and proceed with the flight safely. Bloomberg reported that’s because a third off-duty pilot who was in the cockpit took the steps needed to stop the plane from engaging in repeated nose-down maneuvers—known in aviation as “runaway trim.” The third pilot’s presence wasn’t noted in Indonesia’s preliminary report on the crash of flight JT610, which attributed the corrective action to the commanding pilot on the Oct. 28 flight.https://qz.com/1576597/off-duty-pilot-saved-lion-airs-737-max-the-day-before-its-fatal-flight/amp/

The so-called dead-head pilot on the flight from Bali to Jakarta told the crew to cut power to the motor in the trim system that was driving the nose down, according to the people familiar, part of a checklist that all pilots are required to memorize.
By contrast, the crew on the flight that crashed the next day didn’t know how to respond to the malfunction, said one of the people familiar with the plane’s cockpit voice recorder recovered as part of the investigation. They can be heard checking their quick reference handbook, a summary of how to handle unusual or emergency situations, in the minutes before they crashed, Reuters reported, citing people it didn’t name.https://qz.com/1576597/off-duty-pilot-saved-lion-airs-737-max-the-day-before-its-fatal-flight/amp/

A week after the first crash the U.S. FAA sent out a safety alert directing pilots attention to the STAB TRIM thingy ( atleast thats what I think its doing)

https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/83ec7f95f3e5bfbd8625833e0070a070/%24FILE/2018-23-51_Emergency.pdf

Using the K.I.S.S. method I will say that as aircraft become more high tech the information and knowledge required to pilot such craft increases dramatically. You had better be prepared to respond to emergency better than what the pilots of the first and second crash did. Taking a nose dive at high speed low level is not the time to start thumbing through the big book of learning how to fly. Pilots need to train more in simulators I guess, otherwise people may die. Unfortunately MCAS worked as it was designed too and it worked flawlessly. It appears to me that flipping just one cutoff switch would have removed MCAS from the equation and put the pilot in charge of the plane. I could be wrong but as I said if the history of airplane crashes is any judge it would lean towards the direction it normally takes, lack of training, qualification process and communication of pertinent advisories and emergency procedure in other words pilot error.

Skybird

03-26-19, 05:28 PM

Again a 737 Max without passengers got into serious troubles and had to emergency-rtb immediately after takeoff in Florida.

Third incident.

If it were the MCAS trim alone, pilots shou,d be informed about it by now when beign allowed to ferry empty planes around. They surely got told by now.

Skybird

03-26-19, 05:33 PM

Other reports say it is not the MCAS trim this time, but an engine problem. But the engines are new as well, the airframe geometry as a whole had to be changed for them, the resulting greater instability, or dysbalance, has to be countered by software again.

Rockin Robbins

03-28-19, 10:19 AM

Yes, the Orlando landing was a garden variety engine problem having nothing to do with the MCAS safety problem.

Just ran across a video by a pilot who ran the simulator to show exactly what an MCAS/trim system overrun malfunction looks like in the cockpit and how the trim cutout switch is part of the procedure. Note that MCAS malfunctions are part of a memory procedure: a procedure that pilots are required to memorize so they don't absolutely need to use the book to defang the problem.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xixM_cwSLcQ

Now you know exactly what the malfunction looks like in the cockpit, what steps are used to evaluate the problem and that competent pilots can handle it with the plane as it is now. You also know that American pilots, at least, can rehearse this event realistically in the simulator.

Rockin Robbins

03-28-19, 06:37 PM

Blancolirio checks in with an update. There are disadvantages to having the angle of attack indicator. It takes experience to learn to fly using one and new and lesser hours pilots like the ones in Thailand, Indonesia and other Asian Pacific countries, Africa and South America would be less safe using one than not using one.

It will be interesting to see what Boeing comes up with. The bottom line is that if you're willing to kill yourself and your passengers with a perfectly good aircraft, no safety system that will ever exist can save you. Perhaps the thing to do for those outlying countries would be to require a pilot in the jump seat.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ora-yZCTtpg

Buddahaid

03-28-19, 06:49 PM

It will be interesting to see what Boeing comes up with.

Boeing has already decided to offer the optional warning system that tells of disagreeing sensors as a retrofit at no charge as of a few days ago.
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47722258

Rockin Robbins

03-29-19, 06:34 AM

They also need to attach both starboard and port angle of attack sensors to the MCAS system. On something so critical, redundancy on a persnickety (technical term, don't worry too much about it) sensor which has had problems should be required. Why is nobody talking about that obvious fix?

Skybird

03-29-19, 06:42 AM

It seems indeed that the MCAS trim theory has claimed dominance over the blowback theory. I only hope that this is due to the facts and not due to the circumstance that the MCAS trim problem could be "easily" adressed by a software update, whereas the blowback theory would indicate a problem of potentially project-killing proportions.

Rockin Robbins

03-30-19, 08:45 AM

Blowback theory would require the aircraft speed to vastly exceed never exceed speed, VNE. There's no evidence that either aircraft approached this speed and both black boxes would clearly indicate if that happened.

The press is, as usual, making a mess of their normally disgusting sensationalizing of a situation which is not unique in any way. Airbus has had very similar situations, and since it's European, the American press didn't land on them with crackpot theories and sensational accusations as they are doing to Boeing. Quit paying attention to these outlets who have abdicated their societal responsibilities in favor of whipping up fear to motivate sales of their deservedly failing publications.

Instead, pay attention to the community of airline pilots and the FAA itself. The outline of what will be done is clear now. The press' squealing about two so-called "essential" systems being sold as extras is a gross red herring. Check out the much more prosaic truth from a top airline pilot in a community of other highly qualified airline folks. And reflect: this man's life is dependent on the truth of what he says. He's likely telling you the exact unvarnished truth, no?

This whole public relations disaster, created by an ignorant and uncaring press, is much ado about routine matters. There is no airframe so safe that people cannot crash it. Ignorance is always more ingenious than intelligence.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD0JabYjF3A

Skybird

04-04-19, 05:25 AM

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47812225

A preliminary report into the crash of an Ethiopian Airlines plane last month says the aircraft nosedived several times before it crashed.

Pilots "repeatedly" followed procedures recommended by Boeing before the crash, according to the first official report into the disaster.

In a statement, the chief executive of Ethiopian Airlines, Tewolde GebreMariam, said he was "very proud" of the pilots' "high level of professional performance".

Rockin Robbins

04-05-19, 12:28 PM

Well, everybody woke up this morning to stories in BBC, Wall Street Journal and all over saying that the Ethiopian pilots "repeatedly did what the manual told them to do" and were crashed by the evil plane. And, as usual, the news media, having abdicated their responsibility to apply understanding to sometimes technical reports and find the truth, are merely selling paper and electrons by inappropriate use of laziness, fishing for controversy and finding it whether it exists or not, or just plain deception. Nowhere in these stories is the Ethiopian Preliminary Accident Report quoted or summarized point by point.

To get that critical information, and why the plane really crashed, you have to watch this video by blancolirio.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HBqDcUqJ5_Q
Mentor Pilot will undoubtedly follow with further clarification. The long and short of it is that the Ethiopian pilot made several fatal mistakes, after his low-time (less than 100 hours in type) co-pilot did the right thing and saved the airplane by engaging the trim cutout switches to shut down the MCAS system.

The plane dived for the first time, the pilot compensated with back pressure on the yoke while the copilot recommended that the trim cutout switches should be disengaged to keep the MCAS system from applying any more down trim. The pilot agreed and they disengaged the MCAS system and automatic trim controls. From that point on, MCAS had no influence on how the plane flew.

Because the plane had throttle settings for climb and was now flying level, airspeed very quickly increased beyond the Vmo (maximum operating speed) of the aircraft. This is when flight loads on the control surfaces make it very difficult or impossible to control the plane, even difficult or impossible to manually use the trim wheels with cranks on them that I showed you in a previous post. Cutting throttles was plainly indicated to reduce loads on the control surfaces and allow the pilot to regain trim and elevator control. Yet the throttles were never touched until impact and airspeed continued to increase (duh!) to over 500 knots. That's fatal mistake #1.

(I made my own fatal mistake #1 a couple of posts ago when discussing what Skybird called the "blowback" theory, where aerodynamic loads make control surfaces impossible to input. I said at that time that Vne (Velocity never exceed) speed was that threshold. Vne is the speed where things like wings, enpennage, cabin skin and other things are torn off the aircraft, you have actually structural failure due to aerodynamic loads. It's Vmo (Velocity maximum operating) where loads on control surfaces make the plane difficult or impossible to fly.)

Fatal mistake #2 was when the pilot and copilot together were unable to move the manual trim wheels (they were overstressed by the grossly inappropriate airspeed), they attempted to use the electrical trim switches on the yoke. With the trim cutout switches engaged, these switches were not operative. Their response was to make fatal mistake #3.

They turned MCAS back on by reengaging the trim cutout switches, MCAS trimmed the plane full down and killed them all. This action was against all training, all manuals, all simulator experience. It was the exact opposite of what should have been done.

The proper thing to do was to maintain level trim with yoke pressure, then reduce throttle to get the plane down to about 300 knots, at which point, considering the low altitude, back pressure and if necessary gently apply more throttle (to maintain proper climb speed) to establish a steady climb to a safe level. THEN and ONLY THEN, they should have stabilized attitude at level flight at cruise speed and manually trimming the aircraft would have been easily done.

But what does the so-called "news media" have to say today? The pilots followed every guideline and the MCAS system, which they turned off, repeatedly turned itself back on to crash the airplane. Completely, totally, indefensibly, irresponsibly, incompetently false. The pilot crashed the plane. End of story.

Can MCAS be improved? Heck yes. Both angle of attack sensors should be hooked to MCAS. MCAS should compare those sensors to each other and to the attitude indicator the autopilot uses to trim the airplane. It should turn off malfunctioning sensors as necessary and give the pilot an alarm to reflect what was done.

The MCAS system needs to be throttled back so that at all times pilot input overrules the MCAS system. At no time should the pilot simply lack the strength to overcome the down trim initiated by MCAS. (Well, at any speed below Vmo, anyway) It probably wouldn't be a bad idea that if the pilot exerts more than X pressure on the yoke, MCAS would be cut out automatically.

But no changes can prevent a pilot from killing everybody by turning a known malfunctioning MCAS system back on with a plane already completely out of his control, flying outside the design flight envelope of the plane. It's as if a terrorist hijacker took control, tried to crash the plane, the pilot and copilot overpowered him and promptly voluntarily let the terrorist fly crash again.

Okay so the immediate cause of the crash would be the terrorist. But the actual cause would be that the pilot put the terrorist back at the controls. That is the cause of the Ethiopian Airlines crash. Pilot error.

Skybird

04-06-19, 05:03 AM

Rocking Robbins, there were reports form very early on that Boeing did not provide trainign for the new system, at least not sufficiently, and that the written m,anuals distrubuted with many planes still do not contain cimplete documentation of the changes in cockpit and the MCAS' operation, and it still seems to that Boeing did so to avoid time-consuming certification processes by the FAA, which would have been a legal consequence form that, becasue new training means: "technology too new as if old certificaiton still covers it". While some very quick to try minimise the dmaage to Boeing by claiming its all a pilot error, pilots can only practice what they have been taught and have aquired in knoweldge. The latest report now, which is the preliminary official report, says that what could have been done, was done, but the MCAS system indeed showed to be unable to be switche doff - it seems to still have affected the plane while it already was formally switched of. And this speaks very severly for a very fundamental software error.

Meanwhile, the FAA have accused Boeing of another serious software problem with the 737 Max, it is unrelated to the crashes and the MCAS problem and they did not say over here in our media what exactly it is - but it is severe enough that the FAA ruled that even with this problem alone the planes would stay grounded due to unacceptable risks. Boeing of course again says that it is minor and not means much. Well, they also said the plane and MCAS was okay and functionally right immediately after the crashes. They do not state the MCAS to be fully intact anymore by now, do they.

Boeing gets it hard currently. The yhave been found guilty of illegal state subventions (like Airbus before), and today I read that they had to announce a cut by over 20% in their planned monthly production rate of the 737. A planned update of the MCAS software that by now already should have been released, had to be delayed again because they found the update to be faulty as well.

The whole design of the plane is dubious a bit, I must say. When the new generation of A320s took the lead in the order statistics, Boeing kind of panicked and tried to squeeze another latest update out of an airframe and plane series that by now already is squeezed quite hard. Lets face it, the 737 is an old man in the business. To be more economical in fuel consummation, the engines became bigger. For this the whole airframe geometry and balance changed, and for compensating this, a workaround had to be found, which was the MCAS trim software. The MCAS as present today is a workaround in itslf already, to balance the messed up airframe geometry which was originally not planned for having such big, heavy engines this far to the front of the airframe. All this are drastic, fundamental changes, and were done in not even half the time that Boeing usually plans for work projects of this volume and size. Boeing did ignore its own internal safety regulationsn and testing procedures, to save time on the galloping orders coming in for the Airbus 320.

This paragraph above I quote by the witnessing of a former Boeing engineer who was throughly quoted in a long essay in a German newspaper a week ago or so. He reports by his own experience, he was engaged in the 737 Max development. He said the pressure set up by the management was immense and such as he had never experienced it ever before. Already during the work, he indicated, he felt concerned for the safety of the project. The time pressure was so immense that they did not even fit into the cockpit the new generation of certain cockpit gauges that are available already and would have been commanded to be used by the chnages in the Max model. Doing so would have costed time and so even some old-fashioned analogue displays were used once again, while better alterntaives are avalable since long. - Says this engineer.

It looks as if the 737Max was designed not with security as a priprity, but getting a quick reaction to the A320 AT ALL COST. Time was the priority, nothing else.

They overplayed their cards. Thats what it looks like to me. Over 300 people paid with their lives for this gamble. I do not buy this pilot error's theory. Thats just pawns they want to sacrifice to distract from the company's failure at boss level. Boeing pushed to hrd, too fast, too far, and broke it. Again that egineer: they cut short and ignored their own internal Boeing security and safety routines and testing procedures, that was his conclusion. And I will continue to think so as long as no new, massive changes to the information status become known.

Rockin Robbins

04-06-19, 12:59 PM

The latest report now, which is the preliminary official report, says that what could have been done, was done,
No, it shows that the pilot acted against memory procedures in the case of a trim overrun/MCAS malfunction. After the co-pilot switched the motorized trim system off, the pilot, against all procedures in the 737 from the first flight 40 years ago, turned the electric trim system back on. It did not throw its own switch back to the on position. The captain threw the trim system cutout switch back to the on position. Having overpowered the terrorist threatening to crash the plane, the captain voluntarily put the terrorist back at the controls of the aircraft, according to the Preliminary Accident Report. We now resume our previously running falsehoods

...but the MCAS system indeed showed to be unable to be switche doff - it seems to still have affected the plane while it already was formally switched of. And this speaks very severly for a very fundamental software error.

Again, with the high airspeed the pilot and copilot together couldn't turn the manual trim wheels on either side of the console. The captain then killed everyone by switching the trim system override switch back on so it could crash the plane. It did not turn itself back on. That is not possible. It did not affect the plane, as shown by black box records which show what MCAS wanted to do to the trim but couldn't because the co-pilot saved the plane by turning trim motors off with the trim system cutout switch, as per 40 year old procedures in the entire 737 series of aircraft. The black box clearly says the MCAS commanded x units of down trim but was prevented from doing so by the trim system cutout switch. The actual data is that clear. As long as the trim system cutout switch was off, MCAS commands were never executed by the trim motors. Indeed, they COULD not have been.

Meanwhile, the FAA have accused Boeing of another serious software problem with the 737 Max, it is unrelated to the crashes and the MCAS problem and they did not say over here in our media what exactly it is - but it is severe enough that the FAA ruled that even with this problem alone the planes would stay grounded due to unacceptable risks. Boeing of course again says that it is minor and not means much. Well, they also said the plane and MCAS was okay and functionally right immediately after the crashes. They do not state the MCAS to be fully intact anymore by now, do they.

I'll believe it when I see it. As it is, this whole paragraph is unsubstantiated gossip, worthy of disdain. Facts are stubborn things and only they matter. What people with agendas have to say about the situation is worth nothing.

A planned update of the MCAS software that by now already should have been released, had to be delayed again because they found the update to be faulty as well.

The plane won't be fixed by software changes. Mechanically, more sensors need to be hooked up to the MCAS system. MCAS must be able to be overpowered by pilot input in all circumstances slower than Vmo. The computer must let pilots know when there is disagreement between the three sensors measuring attitude and wing angle of attack. Those are physical, not software changes. They still won't keep people from being stupid, ignoring every flying concept they've ever learned, as the Ethiopian pilot did, and killing everybody. Perhaps in third world countries a qualified pilot should be required to ride along in the jump seat too.

It looks as if the 737Max was designed not with security as a priprity, but getting a quick reaction to the A320 AT ALL COST. Time was the priority, nothing else.

That's a ridiculous fabrication. The reason you go with a tried and true design for the basis of the 737 Max program is that the 737 is an airframe with a long-standing record of reliability and safety. You don't invent new mistakes when you have a thoroughly debugged platform to build from.

They took a proven airframe, widened the body, put more modern engines on it, compensated for the changes (the exact same compensations pilots make every day when cargo or people are distributed differently than the flight plan calls for and they have to compensate for a center of gravity different than anticipated.

The procedure for an MCAS failure is identical to the procedure for a trim overrun on any 737 produced since Fred and Barney Flintstone rode dinosaurs: switch off the trim system override switch. Regain control of the aircraft at a safe altitude in level flight. Then manually use the manual trim adjustment wheels on both sides of the console to set the trim you need. Then resume the flight without incident. This is a memory procedure, known to all 737 series pilots, required to be recited from memory as part of their qualification for a type certificate allowing them to fly 737 series aircraft.

Every 737 pilot for the past three generations has had the information memorized to save the airplane in the situation that killed both of these 737 Max aircraft. Switch the trim system override switch off. That was true for the very first 737 flight in April 1967. It is still true today. Had the Ethiopian pilot followed the procedure that he's absolutely required to know in order to get behind the controls, that aircraft would not have crashed. End of story.

They overplayed their cards. Thats what it looks like to me. Over 300 people paid with their lives for this gamble. I do not buy this pilot error's theory. Thats just pawns they want to sacrifice to distract from the company's failure at boss level. Boeing pushed to hrd, too fast, too far, and broke it. Again that egineer: they cut short and ignored their own internal Boeing security and safety routines and testing procedures, that was his conclusion. And I will continue to think so as long as no new, massive changes to the information status become known.

Yup, big evil corporation sought to kill poor Ethiopian victims by greed and hubris. THAT's the story that's unbelievable here. The official Preliminary Accident Report makes it crystal clear that pilot, against the good sense of his low time co-pilot who saved the plane, promptly snatched defeat from the jaws of victory to crash the plane. He violated 40 year old memory procedures to do so and others paid and are paying the price.

Can the plane be made safer? All planes can be made safer. Just keep them on the ground. But no matter what, no safety system can prevent a pilot from taking leave of his senses, ignoring everything he's learned in his entire life about flying, and crashing a perfectly good airplane.

Proper procedure in this situation was followed up to the point where the co-pilot recommended, the pilot agreed and one of them switched off the trim system cutout switch. At that point the pilot was in command of his aircraft.

Proper procedure would be to gain control of the airframe. Throttle had to be reduced to level attitude cruise position, instead of leaving it in full climb 94% throttle position. Then using yoke only, the pilot should gain control of the aircraft in level flight. Having done that, he should gently increase throttle to best rate of climb setting while he raises the nose with the yoke. No attempts to debug the trim system should be done until the airplane is safe.

Once the plane is at a safe cruise altitude, the pilot should have reduced throttle to level cruise setting and assumed a level cruise attitude. Then the manual trims would easily have been used by either pilot or co-pilot to unload the control yoke. The flight could then either resume to its destination without incident or return to takeoff airfield as management, tower or pilot deemed advisable.

First, FLY THE PLANE. Then look to solve other problems. It's the first thing you learn in ground school before the first time you fly. This pilot tossed that life-saving proverb out the window, killing all aboard.

Rockin Robbins

04-06-19, 01:39 PM

Oh, and Skybird pretends that MCAS is a kludge, produced out of thin air to save a 737 the couldn't fly right. Surprise! MCAS is also used in other airplanes without incidents. The military KC-46 tanker also uses MCAS and has never had a crash resulting from similar pilot errors. The KC-46's MCAS is different from that of the 737 Max in that it uses both angle of attack sensors and the Air Force required pilot input to the yoke to cancel any MCAS operation.

Had the 737 Max been that way and pilots disconneted MCAS and subsequently crashed the plane, we would be reading the same news reports that the greedy airline company allowed pilots to disconnect a system that could have saved 150 lives, and instead allowed the pilot to crash the plane.

The FAA, news-media, politicians and certain people posting on Subsim would still be reciting the same tired old yarns about the greedy airline sacrificing all to get the plane in flight sooner than it could be for safety. These greedy companies don't care about the safety of their customers. I guess dead customers buy a lot of airplanes and the manufacturers don't have to worry about customer safety.

As farcical as the argument is to begin with, ANY MCAS configuration would have the same group of anti-corporation zealots screaming for executives to go to jail and companies to be put out of business. The only solution is to remove all airlines from the air and not let any of them fly. But that wouldn't keep the zealots from keening. Actually, the agenda is to attack corporations with anything that occurs. And those attacks will continue regardless of what those corporations do. There is no right as far as these zealots are concerned, but the death of the corporations. Then the zealots would attempt to evade responsibility for everyone's inability to fly or send cargo by air to remote destinations.

Skybird

04-06-19, 02:19 PM

From here on you are alone with yourself.

Buddahaid

04-06-19, 02:27 PM

Not really. I agree with RR.

Rockin Robbins

04-07-19, 06:36 PM

I have a lot of friends who are pilots. Some of them are commercial pilots. They agree with blancolirio, that the news media has invented their own story and run with it when critical lessons need to be learned.

Some of our commercial pilots, especially third world commercial pilots, are flying by the book, so far as they can remember it, and lack the actual stick and rudder skills that save airplanes when things go wrong. If a book of rules was all you need, then planes would fly automatically. They have pilots because we realize that no book of procedures can anticipate every eventuality.

A pilot with actual "fly by the seat of your pants" stick and rudder skills has an instrument scan that is second nature. He knows proper power settings for level cruise, best rate of climb, best angle of climb, descent and rapid descent. He knows the proper airspeeds, throttle settings, likely trim settings for each, not by looking them up in a book, he knows them as well as his name.

When he's in a plane with throttles set at 94% for climb, and it's traveling over maximum operating speed, he knows instinctively to reduce throttle. The Ethiopian pilot left his throttle at 94%, never touching the throttle through 10 minutes of level or descending flight. He took his plane, which at that altitude should never go above about 340 knots all the way up to 500 and made absolutely no throttle corrections for TEN MINUTES.

That's pilot error in all caps, italicized, underlined and bolded. In 64 point type even. No low time pilot of a Cessna 172 would do such a thing and not lose his flying license.

How pathetic is our so-called "news media" for representing the words of Ethiopian Airlines, powerfully motivated to exculpate itself (how in hades were these pilots even CERTIFIED? Boeing does not certify pilots of Ethiopian Airlines.) and its pilots, whose actions reflect on the Airline. The pilots "repeatedly followed procedures recommended by Boeing before the crash." Whose words are those? They certainly do not reflect the words of the Preliminary Accident Report! It clearly says that the co-pilot recommended, the pilot agreed and the elevator trim cutout switch was turned off per memory procedures for elevator trim overrun. It clearly says that while turned off MCAS commanded a number of units of down trim, which couldn't be executed because the trim cutout switch was off. It clearly says the cutout switch was turned back on, against trim overrun instructions in the 737 manual since 1967. It clearly says the pilot then used the trim switch on his yoke to trim up. It clearly says that MCAS, having been erroneously turned back on by the pilot, then gave full down trim at 500 knots, immediately crashing the aircraft. It clearly says that what happened was pure pilot error.

Again, it is as if a terrorist had seized control of the plane and dived it to crash everyone. But the crew overpowered him and recovered control of the airplane. Then they decided that the terrorist could handle the situation better than they could and voluntarily put him back at the controls. Now they want to blame the terrorist. Bullschnitzel. The pilot crashed the plane.

Don't forget that Airbus had a situation where the plane was so automatic that pilots could not reduce throttle. It would not respond to yoke movement, trim controls, the pilots were completely locked out of interfering with a crashing airplane and it killed lots more than 150 people. But Airbus is European. Boeing is American. I smell anti-Americanism in this mix as well.

Mistakes are equal opportunity oppressors. They respect no nationality, corporate identity, economic system or culture. They sneak in everywhere, regardless of measures taken to avoid them. This situation has nothing to do with the United States, Boeing, or even Ethiopian Airlines. Mistakes were made. They need to be identified and remedied. There is nothing to be gained by punishment or retribution here. All that does is make the ones who made the mistake clam up. Openness, unprejudiced and fact-based evaluation of the events is the only proper course to ensure that similar situations don't happen again.

Rockin Robbins

04-08-19, 11:52 AM

Here are the complete instructions issued to Ethiopian Airlines regarding alterations to their Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM) and the complete contents of that insert. This is copied and OCR'd from the pdf of the Preliminary Crash Report, which I linked above. Remember, we're paying no attention to uninformed conclusions, we care about the EVIDENCE. Red highlighting is mine:

IssueDate: November 6, 2018
Airplane Effectivity: 737-8 /-9
Subject: Uncommanded Nose Down Stabilizer Trim Due to Erroneous Angle of
Attack (AOA) During Manual Flight Only
Reason: To Emphasize the Procedures Provided in the Runaway Stabilizer Non-
Normal Checklist (NNC).
Information in this bulletin is recommended by The Boeing Company, but may not be FAA approred
Ae ae i RE a the ex ent of conflict ith the FAA approved Airplane Flight Mammal
Berein 2% BIg 2 direct or indirect bearing on E ae Do af i adel solane.
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE AND/OR INFORMATION 1S EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
Background Information
The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee has indicated that
Lion Air flight 610 experienced erroneous AOA data. Boeing would like to call
attention to an AOA failure condition that can occur during manual flight only.
This bulletin directs flight crews to existing procedures to address this condition.
In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the stabilizer
nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim
movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim
switches but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are
released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to
occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB
TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the existing procedures in the
Runaway Stabilizer NNC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down
limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputsFlight Crew Operations Manual Bulletin No. ETH-13 , Dated November 6, 2018 (continued)
Additionally, pilots are reminded that an erroneous AOA can cause some or all of
the following indications and effects:
» Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.
* Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.
» Increasing nose down control forces.
» Inability to engage autopilot.
° Automatic disengagement of autopilot.
» IAS DISAGREE alert.
°. ALT DISAGREE alert.
» AOA DISAGREE alert (if the AOA indicator option is installed)
. FEEL DIFF PRESS light.
Operating Instructions
In the event an uncommanded nose down stabilizer trim is experienced on the
737-8 /-9, in conjunction with one or more of the above indications or effects, do
the Runaway Stabilizer NNC ensuring that the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches
are set to CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the
flight.
Note: Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any
stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can
be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the
STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim
can be used after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to
CUTOUT.

Administrative Information
Insert this bulletin behind the Bulletin Record page in Volume 1 of your Flight
Crew Operations Manual (FCOM). Amend the FCOM Bulletin Record page to
show bulletin ETH-12 "In Effect" (IE).
This Bulletin remains in effect until Boeing provides additional information on
system updates that may allow this Bulletin to be canceled.
Please send all correspondence regarding Flight Crew Operations Manual
Bulletin status, to the 737 Manager, Flight Technical Data, through the Service
Requests Application (SR App) on the MyBoeingFleet hom

I call that full disclosure. I call the crash 100% pilot error. Boeing didn't wait for the FAA to issue guidelines. On it's own nickel Boeing issued this advisory and manditory FCOM insert completely describing the cause, effects and proper crew remediation for exactly what happened on the Ethiopian Airlines crash. Having all the information in their hands which would have saved the flight, through pilot error this plane crashed.

Dowly

04-09-19, 12:22 PM

The stroking of the pointy end of the Boeing in this thread is astounding.

eddie

04-09-19, 06:54 PM

The stroking of the pointy end of the Boeing in this thread is astounding.

:haha::up:

Dowly

04-11-19, 05:40 AM

An enlightening video from Mentour Pilot (he has now deleted the video from his channel because he doesn't want to speculate) that shows them trying a similar situation in a simulator.
https://vimeo.com/329558134

At the end their stab trim is at 2.5 units (0= full AND, 10= full ANU) and it is extremely hard to manually trim it back. The Ethiopian plane had about 2.3 units of stab trim for most of the trouble period before going close to 0 (full AND) at the end.

Rockin Robbins

04-13-19, 11:34 AM

The stroking of the pointy end of the Boeing in this thread is astounding.

Dowly, when someone can't contest the evidence, and all I've done is follow the evidence trail of the actual Preliminary Accident Report (https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5793877/Preliminary-Report-B737-800MAX-Ethiopia.pdf), and reported without bias what I found there, and what Juan Brown, blancolirio of You Tube (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCphqjYZxxzjNbONVmY-0J7Q), commercial pilot for 30 years, presently flying 777s loaded with passengers has to say, then they merely admit I'm right by making up a colorful catch phrase like yours above. However, several facts are crystal clear.

* Boeing was absolutely clear and complete in its communication with Ethiopian Airlines, alerting them that the trim overrun situation in the Lion Air crash was definitely a trim overrun situation and probably an error involving MCAS and a jammed angle of attack sensor. Boeing required the addition of a page to the Aircraft Operations Manual an requested that the 737 Operations Manager of Ethiopian Airlines brief all pilots on the possibility, emphasizing that this is merely a variation of the trim overrun memory procedure in place for the past 52 years.

* The pilot followed the memory procedure for switching the elevator trim cutout switches to "cutout," which kept MCAS from executing any more actual trim changes to the airplane. The data flight recorders confirmed that the cutout switches were in the correct position, by recording MCAS commands to enter down trim that could not be applied because the electric trim switches were turned off.

*The flight recorder shows that the pilots neglected to fly the airplane by reducing throttle (airspeed steadily increased to 500 knots, twice the Vmo for the 737 Max at under 10,000 feet. No competent pilot would have allowed the plane to exceed even 300 knots. Because of neglect of rudimentary flying skills, this plane exceeded 500 knots. Indeed, overspeed alarms at high volume were sounding throughout the entire last half of this 10 minute flight. The throttles were never touched.

* Trim controls were unable to be manually adjusted due to the extreme overspeed condition of the plane, putting extreme aerodynamic loads on the elevator trim screw and manual trim system. The plane was literally in danger of coming apart before it even hit the ground.

* Unable to trim the plane, but clearly in control of altitude, according to the altitude plot, the pilot decided the proper thing to do was to "put the terrorist back in control of the aircraft" (my words). Ironically, he could actually have done this safely and I'll detail how.

First, fly the friggin' airplane. First thing you learn in flight school before you crawl into that Cessna 172 is "Aviate, navigate, communicate" in that order. First keep the plane in the air, then figure out where you are with a now stable airplane, then communicate with crew and ground to decide what to do next. These guys forgot to fly the plane. First thing they should have done, since they were in generally level flight is to divide jobs. Pilot works the controls and only does that. Co-pilot throws switches, debugs the problems and communicates. This isn't my idea. It's 100 year old established and time tested emergency procedure, known to every flight crew on the planet.

Pilot should instantly have seen that his speed was threatening to tear the aircraft apart, then asked the co-pilot to reduce throttles to level cruise levels. After several seconds the plane would be flying level at less than 250 knots, unloading the trim system and allowing the copilot to easily trim the elevator. But suppose the trim couldn't be done manually. As the altitude plot clearly shows, the pilot had altitude control! At no point since the cutout switches were engaged had MCAS made the tiniest change to elevator trim and the pilot was climbing using yoke pressure alone! They no longer had an MCAS emergency. They had a gross overspeed emergency and never realized or reacted to it with appropriate actions.

* Leaving the gross overspeed condition to become deadly, the pilot engaged the cutout switches, turning MCAS back on. He did this to be able to try the electric trim switch on the yoke. And it WORKED. He actually was able to trim the plane all the way neutral. He then had five seconds of controlled level flight before MCAS reengaged, and on the basis of the jammed angle of attack sensor moved the trim all the way to full down, crashing the plane.

Although turning the cutout switches back on was totally against Boeing and Ethiopian Airlines procedures, airline captains are like old time ship captains. They are free to elect to ignore procedure in order to save the airplane. Ironically, this could have worked in a strictly controlled manner.

First, the pilot, confining his job to flying the plane manually only would have to lay out the entire plan to his co-pilot. "Here's what we're going to do. I am going to tell you to switch the elevator trim cutout switches to "on" so I can use the electric trim switch. When you do I'll trim the plane neutral. As soon as I release the switch I'll tell you to move both elevator trim cutout switches to "cutout." You only have five seconds to do that before MCAS takes over again and if it does it will give us full down trim. Repeat that back to me." When they both demonstrate full comprehension, the pilot would give the command to reengage the elevator trim cutout switches. He would use the electric trim on his yoke (which turns MCAS temporarily off) to trim to neutral. Immediately he would order "cutout" and the co-pilot would have 5 seconds to throw both switches, an eternity when your life's on the line. It would be against procedure, but it would have worked. I asked Juan if that would work and his reply was "Yes, only if very carefully coordinated."

However that extreme measure wasn't necessary. The pilot had altitude control. All he had to do was reduce throttle, trim straight and level with throttle, assess his altitude and if he needed more, establish throttle settings and attitude for climb to a safe altitude. He then could have again trimmed straight and level throttle and attitude. At that point the elevator would be entirely unloaded, flying at proper airspeed and the co-pilot could have easily manually trimmed to neutral.

This incident, which should have been only a momentary annoyance, was allowed by bad piloting skills, and an unfortunate succession of faulty pilot decisions, to become a life-ending disaster. That's the very definition of pilot error.

Of course if anyone wants to persuade people, providing better facts and better reasoning based on actual aviation experience that I'm wrong, all my statements are falsifiable. But merely proclaiming them to be "The stroking of the pointy end of the Boeing" is just an exercise in informing people that you are unable to dispute what I say.

Catfish

04-13-19, 11:57 AM

Well as far as i read the trimming automatics came on after being put to off position, this video does not mention one word of this.
Not speaking about how you want to build a plane using less fuel while changing aerodynamics and trying to patch this with software.

https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for-the-737-max-was-not-disclosed-to-the-pilots/
"It’s probably this counterintuitive characteristic, which goes against what has been trained many times in the simulator for unwanted autopilot trim or manual trim runaway, which has confused the pilots of JT610. They learned that holding against the trim stopped the nose down, and then they could take action, like counter-trimming or outright CUTOUT the trim servo. But it didn’t. After a 10 second trim to a 2.5° nose down stabilizer position, the trimming started again despite the Pilots pulling against it. The faulty high AOA signal was still present."

"How should they know that pulling on the Yoke didn’t stop the trim? It was described nowhere; neither in the aircraft’s manual, the AFM, nor in the Pilot’s manual, the FCOM. This has created strong reactions from airlines with the 737 MAX on the flight line and their Pilots. They have learned the NG and the MAX flies the same. They fly them interchangeably during the week.
They do fly the same as long as no fault appears. Then there are differences, and the Pilots should have been informed about the differences."

Not mentioning that if one of two sensors fail let the electronics decide which one to trust and not alarming the pilot.

Despite some omissions he also clearly states that this runaway trim was not able to overcome manually with the trim wheels due to the load on the elevators. But you do not take away thrust in a starting condition at a high angle of attack, when your plane's nose goes up and down without being able to control it, and they had two minutes to check it all. Not enough altitude. They were two pilots, not one of them seems to have realized the speed. I can only imagine howit is with a runaway stabilizer, warnings blaring and then adding another one with overspeed.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/faa-order-tells-how-737-pilots-should-arrest-runawa-453443/
" ... in the case of the Lion Air Boeing 737 MAX crash, “now the airplane is pitching down and actually moving the control wheel will not stop that system. If the pilot uses the trim system on the yoke, the [MCAS] system will stop" but "if the airplane isn’t in the proper attitude it will reactivate, ...”
Two minutes sounds like much time and mybe for a fighter pilot it is, but..

Maybe it was a 'pilot error', or an unlucky combination of changed 737's properties and the pilot(s) (both of them!) knowledge, but in any case it is not a good idea to use several automatic systems fighting each other, and overloading the pilot with figuring it all out and requiring inputs to correct faulty sensors.
I do not like Airbus for exactly this reason. Taking control away from pilots is seldomly a good idea when there is a real problem.

Rockin Robbins

04-13-19, 02:06 PM

Well as far as i read the trimming automatics came on after being put to off position, this video does not mention one word of this.

The words "the pilots repeatedly followed procedures by Boeing and MCAS continued to turn back on" came from the airline, not the Preliminary Accident Report, which says no such thing. Who made up that whopper, of course, is unknown.

https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for-the-737-max-was-not-disclosed-to-the-pilots/
"It’s probably this counterintuitive characteristic, which goes against what has been trained many times in the simulator for unwanted autopilot trim or manual trim runaway, which has confused the pilots of JT610. They learned that holding against the trim stopped the nose down, and then they could take action, like counter-trimming or outright CUTOUT the trim servo. But it didn’t. After a 10 second trim to a 2.5° nose down stabilizer position, the trimming started again despite the Pilots pulling against it. The faulty high AOA signal was still present."

Again, facts ONLY come from the Preliminary Accident Report, not the malfunctioning news media. Several statements in this so-called news report are completely false. "It’s probably this counterintuitive characteristic, which goes against what has been trained many times in the simulator for unwanted autopilot trim or manual trim runaway, which has confused the pilots of JT610." is entirely wrong. The memory procedure for dealing with trim overrun was written before April of 1967 and has been in continuous use since then. MCAS is only one of several possible causes of routine trim overrun malfunction. This is a routine malfunction to be handled routinely. See the Preliminary Accident Report for complete verification.

"How should they know that pulling on the Yoke didn’t stop the trim? It was described nowhere; neither in the aircraft’s manual, the AFM, nor in the Pilot’s manual, the FCOM. This has created strong reactions from airlines with the 737 MAX on the flight line and their Pilots. They have learned the NG and the MAX flies the same. They fly them interchangeably during the week.
They do fly the same as long as no fault appears. Then there are differences, and the Pilots should have been informed about the differences."

Again for a complete and thorough treatment of MCAS and electric trim behavior see the Flight Operations Manual section of the Preliminary Accident Report. Pilots knew that pulling on the yoke would never influence the trim system in any way. This has been true for 52 years and nobody in three generations has been concerned about that. The trim system memory procedures are identical for all flavors of 737 and are a memory procedure. Prospective pilots must demonstrate that they know from memory, without reference to a manual, how to deal with this problem. It's a routine, straightforward 100% effective way to deal with any electric trim system overrun, no matter how it's caused, by MCAS or any one of dozens of other possibilities. The MAX flies identically and the procedures for trim overrun are identical to all 737 series.

Despite some omissions he also clearly states that this runaway trim was not able to overcome manually with the trim wheels due to the load on the elevators. They were unable to manually trim the aircraft because they were flying it more than twice the maximum operating velocity of the aircraft, not because MCAS was fighting them.

But you do not take away thrust in a starting condition at a high angle of attack, when your plane's nose goes up and down without being able to control it, and they had two minutes to check it all. Not enough altitude. They were eight minutes into the flight. Where does two minutes come from. They were at enough altitude that level flight, which they had attained wouldn't result in controlled flight into terrain. Altitude wasn't the emergency.

They were two pilots, not one of them seems to have realized the speed. I can only imagine howit is with a runaway stabilizer, warnings blaring and then adding another one with overspeed.
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/faa-order-tells-how-737-pilots-should-arrest-runawa-453443/
" ... in the case of the Lion Air Boeing 737 MAX crash, “now the airplane is pitching down and actually moving the control wheel will not stop that system. If the pilot uses the trim system on the yoke, the [MCAS] system will stop" but "if the airplane isn’t in the proper attitude it will reactivate, ...”

Look at the altitude plot in the Preliminary Accident Report, the ONLY, ONLY source of facts available. At the time the elevator trim override switches were reengaged, the pilot had climbed the airplane to a safe altitude, MCAS was disconnected and unable to influence trim any longer. There WAS NO runaway stabilizer. The co-pilot had saved the airplane. That's when the pilot violated protocol, reengaged the electric trim system and handed control back to MCAS, which he knew would immediately crash the airplane. He put MCAS back in control, regained neutral trim and then let MCAS crash the plane. Pilot error.

"Two minutes sounds like much time and mybe for a fighter pilot it is, but.." But they had more than 8 minutes to fix it. They did and still found a way to crash the plane.

[QUOTE=Catfish;2603095]Maybe it was a 'pilot error', or an unlucky combination of changed 737's properties and the pilot(s) (both of them!) knowledge, but in any case it is not a good idea to use several automatic systems fighting each other, and overloading the pilot with figuring it all out and requiring inputs to correct faulty sensors.
I do not like Airbus for exactly this reason. Taking control away from pilots is seldomly a good idea when there is a real problem.

Several systems were not fighting each other here. Airbus killed more people with a plane that actually malfunctioned, removing control of all functions from the crew, which was left with no possible control of the aircraft.

You're totally correct. New emphasis in manual control of aircraft, proper instrument scan routines, seat of the pants flying needs to be done, especially in third world countries. Total dependence on automatic systems is sure death. This incident totally proves that, but the total dependence doesn't reflect on Boeing, it reflects on the airlines, probably even American airlines, and the individual pilots who don't seek to actually know how to fly. They merely monitor automatic systems and watch the crash from especially close up when the automatic systems fail. And they WILL fail sometimes.

Catfish

04-13-19, 03:52 PM

^ it would appear the evidence we have points to that you are right, and the crucial action that did not take place was switching the throttles to manual to lower the speed and have less pressure on the elevator controls.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jNbayma9dM&feature=youtu.be&list=PL6SYmp3qb3uPp1DS7fDy7I6y11MIMgnbO

When the Aoa vane or some data transfer on one side was indeed damaged why did the MCAS system take this input for real, when there was the second one working?
The vane or some part of the one Aoa sensor on one side is damaged, the control system gets strange readings and sops, handing control to the pilots - autopilot off - ok.

In the second the autopilot is off, the MCAS system counts to 5 seconds and then 'adjusts' the pitch down because of the one wrong one Aoa reading, but what is with the second one?

I still wonder why (and if?) they really engaged the auto trim again when they had regained level flight, if being too fast. Or if it can have been a system fault(?) There also seem to be a lot of Aoa indicators failing recently :hmmm:

mapuc

04-13-19, 04:00 PM

Skybird

04-13-19, 05:49 PM

When it comes to fly or to fully understand how to fly an airliner, like a 747 or similar, I'm useless.

I do know, however that these air crash detectives are really, really good at what they are doing.

In the nearest future we will know exactly what happened and what caused it.

Maybe the producere will upgrade some software and/or some hardware and the pilots will have to upgrade some learning on take-off.

Markus
They do upgrade the software, but the patch had to be pulled again because it was bad, too. MCAS trim is nothing new, it is around since a very long time, but the 737 Max has so drastically changed airframe geometry and shifts in the weight distribution due to the heavy engines moving forward, that parts of the code had to be written new to match the new airframe. The plane is now more vulnerable to the tail striking the runway during takeoff, becasue the gear has moved forward together with the wings, and so the tial got longer. These changes in MCAS trim are suspected to not being documented sufficiently in order to save time and get the airplane out earlier - because if new training beyond a certain treshhold level is required for a pilot who switches to another but "familiar" plane model, the FAA demands a new certification process for the plane itself, and the procedures for that cost much more time than the way the pushed it through the process now: becasue a pilot who flies lets say a 737-600 or -700, mostly is qualified to also fly the -800 and -900 models, since they are quite similiar. If training and documentation beyond a certain amount would be required, FAA ticks by the logicof that then the plane is quite so different from earlier versions of the family that a new certification of the hardware is necessary - and that is what Boeing wanted to avoid, since they lost orders on Airbus' 320 and a further certification of the hardware would have costed them more time.

If then the new part of the code maybe was programmed with an error or several ones in it, or the code commands a handling that is too different than what the pilot knows from earlier versions of the plane, but Boeing did skip proper documentaiton and training (a claim that has been risen by many pilots by now from several airlines areound the globe), then you get into very serious problems. The software issue obviously is serious - a patch Boeing had announced for the MCAS trim thing, had to be pulled again and given back into rework once again. It does not matter whether there is really a flaw, or the work ergoniomic demanded by the new software collides with the pilots' handling as he knwos MCAS - the way it functions has to be recoded, obviously. That Boeing engineer said that normally for developing a project like the 737 MAx and its changes over earlier versions of the 737 (which already are quite optimised to ther max and thus do not offer too much space for more cost efficienct operation anymore, Boeing would have given them m ore than twice the time than they had this time, indicates that the race with airbus was a priority. And that was bad, they overplayed it apparently. Lacking docuemntation. Lacking communication. Lacking retraining to avoid new certification. Lacking knowledge on side of the pilots who did not - and could not!! - have fully understood the changes. Boom. Boom.

Additionally the FAA has grounded the plane model for another software error unrelated to the MCAS issue, that the FAA rates serious enough that for that new issue alone they keep the plane grounded. Boeing, of course, says its minor. What else should they say - they have lost two planes and 300 people are killed and their PR currently hits rock bottom. The new issue illustrates that deliverign new software with errors in it, is not only possible, but real. The enormous time pressure that a Boeing engineer has pointed out in the project and the desire to avoid certification procedures bvy the FAA to save more time, certainly did not help to run all tests properly and check things the way they usually do.

If adding all these hints together, its cheap to already label it a pilot error just to give Boeing a stain-free, clean jacket again. Its far more likely that Boeing pushed the pressure level beyond their usual safety limits. You cannot avoid to add that conclusion to the list of possebilities. Ethiopian Airlines must have had a reason why they did not deliver the blackbox to the US and Boeing for analysis, but to France. depending on whom you ask, that is more or less an affront. Boeing was said to be not happy with that decision and wanted the state department to intervenbe and set up diplomatic pressure on France. Trump was wise enough not to allow that, since the French - the initiators and in principal the founders of Airbus - certainly would have turned stubborn. US diplomacy could only lose, and the criticism that Boeing is being too close to the US goverment and the Pentagon would have gotten fed for free - and this after Boeing was just found guilty by the WTO to have gotten illegal state subventions, like Airbus before. No, staying out of this was the best Trump could have done.

Rockin Robbins

04-13-19, 06:55 PM

Skybird, what are you trying to imply?

Ethiopian Airlines must have had a reason why they did not deliver the blackbox to the US and Boeing for analysis, but to France. depending on whom you ask, that is more or less an affront. Boeing was said to be not happy with that decision and wanted the state department to intervenbe and set up diplomatic pressure on France.

Ethiopian Airlines had nothing to do with where the black boxes were read. That was determined by the local air traffic safety authority. Boeing and the FAA were present when the boxes were read. They were given the full contents of the instruments. Implying that they wished to obtain the black boxes so they could redact unfavorable data is not only wrong, it's reprehensible. And as you can plainly see, the data as extracted in France exculpates Boeing. Shame on you.

The plane is now more vulnerable to the tail striking the runway during takeoff, becasue the gear has moved forward together with the wings, and so the tial got longer.
This characteristic is shared by dozens and dozens of commercial cargo and passenger planes from all manufacturers and nation. It's nothing remarkable and you're implying that it paints Boeing with some kind of rash irresponsibility. Bullocks.

If training and documentation beyond a certain amount would be required, FAA ticks by the logicof that then the plane is quite so different from earlier versions of the family that a new certification of the hardware is necessary - and that is what Boeing wanted to avoid
And that's entirely right and proper. After all, every 737 for the past 52 years could have an electric trim overrun, MCAS is just a new reason that might happen. If you have a trim overrun in a 50 year old version or a Max version, procedures are identical. Many trim overruns have happened over the years. Many pilots have reacted properly turning an annoyance into a harmless event rather than a tragic crash. MCAS trim overruns are not different in character or remedy than any trim overrun that has ever happened in thousands of aircraft over 52 years, and with three generations of pilots and crew. The plane is safe. And it can be made safer, just like any other plane.

Lacking knowledge on side of the pilots who did not - and could not!! - have fully understood the changes. Boom. Boom.
The pilots didn't need to know the changes. They already knew from memory the steps needed to fix a trim overrun. This was nothing new. It was a routine failure that should have been handled routinely. It wasn't.

Procedure says to shut down electric trim by turning the elevator trim override switches to "override." The co-pilot did this, showing that they knew the procedure. The pilot, with an out of trim plane, hand flew the plane to a save altitude and leveled off while his 94% throttle accelerated the plane like a dragster to twice its rated speed for that altitude.

They didn't have a trim problem then. They had an airplane that was about to be disassembled by aerodynamic forces! Still neither touched the throttles until impact. Note that planes at twice safe speed limits (250 knots for 10,000 feet or below) respond quickly and violently to trim inputs. Since the pilot had control of the altitude and indeed doubled the altitude while he was hand controlling the plane, the proper thing for him to do was FLY THE PLANE!

Instead, he turned a known malfunctioning system back on so it could kill everybody. Memory procedure, 52 years old, says clearly to leave the trim override switches off for the remainder of the flight. This pilot did not. Somehow this is Boeing's fault.

Boeing exhibit A, from the ONLY source of facts we have, the Preliminary Accident Report (http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+B737-800MAX+%2C(ET-AVJ).pdf):

IssueDate: November 6, 2018
Airplane Effectivity: 737-8 /-9
Subject: Uncommanded Nose Down Stabilizer Trim Due to Erroneous Angle of
Attack (AOA) During Manual Flight Only
Reason: To Emphasize the Procedures Provided in the Runaway Stabilizer Non-
Normal Checklist (NNC).
Information in this bulletin is recommended by The Boeing Company, but may not be FAA approred
In the event of conflict with the FAA approved Airplane Flight Mammal
(AFM) the AFM shall supercede. The Boeing Company regards this information or procedures described herein as having a direct or indirect bearing on the safe operation of this model airplane.

THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE AND/OR INFORMATION 1S EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT
Background Information
The Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee has indicated that
Lion Air flight 610 experienced erroneous AOA data. Boeing would like to call
attention to an AOA failure condition that can occur during manual flight only.
This bulletin directs flight crews to existing procedures to address this condition.
In the event of erroneous AOA data, the pitch trim system can trim the stabilizer
nose down in increments lasting up to 10 seconds. The nose down stabilizer trim
movement can be stopped and reversed with the use of the electric stabilizer trim
switches but may restart 5 seconds after the electric stabilizer trim switches are
released. Repetitive cycles of uncommanded nose down stabilizer continue to
occur unless the stabilizer trim system is deactivated through use of both STAB
TRIM CUTOUT switches in accordance with the existing procedures in the
Runaway Stabilizer NNC. It is possible for the stabilizer to reach the nose down
limit unless the system inputs are counteracted completely by pilot trim inputsFlight Crew Operations Manual Bulletin No. ETH-13 , Dated November 6, 2018 (continued)
Additionally, pilots are reminded that an erroneous AOA can cause some or all of
the following indications and effects:
» Continuous or intermittent stick shaker on the affected side only.
* Minimum speed bar (red and black) on the affected side only.
» Increasing nose down control forces.
» Inability to engage autopilot.
° Automatic disengagement of autopilot.
» IAS DISAGREE alert.
°. ALT DISAGREE alert.
» AOA DISAGREE alert (if the AOA indicator option is installed)
. FEEL DIFF PRESS light.
Operating Instructions
In the event an uncommanded nose down stabilizer trim is experienced on the
737-8 /-9, in conjunction with one or more of the above indications or effects, do
the Runaway Stabilizer NNC ensuring that the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches
are set to CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the
flight.
Note: Initially, higher control forces may be needed to overcome any
stabilizer nose down trim already applied. Electric stabilizer trim can
be used to neutralize control column pitch forces before moving the
STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches to CUTOUT. Manual stabilizer trim
can be used after the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are moved to
CUTOUT.Administrative Information
Insert this bulletin behind the Bulletin Record page in Volume 1 of your Flight
Crew Operations Manual (FCOM). Amend the FCOM Bulletin Record page to
show bulletin ETH-12 "In Effect" (IE).
This Bulletin remains in effect until Boeing provides additional information on
system updates that may allow this Bulletin to be canceled.
Please send all correspondence regarding Flight Crew Operations Manual
Bulletin status, to the 737 Manager, Flight Technical Data, through the Service
Requests Application (SR App) on the MyBoeingFleet.com

Folks, that's not a company attempting to hide potential harm from its customers. It is a company going the extra mile, even without FAA approval, to fully inform its customers, giving them a complete view of the possible malfunction and a 100% effective method to respond to it. This is a textbook example of a company putting the safety of its customers ahead of everything else, being transparent, helpful and open.

But Skybird paints them evil shirkers of responsibility, actively hiding known defects in their planes because dead people buy the most airplanes. That position is not possible given the facts revealed in the Preliminary Accident Report. But undeterred, Skybird says what he says, although completely contradicted by the truth.

A third passenger pilot/engineer in the blancolirio discussion said this after reading my analysis: "@RockinRobbins13 This guy gets it" On a subsequent post he clearly states "Rob Roilen
5 days ago
@RockinRobbins13 Agreed. I see a lot of people regurgitating the latest half-true mainstream media updates and calling for software fixes without addressing some really common sense flying practices that simply were not used in this accident. Sure, refine MCAS, but teach pilots to rely less on automation." All three commercial pilots and engineers agreed with my assessment that the Ethiopian Airlines crash was caused by pilot error. Doesn't make it any less tragic but facts are stubborn things.

I would be happy to conduct a line by line review of the Preliminary Accident Report (http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+B737-800MAX+%2C(ET-AVJ).pdf) for those who doubt I am telling the simple unbiased truth. But please read it for yourself, very carefully, before disagreeing with my conclusions. It will prevent a lot of embarrassment.

Buddahaid

04-13-19, 08:22 PM

When the Aoa vane or some data transfer on one side was indeed damaged why did the MCAS system take this input for real, when there was the second one working?
The vane or some part of the one Aoa sensor on one side is damaged, the control system gets strange readings and sops, handing control to the pilots - autopilot off - ok.

In the second the autopilot is off, the MCAS system counts to 5 seconds and then 'adjusts' the pitch down because of the one wrong one Aoa reading, but what is with the second one?

That's the part where Boeing offered a reduced price MCAS system that used only one AOA sensor at a time selected by the PIC. The MCAS system that optionally used both AOA sensors and alerted the crew when they didn't agree is what Boeing is now installing at no charge and treating as standard equipment now. The PIC should have recognized the AOA sensor he was using was giving erratic readings and switched to the other sensor.

One might make a similar argument that if you back over a kid on a tricycle in your car, and didn't buy the back up camera with a proximity sensor, that it's the auto manufacturers fault for not making the equipment standard in the first place.

Skybird

04-14-19, 05:01 AM

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage

Rockstar

04-14-19, 05:10 AM

preliminary accident report?
http://www.ecaa.gov.et/documents/20435/0/Preliminary+Report+B737-800MAX+%2C(ET-AVJ).pdf

or

regurgitate the new york times?
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage

not that difficult of a choice in my opinion

Skybird

04-14-19, 05:19 AM

But Skybird paints them evil shirkers of responsibility, actively hiding known defects in their planes because dead people buy the most airplanes. That position is not possible given the facts revealed in the Preliminary Accident Report. But undeterred, Skybird says what he says, although completely contradicted by the truth.

A preliminary accident report is that: a preliminary accident report. And the story on the whole 737 Max stories touches so many more aspects like politics and business ideologies that these will NEVER be contained in such a report.

Fact is that even before the two crashes, there were incidents with pilots not being able to make sens eof what the MCAS did in these planes. How could that be, that is the question.

Fact also is that there are at least one other issue with the plane that keeps it grounded by the fAA, a software issue they say, unrelated to the MCAS.

Fact is that this MCAS is not the old version of it, but a system that in parts was newly designed for the needs of the 737 Max, and for it alone.

Fact is that severla carriers and pilots complain about lacking docuemntation and training, so did external observers.

Fact is that the plane was constructed under immense time pressure before unseen in the Boeing comoany, and that ormer Boeing exploees concluded that in the process Boeing's own - and quite high!! I am not against boeing airplanes at all!! - security standards seem to have been accepted to get violated, to save time.

Fact also is that they did not trust Boeing to be left alone with the black recorder data analysis.And that the comaony is under heavy fire since long to be too close to the government, and the Pentagon.

You can hold up your holy book of accident reprts as long as you want, Robbins, but you wikl need to wake up tot he fact that it will never explain all the world to you.

I do not and never did say how it has been, I just remind of the contreadctions as reproted by people who by teirn own profession - engineering, designing airplanes, flying them for carriers - know much more abiut it. You want to rule out everythign that shall not be: that Boeing may have overplayed the cards and accepted small flaws growing into big, lethal problems. I only remind of the the many lose ends there are, that the explanatiosn so far are not satisfactory, and we cannot rule somethign out just becasue somebody does not want it to be shown as possibole truth.

I refuse a tunnel view. Its too early. Anbd tio many questions from even before the two crashes remain unanswered.

Will you please understand that now, finally, before throwing more mud at me.

Dowly

04-14-19, 11:41 AM

*The flight recorder shows that the pilots neglected to fly the airplane by reducing throttle (airspeed steadily increased to 500 knots, twice the Vmo for the 737 Max at under 10,000 feet. No competent pilot would have allowed the plane to exceed even 300 knots. Because of neglect of rudimentary flying skills, this plane exceeded 500 knots. Indeed, overspeed alarms at high volume were sounding throughout the entire last half of this 10 minute flight. The throttles were never touched.
Can you point where, during the time the pilots had control of the plane, did they exceed 500 kts?

http://i.imgur.com/yEKhziAm.jpg (https://imgur.com/yEKhziA)

Also, if you watched the video I posted above, you see that in a simulator at 300kts it takes some force to move the manual trim and at 340kts it becomes extremely hard to use the manual trim.

Seen as the video has been deleted from vimeo, here is a transcript:

C: We have an IAS disagree.
C: So, IAS disagree memory items.
F: Autopilot if engaged, disengage.
C: Disengaged!
F: Autothrottle if engaged, disengage.
C: Disengaged!
F: Flight directors - Both up
F: With flaps up established a flight path 4 degrees and 75% N1.
C: So, 75% N1.
F: We have 77, 76,...
C: A little bit less...
F: And, there you go.
C: 4 degrees.
F: 4 degrees.

C: So I am trying to establish this now.
F: Check!
F: We are descending...?
F: We probably... Are you feeling troubled with...
F :Any trouble with the flight control?
C: Yeah, I'm trying to trim it but...
C: It continues to trim against me when I'm trimming
C: So state the malfunction, please.
F: Yeah, this doesn't look right. Looks like uh...
F: How do you feel the stabilizer, the trim system?
F: Can you control it?
C: I'm trimming it. It is responding but...
F: It's a runaway stabilizer, if you agree?
C: For every time that I trim backward, it keeps trimming forward.
F: It's trimming forward. Yeah, it's runaway stabilizer.
C: So, runaway stabilizer memory items...
C: And i'm trying to keep this thing at 4 degrees.
F: Control column, hold firmly.
C: I am... [CAPT is holding the yoke firmly with both hands]
F: Autopilot - if engaged, disengage.
C: It's disengaged.
F: Autothrottle - if engaged, disengage.
C: It's..., if you can disengage it for me, make sure that it's disengaged.
F: It's disengaged.
F: And, do you feel that the failure stop?
F: Negative?
C: No, it's still moving.
F: Stab trim cutoff switches to cutoff.
F: OK. It stops. It looks like it stops.
C: You can see now I'm using almost full back pressure here.
F: Exactly.
C: How many degrees nose down?
F: We have 4 units nose down now
C: 4 units nose down?
F: Yup.
C: OK, I'm struggling.
C: I'm actually using almost my full force to keep the aircraft level here.
F: Do you want me to help you?
C: What I would like to do.
C: Just for the sake of exercise, can you trim this forward? [to simulate MCAS trim AND]
C: See if we can reach even zero nose down.
C: And see if I can even hold it.

[FO is trying to crank the trim wheel to reach zero nose down, simulating MCAS AND]

C: So, now we are doing this just as an exercise!
C: Do not try this at home.
C: This...
C: We are at 300 knots now.
F: I'm fighting.
C: I'm sttrugling to to keep this aircraft flying.
F: My god! [FO surprised at how hard it is to trim further nose down]
C: Yeah, the thing is with higher speed the force on the stabilizer will be higher and higher as well.
C: So it becomes almost impossible to move it.
C: So we are now at about 3 degrees.
F: Yup. [FO still tries to continue trimming nose down, the wheels is so difficult to spin]
C: We're still about 3 degrees away from full nose down trim.
C: And I am using everything that I have. [CAPT still holding on to his yoke with both hands]
F: My God ! [the trim wheel barely move for the down trim]
C: This is realistic guys.
C: This is how much of effort it would take to trim the stabilizer at this kind of speed.
C: Umph... [Capt is still trying to hold on to his yoke with his hands]
C: I'm just in control of it, though. But it's getting harder and harder.
C: And remember we're still 2.5 degrees away...
F: My God! [FO still struggles to spin the refused-to-be-spun trim wheel]
C: It's not possible, is it?
C: All right, we stop at that.

C: The reason that we have to try...
C: The reason we have to trim this manually is because the normal trim system wouldn't do this, OK.
C: It would require manual trim to get it away from this.
C: That's fine.
C: Trim it backward. [This time to illustrate the effort to trim the nose back up after "MCAS" brought the AC further nose down]
C: Trim it backward as you can.
F: Oh my God! I couldn't... [FO can't spin the wheel to trim up]
C: OK.
C: Eh...
C: Juan, press the red button! [CAPT called the sim operator...]
C: Press the red button now. [to stop the sim session]
C: This is at 340 knots.
C: And the trim is at...It's still at almost 2.5 degrees.
F: Yeah, 2.5 degrees.What the transcript doesn't convey is that Mentour Pilot has to basically hug the yoke to keep it in control below 340kts and with not as much AND trim as the Ethiopian flight had.
http://i.imgur.com/T6zMUwgm.jpg (https://imgur.com/T6zMUwg)

Rockin Robbins

04-14-19, 11:52 AM

Can you point where, during the time the pilots had control of the plane, did they exceed 500 kts?

http://i.imgur.com/yEKhziAm.jpg (https://imgur.com/yEKhziA)

Dowly, when we're talking about airspeed, you can see (airspeed is the bottom red/blue line, one for each airspeed sensor) the last half of the flight was over Vmo for any altitude. Maximum operating airspeed for under 10,000 feet is 250 knots and the plane was over 300 for that entire time, gaining a 500 knot speed by time of impact, according to the graph from the Preliminary Accident Report. The differences in the speeds supplied by the two sensors reflects the badly out of trim state of the aircraft. Here's a better view of that graph: https://ibb.co/DwpPG45

And a transcript from a simulator session is basically irrelevant to the actual Ethiopian Airlines flight. 340 knots is already 90 knots over maximum flying speed for that altitude, OF COURSE trims are very difficult or even impossible to adjust. The plane was not designed to fly in extreme overspeed conditions. Mentour Pilot proved that, didn't he. Now reflect an additional 160 knots airspeed over the speed where Mentour Pilot couldn't adjust trim and reflect on the consequences of letting the plane get that far outside its rated flight envelope.

However, Mentour Pilot has withdrawn the video of his own volition because "it's wrong." No simulator session can say anything about the facts of what happened on that flight. The final accident report has not been issued and he acknowledged that publishing a "best guess" simulator run with conditions different from the actual flight was wrong and would result in people responding inappropriately to a video that was wrong to produce to begin with. "You subscribe to my channel because you want the facts." The deleted video was pure speculation based on a simulator set up with parameters not reflected in the facts of the case. Mentour Pilot made the right choice for the right reason. Your laborious typing of the transcript from that purely speculative video accomplished nothing at all toward evidence that the pilots don't bear the vast majority of the responsibility for the crash.

Like Mentour Pilot said in his deleted video, "don't try this at home, folks." It's really way beyond any reasonable flying of the aircraft, and not because of MCAS either. Rule #1: fly the plane. Rule #2: see rule #1. These pilots didn't fly the plane. In fact they turned control over, against Flight Manual instructions, to a known malfunctioning electric trim system. Had they followed procedures, they might have saved the flight.

Rockin Robbins

04-14-19, 12:00 PM

One might make a similar argument that if you back over a kid on a tricycle in your car, and didn't buy the back up camera with a proximity sensor, that it's the auto manufacturers fault for not making the equipment standard in the first place.

And that perfectly illustrates why safety features don't appear. Manufacturers can't offer them as options because, having the most money in the transaction, if the driver gets it and doesn't turn it on, that's the manufacturer's fault. If the customer doesn't buy the option, then that's the manufacturer's fault. If the driver has a fully functioning backup camera and backs over the tricycle anyway, that's also the manufacturer's fault. It keeps safety equipment from being deployed because of the misuse of the legal system as a lottery with much better odds.

These manufacturers are not our enemy. They make possible the things we enjoy in life. Vendettas to put them out of business are much more dangerous than the real or imagined faults they pretend to remedy.

Dowly

04-14-19, 12:16 PM

Dowly, when we're talking about airspeed, it's not a great idea to show the altitude plot.
It shows the speed graph, look harder. You can also click it to get a bigger picture. MAGIC!

And a transcript from a simulator session is basically irrelevant to the actual Ethiopian Airlines flight. 340 knots is already 90 knots over maximum flying speed for that altitude, OF COURSE trims are very difficult or even impossible to adjust. The plane was not designed to fly in extreme overspeed conditions. Mentour Pilot proved that, didn't he. Now reflect an additional 160 knots airspeed over the speed where Mentour Pilot couldn't adjust trim and reflect on the consequences of letting the plane get that far outside its rated flight envelope.The VMO of a 737MAX is 340kts, I think? Sorry, that's over 10,000ft. Is that ASL?

EDIT: I can upload and link you the video, Rockin Robbins if you wish.

EDIT2:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnrwVoht9uA

Catfish

04-14-19, 01:59 PM

^ @RR im still with you.
They follow the instructions in this vid, however when the AP is switched off due to wrong IAS the MCAS gets active (within 5 seconds ok), so the pilot tries to hold the plane against the MCAS downtrim which gets worse, then realising there is a runaway trim fail he also switches off auto throttle.

So in the above sim video he put auto throttle to manual at 1:27, but he did not throttle back much or so it seems?
So you say this is why they are unable to trim the plane manually because of the forces on the elevator wuth the plane getting too fast, ok.

So what is the reason they did not throttle back more in the above video?
I mean is there any reasonable explanation when three different experienced pilots in videos do not throttle back in this situation, like the ethiopian pilot did (not)?

edit what i do not understand is why he at first lets the copilot trim the plane forward instead of backward, the latter woulod be bringing them out of the situation?

Dowly

04-14-19, 02:23 PM

I mean is there any reasonable explanation when three different experienced pilots in videos do not throttle back in this situation, like the ethiopian pilot did (not)?
You have a AND (=Aircraft Nose Down) trim, reducing power would make it worse which in turn would make the pilot in charge to have to pull back on the yoke even more. The video also does not show all the other crap the Ethiopian pilots had to deal with. Crap like yoke shaker (stall), over speed warning etc. Contradictory warnings.

Also, to address what RR said elsewhere about MCAS not being a band aid; it absolutely is. The MAX wouldn't have gotten certification without MCAS.

EDIT: edit what i do not understand is why he at first lets the copilot trim the plane forward instead of backward, the latter woulod be bringing them out of the situation? @2:09 They start to simulate MCAS pulling the nose down. Mentour Pilot is a 737NG pilot, so the simulator is probably also a 737NG one.
EDIT2: To further elaborate; the first downward trim is a run away stabilisator, the manual trim is to simulate the MCAS behaviour.
Unfortunately I've not the full video.

Rockin Robbins

04-18-19, 07:17 PM

You have a AND (=Aircraft Nose Down) trim, reducing power would make it worse which in turn would make the pilot in charge to have to pull back on the yoke even more. The video also does not show all the other crap the Ethiopian pilots had to deal with. Crap like yoke shaker (stall), over speed warning etc. Contradictory warnings.

With nose trimmed down the plane accelerates from gravity. The proper thing to do is reduce throttle to keep speeds from destroying the airframe.

Also, to address what RR said elsewhere about MCAS not being a band aid; it absolutely is. The MAX wouldn't have gotten certification without MCAS.

Absolutely false. In fact, Mentour Pilot says that pilots have flown the 737 MAX with MCAS turned completely off and had difficulty distinguishing the difference. It seems that MCAS, meant to make subtle differences in handling to produce a duplicate of the feel of other 737s was overpowered, but it's a catch 22 situation. Remove the pilot and the automation crashes the plane. Remove the automation and the pilot crashes the plane. In both situations, zealots with rabies pursue Boeing with sharp instruments aiming to dismember them. Perhaps we need to simply outlaw all forms of air transport.

EDIT:@2:09 They start to simulate MCAS pulling the nose down. Mentour Pilot is a 737NG pilot, so the simulator is probably also a 737NG one.
EDIT2: To further elaborate; the first downward trim is a run away stabilisator, the manual trim is to simulate the MCAS behaviour.
Unfortunately I've not the full video.
You mean the video that Mentour Pilot pulled because it was wrong, morally and factually? Yes, that one. As Mentour Pilot said explicitly, the video was in error. it was wrong, it was baseless speculation in the face of facts in contradiction.

But far from the situation of a "crippled plane" that "couldn't fly without MCAS" it appears our real situation is quite different: an MCAS system meant to intruduce subtle changes to the feel of the aircraft, perfectly able to fly safely without it, but MCAS being far more powerful then it needs to be. What kind of scenario is it when MCAS gives full down elevator trim to achieve a similar feel to other 737s. That makesanosensa at all. MCAS should shake the stick to alert the pilots and that's about it. Maybe two units of down trim maximum, with an electric trim button contradicting the MCAS adjustment turning MCAS completely off for the rest of the flight.

Remember: the only facts we have are in the preliminary accident report. You Tube videos, simulator runs, anything not directly dependent on that preliminary accident report are speculation only and have no force of reality.

I predict that MCAS will have its fangs pulled, pilots all over the world will be called upon to evaluate the flying characteristics of the 737 Max and this plane will have a long, respected and safe rest of production for many years.

Rockstar

04-18-19, 07:30 PM

https://charts.stocktwits.com/production/original_161256084.jpg

Dowly

04-19-19, 09:10 AM

With nose trimmed down the plane accelerates from gravity. The proper thing to do is reduce throttle to keep speeds from destroying the airframe.You do realise that AND trim doesn't mean the plane is pointing down? Check the preliminary report, the aircraft was flying slightly nose up or at level for most of the flight until MCAS pointed it down.

Absolutely false.The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law was designed and certified for the 737 MAX to enhance the pitch stability of the airplane – so that it feels and flies like other 737s.From: https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-software-updates.page
Due to the way the engines are placed and being bigger makes the MAX nose up at speed, which is why the MCAS system was put in place to counter that. In other words, it's a band aid.

As for Mentour Pilot's video; since his Q&A videos seem to have been removed from his channel I can't verify, but from what I remember he removed the video because it was indeed speculation, but I don't recall him calling it factually wrong. It does show what pilots, who know what is going on, can do to try recover from the situation. In that they failed, because the manual trim was so hard to use even at <340kts speed.

He also mentioned in the now removed Q&A video that he made the video to show what the situation must have been in the cockpit because he didn't like how people (like you) put the blame on the pilots.

Rockin Robbins

04-19-19, 01:17 PM

Check the preliminary report, the aircraft was flying slightly nose up or at level for most of the flight until MCAS pointed it down.
The nose was level or slightly up during takeoff (no MCAS) and after they threw the electric trim cutout switches to "cutout," when MCAS was not operative, It tried to send down trim signals to the trim motor, but the trim cutout switch prevented it from trimming the plane down. As a matter of fact, for more than half the flight there were no trim changes at all! You can see that for half the flight, MCAS was off, all trims were input by the pilot. Then for unknown reasons, the pilot decided that a known malfunctioning MCAS could fly the plane better than he could. He turned the cutout switches back to on and allowed MCAS to crash the plane. That's pilot error

From: https://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-software-updates.page
Due to the way the engines are placed and being bigger makes the MAX nose up at speed, which is why the MCAS system was put in place to counter that. In other words, it's a band aid.
As both Mentour Pilot and blancolirio have said, pilots who flew the 737 MAX with MCAS turned off were barely conscious that there was any difference to the feel of the aircraft. Flying the plane without MCAS was not only possible, it was easy and straightforward, done without difficulty by 737 pilots. That's the real tragedy here, that a system to introduce very subtle "feel" differences in how a plane flies could have the power to crash a plane when the pilot makes an error. Whether pilot error is the ultimate cause or not, the PROXIMATE cause was MCAS diving the plane 8.000 feet into the ground.

If MCAS automatically turned off for the remainder of the flight when the pilot input 2 units or more of electric trim in the opposite direction as MCAS trim, the plane wouldn't have crashed.

If the amount of down trim MCAS could dial into the stab was limited to under four units, the control console could easily overpower MCAS and the plane wouldn't have crashed.

But let's be fair here. If the plane were really in a stalled condition and the pilot could overpower MCAS to pitch the plane even further up, the headline would be "Boeing Automatic Systems Unable to Save 150 Deaths." And the nay-sayers would be crowing that the automatic system could have saved the plane, but wasn't powerful enough to do so. In the safety biz, you are always wrong.

As for Mentour Pilot's video; since his Q&A videos seem to have been removed from his channel I can't verify, but from what I remember he removed the video because it was indeed speculation, but I don't recall him calling it factually wrong. It does show what pilots, who know what is going on, can do to try recover from the situation. In that they failed, because the manual trim was so hard to use even at <340kts speed. He also mentioned in the now removed Q&A video that he made the video to show what the situation must have been in the cockpit because he didn't like how people (like you) put the blame on the pilots.

Note that 340 knots is 90 knots higher than the "speed limit" below 10,000 feet of 250 knots.

He said "I was wrong. I was speculating, not giving the hard facts that you expect from me." I'm not blaming the pilots. I'm saying that pilot error was the cause of the crash. They would be the first to expect us to find the truth and let everyone know how to avoid making their mistake. It is clear, according to the only source of facts we have, the Preliminary Accident Report, that the pilots, through wrong decisions in conflict with the Aircraft Flight Manual regarding elevator trim overrun situations, caused this plane to crash. They were helped by the ability of a system meant to introduce subtle "feel" that imitated the "feel" of other 737 series planes, having the power to input full down elevator that the pilots would be unable to overpower.

The problem is that the general public treats this stuff like a football game. Pick a side and cheer for them, it's "us" against "them." And "them" need to be punished or executed. Real air accident investigation works entirely differently. Realizing that punishing erroneous decisions results in people clamming up and not saying the words that save future lives, air transportation safety agencies are not an adversarial procedure, but a search for the truth and a search for actions that will prevent future similar accidents.

As long as humans live on the face of this planet, human error will occur, sometimes costing the lives of hundreds or thousands of people. Often those making the error pay with their lives and can't be punished later anyway. But when they don't, unless they committed crimes, punishment only forces them not to talk about what went wrong. Air traffic investigation is solely (in theory and mostly in practice) about preventing recurrence of tragedy.

Skybird

04-21-19, 09:17 AM

Jimbuna

04-22-19, 06:42 AM

Boeing employees raise further accusations over shoddy production standards at Boeing, this time the Dreamliner.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/20/business/boeing-dreamliner-production-problems.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage&login=email&auth=login-email

Flew to and from Mexico last October in a Dreamliner (only a month old as far as I was aware) and I recall on the homeward flight the steward passing out paper towels to a couple a few seats ahead off us because the ceiling was dripping water (and this was in first calass).

Slyguy3129

04-22-19, 11:09 PM

You couldn't pay me the Earth's weight in gold to fly in anything French.

I also happily drive where I need to go. If I can't drive there, I have no business there. But some people don't have that luxury. In short, I don't trust anything with wings, no matter who built it.

What would really help these companies is going 100% automated. It would atleast shut the Union idiots up.

Catfish

04-23-19, 05:21 AM

^ Well, the french literally invented flying. I mean the Wright brothers were first (or maybe Karl Jatho even earlier), but their design had no real chance in the long run.

Skybird

04-29-19, 08:49 AM

Boeing slides deeper into it.

https://www.dayandnightnews.org/faa-considered-grounding-some-boeing-737-max-planes-last-year-source/

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/29/world/faa-mulled-grounding-boeing-737-max-jets-last-year-learning-anti-stall-system-woes-source/

The inspectors learned that Boeing had opted to make the malfunction signal optional and an extra that would cost more money.
This came after Southwest asked Boeing to reactivate the signal after the Lion Air crash, which killed all 189 people on board.
Boeing had deactivated the signal on all 737 Max delivered to Southwest without telling the carrier.
Neither the airline nor its pilots were aware of these changes when they started flying the planes in 2017, a spokeswoman for Southwest told AFP.What the hell was Boeing thinking.

Called “disagree lights” in Boeing parlance, these lights turn on when faulty information is sent from so-called angle of attack sensors to the MCAS. Those sensors monitor whether the wings have enough lift to keep the plane flying.
In the case of the Lion Air crash, investigators think one of the angle of attack sensors may have failed and sent incorrect data to the MCAS, causing its nose to go down as pilots fought to bring it back up.
The MCAS overrides the pilots manual efforts to point the plane up or down.
With the angle of attack sensor not working properly, the thing to do would have been to turn off the MCAS. But the Lion Air cockpit crew did not know this.
What the hell was Boeing thinking. Heads must roll for this. Decision-makers must go behind bars. A a super-hefty financial penalty is on order. Additional to the damage compensations for the victims' families. And additionally to the compensations for the carriers whose fleets of 737 max are grounded.

What the hell were they thinking...???

A good news in all the bad news for the families of the pilots. The cheap get-out-of-dodge-theory of "pilot error" is almost ridiculous by now.

Buddahaid

04-29-19, 09:52 AM

Not really, but you've already decided.

Skybird

04-29-19, 11:02 AM

There were several incidents that ended not with crashes but where the pilots had to be told by other pilots knowing the problem what to do and to switch off MCAS. Did these pilot, all of them professionally trained on 737s and with experience, did not know something so profound - their own fault and responsibility - or couldn't they not have have known it since Boeing did not communicate an instructions, as was claimed in this unfoldign story from all beginning on and already during the first of the two crashes...? And also takijhng account the several Boeing employees and engineers that stepped forward on reprted on the intense predssure the company implied on them to use shortcuts to save time and to save time, and then to save time - at all cost.

You know the principle of Occam's razor, I assume. Following it, it was not an individual pilot error, but an intentional bypassing of Boeing's own safety routines, principles and procedures. The part of the management responsible for deciding this policy has to be held liable. 300 are dead, two planes are lost, multi-billion damage has occured, still ticking upwards.

Aktungbby

04-29-19, 03:29 PM

A good news in all the bad news for the families of the pilots. The cheap get-out-of-dodge-theory of "pilot error" is almost ridiculous by now.

Not really, but you've already decided.NOT AFTER TODAY'S WSJ ARTICLE; AS A FORMER AMATEUR CESSNA PILOT, THIS REALLY REEKS OF MALFEASANCE: https://images.wsj.net/im-69975?width=620&aspect_ratio=1.5 Boeing (https://quotes.wsj.com/BA) Co. didn’t tell Southwest Airlines (https://quotes.wsj.com/LUV) Co. and other carriers when they began flying its 737 MAX jets that a safety feature found on earlier models that warns pilots about malfunctioning sensors had been deactivated, according to government and industry officials. Federal Aviation Administration safety inspectors and supervisors responsible for monitoring Southwest, the largest 737 MAX customer, also were unaware of the change, the officials said.
The alerts inform pilots whether a sensor known as an “angle-of-attack vane” is transmitting errant data about the pitch of a plane’s nose. Accident investigators have linked such bad data to the deadly Ethiopian Airlines crash in March and the Lion Air crash last year; both planes lacked the alert system.
In the 737 MAX, which features a new automated stall-prevention system called MCAS (https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-boeings-737-max-failed-11553699239?mod=article_inline), Boeing made those alerts optional. They would be operative only if a carrier bought a package of additional safety features. A LITTLE PROFIT MOTIVE ??
Southwest’s management and cockpit crews didn’t know about the lack of the warning system for more than a year after the planes went into service in 2017, industry and government officials said. They and most other airlines operating the MAX learned about it only after the Lion Air crash in October led to scrutiny of the plane’s revised design.
“Southwest’s own manuals were wrong” about the availability of the alerts, said the Southwest pilots union president, Jon Weaks. Since Boeing hadn’t communicated the modification to the carrier, the manuals reflected incorrect information, he said.
The FAA grounded all 737 MAX jets (https://www.wsj.com/articles/sales-rise-at-southwest-airlines-despite-max-grounding-11556192368?mod=article_inline) on March 13, three days after the Ethiopian Air accident. Boeing recently said it would book $1 billion in expenses (https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-forecasts-initial-1-billion-hit-from-737-max-troubles-11556106144?mod=article_inline) tied to the groundings and related business disruptions.
Boeing hasn’t addressed why it turned off the feature, called “AOA disagree alerts,” without informing customers. After the Lion Air crash, (https://www.wsj.com/articles/plane-with-188-people-on-board-crashes-off-indonesia-1540784983?mod=article_inline) Southwest asked Boeing to activate the alerts on its MAX planes.
This move, along with questions about why the alert system had been turned off, prompted FAA inspectors overseeing Southwest to consider in December recommending that the airline’s MAX fleet be grounded while they assessed whether pilots needed additional training about the alerts. But those internal FAA discussions didn’t go up the agency’s chain of command, according to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.
A Southwest spokeswoman said that before the Lion Air crash, the carrier had assumed the alerts were “operable on all MAX aircraft.” Boeing “did not indicate an intentional deactivation,” she said.
In previous 737 models, the computer-generated alerts appear as colored lights in the cockpit when a plane’s twin angle-of-attack sensors provide significantly different data from each other. In the MAX, they serve the same purpose but additionally are intended to warn pilots that MCAS, the new automated system implicated in both accidents, could misfire because of faulty sensor data.
MCAS commands that automatically push down the nose of a plane when it appears to be in danger of stalling can overpower a pilot’s efforts to get out of a dive by pulling the nose up. In the Ethiopian jet (https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-flight-control-system-is-blamed-for-boeing-crash-pilots-actions-also-prompt-questions-11554761918?mod=article_inline), which lacked the disagree alerts, it took more than four minutes for the pilots to realize that incorrect data from one of the sensors were prompting MCAS to push the jet’s nose down, according to investigators’ preliminary report.
A Boeing spokesman said last week that from now on, “customers will have the AOA disagree alerts as standard” on all MAX aircraft, including those already delivered to airlines. Boeing is devising a new software package that aims to fix MCAS (https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-looks-to-build-overseas-support-for-max-fix-11554927430?mod=article_inline) by making it less powerful, while also restoring the alerts.
The moves are among the safeguards the plane maker and FAA have embraced to make MCAS less hazardous if it misfires, and to get the MAX fleet back in the air.

Although the alerts were reactivated, some midlevel FAA officials who oversaw Southwest briefly considered the possibility of grounding its roughly 30 MAX aircraft until the agency established whether pilots needed new training, according to documents reviewed by the Journal.
Less than a month after the Lion Air jet went down, one FAA official wrote that AOA-related issues on MAX jetliners “may be masking a larger systems problem that could recreate a Lion Air-type scenario.”
About two weeks later, other internal emails referred to a “hypothetical question” of restricting MAX operations, with one message explicitly stating: “It would be irresponsible to have MAX aircraft operating with the AOA Disagree Warning system inoperative.” The same message alluded to the FAA’s power: “We need to discuss grounding [Southwest’s] MAX fleet until the AOA Warning System is fixed and pilots have been trained” on it and related displays.
The email discussions, previously unreported, were fleeting red flags raised by a small group of front-line FAA inspectors months before the Ethiopian jet nose-dived last month.
Within days, the concerns were dismissed by some involved in the discussions. These people concluded that the alerts provided supplemental pilot aids rather than primary safety information, and therefore no additional training was necessary. Boeing and the FAA continued to publicly vouch for the aircraft’s safety.
However, these concerns—ranging from potential training lapses to confusion by pilots about the specifics of angle-of-attack alerts—have emerged as high-priority items as Boeing’s decisions about the MCAS face scrutiny (https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeings-design-for-its-737-max-jet-draws-scrutiny-11552952750?mod=article_inline). The issues are being pursued by congressional, criminal and Transportation Department investigators, people with knowledge of inquiries said.
On Wednesday, a Boeing spokesman said that while the internal FAA discussions were under way last year, “there was no data that indicated the fleet should be grounded.”
An FAA spokesman said the agency expects to mandate that all 737 MAX aircraft include working disagree alerts.
Testifying before a Senate panel last month, acting FAA chief Daniel Elwell said one important factor is prioritizing what data pilots receive. “Every piece of real estate in a cockpit is precious,” he said. “You put one gauge up there, you are sacrificing another.”
American Airlines Group (https://quotes.wsj.com/AAL) Inc. was one of the few U.S. carriers that paid for the package of MAX safety features that included the sensor warning lights. The airline has said it did so in part to obtain the warning system.
In a meeting about a month after the first crash, a Boeing executive appeared to acknowledge the importance of the sensor warnings. The executive told American Airlines pilot union officials that American’s MAX cockpit warning lights would have helped them avoid problems like those encountered by the Lion Air pilots, union officials who attended the meeting said. A Boeing spokesman previously said the executive didn’t recall making that statement.
SO FAR NOTHING HAS ALTERED MY PREVIOUS VIEW (POST#3) OF THIS THREAD...EXCEPT THAT IT'S THE AOA SENSOR AND NOT A MACS SENSOR PROBLEM...AND BOEINGS' STOCK PRICE IS REFLECTING MY POSITION.... On Monday, Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg faced tough questions from shareholders about the crisis involving the grounded 737 MAX plane. It is becoming clear that the company was opaque (https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeings-enduring-puzzle-why-certain-safety-features-on-737-max-jets-were-turned-off-11556456400?mod=article_inline)with regulators and airlines in explanations of the jet’s safety features, and there are concerns that heightened scrutiny around certification will push up costs.
Yet evidence of the plane’s importance to the U.S. economy may discourage authorities from punishing the company more than is strictly necessary....Boeing’s commercial aircraft business has been a front-line ambassador of U.S. economic interests abroad, particularly in China.
On Thursday, official data showed a drop in March aircraft shipments. Some economists see this detail of an otherwise encouraging durable goods report as the first sign that the grounding of Boeing’s 737 MAX jet is having a small—but visible—macroeconomic impact.
Airlines, too, are dependent on the jet. Most can’t really switch from the 737 MAX to a competing jet—like Airbus’ A320—because they rely on many other Boeing products.
Friday’s first-quarter gross domestic product data wasn’t affected by the crisis, probably because the company only reduced output in April. In the second quarter, however, the damage to equipment spending and exports—not wholly offset by inventory buildup of undelivered planes—is likely to reduce U.S. economic growth by about a fifth of a percentage point, according to analysts both at Wells Fargo Securities and Goldman Sachs (https://quotes.wsj.com/GS). (BOTH WITH REPUTATION MALFEASANCE ISSUES OF THEIR OWN)
It’s a small impact, which is likely to be partially reversed in the third quarter if Boeing ramps up production again. Still, not every company can boast about showing up in GDP data.
Investors can expect more unnerving Boeing headlines. The company urgently needs to fix (https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-boeing-needs-to-own-the-737-max-debacle-11556127111?mod=article_inline) its relationship with airlines and regulators to secure its multiyear backlog of jet orders. On Monday, Mr. Muilenburg appeared to deviate from his recent conciliatory tone and outright rejected criticism of how Boeing designed the faulty flight-control system. There are also concerns that heightened scrutiny around certification will push up costs—for starters, it may affect programs such as the 777X and the project for a new midsize airplane.
Yet investors can take some comfort from the company’s unusual degree of market and political power. Airlines and government officials have every reason to find a fix too. The Boeing 737 Max is simply too big to fail. between Boeing and the ’ kissin cousin' FAA's 'apparent lack of impartial integrity in approving the craft and it's faulty MCAS, a universal truth of aviation holds true: profits first...sardine packed expendible passengers second...small wonder the Ethiopian investigators have turned over the flight recorder data to the French to avoid a FAA cover-up!

Buddahaid

04-29-19, 06:15 PM

Catfish

04-30-19, 06:10 AM

Shouldn't there be always two systems, for redundancy?
Especially when it comes to flying and failure of components, what i learned is "Two is one, one is none".

Buddahaid

04-30-19, 01:05 PM

There are two. The argument is about the sensor disagree alarm being tied to an optional feature.

Catfish

04-30-19, 02:46 PM

Sorry i did not enunciate this right - the Boeing 737 MAX does have 2 AoA sensors, but MCAS only takes input from 1 AoA sensor at a time.
So do the inputs 'cycle' in a way, or is the MCAS tied to one aoa sensor? :hmmm:

"The company said it will change the MCAS software to give the system input from more than one AOA sensor."
So: at a time, or at all?
from here:
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/investigators-find-new-clues-to-potential-cause-of-737-max-crashes-as-faa-details-boeings-fix/

Skybird

04-30-19, 03:16 PM

And then there is this.

"The disagree alert was tied or linked into the angle of attack indicator, which is an optional feature on the Max. Unless an airline opted for the angle of attack indicator, the disagree alert was not operable."

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47980959

Quote:
The inspectors learned that Boeing had opted to make the malfunction signal optional and an extra that would cost more money.
This came after Southwest asked Boeing to reactivate the signal after the Lion Air crash, which killed all 189 people on board.
Boeing had deactivated the signal on all 737 Max delivered to Southwest without telling the carrier.
Neither the airline nor its pilots were aware of these changes when they started flying the planes in 2017, a spokeswoman for Southwest told AFP.

Skybird

04-30-19, 03:18 PM

There are two. The argument is about the sensor disagree alarm being tied to an optional feature.
And for the third time, until you finally get it:

Quote:

The inspectors learned that Boeing had opted to make the malfunction signal optional and an extra that would cost more money.
This came after Southwest asked Boeing to reactivate the signal after the Lion Air crash, which killed all 189 people on board.
Boeing had deactivated the signal on all 737 Max delivered to Southwest without telling the carrier.
Neither the airline nor its pilots were aware of these changes when they started flying the planes in 2017, a spokeswoman for Southwest told AFP.

And I would add:

Such a vital thing should not be made an optional at all, it should and must be part of the mandatory base pack like engine temperature gauges and fire extinguishers.

Buddahaid

04-30-19, 04:01 PM

I'm still waiting for you to get it but you're too blinded by wanting get at Boeing to even consider other scenarios. Your not always right but you'll never admit it.

mapuc

04-30-19, 05:36 PM

In the near future, a report on these two crashes will be released.

I hope some of you with knowledge in this field of aviation, will translate it into plain English and post it here in this thread.

So far, as I understand, only preliminary reports have been released not a full report.

Markus

Catfish

05-12-19, 02:20 PM

Maybe a bit 'sensational', but still :hmmm:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H2tuKiiznsY

edit:
We have seen this guy before, presented by Boeing and the FAA.. seems sending the black box to the french was a good idea. He had blamed it on the pilots, and now..

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zGM0V7zEKEQ

So the first iteration of the MCAS system is much too powerful, and can not be overcome easily.
And then: Two vanes, system switching to one at this - and to the other at the next flight, cycling, no redundancy.
As asked here by me: http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showpost.php?p=2606572&postcount=66
Full responsibilty to Boeing. And the FAA.

Skybird

05-12-19, 04:04 PM

Good find, catfishk, the first video nicely illustrates the reasons. Pretty much what I said from beginning on, but better explained than I did.

A few additions, the video is a bit unclear there: MCAS is not new with the 737 max only, it is a system that is in use since long time, but for the new engines and changed airframe geometry, it had to be fed with new data and algorithms of course. And this is what had not been sufficnetly communicated by Boeing. - Next, the re-training was kept on low level to avoid new certification procedures that would have costed much more time and thus would have stopped Boei8njg from starting to try catching up with the leading 320 neo. If Boeing would have announced more intenbsive training, it would have admitted by that that the new plane is not so much similiar to the old one as implied, and thus old certifications would not have been carried over to the new plane, but FAA regulations then would have demanded new certification procedures. This time trap was to be avoided by Boeing at all cost, to allow Boeing starting to race after Airbus' 320 Neos earlier. Airbus by that time already had a solid lead in order numbers.

Boeing is system-relevant to the Us economy, too big to fail, and the FAA thus is urged by every government to be closer to Boeing than is reocmendable or could be accpeted if the independence of the authority from Boeing and the givenrment should have any flesh on its bones. This is old critcism, however. But one we will not hear for the last time. Like Airbus before, Boeing also has been found guilty by the WTO's court to have been illegally subsidized. Its a stiff economic compeoition. And Boeing accepoted twice that it woudl cost lives. That,m and only that - not just some stupid Anmtiu-americanism of mine - is the reaosn why I want to see heads rolling. They overplayed their cards, and now over 300 are dead. The decision making ranks responsible for these politlical failures at Boeing have to lose their heads. But due to the extreme closeness between US polticians withg Boeing plants in their states, and Boeing, I do not believe that too much will happen before I actually see it happening. The first disaster was the consequences of too eager politics, but they did not allow to get stopped by it and pulled no consequences - and thats why I rate the second disaster, as multiple slaughter, if not even murder. It could have been prevented if they would have learned form they first crash. They deliberately refused that. And so: lead them to the gallow.

Aktungbby

05-12-19, 04:27 PM

WHAT'S REALLY SCARY IS THAT THIS IS NOT NEW: TWO BRITISH COMETS DIED FROM MATALLUGIACL WINDOW STRESS FAILURE AND TWO DC TENS FROM CARGO LATCH INADEQUACY.... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Comet (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Comet):oops: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_96 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_96):k_confused:seems sending the black box to the French was a good idea. He had blamed it on the pilots, and now..
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zGM0V7zEKEQ
...profits first...sardine packed expendible passengers second...small wonder the Ethiopian investigators have turned over the flight recorder data to the French to avoid a FAA cover-up!

Aktungbby

05-15-19, 11:10 AM

.....between Boeing and the ’ kissin cousin' FAA's 'apparent lack of impartial integrity in approving the craft and it's faulty MCAS, a universal truth of aviation holds true: profits first...sardine packed expendible passengers second...small wonder the Ethiopian investigators have turned over the flight recorder data to the French to avoid a FAA cover-up!
MEETS The safety-certification process that put the Boeing 737 MAX in the air is coming under congressional scrutiny in what is shaping up as a test of the aircraft maker’s influence in Washington.
Boeing (https://quotes.wsj.com/BA) Co. and its lobbyists for years pushed to speed up the time it takes to get a new plane certified to fly. Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration—which were both targets of the company’s multimillion-dollar lobbying—supported efforts to delegate some safety-certification functions to Boeing. An internal Federal Aviation Administration review has tentatively determined that senior agency officials didn’t participate in or monitor crucial safety assessments of a flight-control system for Boeing (https://quotes.wsj.com/BA) Co.’s 737 MAX jet later implicated in two fatal crashes, according to industry and government officials.
The results, these officials said, also indicate that during the FAA certification process for the 737 MAX, Boeing didn’t flag the automated stall-prevention feature as a system whose malfunction or failure could cause a catastrophic event. Such a designation would have led to more intense scrutiny.
FAA engineers and midlevel managers deferred to Boeing’s early safety classification, the inquiry determined, allowing company experts to conduct subsequent analyses of potential hazards with limited agency oversight. Boeing employees who served as designated agency representatives signed off on the final design, according to people familiar with the findings.
Over the years, the FAA increasingly has relied on so-called authorized designees to act for the agency, with the goal of freeing up government resources to focus on what are deemed to be the most important and complex safety matters. Last year, Congress endorsed and expanded the FAA’s authority to utilize such company resources in approving new aircraft, systems and parts.
Following the two fatal crashes of Boeing 737 MAX airplanes in Indonesia and Ethiopia, lawmakers are questioning whether a new automated antistall system in the aircraft was properly vetted. Several are zeroing in on the Organization Designation Authorization program, established by the FAA in 2005, that allows certain aspects of safety certification to be delegated by the FAA to a plane maker.
That program “left the fox guarding the henhouse,”
Boeing has built an army in Washington of more than 30 in-house lobbyist$ and 16 outside firms to pre$$ for its interests across the federal government.
The company’s $15.1 million in lobbying expenditures in 2018 was the fourth-largest total of any individual company, according to filings compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics.
Among the company’s external lobbyists is Norm Dicks, a former Democratic congressman from Washington, where the company has a major presence. Mr. Dicks was hailed in the local press as “Mr. Boeing” during his time in Congress. In 2018, Boeing paid Mr. Dicks $290,000 to lobby his former colleagues on the company’s behalf, primarily concerning a troubled aerial-refueling tanker plane for the Air Force (https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-unlikely-to-deliver-first-tanker-in-2017-1505849972?mod=article_inline), lobbying records show.
The company’s lobbyists work the halls of Congress seeking to influence everything from the development of future space initiatives to the federal tax code to military-procurement policies.
The company is known to swarm the White House when foreign leaders visit, the better to press the case for the company’s military aircraft and airliners. It was a leading corporate proponent of reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank (https://www.wsj.com/articles/export-import-bank-set-for-renewal-1449265587?mod=article_inline), one of a number of policy fights that have driven up Boeing’s lobbying spending in recent years. Its lobbying expenditures peaked at nearly $22 million in 2015. BOTTOM LINE: A SUCCESSION OF SMALL ERRORS (ALA TITANIC) CAUSED TWO AIR DISASTERS; THE ERRORS STARTED AT THE VERY TOP (PROFIT AND DESIGN) AND WORKED DOWN TO FOUR PEOPLE; THE TWO PILOTS IN TWO AIRPLANES INSUFFICIENTLY BRIEFED TO DEAL WITH THEIR AIRCRAFT STALL SENSOR ISSUES...EVERYONE ELSE WAS...'JUST ALONG FOR THE (SHORT) RIDE'! :dead: https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/2/18518176/boeing-737-max-crash-problems-human-error-mcas-faa (https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/2/18518176/boeing-737-max-crash-problems-human-error-mcas-faa)

Catfish

05-16-19, 02:20 AM

So.. deregulation played a part?
" ... the conservative republicans fighting for a "small government" have already diluted, delayed or abolished dozens of protections in almost all sectors. [me thinking of EPA and this !"§$%&!!! Pruitt] The reason for this is called cost, redundancy and annoying bureaucracy. In truth, this happens at the request and pressure of the industry."

Google translation of the german »Spiegel«:
"Control out of control"
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=de&sl=de&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.spiegel.de%2Fwirtschaft%2Funte rnehmen%2Fdonald-trump-boeing-max-737-und-die-us-flugaufsicht-faa-ausser-kontrolle-a-1258713.html (https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=de&sl=de&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.spiegel.de%2Fwirtschaft%2Funte rnehmen%2Fdonald-trump-boeing-max-737-und-die-us-flugaufsicht-faa-ausser-kontrolle-a-1258713.html)

And a british article
"The Boeing scandal is an indictment of Trump’s corporate America":
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/07/boeing-737-max-regulation-corporate-america

Skybird

05-16-19, 07:21 AM

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/business/boeing-737-max-ethiopian-plane-crash.html

Oh ha!

Aktungbby

06-01-19, 08:15 PM

Shouldn't there be always two systems, for redundancy?
Especially when it comes to flying and failure of components, what i learned is "Two is one, one is none".

MEETS BOTTOM LINE: A SUCCESSION OF SMALL ERRORS (ALA TITANIC) CAUSED TWO AIR DISASTERS; THE ERRORS STARTED AT THE VERY TOP (PROFIT AND DESIGN) AND WORKED DOWN TO FOUR PEOPLE; THE TWO PILOTS IN TWO AIRPLANES INSUFFICIENTLY BRIEFED TO DEAL WITH THEIR AIRCRAFT STALL SENSOR ISSUES...EVERYONE ELSE WAS...'JUST ALONG FOR THE (SHORT) RIDE'! :dead: https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/2/18518176/boeing-737-max-crash-problems-human-error-mcas-faa (https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/2/18518176/boeing-737-max-crash-problems-human-error-mcas-faa)

So.. deregulation played a part?
" ... the conservative republicans fighting for a "small government" have already diluted, delayed or abolished dozens of protections in almost all sectors. [me thinking of EPA and this !"§$%&!!! Pruitt] The reason for this is called cost, redundancy and annoying bureaucracy. In truth, this happens at the request and pressure of the industry."

Google translation of the german »Spiegel«:
"Control out of control"
https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=de&sl=de&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.spiegel.de%2Fwirtschaft%2Funte rnehmen%2Fdonald-trump-boeing-max-737-und-die-us-flugaufsicht-faa-ausser-kontrolle-a-1258713.html (https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=de&sl=de&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.spiegel.de%2Fwirtschaft%2Funte rnehmen%2Fdonald-trump-boeing-max-737-und-die-us-flugaufsicht-faa-ausser-kontrolle-a-1258713.html)

And a british article
"The Boeing scandal is an indictment of Trump’s corporate America":
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/07/boeing-737-max-regulation-corporate-america https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html)
The fatal flaws with Boeing’s 737 Max can be traced to a breakdown late in the plane’s development, when test pilots, engineers and regulators were left in the dark about a fundamental overhaul (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/business/boeing-faa-mcas.html?module=inline) to an automated system that would ultimately play a role in two crashes. A year before the plane was finished, Boeing made the system more aggressive and riskier. While the original version relied on data from at least two types of sensors, the ultimate used just one, leaving the system without a critical safeguard. In both doomed flights, pilots struggled as a single damaged sensor sent the planes into irrecoverable nose-dives within minutes, killing 346 people and prompting regulators around the world to ground the Max (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/23/business/boeing-737-max-faa-regulation.html?module=inline).
But many people involved in building, testing and approving the system, known as MCAS, said they hadn’t fully understood the changes. Current and former employees at Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration who spoke with The New York Times said they had assumed the system relied on more sensors and would rarely, if ever, activate. Based on those misguided assumptions, many made critical decisions, affecting design, certification and training.....As Boeing rushed (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html?module=inline) to get the plane done, many of the employees say, they didn’t recognize the importance of the decision ....
The current and former employees, many of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the continuing investigations, said that after the first crash, they were stunned to discover MCAS relied on a single sensor.
“That’s nuts,” said an engineer who helped design MCAS.
“I’m shocked,” said a safety analyst who scrutinized it.
“To me, it seems like somebody didn’t understand what they were doing,” said an engineer who assessed the system’s sensors. BOTTOM LINE: EVEN AFTER THEY SAY THEY GOT IT ALL FIXED I'LL NEVER FLY ON ONE!
:/\\!! :damn:

Catfish

06-02-19, 06:24 AM

Edited: too off topic i think.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQidEmwMBvQ

FAA and Boeing's relationship. "America First nationalism, indulgent free market economics, Republican libertarianism and a political system in hock to corporate lobbying has just contributed to killing 356 innocent people." (The Guardian)
Will there be any accusation or indiction? So the the Boeing CEO says he "takes responsibility". Which means.. nothing.

Like Aktung I would prefer other planes than the 737 max right now.. and what will Boeing do? I mean the basic design is flawed, and while you can add gadgets and electronical helpers here and there it all boils down to if this plane is aerodynamically safe and able to control and fly if electronics fail.

Skybird

06-03-19, 03:58 PM

And more good news.

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48503610

Dowly

06-27-19, 07:48 AM

US regulators have uncovered a possible new flaw in Boeing's troubled 737 Max aircraft that is likely to push back test flights.

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48752932

:p2:

Skybird

07-29-19, 07:19 AM

The chain of revelations and new bad details about Boeing's failure - its safe to put it in this term now - has not broken off in past weeks. I came to think of the story of the 737 Max not being a self-standing isolated incident anymorek, but just a stellar symptom of deep-rooting background collapse of company structure and policy.

Like so often when companies turn from "quality for the sake of quality and own reputation", to "pleasing the shareholders". Usually the latter comes at the cost of the first. Health care being a superb example.

This is usually not being talked about when stating that "people should by stocks". But when you really think it consistently to the end, and although I defend stocks over any other form of investment and value papers, holding stocks with the expectation and demand to get a regular profit from it, in the end ist just: immoral. You should get a one-time-compensation for the risk you take when lending money. Not more.

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49142761

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/boeing_two_deadly_crashes

This isnot to slam one US company for beign what it is, a US company. There may be other foulplayers as well. But this thread de facto is about Boeing and two air disasters it has to accept responsibility for, and not any other company or other events in the world.

Skybird

10-18-19, 03:52 PM

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/business/boeing-flight-simulator-text-message.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage

A Boeing pilot working on the 737 Max said in messages from 2016 that a new automated system was making the plane difficult to control in flight simulators, more than two years before it was grounded following two deadly crashes.
The existence of the messages strike at a central part of Boeing’s defense over how the plane was certified to fly. For months, the company has maintained that the Max was certified in accordance with all appropriate regulations, suggesting that there was no indication that MCAS was unsafe.
Yet in the messages, the pilot, Mark Forkner, complained that the system, known as MCAS, was causing him trouble in a flight simulator. “It’s running rampant in the sim,” he wrote to a colleague. The messages are from November 2016, months before the Max was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration.
“Granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious,” he went on to say, according to a transcript of the exchange reviewed on Friday by The New York Times.

The 737 Max was grounded earlier this year after crashing twice in five months, killing 346 people. In both cases, MCAS malfunctioned based on erroneous data, sending the planes into unrecoverable nose dives.
Mr. Forkner was the chief technical pilot for the 737 Max and in charge of communicating with the F.A.A. group that determined how pilots would be trained before flying the plane. The Times previously reported that Mr. Forkner had failed to tell the F.A.A. that the original version of MCAS was being overhauled, leaving regulators with the impression that the system was relatively benign and would only be used in rare cases.
In the messages, Mr. Forkner states that during tests, the simulator reflected unexpected movements by the plane through a process called trimming.
“The plane is trimming itself like craxy,” he wrote to Patrik Gustavsson, a fellow 737 technical pilot at Boeing. “I’m like WHAT?”
Mr. Forkner went on to say that he had lied to the Federal Aviation Administration.
“I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly),” Mr. Forkner says in the messages, though it was not clear what he was specifically referring to.

Eight months earlier, Mr. Forkner had asked the F.A.A. if it would be O.K. to remove mention of MCAS from the pilot’s manual. The F.A.A., which at the time believed the system would only activate in rare cases and wasn’t particularly dangerous, approved Mr. Forkner’s request.
[The New York Times was the first to report (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/01/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html?module=inline) on Mr. Forkner’s role in the development of the 737 Max and his request to the F.A.A.]
“This is the smoking gun,” Representative Peter DeFazio, Democrat of Oregon, said in an interview. “This is no longer just a regulatory failure and a culture failure. It’s starting to look like criminal misconduct.”
As chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Mr. DeFazio’s office is overseeing the investigation into the crashes.
Mr. DeFazio said he had reviewed other internal Boeing documents and emails that suggested employees were under pressure to produce planes as fast as possible and avoid additional pilot training.
“Boeing cannot say this is about one person,” Mr. DeFazio said. “This is about a cultural failure at Boeing under pressure from Wall Street to just get this thing out there and make sure that you don’t open the door to further pilot training.”

A lawyer for Mr. Forkner downplayed the importance of the messages, suggesting Mr. Forkner was talking about issues with the simulator.
“If you read the whole chat, it is obvious that there was no ‘lie’ and the simulator program was not operating properly,” the lawyer, David Gerger, said in a statement. “Based on what he was told, Mark thought the plane was safe, and the simulator would be fixed.”
Flight simulators replicate real cockpits and are used to test planes during development. They can sometimes behave unpredictably, depending on their configuration.
Mr. Forkner, who is now a pilot for Southwest Airlines, and Mr. Gustavsson did not respond to requests for comment.
Reuters was first to report (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-airplane-boeing-exclusive/exclusive-boeing-2016-internal-messages-suggest-employees-may-have-misled-faa-on-737-max-sources-idUSKBN1WX25G) on the existence of the transcript.
Boeing provided the transcript to lawmakers on Capitol Hill on Friday morning, in advance of hearings this month at which the company’s chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, will testify about the crashes for the first time.
Boeing had provided the transcript earlier this year to the Department of Justice, which is conducting a criminal investigation, according to two people familiar with the communications who spoke on condition of anonymity because the exchange was not yet public.
The F.A.A. administrator, Stephen Dickson, sent Mr. Muilenburg a letter Friday morning demanding that the company account for why it did not provide the messages to the agency earlier.

“I expect your explanation immediately regarding the content of this document and Boeing’s delay in disclosing the document to its safety regulator,” Mr. Dickson wrote.
A Boeing spokesman, Gordon Johndroe, said the company was “voluntarily cooperating” with the congressional investigation and provided the messages to lawmakers as part of that process.
Jon Weaks, president of Southwest Airlines Pilots Association, said in a statement that “this is more evidence that Boeing misled pilots, government regulators and other aviation experts about the safety of the 737 Max.”
“It is clear that the company’s negligence and fraud put the flying public at risk,” Mr. Weaks added. “As pilots, we have to be able to trust Boeing to truthfully disclose the information we need to safely operate our aircraft. In the case of the 737 MAX, that absolutely did not happen.”

Skybird

10-23-19, 06:45 AM

https://www.investors.com/news/boeing-737-max-crash-report-regulators-meet/

Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee's report claims that Boeing 737 Max design flaws (https://www.wsj.com/articles/indonesia-to-fault-737-max-design-u-s-oversight-in-lion-air-crash-report-11569185664), lax oversight and pilot and maintenance errors were all responsible for last year's Lion Air crash, sources told the Wall Street Journal. But Lion Air (https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-23/boeing-max-crash-report-faces-pushback-from-lion-air-regulator) is pushing back on the report, saying that too much blame was being put on Indonesia, sources told Bloomberg.

Short time earlier, Boeing's former top manager for the Boeing Commercial Airplanes department, Kevin MacAllister, was ousted.

Skybird

10-25-19, 06:50 AM

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50177788

Skybird

10-29-19, 06:26 PM

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50225025

Who would have thought that it all would lead this far when the mess started... Seems to have been about time, although still too late.

Skybird

11-06-19, 06:32 AM

And more good news for Boeing.

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50293927

Jimbuna

11-06-19, 08:25 AM

Things just go from bad to worse it would appear.

Aktungbby

12-12-19, 01:21 PM

between Boeing and the ’ kissin cousin' FAA's 'apparent lack of impartial integrity in approving the craft and it's faulty MCAS, a universal truth of aviation holds true: profits first...sardine packed expendible passengers second...small wonder the Ethiopian investigators have turned over the flight recorder data to the French to avoid a FAA cover-up!

Things just go from bad to worse it would appear. U.S. regulators decided to allow Boeing (https://quotes.wsj.com/BA) Co. BA -0.90% (https://quotes.wsj.com/BA?mod=chiclets)’s 737 MAX jet to keep flying after its first fatal crash last fall even when their own analysis indicated it could become one of the most accident-prone airliners in decades without design changes.
The Federal Aviation Administration’s November 2018 internal analysis, released during a House committee hearing Wednesday, projected that without the agency’s intervention the MAX could have averaged one fatal crash about every two or three years. That amounts to a substantially greater safety risk than either Boeing or the agency indicated publicly at the time.
Mr. DeFazio said more than 500,000 documents gathered by his panel from the FAA and Boeing, combined with emails and interviews, have “uncovered a broken safety culture within” the company and the agency.
“The FAA failed to ask the right questions and failed to adequately question the answers that agency staff received from Boeing,” he said. “Our investigation has revealed that many of the FAA’s own technical experts and safety inspectors believe FAA’s management often sides with Boeing rather than standing up for the safety of the public.” The FAA analysis projected as many as 15 similar catastrophic accidents globally over the life of the MAX fleet—spanning 30 to 45 years—unless fixes were made to the automated flight-control system implicated in the October 2018 crash.
The projected crash total, according to the Journal’s calculations, was roughly comparable to all fatal passenger accidents over the previous three decades—from any cause—involving Boeing’s 757, 767, 777, 787 and latest 747 models. The MAX fleet was expected to eventually number nearly 5,000 jets world-wide; the other fleets together total slightly more than 3,800 aircraft.
The potential for 15 projected crashes “would be an unacceptable number in the modern aviation-safety world,” said Alan Diehl, a retired FAA and Pentagon air-safety official, who hasn’t had any involvement in the MAX crisis.
The MAX’s safety record when it was grounded, after two years in service, amounted roughly to two catastrophic accidents for every one million flights, according to estimates by industry officials relying on unofficial data. By contrast, the 737 model that preceded the MAX has suffered one fatal crash for every 10 million flights, according to data from Boeing.
The 2018 global accident rate for all scheduled Western-built jetliners—including those made by Europe’s Airbus (https://quotes.wsj.com/EADSY) SE as well as regional passenger planes from Canadian, Brazilian and other manufacturers—was one fatal crash per approximately three million flights.
After the hearing, Mr. DeFazio told reporters the FAA’s analysis far exceeded the agency’s safety threshold for a potential catastrophic accident.
Pressed on whether the FAA took sufficient action following the agency’s internal risk analysis, Mr. Dickson said Wednesday that was “something that we need to look at very closely,” adding the “result is not satisfactory.”
Mr. Dickson said he didn’t want to second-guess decisions made following the first accident, but that based on what he knows today he would have grounded the aircraft then. PILOTS ARE COMPELLED TO GAZE THROUGH THE WINDSHIELD
.....FORESIGHThttps://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/OG-DB458_201908_M_20190815195340.gif<At the root of the company’s miscalculation was a flawed assumption that pilots could handle any malfunction. ....THE FAA HAS THE LUXURY OF ...HINDSIGHT??!!:timeout: :oops: :nope: :dead: