How did real captains investigate why their torpedoes were duds?

[Drakken]

I have a question on my mind lately, which I cannot find an answer in my searches. As we know, there are many types of failures with torpedos on a hunt:

- Pre-trigger to explosion
- Precociously going out of steam or fuel OTW
- Hitting the target without explosion, or at a too steep angle to detonate
- Missing the target due to human error
- Going under keel depth because of faulty settings

If there is a malfunction or a mechanical glitch, like during the early war with the TII G7e torpedo, obviously a captain would like to know why to report the issues both to BdU and Ordinance.

For us, it is easy to know why: We press F6 and we can see if a torpedo passes under the keel or hits without an explosion.

However, how were real U-boat commanders able to deduct which type of failure was the cause of a torpedo failure? Obviously, the target not exploding was a big indicator in itself, but what other indicators did they have in hand to find the reasons why and report them back to BdU?

[Aktungbby]

http://www.uboataces.com/articles-wooden-torpedoes.shtml (http://www.uboataces.com/articles-wooden-torpedoes.shtml)

[sublynx]

If you google Wolves without teeth torpedo crisis pdf, you'll find a study made about the torpedo malfunctions, how it was discoverd and how it was solved.

[CaptBones]

That's the short answer.

Neither U-boat captains nor US submarine commanders had the tools or the time and expertise to investigate torpedo failures. They reported the failures, along with all available data on the circumstances surrounding the failures, to "higher authority". It was the responsibility of "higher authority" to do the investigations and fix the problems.

What you will find is that the "higher authority" in both navies failed miserably to do their job. They refused to believe there was anything wrong with the torpedoes, they blamed the captains/crews for the failures.

In both navies, the problems were finally addressed and fixed only after the operational commanders (BdU and COMSUBPAC) insisted the submarine skippers were right. There was overwhelming evidence that there were problems with torpedoes that the technical authorities needed to investigate and resolve. A(nother) perfect example of bureaucratic arrogance.

[Drakken]

Thank you. This is of great help, I was always wondering how these kinds of problems were found and deducted on-site, then transmitted to BdU.