Why did the IJN lose most all sea battles?

[thegrindre]

Hi all,
I've been watching the History Channel's Battle 360 series about WWII's Pacific Navel battles.
In most cases, 'we' (USA) were out numbered, out witted and out skilled yet we won. WHY did the IJN lose most all battles??? I don't understand. :o They were better then we were most of the time.
It puzzles me...

Waddaya think?

Thanks
:)

[nikimcbee]

Smart ass answer.
Jesus.

Actual answer.
ULTRA.
:/\\k:

[Betonov]

One of the reasons I heard was that the Japaneese rigid hierarchy worked against them.
If a shell hit a Japaneese ship and the section commander was killed, the crew did nothing because they were allowed onyl to act on orders from superior officers. Before a CO could assign a new commander the ship would already fill with water.
Amercian crews were allowed a lot of self initiative. The hole was pluged before the new commander was assigned.

But this could be busted, It was just something I heard in a documentary.

[Oberon]

ULTRA, lack of decent command and communications, lack of decent radar.

Basically, once they got to a battle they were very good, but actually getting to the battle and not being jumped first was the biggest problem.

[Torplexed]

Hi all,
I've been watching the History Channel's Battle 360 series about WWII's Pacific Navel battles.
In most cases, 'we' (USA) were out numbered, out witted and out skilled yet we won. WHY did the IJN lose most all battles??? I don't understand. :o They were better then we were most of the time.
It puzzles me...

Waddaya think?

Thanks
:)

I don't know if I would call the US out numbered. The first carrier battle at the Coral Sea was basically a even match two fleet carriers versus two fleet carriers. One US carrier was sunk, but the two Japanese carriers were scratched from the upcoming Midway operation. And Midway was a far closer battle than most would think. You could really qualify more as a carrier ambush on the Japanese than the miracle it was often described as.

Certainly one huge US advantage was the ability to out-produce and replace losses. Every Japanese ship that went down often had no replacement available in the wings anytime soon. For example, the US put 65 carriers of every size and shape into the water in 1943. Japan, just two. Mere attrition wasn't going to serve Japan well.

[CCIP]

One of the things that often gets cited in the context of Japan's overconfidence in the IJN is:

"It takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition." -Adm. of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham

[Raptor1]

In terms of actual losses, the IJN came out pretty evenly in the few major battles they had parity with the US navy, with the obvious exception of Midway which they lost due to a combination of intelligence, poor planning and general luck on the American side. When they had the right conditions on their side, they even managed a couple of clear victories (Savo Island and Tassafaronga being the obvious examples). By the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, they were clearly outmatched in technology, training and numbers and had very little chance of any sort of victory.

[Webster]

I think rigid ideology and command structure was the downfall of both japan and Germany as there are many examples where soldiers were unwilling or not allowed to think for themselves and do what needed to be done to win during battles and instead were forced to wait for orders of what to do and let many opportunities for victory slip past them.

I think a lot of the reason we did so well is because we are used to being unorganized and not rigid to following orders to the letter so we adapted to things as they happened which was not allowed to happen with our opponents soldiers

[Torplexed]

One of the things that often gets cited in the context of Japan's overconfidence in the IJN is:

"It takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition." -Adm. of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham

One of the most succinct statements that came from the Japanese naval authorities after the war was that they lost by "battling " instead of "warring" --"We conceived the war with America on a far smaller scale, studied it as a battle. We never became aware of this mistake, much less outgrew it."

The misapplied and probably out of date doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan and the concept of the "Decisive Battle"certainly came back to haunt them. They kept chasing for that decisive battle until they had no fleet left.

[thegrindre]

We seem to be bumbling bozos that never give up. We were a proud nation back then.

:)

[Oberon]

In terms of actual losses, the IJN came out pretty evenly in the few major battles they had parity with the US navy, with the obvious exception of Midway which they lost due to a combination of intelligence, poor planning and general luck on the American side. When they had the right conditions on their side, they even managed a couple of clear victories (Savo Island and Tassafaronga being the obvious examples). By the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, they were clearly outmatched in technology, training and numbers and had very little chance of any sort of victory.

Nah, admit it Raptor, they kept rolling ones. :03:

[Torplexed]

Nah, admit it Raptor, they kept rolling ones. :03:

"I fear we have awoken a sleeping giant and loaded his dice." :D

http://boardgamegeek.com/camo/810395f17a321ffb7643822c8eb2b7ad4827b82c/687474703a2f2f63662e6765656b646f2d696d616765732e63 6f6d2f696d616765732f7069633137353035395f6d642e6a70 67

[Raptor1]

Nah, admit it Raptor, they kept rolling ones. :03:

The dice were loaded! The cards were stacked!

I still haven't gotten revenge for the Marshalls, have I?

[Wolferz]

:sign_yeah:

The melted down beer cans they used for shells didn't help much either. :O:

The IJN just didn't have the numbers in assets and their failure to catch our carriers at Pearl was also an ingredient in the recipe for failure.

We have only succeeded in awaking a sleeping giant.
Admiral (I think I'll take a trip in a Zippo plane) Yamamoto

[Subnuts]

As far as post-1942 goes, I imagine having superior numbers, reliable radar, better surface fire control, vastly superior damage control, and ULTRA probably gave the USN a decided advantage. Having a massive industrial base and the ability to easily replace losses didn't hurt, either. During the Guadalcanal campaign, the USN lost almost twice as many cruisers and more destroyers than the IJN, along with two aircraft carriers. However, the Japanese had completely lost control of the sea around Guadalcanal by February 1943. The sinking of the battleships Hiei and Kirishima within 24 hours of one another were the kind of crippling losses the IJN just couldn't recover from.

I know I've mentioned it before, but anyone seriously interested in the Pacific War needs to read Shattered Sword. It explains the inner workings of the IJN and the Japanese naval mindset in way more detail than I could ever hope to do in a single message board post. :yeah:

[Oberon]

The dice were loaded! The cards were stacked!

I still haven't gotten revenge for the Marshalls, have I?

Indeed, the battle that I won and then retreated from... :oops:

[Torplexed]

I know I've mentioned it before, but anyone seriously interested in the Pacific War needs to read Shattered Sword. It explains the inner workings of the IJN and the Japanese naval mindset in way more detail than I could ever hope to do in a single message board post. :yeah:

I've got a copy. As someone who grew up on Walter Lord's book, Incredible Victory it certainly has forever changed the way I see the Battle of Midway. From an American underdog win to Japan basically sticking it's head in a noose for lack of imagination on how to further prosecute the war.

[CCIP]

One of the most succinct statements that came from the Japanese naval authorities after the war was that they lost by "battling " instead of "warring" --"We conceived the war with America on a far smaller scale, studied it as a battle. We never became aware of this mistake, much less outgrew it."

The misapplied and probably out of date doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan and the concept of the "Decisive Battle"certainly came back to haunt them. They kept chasing for that decisive battle until they had no fleet left.

Yup! IJN's thinking, of course, was shaped in a lot of ways by their experience of the Russo-Japanese War and the quasi-Mahanian victory at Tsushima. The IJN certainly took to heart the reasons for their own triumph, but failed to grasp the real reasons for Russia's humiliating defeat. To them, it was an example of a European empire falling to tactical brilliance and superior morale, all under the command of a genius admiral and his ultra-disciplined subordinates. In that, they totally disregarded the fact that Tsushima had virtually no impact on the war's outcome, or that Russia's war effort collapsed from the inside, for systemic reasons unique to Russia.

So their myth of the decisive battle was born, and built on layer upon layer of flawed assumptions that were held up as doctrine for the next 40 years.

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

The Russo-Japanese War played a part, but I suspect that a rarely discussed factor is the warpage caused by Washington Naval Treaty. I won't call the "Fleet Faction" unrealistic - they knew well enough they can't really get parity, so they were trying for 70%, which as I understand it is actually defensible by then contemporary naval theory as the approximate minimum mark they need to win.

The 70% is roughly adequate for (according to then naval theory):
1) Mutual annihilation with the Americans, should it gather up its entire force and move across the Pacific, since they are expected to lose 30% combat power while swimming over.
2) The defeat of the American Navy, should it commit its Pacific Fleet first, then the Atlantic in-turn.
3) The defeat of a theoretical British/American allied force if the issue is such that they'd only commit their Pacific Fleets.

Overall, these aren't extremely unreasonable goals or "excessive sufficiency."

The Americans and Brits crow about their "Two ocean theory" but let's fact it, the Brits are only defending their colonies and America is more or less self-sufficient even without oceanic trade at that time, so their justification is, in objective terms, much weaker than Japan's whose trade relates to the very survival of their core nation. There's also the fact that American and British national power is in the long run much stronger and so the Japanese will have to think really hard before getting too cocky, even if they did get an edge in the Pacific.

The Fleet Faction even read America properly that they would be reasonable and concede to 70%. Well, that is, until the moronic Japanese Foreign Ministry decided to send messages suggesting that 60% would be acceptable to the Japanese government. The Americans decoded the message and failed to consider the real consequences of forcing a treaty that's just below what they needed. The fact the decoding tends to be dominant factor in American accounts would suggest that really, the 60% was a nice to have rather than a critical necessity as far as the Americans are concerned.

Because of the idiocy of the Japanese Treaty Faction (yes, the idea of some kind of treaty is definitely a good one for Japan, but the Fleet Faction actually read America's limits better that time) and America's "Take When You Can" policy, the rest of Japanese naval construction and tactics throughout the 20s and 30s are a desperate attempt to make up for that "missing" 10%. You can tell how a navy feels about its position by how overloaded its ships are :-)

In a sense, it may actually have been better for the Japanese Navy had a deal where they are limited to say 30 or 40% of the American Navy was shoved down their throats. With the gap so great, the goal to beat the American Navy (on a tactical level) would be completely off the table, and a different development can take place. It also gives them a firmer ground to demand decisively different terms for the next treaty.

It didn't help when in the next Treaty, the Americans and Brits came up with the brilliant tactic of banning the "Special Type" destroyers, which really are a defensive measure. Sigh...

[Bilge_Rat]

I have not seen the history program, but it is not accurate to say the IJN lost most battles.

You can break it down into time periods:

-phase I: dec. 41-april 42. In phase I, the IJN won almost every battle, scored some spectacular successes, including the Java Sea battles, destroyed most of the ABDA/Asiatic fleet and captured SE Asia. This was the peak of the IJN in terms of leadership and competence;

-phase 2: may-november 42, the carrier battles. Much maneuvering, 4 actual CV vs CV battles: Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz. Midway was a IJN loss, but the other three were tactical draws. At the end, the loss table was the same, 4 CVs lost by both sides. In this phase, due to losses, the quality of IJN pilots detoriorates quickly;

-phase 3: aug. 42-nov. 43, Guadalcanal/Solomons Islands. Almost exclusively surface night fighting. At the beginning, the IJN is excellent, good tactics, equipment, optics. They score a spectacular success at Savo Island, sinking 4 Allied CAs. At that time, the U.S. is only average, poor radar equipment and over reliance on it, poor night fighting techniques.

The USN improves its tactics in the next 3 battles: Cape Esperance, and Guadalcanal I and II, which are all U.S. tactical victories.

At Tassafaronga, the U.S. suffers a defeat when 3 CAs are heavily damaged and 1 sunk, all by torpedoes.

However, the U.S.N. kept improving its equipment, by mid-43, the U.S. radar was generally better that IJN optics, they keep improving their leadership/planning, radar fire control, damage control, torpedo evasion and attack tactics. The IJN does not however, and its skill level declines over this period. IMHO, this has more to do with the fact that the IJN is badly overstretched and running out of competent personnel.

The IJN does score some occasional successes such as Kolombangara in july 43, where 3 U.S. CLs are heavily damaged by "Long Lance" torps.

The last major battle is Empress Augusta Bay in Nov.43 where the tables are completely turned from Savo. A scratch IJN force of 2 CAs, 2 CLs and 6 DDs try to intercept the Bougainville invasion fleet. Rear adm. Merrill only has 4 CLs and 8 DDs to stop them(much weaker than the allied force at Savo), but his group is intensely trained, knows exactly the battle plan and are all combat veterans. His radar picks up the enemy quickly, firing is started quickly and kept up at a frenetic pace (the IJN admiral thought he faced a much bigger force because of the firing, which totalled 10,000 6" shells) and Merrill keeps his force constantly going through 180 turns to throw off IJN torpedoes. At the end, the IJN loses 1 CL, 1 DD and are driven off, Merrill does not lose any ships.

-phase 4: jan. 44 on. Not much to say, "Turkey shoot".

[mapuc]

I have like most of you read many books or seen documentary about WWII and the war in the pacific.

Each book or author had his or her view on why Japan lost the war

Even the documentary had their view on why...

I guess it was due to many factors..You can not point at only one thing.

That what I think.

Markus

[Armistead]

Often they had the battle won, but lacking resources and other capital ships, they often retreated to protect what they had..

It was much the same with the South vs. the North in our US Civil War, the South had it's ways until numbers, industry and technology caught up.

[Oberon]

Often they had the battle won, but lacking resources and other capital ships, they often retreated to protect what they had..

I know that feeling... (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showpost.php?p=1878602&postcount=61) :shifty:

[Bubblehead1980]

Interesting although often discussed topic. I won't repeat what everything said, all had valid points but agree most with the posts concerning rigid adherence to ideology being the downfall of the japanese as it extended to all levels .I also feel sheer luck was on our side in the desperate days when if had not, the pacific war would have ended in a much different manner.

Although luck is seen by many as preparation meets opportunity(which is mostly true) there is sheer blind luck. Midway which is acknowledged as the turning point, that stopped the japanese onslaught in the Pacific, was the most lucky battle the USNavy ever fought.

The Japanese had the advantage and had we not been so lucky, likely the US would not have scored the big victory, or could have even lost.I often wonder what would have happened had japanese had all four or even 3 carriers to attack once they realized carriers were in the area and armed their planes.Sink the Yorktown then go after Enterprise and Hornet, likely one of them would have been lost, maybe two.We were so close to defeat at that point in the war.

Point I am making while the Admirals showed plenty of sound planning, the aircrews were as brave as any could be, a lot of it was just sheer luck, good luck for US, bad for the japanese.

[Torplexed]

The Japanese had the advantage and had we not been so lucky, likely the US would not have scored the big victory, or could have even lost.I often wonder what would have happened had japanese had all four or even 3 carriers to attack once they realized carriers were in the area and armed their planes.Sink the Yorktown then go after Enterprise and Hornet, likely one of them would have been lost, maybe two.We were so close to defeat at that point in the war.

Point I am making while the Admirals showed plenty of sound planning, the aircrews were as brave as any could be, a lot of it was just sheer luck, good luck for US, bad for the japanese.


I tend to be of the opinion that luck was heavily minimized by the US prior to Midway. Outstanding US intelligence was no accident. Putting the whole of US carrier strength on location was no accident. Having the Yorktown repaired and operational in 24 hours was no accident. Having extra search assets at Midway was no accident.

That Japan multi-tasked their carriers to simultaneously attempt to accomplish three missions at once was not due to luck. It was standard bad operational planning for Japan once all the set piece battles had been won in the first six months of the war. Japan failing to grasp the implications of enhanced US search assets all along the string of islands that link the Hawaiian Islands to Midway was no accident. Japan failing to grasp the odd coincidence that American surface vessels just happened to be in their strategic recon lagoon at French Frigate Shoals the right moment, along with all the other obviously weird going-ons on in the Central Pacific was no accident. The latter two were the result of poor pre-war Japanese commitment to intel and their inability to commit resources to (indicative of their contempt for) strategic intelligence. During the battle, the reckless Japanese decision to stubbornly continue fighting with just the Hiryu alone was also not luck. Just indicative of a poorly thought out naval philosophy that put too much stock into the offensive for the offensive's sake.

Midway turned out as it did because the Japanese were lax, poorly informed, and poorly prepared, and because the USN was well prepared, well informed, and ready to seize the opportunity that was stupidly handed out by Japan. The only "miracle" at Midway was that the Japanese did not lose more than they actually lost when all the shooting stopped. Luck was a factor, but certainly Nimitz did a great deal to stack odds in his favor.

[Bilge_Rat]

one point that often gets lost is that after 1 year of war, at the end of 1942, the IJN and Allied fleets had lost about the same number, types and tonnage of warships.

In dec. 42, the USN had only 1 operational carrier in the Pacific, the old U.S.S. Saratoga. The RN detached one of their carriers to the Solomons Islands in case the IJN tried something.

The big difference is that the USN had replaced all their losses by mid-43 and just kept on expanding the fleet while Japan struggled for the end of the war just to replace their losses.

Japan could never win a war of attrition with the U.S.. Even if Midway had turned out to be a IJN victory with all 3 american carriers lost, the U.S. would still have won the war.

[Aktungbby]

I tend to be of the opinion that luck was heavily minimized by the US prior to Midway. Outstanding US intelligence was no accident. Putting the whole of US carrier strength on location was no accident. Having the Yorktown repaired and operational in 24 hours was no accident. Having extra search assets at Midway was no accident.
:agree:The Vikings always held battle luck to be major consideration (The Gods!:up:) and a plucky leader with such perceived luck was followed. It was also no luck that the sister carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku were held back from the Midway battle partially due to damage from Coral Sea but also to guard the Home Islands from another raid from 'our secret base in Shangri-La" as FDR had boasted of the the Doolittle Raid. Shokaku arrived at Kure capable of full speed, following heavy bow damage at Coral Sea on 17 May 1942 and entered drydock on 16 June 1942.:hmmm:a whole month? Repairs were completed within ten days and, a little over two weeks later on 14 July, she was formally reassigned to Striking Force, 3rd Fleet, Carrier Division 1. Had that ten day repair started on May 17 for ten days...the Battle of Midway might have had Japan's best two carriers and light carrier Zuiho with their elite aircrews, each with nine more aircraft than the four Hiryu class ships that were sunk, and the tide of battle would perhaps have been altered. Or at least the presence two of the three carriers and their reformed aircrews would have "increased firepower" for so critical an operation. It was also no luck that US forces had an untested B-25 available for the raid, adaptable to a carrier deck-and a very plucky leader in Doolittle. The Imperial Japanese Navy bore a special responsibility for allowing an American aircraft carrier force to approach the Japanese Home Islands in a manner similar to the IJN fleet to Hawaii in 1941, and permitting it to escape undamaged. The fact that medium, normally land-based bombers carried out the attack confused the IJN's high command. This confusion and the knowledge that Japan was now vulnerable to air attack-a major propaganda defeat for the Japanese people- strengthened Yamamoto's resolve to capture Midway Island; essentially A knee-jerk under-strength poor response to salvage the dignity of the Emperor, resulting in a decisive Japanese defeat at Midway. As in boxing: you set him up with the B-25 jab (Doolittle) and KO him with the 3 carrier hook (Spruance)...Pluck!

[thegrindre]

I tend to be of the opinion that luck was heavily minimized by the US prior to Midway. Outstanding US intelligence was no accident. Putting the whole of US carrier strength on location was no accident. Having the Yorktown repaired and operational in 24 hours was no accident. Having extra search assets at Midway was no accident.

That Japan multi-tasked their carriers to simultaneously attempt to accomplish three missions at once was not due to luck. It was standard bad operational planning for Japan once all the set piece battles had been won in the first six months of the war. Japan failing to grasp the implications of enhanced US search assets all along the string of islands that link the Hawaiian Islands to Midway was no accident. Japan failing to grasp the odd coincidence that American surface vessels just happened to be in their strategic recon lagoon at French Frigate Shoals the right moment, along with all the other obviously weird going-ons on in the Central Pacific was no accident. The latter two were the result of poor pre-war Japanese commitment to intel and their inability to commit resources to (indicative of their contempt for) strategic intelligence. During the battle, the reckless Japanese decision to stubbornly continue fighting with just the Hiryu alone was also not luck. Just indicative of a poorly thought out naval philosophy that put too much stock into the offensive for the offensive's sake.

Midway turned out as it did because the Japanese were lax, poorly informed, and poorly prepared, and because the USN was well prepared, well informed, and ready to seize the opportunity that was stupidly handed out by Japan. The only "miracle" at Midway was that the Japanese did not lose more than they actually lost when all the shooting stopped. Luck was a factor, but certainly Nimitz did a great deal to stack odds in his favor.
Exceptional post, sir. :salute: :agree: Personally, I don't believe in luck. It's just a stupid word for unknown ideas and thoughts. It has nothing to do with reality. :down:

:)

[Aktungbby]

Exceptional post, sir. :salute: :agree: Personally, I don't believe in luck. It's just a stupid word for unknown ideas and thoughts. It has nothing to do with reality. :down:

:)The Vikings always held battle luck to be major consideration (The Gods!:up:) and a plucky leader with such perceived luck was followed. Unfortunately you've got to believe. One of the first rules of war is: when you start the actual battle... you are no longer on Plan A. R.E. Lee used to get to the battlefield on time...and then put his trust in God. Eisenhower who famously exhorted the troops: "I have full confidence in your courage (http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Courage) and devotion to duty (http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Duty) and skill in battle (http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Battle).
We will accept nothing less than full Victory! Good luck And let us beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking" also carried an apology note in his pocket on D-day in the event his (history's) extremely meticulously well planned invasion didn't go well... it, sort of, didn't.https://i1.wp.com/www.archives.gov/education/lessons/d-day-message/images/failure-message.gif It was the Viking Leif “The Lucky” (Leif Ericsson), that in the year 1000 a.d. discovered America, or “Vinland” as he called it, not Columbus. He was given his nickname, “The lucky” because he was responsible for rescuing fifteen shipwrecked mariners marooned on a skerry (Islet) in Greenland. Essentially amphibious military operations:


Leif’s journey to America, along with thirty five other men, is recounted in both “The Saga of Eric the red, and Snorre’ s “Heimskringla”. The honour for the discovery of America almost fell to Eric The Red, Leif had asked his father to be leader of the expedition, but as Eric was on his way to the ship, his horse stumbled and caused the aging chieftain to fall off and injure his leg. He took this as a less than propitious sign...of the gods' favor that his conquering days were ended. According to the sagas, he was heard to comment: “It was not meant for me to discover other lands than that in which we now live. We shall sail together no more.” Three acknowledged professionals with a remarkably similar point of view IMHO. A fourth, Alexander the Great, just cut to the core issue-eliminated the middleman- and declared himself a god, not unlike the devine Emperor Hirohito actually, and the night before Gaugamela...and victory over Persia, declared a full eclipse of the moon to be a sure sign of victory!:yeah: Rising suns or eclipsing moons...go figure!
.http://i2.mirror.co.uk/incoming/article5369321.ece/alternates/s615/Eclipse-in-Svalbard.jpgwow that sure makes me feel like a winner BBY! talk about spin! :huh:

[thegrindre]

I don't have to and never did nor will I ever believe in a stupid word as luck. Just because a few famous people used the word, certainly doesn't mean it is proper or correct. There is no such thing as luck. It's just a stupid word for unknown thoughts and ideas. (Ignorance)

:)

[Sailor Steve]

When people say they "don't believe in luck", do they mean "Luck" as controlled by outside supernatural forces (aka the Roman Goddess Fortuna) or just that sometimes random unforeseeable events happen to us? I don't believe in the former either, but certainly the poor guy who has a plane fall on his house is indeed a victim of "bad luck". When it's not your fault and nothing you did could have prevented it, it's random chance, but can also be described as luck.

In the case in point, the US forces certainly gave themselves all the advantages they could. Even so, both sides were searching vast areas of open ocean. Did the US Navy have advanced knowledge of the proper area to search, or was it random chance that led them to find the Japanese carriers at the opportune moment? If the former, then they certainly tipped the scales with technology and energy. If the latter, then it was still luck...meaning random chance, not supernatural guidance by the fates.

[thegrindre]

Captains, I'm afraid you'll never convince me that there is any such thing as luck in this world. It just doesn't exist.
If a plane falls out of the sky onto your house, it was probably induced by the mechanic who overlooked something on the aircraft to cause it to fall. Maybe pilot error. It's all hypothetical, who knows, but it wasn't luck.
Because it was your house, well, those were just the odds of it happening,
but luck wasn't involved.

Unfortunately, we will never agree... Conversation Over and Out. :salute:

Now, let's enjoy the sim.

:)

[Sailor Steve]

I'm sorry, but I find that a little dismissive. You started a great thread with a very good question. You then stated an opinion, which I thought was also good. I attempted to explore it. Not bash it, or even argue with it. Just discuss it. Now you want me to ignore it and "enjoy the sim". But your thread really has nothing to do with the sim. That's cool, it's what this section is for. I just wanted to explore the possibilities. :sunny:

[CCIP]

I think you also failed to read the actual post, because Torplexed very clearly said "luck was deliberately minimized", which is an indirect way of saying "the USN didn't leave much to chance and planned carefully, so they could make sure that things would go right and the Japanese would fall for the trap." Otherwise, actual luck didn't enter into this discussion until you'd mentioned it. And I think you'll have seen some excellent posts from several people - thanks to Kazuaki Shimazaki for also bringing in a very valid point about the Washington treaties - that actually did a great job of explaining some of the very logical historical issues here.

[Captain Vlad]

On a tactical/operational level, the Japanese higher up's tendency to develop overly complex schemes that relied a bit too much on their interpretation of how Allied forces would react and to split their forces into much smaller parcels also likely had something to do with many of their losses.

[Aktungbby]

which is an indirect way of saying "the USN didn't leave much to chance and planned carefully, so they could make sure that things would go right and the Japanese would fall for the trap." Otherwise, actual luck didn't enter into this discussion until you'd mentioned it. And I think you'll have seen some excellent posts from several people - thanks to Kazuaki Shimazaki for also bringing in a very valid point about the Washington treaties - that actually did a great job of explaining some of the very logical historical issues here.
Actually luck entered into all of it at the critical moment at Midway. Not only was the American carrier point NE of Midway dubbed Point Luck,:hmmm: but the attack on the Japanese carriers, given the extreme range of Spruance's launch/delays coupled with the deplorable attack by Waldron's Torpedo 8 all culminated on one man and luck as fuel was running short and some planes were ditching. "The two squadrons from Enterprise were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy. However, squadron commander C. Wade McClusky Jr decided to continue the search, and by good fortune spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyer Arashi (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_destroyer_Arashi), steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carriers after having unsuccessfully depth-charged (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Depth-charge) U.S. submarine Nautilus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Nautilus_(SS-168)), which had earlier unsuccessfully attacked the battleship Kirishima (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_battleship_Kirishima). Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced. McClusky's decision to continue the search and his sole judgment, in the opinion of Admiral Nimitz, "decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway ..."[wiki] All three American dive-bomber squadrons (VB-6, VS-6 and VB-3) arrived almost simultaneously at the perfect time, locations and altitudes to attack. In short, all plan A preparations and preliminary ground work aside, and running on plan B due to distance, bad spotting reports, and fuel mishaps came down to one squadron commander tossing aside his initial info and taking a terrible gamble on a lone enemy destroyer's heading to arrive over the carriers of the enemy...His pluck and a whole lotta luck as to the enemy carriers' vulnerability and lack of high air cover directly caused the a ten-minute window of time/opportunity that changed the course of the war. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/96/Arashi.jpg/300px-Arashi.jpg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arashi.jpg)Arashihttp://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c7/USS_Nautilus_%28SS-168%29.jpg/300px-USS_Nautilus_%28SS-168%29.jpg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USS_Nautilus_(SS-168).jpg)USS Nutilaus: 1st patrol at Midway and her plucky commander LCDR Brockman http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/31/William_Brockman.jpg/220px-William_Brockman.jpg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:William_Brockman.jpg) Clarence Wade McClusky-turner of the tide of battle> http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/98/Clarence_Wade_McClusky.jpg/220px-Clarence_Wade_McClusky.jpg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Clarence_Wade_McClusky.jpg)The case for luck rests! :hmph:

[Torplexed]

Clarence Wade McClusky-turner of the tide of battle. The case for luck rests! :hmph:



While I certainly agree that McCluskey was a resourceful first rate naval airman worthy of all accolades, I think in many respects his decision shows how luck evens out. First of all, McCluskey's group was one of the two SBD groups that hit the Japanese carriers more or less simultaneously. His group had to stretch the limits of their fuel because a known Japanese course change, which occurred after his group launched, and was not reported to him via radio. Had it been reported to him, he would have found the target anyhow. So, that outcome (McCluskey finding the targets) was predicated on two lucky "breaks" that favored the Japanese and one that favored the Americans. The two pro-Japanese breaks were the fortuitous unplanned course change, and the US decision to not report the course change to McCluskey. The pro-US break was McCluskey reasoning that the Japanese destroyer lagging behind was an element of the carrier group.

The destroyer Arashi was there to hunt for the US sub Nautilus with which contact had instigated the Japanese course change, so you can't lay the observation of the Japanese destroyer as a lucky break. Had the US sub not been there for the DD to be dealing with the Japanese would not have changed course at all. In that event McClusky would not have had to extend his search.

The *other* (non-McCluskey) group was directed to the correct position because it was launched after the Japanese course change was known. No matter how you slice it, the Japanese lose at least two carriers in the initial US attack, even if you cut McCluskey out of the equation entirely. Which is basically the result that the Japanese obtained in their pre-operational wargame of the plan (the infamous wargame in which Admiral Ugaki interfered with the umpire's results and re-floated the Akagi, because he didn't like the results).

Most of the events in battles that are attributed to luck can be more usefully attributed to one of three things. 1.) A bad plan. 2.) A good plan badly executed. 3.) Insufficient assessment of enemy capability. It often seems that 99% of the time when someone invokes "luck" it is a case of CYA analysis.

At Midway Japan suffered the consequences of both 1 and 3.

[MaDef]

Most of the events in battles that are attributed to luck can be more usefully attributed to one of three things. 1.) A bad plan. 2.) A good plan badly executed. 3.) Insufficient assessment of enemy capability. It often seems that 99% of the time when someone invokes "luck" it is a case of CYA analysis.
Halsey got "lucky" during Oct 44' in the Leyte Gulf. Had Kinkiad not reacted the way he did, the invasion of Leyte might have failed.

[Torplexed]

Had Kinkiad not reacted the way he did, the invasion of Leyte might have failed.

I fail to see how. :hmmm: The Leyte amphibious landings took place on 20th October 1944. The Battle off Samar between Kinkaid's Taffy 3 and Kurita's Center Force was on October 25th. Had the Japanese made it they would have been five days late to the party. Shelling a developing beachhead on D-Day can be devastating; shelling it on D-Day+5 when the majority of the troops have advanced inland and the equipment and supplies have been dispersed to locations away from the beach, would be pretty ineffective. Not to mention that the majority of troop transports had already left to pick up another load.

Yes, assuming he had sufficient ammunition in his magazines left, I suppose Kurita could have sunk some transports at the likely cost of his entire remaining force being annihilated. That was an exchange the Allies could well afford in 1944.

Oh...and welcome aboard. After eight years. :rock:

[Aktungbby]

MaDef!:Kaleun_Salute:Your first post after a long silent run! It's LUCKY Torplexed and I were engaged in hot debate:huh: or you might have remained silent longer!:03: :arrgh!: :up:

[Torplexed]

MaDef!:Kaleun_Salute:Your first post after a long silent run! It's LUCKY Torplexed and I were engaged in hot debate:huh: or you might have remained silent longer!:03: :arrgh!: :up:

What can I say. I'm a big believer that all luck evens out. :D

http://pyxis.homestead.com/Wind.jpg

[MaDef]

Failed was probably too strong a term, Japan was trying to take out the transport/supply ships, they needed to hold the Philippines (without it their supply lines for raw materials were cut). Halsey made a tactical blunder when he took all 60+ ships north without leaving a blocking force at the San Bernardino straights. it was luck that Kurita was turned back by Kinkaid's escort carriers.

[Subnuts]

Another book recommendation: Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 by David C Evans and Mark R Peattie. Essentially a prequel to Shattered Sword, although it was written in 1997 by different authors. Very readable and lucid, even if it's almost 700 pages long.

[Dammit_Carl!]

... but anyone seriously interested in the Pacific War needs to read Shattered Sword. It explains the inner workings of the IJN and the Japanese naval mindset in way more detail than I could ever hope to do in a single message board post.

Gracias on the suggestion, amigo :salute: