A Case Study of the Mark 14 failure

[Warren Peace]

Given the response to a posting over in the SHIII area regarding the torpedokrise (torpedo crisis) experienced by Germany, I dug up a similar study done by retired US Army Colonel, David F. Matthews regarding the Mark 14 (for those interested in the torpedokrise paper, it can be found here http://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1599&context=etd ).

While Colonel Matthews study seems to be less in-depth than Wright's, I still found it quite interesting and well put together, definitely worth the read (even for those who may not be interested in the Mark 14's sordid past, I would recommend checking out pages 16-23, it shows what happens when a Mark 18 detonates under the keel of a destroyer. Good stuff). So, for those parties interested in the cluster-insert word here that was the Mk.14 torpedo, here's the link:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a550699.pdf

[TorpX]

Good find. :up:

[Dread Knot]

Interesting article there. Thanks for posting it. It just goes to show how faulty pre-war thinking and doctrine can warp the development of a weapons system. The irony is that having developed an intricate magnetic exploder in a attempt to defeat battleship armor, the USN found itself with an almost worthless weapon for sinking much more fragile merchant vessels which a far simpler torpedo would have been ideal for.

The Japanese on the other hand, with the best torpedoes in the world at the time, stubbornly passed on sinking merchants for the most part simply out of strict adherence to pre-war doctrine, with the result that they ended up sinking less Allied merchant tonnage than Italy did.

[banryu79]

Thank you, Warren Peace, I'm sure it will be a fun & intresting reading :up:

[Warren Peace]

Interesting article there. Thanks for posting it. It just goes to show how faulty pre-war thinking and doctrine can warp the development of a weapons system. The irony is that having developed an intricate magnetic exploder in a attempt to defeat battleship armor, the USN found itself with an almost worthless weapon for sinking much more fragile merchant vessels which a far simpler torpedo would have been ideal for.

The Japanese on the other hand, with the best torpedoes in the world at the time, stubbornly passed on sinking merchants for the most part simply out of strict adherence to pre-war doctrine, with the result that they ended up sinking less Allied merchant tonnage than Italy did.

This, exactly. While the Mk. 14 was a great weapon system on paper, abysmal development and testing, combined with an unnecessarily complicated exploder, resulted in a weapon that was basically useless. I shudder to think what life would have been like for the Japanese Merchant fleets had the US simply continued development of the stupidly simple, yet reliable, Mk. 10.

Heck, they could have just slapped the contact detonator from the Mk. 10 onto the Mk. 14 and had a better weapon, at least it would have exploded when it was supposed to.