Torpedo failures - weather related.

[GJO]

I recently started a new career in SH3 with GWX and Hsie's V16b patch. On my first war patrol all but one of my 14 torpedoes failed to detonate -the 13 duds just sailed right under their targets despite my careful attention to depth setting. These were all G7a types fired from a range of between 450 and 500 metres.

Being somewhat disappointed, I decided to research the available facts and found that during the early war years, a 30% failure rate was experience but, nevertheless, the G7a was regarded as the more reliable torpedo choice. Having said that, I have been unable to find any evidence to suggest that the depth keeping ability of these torpedoes was affected adversely by the sea state since failure seemed to occur equally in relatively calm water - the early failure appears to have been blamed on excess pressure in the (depth keeping) balance chambers which caused the torpedoes to run too deep and defective firing pistols which resulted in either premature detonation or failure to detonate on impact. Both faults could have been partially compensated for by using impact pistols and setting the torpedo to run shallow as was ordered.

None of the above would have caused the 93% failure rate that I had in the game so I have concluded that my preference for attacking in adverse weather conditions conflicts with the torpedo failure model imposed by Hsie's V16b patch. I have therefore deselected the "Torpedo failure fix" and have re-run my first war patrol in which I suffered just three torpedo failures and one that missed its target completely and I think this is possibly a more realistic result? All comments and suggestions welcome . . .

[Aras]

Yes. It is related to H.sie patch. If you read the manuel, it is explained very well. If you want to have minimum risk of failure, you should launch your torpedoes at least 4*windspeed/10 m depth.

Example :
Wind speed is 6m/s, safe depth to fire the torpedoes is 4*6/10 = 2,4 meters
Wind speed is 15 m/s, safe depth to fire the torpedoes is 4*15/10 = 6 meters

Any torpedoes fired with depth set to less than windspeed/10 will %100 fail.

[banryu79]

If you want to have minimum risk of failure, you should launch your torpedoes at least 4*windspeed/10 m depth.

Sorry to bother with this question but: what is this 'rule' simulating? (I have not tried H.sie patch yet).
The depth keeping problem caused by the excess pressure in the torpedo's balance chambers?

[BigWalleye]

I recently started a new career in SH3 with GWX and Hsie's V16b patch. On my first war patrol all but one of my 14 torpedoes failed to detonate -the 13 duds just sailed right under their targets despite my careful attention to depth setting. These were all G7a types fired from a range of between 450 and 500 metres.

Being somewhat disappointed, I decided to research the available facts and found that during the early war years, a 30% failure rate was experience but, nevertheless, the G7a was regarded as the more reliable torpedo choice. Having said that, I have been unable to find any evidence to suggest that the depth keeping ability of these torpedoes was affected adversely by the sea state since failure seemed to occur equally in relatively calm water - the early failure appears to have been blamed on excess pressure in the (depth keeping) balance chambers which caused the torpedoes to run too deep and defective firing pistols which resulted in either premature detonation or failure to detonate on impact. Both faults could have been partially compensated for by using impact pistols and setting the torpedo to run shallow as was ordered.

None of the above would have caused the 93% failure rate that I had in the game so I have concluded that my preference for attacking in adverse weather conditions conflicts with the torpedo failure model imposed by Hsie's V16b patch. I have therefore deselected the "Torpedo failure fix" and have re-run my first war patrol in which I suffered just three torpedo failures and one that missed its target completely and I think this is possibly a more realistic result? All comments and suggestions welcome . . .

Herbert Werner, in his first-person account of commanding a U-boat in WW2 (Iron Coffins), mentions several times that attacks either failed or had to be abandoned due to heavy weather. So we can conclude that torpedoes were subject to failure in heavy weather and that U-boat skippers knew this and were reluctant to attack in bad weather.

The problem is not one of torpedo defects. It is due to the shallow-running, self-propelled torpedo being disrupted by wave action near the surface and possibly even broaching. A broaching torpedo, clearing the water at 40 knots and then smashing into the next wave, is liable either to detonate short of its target or be deflected. h.sie simulates these failure modes by setting a "failed" torpedo to maximum depth. That's an artifice, but the operational results are appropriate.

The problem was not unique to the G7a, or to German torpedoes. Dick O'Kane has some similar discussion in his books detailing his experience commanding an American sub.

You can not compare your 93% failure rate, achieved under conditions which R/L Kaleuns would avoid, with their 30% experience rate achieved mostly under better conditions. Your high failure rate is why such conditions were avoided.

If you want to attack under conditions which historically were avoided, that's up to you. If you do, I strongly recommend that you first read h.sie's excellent and thorough documentation of the "Torpedo Failure Fix." Here you will see the algorithm h.sie used to model the problem and infer the tactics you can use to minimize its effect. Setting the torpedo to run deep and relying on the magnetic exploder can be effective, until weather conditions argue against risking a torpedo at all.

But you shouldn't expect 70% torpedo performance in 15 m/sec winds.

[GJO]

I am currently reading 'Iron Coffins' but have not yet reached the point in the book where Werner took his own command. In research elsewhere, I haven't found any evidence to suggest that wind speed had any effect on a torpedo's performance and although it seems logical to expect high waves to cause problems, U Boat Commanders were instructed to attack (and instructed how to attack) in these circumstances whenever a suitable target presented itself.

I agree that Hsie's work and thorough documentation is quite splendid but for my own interest I just wonder what real life evidence there is to say that a torpedo fired at close range in a big Atlantic swell would be prone to failure. Surely, the weapon was designed to be used in the Atlantic where the sea is rarely calm and huge waves are normal.

[banryu79]

Surely, the weapon was designed to be used in the Atlantic where the sea is rarely calm and huge waves are normal.
Mmm... seems a logical deduction, but from experience of RL design failures (in other fields) I will not bet on it :)

[BigWalleye]

Surely, the weapon was designed to be used in the Atlantic where the sea is rarely calm and huge waves are normal.

Based on the sorry history of poor torpedo design and development in both the German and US navies, I'm not sure that is a safe assumption.:)

[Lokisaga]

With these torpedoes it's important to remember that we're talking about something with the same mass as a 4-door sedan slamming into waves at 75-80 kph (45-50 mph). It stands to reason that something could be damaged and cause the torpedo to run deep, run off course, or prematurely detonate. Given how little attention the designers paid to critical components (the impact and magnetic triggers, the depth keeping machinery), I don't think strengthening the torpedo casing even occurred to them. H.sie's mood simulates a number of different mechanical failures by simply overriding the depth setting on the TDC. The torpedo runs at 25 meters and fails to detonate. It achieves the desired end result, a torpedo failure, without the need to program completely new torpedo behaviors for each possible malfunction.

[Warren Peace]

For further reading regarding the failures of German torpedoes, I would suggest this little gem:

http://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1599&context=etd

I haven't gotten through all of it yet, but thus far it has proven to be a well researched and well written thesis on the German torpedo crisis that occurred early in the war.

Given what I have read thus far regarding the depth keeping springs, heavy waves would definitely have an adverse effect on torpedo reliability. The depth keeping springs were not thoroughly tested, or reliable, to begin with; combined with the constantly changing water pressures that come with 2-3m swells, I can easily imagine some failures being the direct result of heavy waves. To bring wind speed into the equation, winds above 15kt can easily cause swells of 3m or higher.

[GJO]

Although many of us think of the breaking waves that we may see at the sea shore or in shallow water, the long rollers of the North Atlantic are quite different. Here the length of the trough between wave crests may be more than sufficient to enable a torpedo to keep to a constant depth below the surface whilst following the shape of the wave - this would be especially true if the advice provided at Torpedo School was followed regarding positioning to enable the weapon to be fired at approximately 90 degrees to the wave direction.

ETA: In heavy seas, merchant ships (especially in the days of sail or steam) would choose to head into or away from waves rather than take them broadside on. Therefore, a torpedo fired at 90 AOB would be fired along the waves rather than against them.

[BigWalleye]

Although many of us think of the breaking waves that we may see at the sea shore or in shallow water, the long rollers of the North Atlantic are quite different. Here the length of the trough between wave crests may be more than sufficient to enable a torpedo to keep to a constant depth below the surface whilst following the shape of the wave - this would be especially true if the advice provided at Torpedo School was followed regarding positioning to enable the weapon to be fired at approximately 90 degrees to the wave direction.

ETA: In heavy seas, merchant ships (especially in the days of sail or steam) would choose to head into or away from waves rather than take them broadside on. Therefore, a torpedo fired at 90 AOB would be fired along the waves rather than against them.

"...along the waves..." doesn't mean that they would be tucked safely in the belly of the wave. A torpedo is not a bullet. It takes 30-120 seconds to reach its target. During that time, the torpedo is going to be passed over by several swells and troughs. Amd, at 15 m/s wind speed, those are not going to be long, gentle rollers. There are going to be perturbing forces on the torpedo which are going to push it in different directions over time. Think of trying to hold a boat on course in beam winds and seas. Granted that the torpedo is below the surface, but the water within a wave height of the surface is moving in a churning circular flow pattern. And the torpedo is steered by a mechanical feedback loop that is prone to upset by impulsive inputs.

Again, it is your game and you are free to play it in any way that you enjoy. So turn off h.sie's Torpedo Failure Fix and go out and sink 'em in a howling gale. We all adjust the game to make it play the way we want. Personally, I object to the lack of crew assistance and am willing to accept some totally unrealistic compromises to avoid having to do things no R/L sub skipper ever had to do. YMMV

BTW, how do you line up a shot? Do you turn off No Stabilized View? Either on the surface or at periscope depth in 15 m/s met conditions, the sub is liable to be moving around pretty well, maybe even broaching, and the peri or UZO under water much of the time. I can't even line up a shot under those conditions. What's your technique?

[GJO]

My technique is to get in real close (between 250 and 450 metres) on a parallel course matching the targets speed then drop back very slightly and fire with a 90 degree giro angle. The torpedo usually explodes amidships on the target which is often enough to break it's back or at least put it's engine room out of action. My only problem is that I sometime get port and starboard mixed up and have been known to send one off in entirely the wrong direction!

[BigWalleye]

My technique is to get in real close (between 250 and 450 metres) on a parallel course matching the targets speed then drop back very slightly and fire with a 90 degree giro angle. The torpedo usually explodes amidships on the target which is often enough to break it's back or at least put it's engine room out of action. My only problem is that I sometime get port and starboard mixed up and have been known to send one off in entirely the wrong direction!

:o!

[Warren Peace]

My technique is to get in real close (between 250 and 450 metres) on a parallel course matching the targets speed then drop back very slightly and fire with a 90 degree giro angle.

:o!

Quoted Walleye for emphasis/truth, I tried to actually respond in some fashion, but he summed it up perfectly.

[banryu79]

Quoted Walleye for emphasis/truth, I tried to actually respond in some fashion, but he summed it up perfectly.
Me too! I wanted to say something but was too much flabbergasted :dead:
Btw, Warren Peace, thak you very much for the extremely intresting link you posted, I'm having great fun (and enlightenment) in reading it! :up:

[GJO]

:o!

I am sorry if have caused offence - but you asked what my technique was and I explained it in as few words as made sense.
Perhaps I am stating the obvious but it is very simple and it works.

The only drawback is that it is better not to be too close when a ship explodes (I recently had my boat lose significant hull integrity through this) and, in the later war years when the target is armed, surface attacks are impossible so the technique only works if the target speed can be matched while submerged - and, unless visibility is very poor, it is necessary to keep the periscope down and use the hydrophones for positioning until the last few seconds before firing.

BTW I have read through the theses by David Haversham Wright and it appears to agree with my stance that weather and wave height was not the problem. This had been the initial reaction by Dönitz but it was subsequently proved not to be the case.

[banryu79]

BTW I have read through the theses by David Haversham Wright and it appears to agree with my stance that weather and wave height was not the problem. This had been the initial reaction by Dönitz but it was subsequently proved not to be the case.
I have not read it all, I'm at page 78 out of 200.
But even at this point, I feel myself so lucky and blessed and experiencing a (too) easy life in the face of the incredible torpedo failures documented there :wah: expecially for the first months of war (I'm currently finishing my first patrol, October 1939). :doh:

[BigWalleye]

I am sorry if have caused offence - but you asked what my technique was and I explained it in as few words as made sense.
Perhaps I am stating the obvious but it is very simple and it works.

The only drawback is that it is better not to be too close when a ship explodes (I recently had my boat lose significant hull integrity through this) and, in the later war years when the target is armed, surface attacks are impossible so the technique only works if the target speed can be matched while submerged - and, unless visibility is very poor, it is necessary to keep the periscope down and use the hydrophones for positioning until the last few seconds before firing.

BTW I have read through the theses by David Haversham Wright and it appears to agree with my stance that weather and wave height was not the problem. This had been the initial reaction by Dönitz but it was subsequently proved not to be the case.

I was hardly offended. I was just in awe of your chutzpah. And a bit bemused that your thread began as a critique of the historical accuracy of h.sie's Torpedo Failure Fix.:)

[Friscobay]

I sometimes wondered what SH3 AI did for the 1940 post-Norway improvement of the G7e. I notice that in rough waters after Bergen goes ''blue'', I experience fewer problems with the eels. Perhaps coincidental, but the challenges with contact detonation and depth appear to slacken. However, in granting that Doenitz struggled with problems of the G7 being set too deep [ due to shore pre-settings at normal 14.7 PSI atmospheric instead of the greater pressures within a submerged U-boat whereupon depth sensors were impacted usually at a ''false deeper depth'' ], I considered, and used, settings at shallower depth in rough seas against larger C2-3 targets within 900 meters at the T and sent them to Davy Jones without other incident.

Or maybe I was just lucky.. The war drags on outside the BF grid on a calm summer day in waters still enough to fish in.

[GJO]

I was hardly offended. I was just in awe of your chutzpah. And a bit bemused that your thread began as a critique of the historical accuracy of h.sie's Torpedo Failure Fix.:)

The 'getting up close' technique is realistic and was clearly employed in real life by the most daring commanders of the early war years. Eye witness reports from merchant seamen who had survived a torpedo attack include reports of periscope spotted and even U Boats surfacing on a parallel course at a range of 200 yards. I am currently working with two volunteers who have tales to tell - one, as a child, was a survivor of the Dutch steamship Bodegraven that was sunk by U-547 in July 1944 - the other joined the Merchant Navy at the age of 16 in 1947 and served his apprenticeship with a Chief Engineer who had been torpedoed twice and gave very graphical descriptions that have stuck firmly in his memory for the last 67 years - both men have thoroughly researched aspects of the U-Boat War by talking to former Royal Navy and merchant seaman who were involved. The term "audacious" crops up frequently when they describe the attitude of U-Boat Commanders. As an example, both quote many incidences of a U-Boat surfacing alongside a sinking ship or among survivors in lifeboats so that the U-Boat Commander could ascertain the name and home port of the ship that had been sunk - something that is not mentioned in the books by Werner and Kretschmer!

[BigWalleye]

Clearly, you have found sources which lead you to have a different view of U-boat tactics than many others, including historians and men who were there and did the things we are discussing. It is interesting to read your comments. Enjoy your game!

[GJO]

Clearly, you have found sources which lead you to have a different view of U-boat tactics than many others, including historians and men who were there and did the things we are discussing. It is interesting to read your comments. Enjoy your game!

Yes I do enjoy the game very much and I also enjoy the expert advice that can be found on this forum. Nevertheless, I do like to be clear about historical accuracy. If I have said something that is incorrect, I would welcome evidence to that effect. I am new to the game and to this forum and have made time to research available information. I started this thread after trying to find evidence of torpedo failures due to wave height in the North Atlantic - I tried to compare the incidence of ships sunk with contemporary weather reports and the evidence seems to indicate that successful attacks occurred in almost all weather conditions apart from the most severe gales.

[BigWalleye]

Yes I do enjoy the game very much and I also enjoy the expert advice that can be found on this forum. Nevertheless, I do like to be clear about historical accuracy. If I have said something that is incorrect, I would welcome evidence to that effect. I am new to the game and to this forum and have made time to research available information. I started this thread after trying to find evidence of torpedo failures due to wave height in the North Atlantic - I tried to compare the incidence of ships sunk with contemporary weather reports and the evidence seems to indicate that successful attacks occurred in almost all weather conditions apart from the most severe gales.

If your research has led you to believe that the attack tactic you described above is in some way historically representative, that's OK with me. I would not attempt to dissuade you. We all play the game the way we like.

Good luck and good hunting!

[Friscobay]

The 'getting up close' technique is realistic and was clearly employed in real life by the most daring commanders of the early war years. Eye witness reports from merchant seamen who had survived a torpedo attack include reports of periscope spotted and even U Boats surfacing on a parallel course at a range of 200 yards. I am currently working with two volunteers who have tales to tell - one, as a child, was a survivor of the Dutch steamship Bodegraven that was sunk by U-547 in July 1944 - the other joined the Merchant Navy at the age of 16 in 1947 and served his apprenticeship with a Chief Engineer who had been torpedoed twice and gave very graphical descriptions that have stuck firmly in his memory for the last 67 years - both men have thoroughly researched aspects of the U-Boat War by talking to former Royal Navy and merchant seaman who were involved. The term "audacious" crops up frequently when they describe the attitude of U-Boat Commanders. As an example, both quote many incidences of a U-Boat surfacing alongside a sinking ship or among survivors in lifeboats so that the U-Boat Commander could ascertain the name and home port of the ship that had been sunk - something that is not mentioned in the books by Werner and Kretschmer!


This is a factual reading. At times, I believe that there is collision between ''gaming'' and ''historical'' aspects of SUBSIM. I am positively NO expert on the epic SH series and have experienced some of my greatest pleasure in simulations by my often-stumbling and evolving mastery of the TDC and the environment of the world in which I move . The full credit for devotion to the realism aspects of this series goes nearly solely, if not exclusively, to the hard work of those who are right here at SUBSIM.
I can however, claim to have gotten drunk with Erich Topp a long time ago when gamers were pushing little pieces of hard cardboard across a vinyl map surface where dice were rolled or counters spun in order to determine the ''music of chance'' which in turn, made the rules on whether you made it back to Lorient, or plowed mud at the bottom of the Atlantic back when Steve Jobs and Bill Gates were totally unknown to anyone other than themselves and a few college pals.
Thus in reading the historical record, we find [ never mind even Topp, who readily acknowledged getting his Red Devil in as close as fate or skill would allow ], that the drivers of U-boats and their victims, would play their deadly games at as little as a few hundreds of yards, between hunter and prey.


Heres some of the action between ships of the famous SC 42 and U-652 skippered by Oberleutnant zur-See Georg Werner Franz on the night of Sept. 09,1941 at approximately 2210 Hours.

'' Franz was stealthily overtaking the convoy on the surface from the starboard quarter. Carefully matching the ships alteration of course to-port, Franz entered between columns 7 and 8 when the submarine was seen by lookouts aboard KNOLL and PLM 13.

The range was only 300 yards''.......................

OK , so we understand that to win close, you must get close. Hell, even I haven't closed to this range yet before any convoy, Taffy, or lone wolf in either SH 3 or 4.

Damn the Torpedoes, as they say..................

[Warren Peace]

I just added this to my list of documents on the server. Have you got more?

As of this point, no, at least none that haven't already been mentioned and/or discussed to death in previous threads. If I happen across any more gems, I'll be certain to bring them to the community's attention.

I'm glad you all have been enjoying that thesis as much as I did, it really is a great insight into what kind of crap the Kaleuns had to deal with during the early years (I feel especially bad for Zahn. A type II having a perfect shot on the Nelson, only to be screwed because of faulty torpedoes, small surprise he was mentally broken for awhile).

[GJO]

>Content snipped for brevity<
Heres some of the action between ships of the famous SC 42 and U-652 skippered by Oberleutnant zur-See Georg Werner Franz on the night of Sept. 09,1941 at approximately 2210 Hours.

'' Franz was stealthily overtaking the convoy on the surface from the starboard quarter. Carefully matching the ships alteration of course to-port, Franz entered between columns 7 and 8 when the submarine was seen by lookouts aboard KNOLL and PLM 13.

The range was only 300 yards''.......................

OK , so we understand that to win close, you must get close. Hell, even I haven't closed to this range yet before any convoy, Taffy, or lone wolf in either SH 3 or 4.

Damn the Torpedoes, as they say..................

Thank you for confirming what my historical research is suggesting. To be clear, I believe that poor visibility was the U-Boat Commander's friend - and tactics were developed to take advantage of the natural stealth that his boat enjoyed in such conditions. Getting in close was risky and demanded nerves of steel as well as courage and determination.

[banryu79]

Hey, GJO if you red the paper link by Warren Peace, about your previous remark that surely they did design the right way... I just came across this passage:

... In the meantime, while Dönitz awaited the committee’s findings, Dr. Cornelius and his AGC had been hard at work carrying out intensive tests of the impact pistol. The results, which were presented on May 1, were “worse than could ever have been suspected.” Not only was it proved that the AZ pistol was susceptible to a high percentage of failures as a result of the premature release of the firing pin, a fact which Cornelius attributed to its poor and overly complex design, but apparently the pistol had been cleared in peacetime as ready for front-line use after passing a “proving trial” which consisted of only two partially successful shots! “A method of working
such as this,” Dönitz wrote, “can only be regarded as criminal.”
RL tests, go figure RL design! :haha:

Btw, very intresting thread, thanks to all for the info shared here :)

[GJO]

It is indeed all very interesting and educational. I am one of many that probably owe our very existence to those rather fortunate torpedo failures! Although it is still open to debate as to how things may have developed had the early war torpedoes been perfect.

What is not established, so far, is the impact that high waves (the typical "North Atlantic Rollers") had on torpedo failure. It is true that, in the early days, BDU blamed the weather and even the Commanders themselves but it was subsequently decided that the cause was due to criminal negligence by the Torpedo Inspectorate, design defects and poor manufacture.

From the evidence available, I think it is reasonable to believe (although I would like to see hard evidence either way) that these German torpedoes were not significantly affected by weather and wave height especially when fired at close range. Another interesting fact that has emerged is that the fastest speed setting was used only when the weapon was launched from a fast surface craft (S-Boot) and the fact that these weapons were launched into the sea at high speeds (even from aircraft) tends to defeat the argument that "hitting a wave" would automatically result in failure.

[banryu79]

What is not established, so far, is the impact that high waves (the typical "North Atlantic Rollers") had on torpedo failure.

I haven't the slightest idea about how much the "wave factor" coud determine a torpedo failure (in the broadest sense: either determining a premature detonation or causing the torpedo to miss the target). The thesis linked by Warren Peace doesn't quantify this aspect.

But reading that it is clear that the main culprit of the crappy performances of early war torpedoes was the pistol (both AZ and MZ aka impact & magnetic, each one in its specific way).

Just to sum up things for readers of this thread that do not want to read the whole thesis to dig up some statistics, I report them here:

During this time from the middle of November 1939 to June 12, 1940, the Uboats had fired a total of 531 torpedoes equipped with the Pi A+B pistol. Of the 531 torpedoes a total of 440 employed the magnetic setting. Ofthese, forty-three torpedoes (9.8%) were categorized as “self-detonators.” Nine torpedoes (2.0%) were “early detonators.” Sixteen
(3.6%) were “electric detonators,” while a further thirty-three were “miss detonators” (Fehlzündungen).

Obviously this is a rather complicatedsystem of classification, and it is not necessary for the purposes of this study to knowthe exact meaning of each of these vague subcategories. What is pertinent to this study is that tallying up all the individual sub-categories together reveals a total of 101 torpedoes for 23 percent of the total torpedoes fired that spontaneously exploded without hitting either the target or another object. Any of these explosions could have been noticed by an accompanying escort vessel, alerting it to the U-boat’s location and hence jeopardizing the safety of the U-boat and its crew.
Short version:

Data about Torpedoes equipped with the Pi A+B pistol - MZ setting.
period: November 1939 to June 12, 1940
fired: 440 with magnetic setting (out of 531 total eels fired).
premature detonations: 101 (23%).
So, consider how do you would feel, as a kaleun, if every 4th eel you attempt to fire is not a weapon that you throw at your enemy but an out loud scream to every ear in your sorrounding that say: "HELLO WORLD!!!". :timeout:
And here we are only counting the fishes that went Ka-boom too early, add in also the dud ones and the wrong-depth runners and I let you imagine how much the failure rate climbs... :nope:

(Btw, after June 12, 1940, Bdu ordered to fire torps with the AZ setting, and due to the recents improvements on the pistol the failure rate dropped significantly, coincidentally this time frame mark the start of the "Happy Time" and MZ detonation would not be used again until 1942).

[Iron Budokan]

Although many of us think of the breaking waves that we may see at the sea shore or in shallow water, the long rollers of the North Atlantic are quite different. Here the length of the trough between wave crests may be more than sufficient to enable a torpedo to keep to a constant depth below the surface whilst following the shape of the wave - this would be especially true if the advice provided at Torpedo School was followed regarding positioning to enable the weapon to be fired at approximately 90 degrees to the wave direction.

ETA: In heavy seas, merchant ships (especially in the days of sail or steam) would choose to head into or away from waves rather than take them broadside on. Therefore, a torpedo fired at 90 AOB would be fired along the waves rather than against them.

This is interesting information, thank you!

[roadhogg]

As mentioned by Banryu79, and confirmable on Wikipedia if you type "German T2 electric torpedo" in your search bar, most of the T2's depth keeping and detonation problems were apparently solved by the end of the Norwegian campaign (June 40).

I only state this due to testing of my sphere work in rough weather against warships using a 1942 IXB.
I'm having some trouble testing the reliability of the spheres due to the seemingly excessive pre-detonation, and non exploding magnetics in 42.

So I wonder if anyone would be kind enough to tell me what files control the torpedo failure rates?
It would save me some time searching through files.
I could ( and will ) replace the T2'S with T3's for testing, but as with other elements of this game, I'd rather fix it while I'm tinkering.

[roadhogg]

Ah well, obviously not then.

[BigWalleye]

As mentioned by Banryu79, and confirmable on Wikipedia if you type "German T2 electric torpedo" in your search bar, most of the T2's depth keeping and detonation problems were apparently solved by the end of the Norwegian campaign (June 40).

That is certainly at odds with the picture presented by Clay Blair (Hitler's U-boat War, Volume I, The Hunters, 1939-1942). According to Blair, sub commanders were still critical of torpedo performance, and Dönitz was still raising the issue with OKM in mid-1941. Blair even mentions reports of circular runs, including one that may have destroyed a boat. In June, 1941, Endrass, a Ritterkreuz holder, reported four failures out of four firings.

[Zosimus]

Personally I never use T2s. T1s can be fired from further out, go faster, and have never given me problems.

[banryu79]

Personally I never use T2s. T1s can be fired from further out, go faster, and have never given me problems.
Even if you fire them in plain daylight, from afar (let's say from more then 2000 meters)?
Of course I'm thinking about the telltale wake of bubbles...

[Zosimus]

I haven't had any problems. Usually the target is not escorted. In those cases where the target is, the destroyers can usually figure out where you are shooting from anyway. I'm almost always broadside to the target. Those extra seconds that it takes the torpedo to hit its target let me get deeper. I usually locate the target by hydrophone, go scope up, click lock, dive, and fire. I am already on my way down before the second torpedo leaves the tube.

I use two torpedo salvos on ships in convoy and only target the biggest ships. I use the slowest speed for convoys. On ships traveling alone, I can usually use a higher speed, especially if I'm unsure about the ship's speed.

[roadhogg]

Poor choice of words perhaps on my part Bigwalleye.

I was stating the info on Wikipedia, but since people can contribute to the info there it may not necessarily be entirely accurate, especially in comparison to the first hand experience of those who actually used those torpedoes.
May have been better if I replaced the word "state" with "mention".

I'd still like to know where the failure rate can be tweaked without fishing through hundreds of files though, if anyone knows?

[BigWalleye]

Poor choice of words perhaps on my part Bigwalleye.

I was stating the info on Wikipedia, but since people can contribute to the info there it may not necessarily be entirely accurate, especially in comparison to the first hand experience of those who actually used those torpedoes.
May have been better if I replaced the word "state" with "mention".

I'd still like to know where the failure rate can be tweaked without fishing through hundreds of files though, if anyone knows?

If you have h.sie's patches installed, look in your game folder for a file named hsie.ini. Open it in Notepad (or your preferred text editor) and scan down until you find:



;-----------------------------------------------------------------------
; Torpedo Failure Fix.
;---------------------
; Failure rates (assuming torpedo set to depth = 0.4*windspeed or deeper)
; Impact Pistol, until June 1940. Range: [0.00 - 0.99]. Default: 0.25
Val3=0.25
; Impact Pistol, June'40-June'42. Range: [0.00 - 0.99]. Default: 0.10
Val4=0.10
; Impact Pistol, after June 1942. Range: [0.00 - 0.99]. Default: 0.03
Val5=0.03
; Magnet Pistol, until June 1940. Range: [0.00 - 0.99]. Default: 0.15
Val6=0.15
; Magnet Pistol, June'40-June'42. Range: [0.00 - 0.99]. Default: 0.10
Val7=0.10
; Magnet Pistol, after June 1942. Range: [0.00 - 0.99]. Default: 0.02
Val8=0.02
;-----------------------------------------------------------------------


I've never tried changing the settings, so I don't have a recommendation. If you find settings you like, please do post here and share your results with the community. Thanks.

I'm assuming that you have h.sie's patches installed. If you don't, then I urge you to get both h.sie's and Stiebler's path kits and add them. Together they add about two dozen great improvements to the game.

[roadhogg]

I don't have any of h.sie's patches.

I don't like to download other people's work, having decided to walk away from these forums some years ago, with the intention of never participating again, or releasing any of my own mods.

Exceptions to that were GWX3, torpedo damage final v2, and lifeboats & debris v4, which I had before leaving, and "The DarkWraiths ejecting pilots", "Widescreen_GWX3" and "LSH3", specifically so I could nick the Yamato and Strasbourg to add to my game.
There are probably some others I had before I left, but those mentioned above are the only ones I use.

Recently I started testing an existing mod ( of mine ) specifically in heavy weather, but I found the failure rate of the torpedoes was making a mockery of the tests, so due to lazy-itus really, I've chirped up again.

In doing so it has not been my intention to hijack anybody else's thread, I simply found an existing thread on the subject to ask a question.

It was a mistake to chirp up again, so I thank you BigWalleye for your advice.
Adios, and good hunting.