Callin' all sub history buffs!

[swellfella]

Okay. Need to know a question about sub crews in WW2.
Particularly, the cook and the stewart (mess attendant).

Who did what with whom? What were the duties of these guys respectively?

Did they overlap? IOW, could or did one sailor perform both duties.

I need this info for research. And although, I've checked WW2 forums, Navy sites, etc. I don't get a clear picture or understanding.

If anybody can help, you guys are the ones! If you can't help, Lord help me!:03:

[AndyJWest]

Um, Steward, not Stewart. A Stewart is a badly-spelled dead king of Scottish descent... :)

[Mr Quatro]

Cooks cooked for the crew ... the low man on the totem pole assisted the cook and he was the chief bottle washer called, "the mess cook"

Steward's were black and fillipino and they served the officer's and cleaned the officer's quarters ... never would the two (cook and steward) be considered or treated the same.

[Armistead]

I'm fairly sure they had to qualify for subs like everyone else. Certainly they had specific duties, but I suspect they overlapped when needed.

[Stealhead]

According to "Silent Victory" Stewards where either black or Filipino their primary job was to serve the officers meals and prepare their uniforms,serve them coffee though on a sub they would also go around when the boat was at general quarters and give water and sandwiches to any hungry crewman.There would always be at least one cook and two or three stewards.

Everyone on a submarine stood watch usually on a rotational pattern.According to "Silent Victory" it was a believed that blacks had better night vision so the black stewards usually stood watch at night.

I do not think during the war that all sub crew members had to go through specific submarine training either Stewards,Cooks,Pharmacist Mates,and Corpsmen, typically did not receive any specific submarine training prior to being assigned to a sub it was OJT for them.In fact during the war many sub crewman did not fully qualify like they do today or as they would have prior to the war.There simply was not enough time to go through peace time training lengths even for complex jobs on subs.By 1943 they even accelerated submarine officers training.

Cooks not where the lowest man on totem pole though that accolade would go to the youngest and newest enlisted man.A cook might have served in the Navy for many years and have achieved rank in that time span.They also where not usually black or Filipino many where white.

The treatment of black and Filipino sailors varied greatly in the Navy but so far as I can tell on most submarines they where treated with respect for example fellow sub crewman would take photos with black and Filipino crew mates something that did not happen very often on surface ships.They where an equal part of the crew in the submarine force.

In most every book written by sub commanders after the war it is very clear that they had great respect for the stewards.On a sub they also fought manning guns and in other vital roles.Perhaps on a surface ship they where seen as merely servants but not on most subs.

[nikimcbee]

According to "Silent Victory" Stewards where either black or Filipino their primary job was to serve the officers meals and prepare their uniforms,serve them coffee though on a sub they would also go around when the boat was at general quarters and give water and sandwiches to any hungry crewman.There would always be at least one cook and two or three stewards.


:salute:
Stole my thunder.

[Stealhead]

I know that the Mess Hall at the US Navy Submarine School Cross Hall is named after former steward and later Steward Fist Class Joseph Cross he served as a steward on several patrols during WWII on the USS USS Halibut he earned a Bronze Star during WWII.He did not earn that by merely handing out sandwiches.And the fact that he was awarded a Bronze Star means that his commanding officer had much respect for him.

He was killed when the USS Scorpion SSN-589 was lost with all hands in 1968.

[swellfella]

Thanks, guys. You wouldn't believe how to what extent I've gone for the scuttlebut on this. To think I arrive at an understandable explanation on the division of labor of these two ratings at all places: a sub gaming site! Shoulda come here from the jump. Again, much appreciated.

Oh. And Andy, thanks for the spelling heads up...any other totally useless titillating tid-bits...?:know:

[Bilge_Rat]

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/g10000/g11741.jpg

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/k15000/k15541.jpg

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/g330000/g336900.jpg

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/g330000/g338463.jpg


The U.S. Navy was never as segregated as the other services and most restrictions were lifted during the war. The first U.S. Navy african-american officers were commissioned in 1944.

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/prs-tpic/af-amer/afa-wwii.htm

[Stealhead]

The U.S. Navy was never as segregated as the other services and most restrictions were lifted during the war. The first U.S. Navy african-american officers were commissioned in 1944.

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/prs-tpic/af-amer/afa-wwii.htm

Are you so sure of that statement?The Navy as a whole was very segregated if anything the submarine force was an exception to the rule.


That site seems to be very idealized and in most of the photos it is very clear with the exclusion of the first one that you posted the unit is segregated there are no non black enlisted men or petty officers and all of the officers are whites in other words a segregated unit.

Oh and key sentence from the site itself: Though the Navy remained racially segregated in training and in most service units, in 1942 the enlisted rates were opened to all qualified personnel.
As I said earlier the submarine force was an exception to the rules though still blacks could only officially serve in a few roles in submarines.A black NCO or officer would never have been placed in a situation where he was commanding whites.


The Navy was as segregated as any other branch during WWII it clung to segeration more than any other branch short of the Marines.Where as the Army did try out some interrogated units in some locations late war.And the AFF had black pilots the Navy did neither of these.Even in the submarine force it was the commanders that allowed blacks to man guns and other vital action roles not any Navy regulation.

If anything on submarines the person earned respect by their actions because everyone on the boat knew everyone there was no room for segregation on the grounds of creed or race.A sub is a truly a closely knit team.

[Bilge_Rat]

Are you so sure of that statement?The Navy as a whole was very segregated if anything the submarine force was an exception to the rule.


That site seems to be very idealized and in most of the photos it is very clear with the exclusion of the first one that you posted the unit is segregated there are no non black enlisted men or petty officers and all of the officers are whites in other words a segregated unit.

Oh and key sentence from the site itself: Though the Navy remained racially segregated in training and in most service units, in 1942 the enlisted rates were opened to all qualified personnel.
As I said earlier the submarine force was an exception to the rules though still blacks could only officially serve in a few roles in submarines.


The Navy was a segregated as any other branch during WWII.

what, another subject that you are an "expert" on...:rotfl2:

[Stealhead]

I am not trying to be a smart Alec here but your statement about the US Navy not being very segregated during WWII is simply incorrect.

Like it or not the truth is opposite of what you claimed.

Go ahead and do some extensive research on it and prove me other wise if you think I am wrong.


You can :rotfl2:all you want it does not make you right.

[Bilge_Rat]

I did not say the U.S. Navy was not segregated in WW2, just that it was not as bad as the U.S. Army. Re-read my post again and try to understand it.

The Navy could not, for practical purposes, have "segregated" ships. By 1942, the Navy had, in theory, opened up all branches to enlisted men. By 1945, the Navy was already experimenting with "integrated" ships.

The U.S. Army had segregated units as late as the Korean War.



The Navy was as segregated as any other branch during WWII it clung to segeration more than any other branch short of the Marines.Where as the Army did try out some interrogated units in some locations late war.And the AFF had black pilots the Navy did neither of these.Even in the submarine force it was the commanders that allowed blacks to man guns and other vital action roles not any Navy regulation.

p.s. - what are "interrogated" units? :O:



A black NCO or officer would never have been placed in a situation where he was commanding whites.


p.s. 2 - that is not correct actually, by late in the war, african-american officers were in charge of white sailors on integrated ships:



The comments of his commanders convinced King that the auxiliary vessels n the fleet could be integrated without incident. He approved a plan submitted by the Chief of Naval Personnel on 6 March 1945 for the gradual assignment of Negroes to all auxiliary vessels, again in numbers not to exceed 10 percent of the general service billets in any ship's complement.90 (http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-03.htm#90) A month later Negroes were being so assigned in an administratively routine manner. 91 (http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-03.htm#91) The Bureau of Naval Personnel then began assigning black officers to sea duty on the integrated vessels. The first one went to the Mason in March, and in succeeding months others were sent in a routine manner to auxiliary vessels throughout the fleet.92 (http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-03.htm#92) These assignments were not always carried out according to the bureau's formula. The commander of the USS Chemang, for example, told a young black ensign:

"I'm a Navy Man, and we're in a war. To me, it's that stripe that counts�and the training and leadership that it is supposed to symbolize. That's why I never called a meeting of the crew to prepare them, to explain their obligation to respect you, or anything like that. I didn't want anyone to think you were different from any other officer coming aboard."




http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-03.htm


We are both going to be on this board for a long time, we can keep having these pointless fights or we can stay out of each other's way. Your choice.

[Stealhead]

We are both going to be on this board for a long time, we can keep having these pointless fights or we can stay out of each other's way. Your choice.

The problem here is that you get bent out of shape when anyone on this forum disagrees with something you claim you take it personally.I have seen you do this with several other people.


You take things personally and then you go and try to show how another is wrong in some way while at the same completely ignoring facts that validate the other persons opinion.

The Korean War was not even part of this particular thread and really deserves no mention when to topic was WWII US Navy submarines and the roles that cooks and stewards performed.The Korean War is a whole other can of worms and I was fully aware of the segregated army units in existence early in the war.

I wont even bother playing your game by linking the numerous documented events that prove just how segregated the Navy was and how badly black sailors where treated in some locations. You are obviously unaware of one situation that was so bad that a mutiny arose.You might find the link you posted interesting reading as well.

If you are unable to discuss then dont post things on site where discussion is common place.Also do not take everything as a personal attack.As I have said you do this same thing with several other members.

If you do not like me then please block me.

[Bilge_Rat]

You might find the link you posted interesting reading as well.


That chapter is part of a larger work on integration in the armed forces which shows that the Navy, in its own bumbling way, was farther advanced on the road to integration than the Army in WW2.

There is of course a difference between legal segregation and racism. Officially segregation in the Armed forces ended in 1948, although racism still exists in society as a whole.

Officially, much of the legal segregation in the U.S. Navy was ended in april 1942 when African-American sailors were eligible to apply for all positions:


The two-year debate over the admission of Negroes ended just in time, for the opposition to the Navy's policy was enlisting new allies daily. The national press made the expected invidious comparisons when Joe Louis turned over his share of the purse from the Louis-Baer fight to Navy Relief, and Wendell Willkie in a well-publicized speech at New York's Freedom House excoriated the Navy's racial practices as a "mockery" of democracy.25 (http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-03.htm#25) But these were the last shots fired On 7 April 1942 Secretary Knox announced the Navy's capitulation. The Navy would accept 277 black volunteers per week�it was not yet drafting anyone - - for enlistment in all ratings of the general service of the reserve components of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Their actual entry would have to await the construction of suitable, meaning segregated, facilities, but the Navy's goal for the first year was 14,000 Negroes in the general service.26 (http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-03.htm#26)



http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-03.htm

In practice however, segregation existed for much of the war for much of the Navy. Integration of African-American officers and sailors on ships was only started in 1944 and only on certain auxiliaries. However, when it did happen, it was full integration:



Secretary Forrestal also won the support of the Chief of Naval Operations for the move, but Admiral King still considered integration in the fleet experimental and was determined to keep strict control until the results were known. On 9 August 1944 King informed the commanding officers of twenty-five large fleet auxiliaries that Negroes would be assigned to them in the near future. As Forrestal had suggested, King set the maximum number of Negroes at 10 percent of the ship's general service. Of this number, 15 percent would be third-class petty officers from shore activities, selected as far as possible from volunteers and, in any case, from those who had served the longest periods of shore duty. Of the remainder, 43 percent would be from Class A schools and 42 percent from recruit training. The basic 10 percent figure proved to be a theoretical maximum; no ship received that many Negroes.

Admiral King insisted that equal treatment in matters of training, promotion, and duty assignments must be accorded all hands, but he left the matter of berthing to the commanding officers, noting that experience had proved that in the shore establishment, when the percentage of blacks to whites was small, the two groups could be successfully mingled in the same compartments. He also pointed out that a thorough indoctrination of white sailors before the arrival of the Negroes had been useful in preventing racial friction ashore
.
King asked all commanders concerned in the experiment to report their experiences. Their judgment: integration in the auxiliary fleet worked. As one typical report related after several months of integrated duty:

The crew was carefully indoctrinated in the fact that Negro personnel should nor be subjected to discrimination of any sort and should be treated in the same manner as other members of the crew.


The Negro personnel when they came aboard were berthed indiscriminately throughout the crew's compartments in the same manner as if they had been white. It is felt that the assimilation of the general service Negro personnel aboard this ship has been remarkably successful. To the present date there has been no report any difficulty which could be laid to their color. It is felt that this is due in part, at least, to the high calibre of Negroes assigned to this ship.

The comments of his commanders convinced King that the auxiliary vessels in the fleet could be integrated without incident. He approved a plan submitted by the Chief of Naval Personnel on 6 March 1945 for the gradual assignment of Negroes to all auxiliary vessels, again in numbers not to exceed 10 percent of the general service billets in any ship's complement. A month later Negroes were being so assigned in an administratively routine manner. The Bureau of Naval Personnel then began assigning black officers to sea duty on the integrated vessels. The first one went to the Mason in March, and in succeeding months others were sent in a routine manner to auxiliary vessels throughout the fleet. These assignments were not always carried out according to the bureau's formula. The commander of the USS Chemang, for example, told a young black ensign:

I'm a Navy Man, and we're in a war. To me, it's that stripe that counts and the training and leadership that it is supposed to symbolize. That's why I never called a meeting of the crew to prepare them, to explain their obligation to respect you, or anything like that. I didn't want anyone to think you were different from any other officer coming aboard.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-03.htm

In contrast, the official policy of the U.S. Army troughout the war was segregation of African-Americans in separate units:



The White House tried to adjust the conflicting demands of the civil rights leaders and the Army traditionalists. Eager to placate and willing to compromise, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought an accommodation by directing the War Department to provide jobs for Negroes in all parts of the Army. The controversy over integration soon became more public, the opponents less reconcilable; in the weeks following the President's meeting with black representatives on 27 September 1940 the Army countered black demands for integration with a statement released by the White House on 9 October. To provide "a fair and equitable basis" for the use of Negroes in its expansion program, the Army planned to accept Negroes in numbers approximate to their proportion in the national population, about 10 percent. Black officers and enlisted men were to serve, as was then customary, only in black units that were to be formed in each major branch, both combatant and noncombatant, including air units to be created as soon as pilots, mechanics, and technical specialists were trained. There would be no racial intermingling in regimental organizations because the practice of separating white and black troops had, the Army staff said, proved satisfactory over a long period of time. To change would destroy morale and impair preparations for national defense. Since black units in the Army were already "going concerns, accustomed through many years to the present system" of segregation, "no experiments should be tried . . . at this critical time."

The President's "OK, F.D.R." on the War Department statement transformed what had been a routine prewar mobilization plan into a racial policy that would remain in effect throughout the war. In fact, quickly elevated in importance by War Department spokesmen who made constant reference to the "Presidential Directive," the statement would be used by some Army officials as a presidential sanction for introducing segregation in new situations, as, for example, in the pilot training of black officers in the Army Air Corps. Just as quickly, the civil rights leaders, who had expected more from the tone of the President's own comments and more also from the egalitarian implications of the new draft law, bitterly attacked the Army's policy.


http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-02.htm

The only experiment the Army did with "integrated" units came late in the war when individual African-American platoons were assigned to certain white regiments, although even then African-Americans were not integrated as individuals, as the Navy had done:



The Eisenhower revision needed considerable clarification. It mentioned the replacement needs of black combat units, but there were no black infantry units in the theater; and the replacement command was not equipped to retrain men for artillery, tank, and tank destroyer units, the types of combat units that did employ Negroes in Europe. The revision also called for volunteers in excess of these needs to be "suitably incorporated in other organizations," but it did not indicate how they would be organized. Eisenhower later made it clear that he preferred to organize the volunteers in groups that could replace white units in the line, but again the replacement command was geared to train individual, not unit, replacements. After considerable discussion and compromise, Eisenhower agreed to have Negroes trained "as members of Infantry rifle platoons familiar with the Infantry rifle platoon weapons." The platoons would be sent for assignment to Army commanders who would provide them with platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and, if needed, squad leaders.

Unaware of how close they had come to being integrated as individuals, so many Negroes volunteered for combat training and duty that the operations of some service units were threatened. To prevent disrupting these vital operations, the theater limited the number to 2, 500, turning down about 3,000 men. Early in January 1945 the volunteers assembled for six weeks of standard infantry conversion training. After training, the new black infantrymen were organized into fifty-three platoons, each under a white platoon leader and sergeant, and were dispatched to the field, two to work with armored divisions and the rest with infantry divisions. Sixteen were shipped to the 6th Army Group, the rest to the 12th Army Group, and all saw action with a total of eleven divisions in the First and Seventh Armies.

In the First Army the black platoons were usually assigned on the basis of three to a division, and the division receiving them normally placed one platoon in each regiment. At the company level, the black platoon generally served to augment the standard organization of three rifle platoons and one heavy weapons platoon. In the Seventh Army, the platoons were organized into provisional companies and attached to infantry battalions in armored divisions. General Davis warned the Seventh Army commander, Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, that the men had not been trained for employment as company units and were not being properly used. The performance of the provisional companies failed to match the performance of the platoons integrated into white companies and their morale was lower. At the end of the war the theater made clear to the black volunteers that integration was over. Although a large group was sent to the 69th Infantry Division to be returned home, most were reassigned to black combat or service units in the occupation army





http://www.history.army.mil/books/integration/IAF-02.htm