paulhager
02-05-13, 06:21 PM
U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
CONFIDENTIAL April 2, 1944
From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet
Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #2.
Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering second war patrol.
Bernard H. Schwartz
(A) Prologue
Performed gunnery drills, focusing on loading and rate-of-fire. Lt. jg. Hornsby developed acute appendicitis – replaced him with Ensign Townsend, who comes highly recommended for his engineering acumen. Townsend shared some interesting ideas he has about variations in the Earth’s magnetic field affecting the Mark 6 Exploders. We may put them to the test.
(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)
(B) Narrative
20 JAN – 29 JAN
In transit to patrol zone.
30 JAN
Still in transit, received position report on enemy convoy from ComSupPac at 1745 30 January: 144° 08’ E, 22° 23’ N; Course S, Speed 7. If it continued on its present course, at full speed we could intercept it just short of our PZ in 21 hours.
13 JAN
Attack #1
Made early contact with enemy convoy, 1203 31 January: 144° 40’ E, 20° 04’ N; Course now 135° true, Speed still 7. Had excellent position. Convoy consisted of one escort, trailed by three cargo ships in column.
Obtained position so that initial phases of the attack could be conducted with enemy silhouetted by setting moon.
Radar and visual data were fed into TDC for trailing ship – a Nagara Maru. The plan of attack would be to go after the trailing ship first, followed by number 2 ship, another Nagara Maru. Each target would receive one Mark 14, using the magnetic trigger and, since the seas were exceptionally calm, depth would be set to 26 feet – a foot-and-a-half below the keel.
First torpedo was launched at 1338 – 30 seconds later the 2nd torpedo was away. We dove the boat, a precaution based on both proximity to the targets and fact that the moon was still above the horizon.
Both torpedoes detonated right on schedule.
http://imageshack.us/a/img828/8886/194401311340z.jpg
One ship was heard to sink but the other continued on at a reduced speed. Both cargo ships were easily detected by the hydrophone but the escort traveled to the rear of the column and went silent. Probably picking up survivors of the sunken Nagara.
Began reloading tubes 7 and 8 while submerged.
Rose to periscope depth at 1400 to reconnoiter. The Nagara Maru was noticeably down by the bow but still making headway. Astern 1500 yards or so was a Type A/B Coastal Defense Ship: the escort. Range to the escort was 4000 yards.
Battle surfaced at 1519. The Nagara Maru was making 4 knots – the Type A/B was continuing to bring up the rear but had fallen back. Several thousand yards ahead was the other cargo ship. It was making S-turns, apparently so as not to pull too far ahead.
The lead cargo ship would be an easy target, considering the escort was back shepherding the Nagara. However, we’d have to go after the Nagara sooner or later and now, at night, was our best chance.
Attack#2
We closed to 7000 yards and paralleled the track of the Nagara, keeping her at 135 relative. At 1730 the convoy turned to 192° and the Type A/B swung to the West to search. This was our opportunity. We closed to 3800 yards off the track and manned the 4”. At 1810, we commenced firing. We expended 22 rounds for 5 hits. Hit number 4 produced a large explosion. Hit number 5 was the capper – and none too soon because the errant escort was returning at full speed.
We headed in the opposite direction at flank and led the Type A/B on a merry chase for the better part of 30 minutes. We slowly pulled away and our pursuer gave up. After swinging behind the remnants of the convoy, we set course for our PZ at two engine speed.
01 FEB
Reported arrival in PZ at 0227. ComSubPac sent orders to hunt generally along the Japan-Rabaul supply route.
02 FEB – 06 FEB
Patrolling, generally toward the Bismarck Sea and Rabaul.
07 FEB – 08 FEB
Storms through most of the 7th – cleared on the 8th.
At 2000, 45 nm NW of Rabaul.
09 FEB
Patrolling in Bismarck Sea within 100 nm of Rabaul.
10 FEB
Attack #3
Another severe storm hit while we were close to Rabaul. Since we had encountered bupkes for the past week-and-a-half, the storm offered an opportunity to penetrate the harbor at Rabaul – to dash in, wreak havoc, and dash out enshrouded by night and fog.
We ran in at full speed.
http://imageshack.us/a/img840/686/194402072047z.jpg
There were two escorts patrolling. One was running patterns at the mouth of the harbor and the other in the bay. It was easy to elude to outer patrol – the inner proved more challenging because there was less room to maneuver. However, the patterns run by the inner patrol demonstrated there were no minefields at the harbor entrance.
Eventually, the patroller provided an opening and we shot through at flank speed. We passed astern less than 1000 yards from the escort. The inner harbor was now open and (we hoped) lay defenseless before us.
Radar showed a half dozen ships – some docked, some riding at anchor. We got into position for the first attack and fired two Mark-14’s at one of the anchored blips. A nacreous pink flash surrounded us as the first torpedo detonated. Some of the spotters on the bridge said that they briefly saw the superstructure of the target looming through the fog.
Darkness fell immediately, punctuated by a loud boom and several seconds of return echoes from structures in the harbor and the surrounding hills. There was no repeat performance – the second torpedo was a dud. We readied two more torpedoes and fired those as before. Both hit, producing more man-made thunder to awaken the inhabitants of Rabaul. Secondary explosions indicated that the last hits were fatal.
Radar was still clear astern, so we backed up and repositioned to attack a ship docked 800 yards away. Two more torpedoes from the bow tube were fired and both hit.
http://imageshack.us/a/img140/6244/194402100454z.jpg
Lookouts said they briefly glimpsed the target illuminated by the twin flashes and indicated it was a warship – probably a destroyer. Two torpedoes should have sufficed for a destroyer but there was no evidence that it was sinking. Unfortunately, the escort, now alerted, was coming straight down the channel at 20 knots. There would be no finisher for the warship - it was time to leave.
We headed down the channel toward our adversary, swinging wide as it closed to 3000 yards. We had a solution on the escort and would fire on it from the stern tubes as it passed. Tubes 7 and 8 were loaded with Mark 14’s – they were set for high speed, shallow depth. Range was 700 yards when we fired though it was a bit of a stern chase.
The target almost immediately began to slow and turned away from our track – needless to say, both torpedoes missed. We veered toward the center of the channel while the escort commenced a methodical search of the harbor.
We blew past the second escort and were back in the Bismarck Sea before dawn.
The results of the attack were reported to ComSubPac. Perhaps because we never really saw our targets and there was no way to confirm precisely what we sunk, ComSubPac ordered us to continue with our patrol.
11-FEB – 13 FEB
The attack depleted our store of torpedoes and fuel was now around 60% so we made a patrolling detour to Tulagi to refuel and rearm. Along the way tracked a TF which turned out to be friendly. Docked Tulagi 1028 13 February.
Apparently the base facility had a surplus of Mark 23 torpedoes – we were given 6. Those, along with 10 Mark 14’s and 8 Mark 18’s, constituted our loadout.
As soon as reprovisioning was completed, set course for Bismarck Sea.
14 FEB
Storms and torrential rain all day.
15 FEB
Patrolling in Bismarck Sea.
16 FEB
Attack #4
Enemy convoy spotted at 1845: Range 34000, Speed 12, Course 111. Composition: a three-ship column, with 3 escorts in a triangular pattern around it. Given the number of escorts, assume high value targets – tankers or transports.
According to our Ephemeris (http://www.usno.navy.mil/USNO/astronomical-applications/data-services/rs-one-day-world), sunrise would be at 1955 – in an hour and 10 minutes. If the attack weren’t made now, the convoy would be in Rabaul before sundown.
Racing the sunrise at flank speed, we closed the distance: 22000 yards at 1900, 15200 at 1907, 13000 at 1909. We went to radar depth and began tracking the number 2 merchant.
The sky was noticeably lightening to the East now – we went to periscope depth at 1917.
As the enemy convoy approached from the West, the number 1 and number 2 ships were identified as a Heito Maru and a Kasagisan Maru, respectively. All that remained was the allocation of torpedoes to the targets.
There were 3 Mark 14’s in tubes 1-3 and 2 Mark 23’s in tubes 4 and 5. The original plan was to fire the Mark 23’s at number 2 and the Mark 14’s at number 1. However, with these smaller ships, the three Mark 14’s would suffice – 1 for number 2 and 2 for number 1.
The attack proceeded according to plan. After all torpedoes were away, we dove and turned toward the rear of the convoy. The first torpedo hit at 1946.
Both torpedoes missed the lead ship. Our timing was off and it had too much time to react.
At 1958 an escort passed close astern pinging but it was moving too fast to hear anything.
http://imageshack.us/a/img29/4782/194402161958z.jpg
The escorts thrashed away in the distance as we slowly withdrew. Ceased silent running at 2149 and commenced torpedo reload. Last tube was loaded at 2236. Surfaced at 2243. Sent report to ComSubPac 2311 – received new orders to concentrate our efforts at our present location in the Bismarck Sea.
17 FEB – 18 FEB
Patrolling in Bismarck Sea.
19 FEB
Day began with heavy rain and fog – moved through and was clear by midday.
Attack #5
Small convoy detected 1548. Consisted of 2 cargo ships and 1 escort. Made surface attack, range 1600, firing spread of 2 from bow tubes at each. Result: 1 hit, 1 miss on each – both sunk.
Withdrew, reloaded torpedoes, and resumed patrol.
20 FEB – 23 FEB
Received new orders to patrol within 200 nm of Truk Lagoon.
Reached PZ 22 February, began patrolling.
24 FEB
Overcast all day – at 2000 heavy rain and fog rolled in.
We were close to the lagoon when the bad weather hit. With visibility 200 – 300 yards, it presented another opportunity to penetrate an enemy anchorage.
25 FEB
Attack #6
Entered the main channel and the screen erupted with more than a dozen blips. All were stationary.
There was a very strong return from one of the targets.
http://imageshack.us/a/img524/1462/194402250014z1.jpg
http://imageshack.us/a/img375/7498/194402250014z2.jpg
It took the better part of an hour-and-a-half to negotiate the channel and the shallows to get into position to take the shot on the “big blip”. We fired 4 torpedoes at 16 feet – a compromise since we weren’t sure if we were targeting a CA or a BB. All hit but one was a dud.
We began to back away and there was a fourth, massive explosion. It must have been a magazine.
On the way out, we paid a visit to the ship anchored off Moen Island. It received all 4 torpedoes in the stern tubes – range was 600 yards.
Less than an hour later we were out of the lagoon and in the Pacific.
26 FEB – 29 FEB
The weather finally cleared and we received orders to patrol farther to the West.
01 MAR – 03 MAR
Patrolling.
04 MAR – 06 MAR
Ordered to Patrol East of Palau. In transit.
07 MAR – 08 MAR
Reach PZ. Patrolling.
09 MAR
Attack #7
Single ship detected at 1127 – Speed 10, Course 209°. Conducted surface attack – range 1400. Target turned out to be an escort. Took no chances – hit it with three torpedoes.
http://imageshack.us/a/img209/9083/194403091226z.jpg
10 MAR – 13 MAR
Ordered to patrol 100 nm to the SW.
A ship came into range on the 13th but abruptly turned away at 20000 yards. Chose not to pursue – target was traveling at 15 knots and behaved like a destroyer.
New orders were received: patrol along the Japan-Rabaul convoy route.
Encountered convoy at 2147: Position 5° 41’ N, 134° 53’ E, Speed 9 knots, Course 175°T. Two ships were being shepherded by 4 escorts in a diamond pattern.
As we set up the attack, the convoy changed course to 119°T.
14 MAR
Attack #8
Got into position for submerged attack. Selected remaining 2 Mark 18’s in the bow tube, targeting the lead merchant. Both hit.
Escorts were unable to find us – we surfaced an hour-and-a-half later.
Attack #9
Encountered another convoy, similar in composition to the previous one. Speed was 8 knots, Course was 114°T. We were now down to 4 stern torpedoes.
Prepared for a surface attack, range 2600, when the convoy changed course to 149°T. We had to reverse course and cut across the target track 8000 yards in front of the approaching convoy. Speed was 5 knots at radar depth.
Fired both Mark 14’s at the high speed setting at the lead merchant. Because of the enemy formation, the shot was made at an oblique angle from 1400 yards off the track. An enemy destroy was close to cutting off our escape so we dived the boat right after firing. Both torpedoes missed. We were undetected and the convoy continued on, unaware it had been attacked.
15 MAR – 18 MAR
Patrolling.
On the 18th, ordered to return to base.
19 MAR – 30 MAR
Return to base.
(C) Fuel Consumed
82%
(D) Weather
See Narrative, above.
(E) Torpedoes Expended
32 – 9 ships sunk, estimated tonnage 33820.
(F) Reference
See Patrol 1 (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?t=201862).
See Patrol 3 (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showpost.php?p=2018897&postcount=483).
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
CONFIDENTIAL April 2, 1944
From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet
Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #2.
Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering second war patrol.
Bernard H. Schwartz
(A) Prologue
Performed gunnery drills, focusing on loading and rate-of-fire. Lt. jg. Hornsby developed acute appendicitis – replaced him with Ensign Townsend, who comes highly recommended for his engineering acumen. Townsend shared some interesting ideas he has about variations in the Earth’s magnetic field affecting the Mark 6 Exploders. We may put them to the test.
(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)
(B) Narrative
20 JAN – 29 JAN
In transit to patrol zone.
30 JAN
Still in transit, received position report on enemy convoy from ComSupPac at 1745 30 January: 144° 08’ E, 22° 23’ N; Course S, Speed 7. If it continued on its present course, at full speed we could intercept it just short of our PZ in 21 hours.
13 JAN
Attack #1
Made early contact with enemy convoy, 1203 31 January: 144° 40’ E, 20° 04’ N; Course now 135° true, Speed still 7. Had excellent position. Convoy consisted of one escort, trailed by three cargo ships in column.
Obtained position so that initial phases of the attack could be conducted with enemy silhouetted by setting moon.
Radar and visual data were fed into TDC for trailing ship – a Nagara Maru. The plan of attack would be to go after the trailing ship first, followed by number 2 ship, another Nagara Maru. Each target would receive one Mark 14, using the magnetic trigger and, since the seas were exceptionally calm, depth would be set to 26 feet – a foot-and-a-half below the keel.
First torpedo was launched at 1338 – 30 seconds later the 2nd torpedo was away. We dove the boat, a precaution based on both proximity to the targets and fact that the moon was still above the horizon.
Both torpedoes detonated right on schedule.
http://imageshack.us/a/img828/8886/194401311340z.jpg
One ship was heard to sink but the other continued on at a reduced speed. Both cargo ships were easily detected by the hydrophone but the escort traveled to the rear of the column and went silent. Probably picking up survivors of the sunken Nagara.
Began reloading tubes 7 and 8 while submerged.
Rose to periscope depth at 1400 to reconnoiter. The Nagara Maru was noticeably down by the bow but still making headway. Astern 1500 yards or so was a Type A/B Coastal Defense Ship: the escort. Range to the escort was 4000 yards.
Battle surfaced at 1519. The Nagara Maru was making 4 knots – the Type A/B was continuing to bring up the rear but had fallen back. Several thousand yards ahead was the other cargo ship. It was making S-turns, apparently so as not to pull too far ahead.
The lead cargo ship would be an easy target, considering the escort was back shepherding the Nagara. However, we’d have to go after the Nagara sooner or later and now, at night, was our best chance.
Attack#2
We closed to 7000 yards and paralleled the track of the Nagara, keeping her at 135 relative. At 1730 the convoy turned to 192° and the Type A/B swung to the West to search. This was our opportunity. We closed to 3800 yards off the track and manned the 4”. At 1810, we commenced firing. We expended 22 rounds for 5 hits. Hit number 4 produced a large explosion. Hit number 5 was the capper – and none too soon because the errant escort was returning at full speed.
We headed in the opposite direction at flank and led the Type A/B on a merry chase for the better part of 30 minutes. We slowly pulled away and our pursuer gave up. After swinging behind the remnants of the convoy, we set course for our PZ at two engine speed.
01 FEB
Reported arrival in PZ at 0227. ComSubPac sent orders to hunt generally along the Japan-Rabaul supply route.
02 FEB – 06 FEB
Patrolling, generally toward the Bismarck Sea and Rabaul.
07 FEB – 08 FEB
Storms through most of the 7th – cleared on the 8th.
At 2000, 45 nm NW of Rabaul.
09 FEB
Patrolling in Bismarck Sea within 100 nm of Rabaul.
10 FEB
Attack #3
Another severe storm hit while we were close to Rabaul. Since we had encountered bupkes for the past week-and-a-half, the storm offered an opportunity to penetrate the harbor at Rabaul – to dash in, wreak havoc, and dash out enshrouded by night and fog.
We ran in at full speed.
http://imageshack.us/a/img840/686/194402072047z.jpg
There were two escorts patrolling. One was running patterns at the mouth of the harbor and the other in the bay. It was easy to elude to outer patrol – the inner proved more challenging because there was less room to maneuver. However, the patterns run by the inner patrol demonstrated there were no minefields at the harbor entrance.
Eventually, the patroller provided an opening and we shot through at flank speed. We passed astern less than 1000 yards from the escort. The inner harbor was now open and (we hoped) lay defenseless before us.
Radar showed a half dozen ships – some docked, some riding at anchor. We got into position for the first attack and fired two Mark-14’s at one of the anchored blips. A nacreous pink flash surrounded us as the first torpedo detonated. Some of the spotters on the bridge said that they briefly saw the superstructure of the target looming through the fog.
Darkness fell immediately, punctuated by a loud boom and several seconds of return echoes from structures in the harbor and the surrounding hills. There was no repeat performance – the second torpedo was a dud. We readied two more torpedoes and fired those as before. Both hit, producing more man-made thunder to awaken the inhabitants of Rabaul. Secondary explosions indicated that the last hits were fatal.
Radar was still clear astern, so we backed up and repositioned to attack a ship docked 800 yards away. Two more torpedoes from the bow tube were fired and both hit.
http://imageshack.us/a/img140/6244/194402100454z.jpg
Lookouts said they briefly glimpsed the target illuminated by the twin flashes and indicated it was a warship – probably a destroyer. Two torpedoes should have sufficed for a destroyer but there was no evidence that it was sinking. Unfortunately, the escort, now alerted, was coming straight down the channel at 20 knots. There would be no finisher for the warship - it was time to leave.
We headed down the channel toward our adversary, swinging wide as it closed to 3000 yards. We had a solution on the escort and would fire on it from the stern tubes as it passed. Tubes 7 and 8 were loaded with Mark 14’s – they were set for high speed, shallow depth. Range was 700 yards when we fired though it was a bit of a stern chase.
The target almost immediately began to slow and turned away from our track – needless to say, both torpedoes missed. We veered toward the center of the channel while the escort commenced a methodical search of the harbor.
We blew past the second escort and were back in the Bismarck Sea before dawn.
The results of the attack were reported to ComSubPac. Perhaps because we never really saw our targets and there was no way to confirm precisely what we sunk, ComSubPac ordered us to continue with our patrol.
11-FEB – 13 FEB
The attack depleted our store of torpedoes and fuel was now around 60% so we made a patrolling detour to Tulagi to refuel and rearm. Along the way tracked a TF which turned out to be friendly. Docked Tulagi 1028 13 February.
Apparently the base facility had a surplus of Mark 23 torpedoes – we were given 6. Those, along with 10 Mark 14’s and 8 Mark 18’s, constituted our loadout.
As soon as reprovisioning was completed, set course for Bismarck Sea.
14 FEB
Storms and torrential rain all day.
15 FEB
Patrolling in Bismarck Sea.
16 FEB
Attack #4
Enemy convoy spotted at 1845: Range 34000, Speed 12, Course 111. Composition: a three-ship column, with 3 escorts in a triangular pattern around it. Given the number of escorts, assume high value targets – tankers or transports.
According to our Ephemeris (http://www.usno.navy.mil/USNO/astronomical-applications/data-services/rs-one-day-world), sunrise would be at 1955 – in an hour and 10 minutes. If the attack weren’t made now, the convoy would be in Rabaul before sundown.
Racing the sunrise at flank speed, we closed the distance: 22000 yards at 1900, 15200 at 1907, 13000 at 1909. We went to radar depth and began tracking the number 2 merchant.
The sky was noticeably lightening to the East now – we went to periscope depth at 1917.
As the enemy convoy approached from the West, the number 1 and number 2 ships were identified as a Heito Maru and a Kasagisan Maru, respectively. All that remained was the allocation of torpedoes to the targets.
There were 3 Mark 14’s in tubes 1-3 and 2 Mark 23’s in tubes 4 and 5. The original plan was to fire the Mark 23’s at number 2 and the Mark 14’s at number 1. However, with these smaller ships, the three Mark 14’s would suffice – 1 for number 2 and 2 for number 1.
The attack proceeded according to plan. After all torpedoes were away, we dove and turned toward the rear of the convoy. The first torpedo hit at 1946.
Both torpedoes missed the lead ship. Our timing was off and it had too much time to react.
At 1958 an escort passed close astern pinging but it was moving too fast to hear anything.
http://imageshack.us/a/img29/4782/194402161958z.jpg
The escorts thrashed away in the distance as we slowly withdrew. Ceased silent running at 2149 and commenced torpedo reload. Last tube was loaded at 2236. Surfaced at 2243. Sent report to ComSubPac 2311 – received new orders to concentrate our efforts at our present location in the Bismarck Sea.
17 FEB – 18 FEB
Patrolling in Bismarck Sea.
19 FEB
Day began with heavy rain and fog – moved through and was clear by midday.
Attack #5
Small convoy detected 1548. Consisted of 2 cargo ships and 1 escort. Made surface attack, range 1600, firing spread of 2 from bow tubes at each. Result: 1 hit, 1 miss on each – both sunk.
Withdrew, reloaded torpedoes, and resumed patrol.
20 FEB – 23 FEB
Received new orders to patrol within 200 nm of Truk Lagoon.
Reached PZ 22 February, began patrolling.
24 FEB
Overcast all day – at 2000 heavy rain and fog rolled in.
We were close to the lagoon when the bad weather hit. With visibility 200 – 300 yards, it presented another opportunity to penetrate an enemy anchorage.
25 FEB
Attack #6
Entered the main channel and the screen erupted with more than a dozen blips. All were stationary.
There was a very strong return from one of the targets.
http://imageshack.us/a/img524/1462/194402250014z1.jpg
http://imageshack.us/a/img375/7498/194402250014z2.jpg
It took the better part of an hour-and-a-half to negotiate the channel and the shallows to get into position to take the shot on the “big blip”. We fired 4 torpedoes at 16 feet – a compromise since we weren’t sure if we were targeting a CA or a BB. All hit but one was a dud.
We began to back away and there was a fourth, massive explosion. It must have been a magazine.
On the way out, we paid a visit to the ship anchored off Moen Island. It received all 4 torpedoes in the stern tubes – range was 600 yards.
Less than an hour later we were out of the lagoon and in the Pacific.
26 FEB – 29 FEB
The weather finally cleared and we received orders to patrol farther to the West.
01 MAR – 03 MAR
Patrolling.
04 MAR – 06 MAR
Ordered to Patrol East of Palau. In transit.
07 MAR – 08 MAR
Reach PZ. Patrolling.
09 MAR
Attack #7
Single ship detected at 1127 – Speed 10, Course 209°. Conducted surface attack – range 1400. Target turned out to be an escort. Took no chances – hit it with three torpedoes.
http://imageshack.us/a/img209/9083/194403091226z.jpg
10 MAR – 13 MAR
Ordered to patrol 100 nm to the SW.
A ship came into range on the 13th but abruptly turned away at 20000 yards. Chose not to pursue – target was traveling at 15 knots and behaved like a destroyer.
New orders were received: patrol along the Japan-Rabaul convoy route.
Encountered convoy at 2147: Position 5° 41’ N, 134° 53’ E, Speed 9 knots, Course 175°T. Two ships were being shepherded by 4 escorts in a diamond pattern.
As we set up the attack, the convoy changed course to 119°T.
14 MAR
Attack #8
Got into position for submerged attack. Selected remaining 2 Mark 18’s in the bow tube, targeting the lead merchant. Both hit.
Escorts were unable to find us – we surfaced an hour-and-a-half later.
Attack #9
Encountered another convoy, similar in composition to the previous one. Speed was 8 knots, Course was 114°T. We were now down to 4 stern torpedoes.
Prepared for a surface attack, range 2600, when the convoy changed course to 149°T. We had to reverse course and cut across the target track 8000 yards in front of the approaching convoy. Speed was 5 knots at radar depth.
Fired both Mark 14’s at the high speed setting at the lead merchant. Because of the enemy formation, the shot was made at an oblique angle from 1400 yards off the track. An enemy destroy was close to cutting off our escape so we dived the boat right after firing. Both torpedoes missed. We were undetected and the convoy continued on, unaware it had been attacked.
15 MAR – 18 MAR
Patrolling.
On the 18th, ordered to return to base.
19 MAR – 30 MAR
Return to base.
(C) Fuel Consumed
82%
(D) Weather
See Narrative, above.
(E) Torpedoes Expended
32 – 9 ships sunk, estimated tonnage 33820.
(F) Reference
See Patrol 1 (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?t=201862).
See Patrol 3 (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showpost.php?p=2018897&postcount=483).