paulhager
02-02-13, 12:07 PM
BACKGROUND:
Regrettably, neither SH4 nor the modders produced a realistic way for submarine commanders to be promoted out of their commands. (I seem to recall that SH3 had a mod called “commander” that did do this.) I decided that I would retire my previous commander, Archibald Leach (http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000026/), when he reached captain if he survived that long. He did and I did. Now I’ve begun a new career with Bernard H Schwartz (http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000348/bio). The choice of Schwartz is particularly apposite: the real Schwartz served in the US Navy aboard a submarine tender. He credited his desire to enlist in the Navy on watching Cary Grant in Destination Tokyo (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035799/) and Tyrone Power (http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000061/bio) in Crash Dive (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035763/). The real Schwartz would also appear with Grant in Operation Petticoat (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0053143/), 14 years after War's end.
For these write-ups, I imagine the fictional Schwartz has been recently promoted to Lt. Cdr. His last billet was XO under Leach, where he served with distinction on the last two patrols.
As for the sub, the Picuda (http://www.uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/3118.html) is a Balao class. It has the standard starting complement: 9 officers (not counting the captain) – 1 Lt, 2 Lt jg, 6 Ensigns; 6 CPOs, 3 PO 1st, 8 PO 2nd, and 9 PO 3rd; and, 52 seamen.
The boat has the latest electronic suite: improved SD, SJ-1, and a radar warning receiver. It also sports the improved passive sonar system. Weapons are the 4” bow deck gun, the 40mm Bofors, and 2 20mm. The Picuda carries 8 Mark 18 electrics (2 in the stern, 6 in the bow) and 16 Mark 14’s.
I borrowed the book Wahoo (http://www.amazon.com/Wahoo-Patrols-Americas-Famous-Submarine/dp/0891415726/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1286495592&sr=1-1) by it’s XO, Richard H. O’Kane and have also read the war diaries of both the Wahoo and O’Kane’s own boat, the Tang. Although the war diaries had a standard format, the styles of Kennedy (the first skipper of the Wahoo), Morton (the last), and O’Kane were distinctive. I’ll try to come up with a style that’s appropriate for Bernie.
And now, on to the patrols.
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
CONFIDENTIAL January 6, 1944
From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet
Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #1.
Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering first war patrol.
Bernard H. Schwartz
(A) Prologue
Completed two weeks of training prior to departure. This included practicing night radar approaches and attacks, firing exercise torpedoes, and numerous diving drills.
(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)
(B) Narrative
17 NOV – 01 DEC
In transit to patrol zone, speed 10 knots. No enemy sighted.
02 DEC
Radar detected convoy at 0455 – position 17° N, 133° 40’ E. Convoy speed established as 10 knots, course 6° true. Eleven ships in two columns – 4 in starboard column, 7 in port. Sent information to ComSubPac. Tracked targets, which came into visual range at 0530. Starboard column consisted of Nagara Maru class cargo ships, armed fore and aft with 3” guns. Port column was composed of 4 smaller cargo ships and another Nagara Maru, with a single escort at the head and tail.
Attack#1
Submerged the boat 1200 yards off track of starboard column. Already had a good solution via radar on the trailing ship. The attack would consist of single Mark 18’s fired at the last two Nagara Marus and two spreads of two Mark 14’s set for high speed targeted at the lead Nagara Marus. Made visual refinements on the solution and commenced firing at targets. Made last sweep with periscope before diving and saw that lead escort was making knots in our direction. Dove deep and listened for hits. Heard one hit – it would have been the first electric. All of the remaining torpedoes exceeded their time. About 30 seconds late there was a hit and a discernable “clang” – a dud. Three torpedoes struck their targets, three missed. By this time, we had crossed the thermal found by the bathythermograph at 190 feet.
http://img836.imageshack.us/img836/9281/194312020647z.jpg
There was little time to ponder the effectiveness of the attack because the escort was on top of us. It pinged like mad but dropped no depth charges. It was soon joined by its comrade and both ran curlicue patterns in our vicinity while pinging but were never confident enough to actually expend any of their depth charges. After a half hour or so, both escorts were some distance away but they persisted in their random search.
One of the escorts finally peeled off to rejoin the convoy. The other lingered. It wasn’t until after local sundown, nearly 4 hours later, that the escort was far enough away that we could safely go to periscope depth. A sweep showed a stationary Nagara Maru with a 20° starboard list. We surfaced and prepared to deliver the coup de grace with the stern tubes. Radar immediately detected a ship at 7500 yards: our persistent adversary. We made a slow approach and the escort started moving again…away. By the time we were in position, the escort was 10000 yards away, moving at high speed. Two Mark 14’s were necessary to finish off the cripple.
We commenced an end around maneuver, expecting to find a damaged Nagara Maru lagging behind the convoy. If there were damage, it was insufficient to slow the ship below convoy speed. Another possibility suggested itself. The first torpedo hit the number 4 ship but the timing on the other torpedoes was sufficiently off that all of the ships had time to turn away. The first hit didn’t cause enough damage to slow the victim, which blundered into one of the spreads, probably the one that missed the number 2 ship. This would explain why the spread hit late, coupled with the fact that it was one of the Nagara Marus that was dead in the water. Irrespective of these speculations, the practical result of our attack was one ship sunk for 8 torpedoes expended.
Attack#2
We reacquired the convoy and closed to 7000 yards – there was a light mist so visibility was poor and we relied on our radar. The convoy had slowed but not because of a cripple – it was traveling along a path that resembled a flat sine wave. We tracked it long enough to determine that it was still following its base course of 6°T. The effective speed along the base course was 5 knots.
The convoy arrangement was the same as it was for Attack#1 except for the missing Nagara Maru. This time, we set up 3000 yards off the track and prepared for a surface attack. We tracked the convoy with radar, continuing with a mix of radar and visual when it came within 7000 yards. This time, 2 Mark-18’s were allocated to Maru#2 and 2 Mark-14’s to Maru#1. After torpedoes away, we made a 180 at 2 engine speed. About 30 seconds before the first spread was to hit, dived because of proximity to enemy ships.
Lead ship received the first hit – number 2 in the spread – followed a half minute later by both electrics on the second ship. One torpedo missed.
http://imageshack.us/a/img69/4572/194312021502z.jpg
As the boat went below 60 feet, we heard the sounds of bulkheads breaking and metal groaning – one of the Marus was going down. Neither of the escorts searched anywhere close – perhaps there was no need to dive.
After an hour, rose to periscope depth to look for the other Maru and found it with a 30° list to starboard. We closed to 2000 yards, surfaced, and engaged with the deck gun. It took at least an extra minute to get the gun into action – extra drills will be needed. After commence firing, the enemy responded with its main armament, though the severe list made it difficult to bring its guns to bear. After a handful of hits, its guns were silenced. A few more hits produced an explosion and the ship heeled the rest of the way over. We left the area at flank speed to catch up to the convoy.
Attack#3
The final attack of 2 December was conducted shortly after sunrise. With 6 torpedoes in the bow and 6 in the stern, the logical approach was to attack using the two Mark-18’s in the stern.
While approaching the convoy, it changed course to 343°. We paralleled it at 8000 yards. The last of the four original Nagara Marus was all but invisible through the light mist – only the phosphorescence generated at the bow and stern betrayed its presence.
We set up for the attack 2000 yards off the track. Once again, we obtained an excellent solution via radar before submerging. The solution was refined 3 more times visually before we fired the two Mark 18’s. Both hit, the first at precisely 2327.
The second struck a bit behind the first and produced a satisfying explosion. The ship was obviously finished before we dove.
The escorts were even more befuddled this time than last. No attempt was made to find us.
03 DEC
After a poor start, expending 8 torpedoes for one enemy ship sunk, we had rebounded strongly, firing 6 torpedoes for 3 more ships. The lesson here is to avoid getting overly ambitious.
There was still one more Nagara Maru in the convoy and we aimed to get it before we broke off the action and headed to our patrol zone. Surfaced the boat, reacquired the convoy on radar and performed another end around.
Attack#4
This would be another daylight attack. Obtained a good solution on the remaining Nagara Maru using radar – then submerged when the lead ship came into visual range. Position was 1200 yards off target track. Attack was conducted with spread of two from stern, high speed, depth 15. Fired two – both running hot, straight, and normal.
http://imageshack.us/a/img251/2083/194312030611z.jpg
The torpedoes hit – within a minute there were secondary explosions and the now familiar sounds of a ship breaking up and sinking.
The near escort was Johnny-on-the-spot but still seemed unable to get a fix. After 20 minutes, the second escort joined but neither was able to home in on us. With 400 feet of the Pacific above our heads, we were as secure as if docked at Pearl.
Although the escorts were not close enough to pose a threat, they were too close to allow us to surface. We continued submerged for another 2 hours, finally rising to periscope depth at 0830. Surfaced at 0845. We had a radar blip astern at 14000 yards – presumably one of the escorts.
04 DEC to 07 DEC
Patrolling.
Received Flash Message 6 December that a convoy en route to Peleliu would be at 4° 45’ N, 122° 00’ E at 0800 8 December – a good 1000 nm from our position.
08 DEC
Received orders to patrol East of Peleliu. This would likely put us in position to attack the reported convoy – assuming a speed of 10 knots, it would reach Peleliu on the 11th. We should be on station by the 10th.
09 DEC
Attack #5
At 0935, 60 nm West of Peleliu, we picked up a single contact: speed 9, course 295° true. It was headed in the wrong direction to be the vanguard of the convoy – it was also too early. We began feeding radar data into the TDC.
Set up for a surface attack 1200 yards off track. Upon sighting ship, determined it was a small Taihosan Maru class. This baby only needed one torpedeo.
Attack was routine…except that target commenced turn just as the torpedo was fired. It missed but was close enough to alert the target. Searchlights came on and began playing about in our vicinity. Making a quick adjustment, fired a second torpedo. This caught her in the stern, blowing it off.
We left the scene at 2 engine speed.
10 DEC to 12 DEC
Patrolling.
Received orders to proceed Molucca Passage and patrol.
13 DEC
Attack #6
At 1058, 40 nm SSE of Peleliu, radar found a small convoy. Range 37000 yards, speed 10, course 122° true. Convoy consisted of 6 ships of unknown type in two columns of 3 with escorts at the head and tail of the port column.
Refined the target solution and closed for the attack. Moon was rising – waning gibbous and quite bright. Closed to 2200 yards off track of starboard (near) column. Because of the bright moon and clear weather, went to radar depth.
The convoy came within visual range. Dived the boat to periscope depth – there was too much moonlight. The lead two ships in the starboard column were Zinbu Maru class. Targeted trailing Maru with Mark 18’s in tubes 1 and 2 and the leader with the Mark 14’s in tubes 3 and 4. Right after firing the first spread the convoy executed a slight turn to port. Made a rapid “Kentucky windage” adjustment on the leader and let fly.
The Mark 18’s missed but both the Mark 14’s found their target. We dove to 400 feet and withdrew. The target was heard to explode and sink
http://imageshack.us/a/img337/7692/194312131244z.jpg
We were not harassed by the escorts. However, when we surfaced, radar picked up both escorts – one was at 6000 yards bearing 180 and the other was at 7500 yards bearing 220. We went to flank speed to exit the area but this proved to be a mistake. The near escort caught sight of us and began to pursue. The far escort quickly joined. The moon was too bright! We crash dived and made a 45° starboard turn. The escorts approached within 1000 yards or so but never came closer.
We spent the next several hours submerged, finally surfacing at 1901. A small blip at 22000 yards was traveling at 10 knots on 280. Probably not one of the original escorts.
Set course for Molucca Passage.
14 DEC to 15 DEC
In transit to patrol zone.
15 DEC to 18 DEC
Patrolled along Molucca Passage.
Had to dive because of enemy aircraft at 2156 16 December and 0200 17 December.
Reported to ComSubPac, 18 December at 2018. Ordered to return to base.
18 DEC to 3 JAN 44
Transit to base.
(C) Fuel Consumption
83%
(D) Weather
Nominal.
(E) Torpedoes expended
22 – 7 ships sunk, estimated tonnage 43,166.
(F) Reference
See Patrol_2 (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?t=201958).
Regrettably, neither SH4 nor the modders produced a realistic way for submarine commanders to be promoted out of their commands. (I seem to recall that SH3 had a mod called “commander” that did do this.) I decided that I would retire my previous commander, Archibald Leach (http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000026/), when he reached captain if he survived that long. He did and I did. Now I’ve begun a new career with Bernard H Schwartz (http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000348/bio). The choice of Schwartz is particularly apposite: the real Schwartz served in the US Navy aboard a submarine tender. He credited his desire to enlist in the Navy on watching Cary Grant in Destination Tokyo (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035799/) and Tyrone Power (http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000061/bio) in Crash Dive (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0035763/). The real Schwartz would also appear with Grant in Operation Petticoat (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0053143/), 14 years after War's end.
For these write-ups, I imagine the fictional Schwartz has been recently promoted to Lt. Cdr. His last billet was XO under Leach, where he served with distinction on the last two patrols.
As for the sub, the Picuda (http://www.uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/3118.html) is a Balao class. It has the standard starting complement: 9 officers (not counting the captain) – 1 Lt, 2 Lt jg, 6 Ensigns; 6 CPOs, 3 PO 1st, 8 PO 2nd, and 9 PO 3rd; and, 52 seamen.
The boat has the latest electronic suite: improved SD, SJ-1, and a radar warning receiver. It also sports the improved passive sonar system. Weapons are the 4” bow deck gun, the 40mm Bofors, and 2 20mm. The Picuda carries 8 Mark 18 electrics (2 in the stern, 6 in the bow) and 16 Mark 14’s.
I borrowed the book Wahoo (http://www.amazon.com/Wahoo-Patrols-Americas-Famous-Submarine/dp/0891415726/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1286495592&sr=1-1) by it’s XO, Richard H. O’Kane and have also read the war diaries of both the Wahoo and O’Kane’s own boat, the Tang. Although the war diaries had a standard format, the styles of Kennedy (the first skipper of the Wahoo), Morton (the last), and O’Kane were distinctive. I’ll try to come up with a style that’s appropriate for Bernie.
And now, on to the patrols.
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
CONFIDENTIAL January 6, 1944
From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet
Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #1.
Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering first war patrol.
Bernard H. Schwartz
(A) Prologue
Completed two weeks of training prior to departure. This included practicing night radar approaches and attacks, firing exercise torpedoes, and numerous diving drills.
(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)
(B) Narrative
17 NOV – 01 DEC
In transit to patrol zone, speed 10 knots. No enemy sighted.
02 DEC
Radar detected convoy at 0455 – position 17° N, 133° 40’ E. Convoy speed established as 10 knots, course 6° true. Eleven ships in two columns – 4 in starboard column, 7 in port. Sent information to ComSubPac. Tracked targets, which came into visual range at 0530. Starboard column consisted of Nagara Maru class cargo ships, armed fore and aft with 3” guns. Port column was composed of 4 smaller cargo ships and another Nagara Maru, with a single escort at the head and tail.
Attack#1
Submerged the boat 1200 yards off track of starboard column. Already had a good solution via radar on the trailing ship. The attack would consist of single Mark 18’s fired at the last two Nagara Marus and two spreads of two Mark 14’s set for high speed targeted at the lead Nagara Marus. Made visual refinements on the solution and commenced firing at targets. Made last sweep with periscope before diving and saw that lead escort was making knots in our direction. Dove deep and listened for hits. Heard one hit – it would have been the first electric. All of the remaining torpedoes exceeded their time. About 30 seconds late there was a hit and a discernable “clang” – a dud. Three torpedoes struck their targets, three missed. By this time, we had crossed the thermal found by the bathythermograph at 190 feet.
http://img836.imageshack.us/img836/9281/194312020647z.jpg
There was little time to ponder the effectiveness of the attack because the escort was on top of us. It pinged like mad but dropped no depth charges. It was soon joined by its comrade and both ran curlicue patterns in our vicinity while pinging but were never confident enough to actually expend any of their depth charges. After a half hour or so, both escorts were some distance away but they persisted in their random search.
One of the escorts finally peeled off to rejoin the convoy. The other lingered. It wasn’t until after local sundown, nearly 4 hours later, that the escort was far enough away that we could safely go to periscope depth. A sweep showed a stationary Nagara Maru with a 20° starboard list. We surfaced and prepared to deliver the coup de grace with the stern tubes. Radar immediately detected a ship at 7500 yards: our persistent adversary. We made a slow approach and the escort started moving again…away. By the time we were in position, the escort was 10000 yards away, moving at high speed. Two Mark 14’s were necessary to finish off the cripple.
We commenced an end around maneuver, expecting to find a damaged Nagara Maru lagging behind the convoy. If there were damage, it was insufficient to slow the ship below convoy speed. Another possibility suggested itself. The first torpedo hit the number 4 ship but the timing on the other torpedoes was sufficiently off that all of the ships had time to turn away. The first hit didn’t cause enough damage to slow the victim, which blundered into one of the spreads, probably the one that missed the number 2 ship. This would explain why the spread hit late, coupled with the fact that it was one of the Nagara Marus that was dead in the water. Irrespective of these speculations, the practical result of our attack was one ship sunk for 8 torpedoes expended.
Attack#2
We reacquired the convoy and closed to 7000 yards – there was a light mist so visibility was poor and we relied on our radar. The convoy had slowed but not because of a cripple – it was traveling along a path that resembled a flat sine wave. We tracked it long enough to determine that it was still following its base course of 6°T. The effective speed along the base course was 5 knots.
The convoy arrangement was the same as it was for Attack#1 except for the missing Nagara Maru. This time, we set up 3000 yards off the track and prepared for a surface attack. We tracked the convoy with radar, continuing with a mix of radar and visual when it came within 7000 yards. This time, 2 Mark-18’s were allocated to Maru#2 and 2 Mark-14’s to Maru#1. After torpedoes away, we made a 180 at 2 engine speed. About 30 seconds before the first spread was to hit, dived because of proximity to enemy ships.
Lead ship received the first hit – number 2 in the spread – followed a half minute later by both electrics on the second ship. One torpedo missed.
http://imageshack.us/a/img69/4572/194312021502z.jpg
As the boat went below 60 feet, we heard the sounds of bulkheads breaking and metal groaning – one of the Marus was going down. Neither of the escorts searched anywhere close – perhaps there was no need to dive.
After an hour, rose to periscope depth to look for the other Maru and found it with a 30° list to starboard. We closed to 2000 yards, surfaced, and engaged with the deck gun. It took at least an extra minute to get the gun into action – extra drills will be needed. After commence firing, the enemy responded with its main armament, though the severe list made it difficult to bring its guns to bear. After a handful of hits, its guns were silenced. A few more hits produced an explosion and the ship heeled the rest of the way over. We left the area at flank speed to catch up to the convoy.
Attack#3
The final attack of 2 December was conducted shortly after sunrise. With 6 torpedoes in the bow and 6 in the stern, the logical approach was to attack using the two Mark-18’s in the stern.
While approaching the convoy, it changed course to 343°. We paralleled it at 8000 yards. The last of the four original Nagara Marus was all but invisible through the light mist – only the phosphorescence generated at the bow and stern betrayed its presence.
We set up for the attack 2000 yards off the track. Once again, we obtained an excellent solution via radar before submerging. The solution was refined 3 more times visually before we fired the two Mark 18’s. Both hit, the first at precisely 2327.
The second struck a bit behind the first and produced a satisfying explosion. The ship was obviously finished before we dove.
The escorts were even more befuddled this time than last. No attempt was made to find us.
03 DEC
After a poor start, expending 8 torpedoes for one enemy ship sunk, we had rebounded strongly, firing 6 torpedoes for 3 more ships. The lesson here is to avoid getting overly ambitious.
There was still one more Nagara Maru in the convoy and we aimed to get it before we broke off the action and headed to our patrol zone. Surfaced the boat, reacquired the convoy on radar and performed another end around.
Attack#4
This would be another daylight attack. Obtained a good solution on the remaining Nagara Maru using radar – then submerged when the lead ship came into visual range. Position was 1200 yards off target track. Attack was conducted with spread of two from stern, high speed, depth 15. Fired two – both running hot, straight, and normal.
http://imageshack.us/a/img251/2083/194312030611z.jpg
The torpedoes hit – within a minute there were secondary explosions and the now familiar sounds of a ship breaking up and sinking.
The near escort was Johnny-on-the-spot but still seemed unable to get a fix. After 20 minutes, the second escort joined but neither was able to home in on us. With 400 feet of the Pacific above our heads, we were as secure as if docked at Pearl.
Although the escorts were not close enough to pose a threat, they were too close to allow us to surface. We continued submerged for another 2 hours, finally rising to periscope depth at 0830. Surfaced at 0845. We had a radar blip astern at 14000 yards – presumably one of the escorts.
04 DEC to 07 DEC
Patrolling.
Received Flash Message 6 December that a convoy en route to Peleliu would be at 4° 45’ N, 122° 00’ E at 0800 8 December – a good 1000 nm from our position.
08 DEC
Received orders to patrol East of Peleliu. This would likely put us in position to attack the reported convoy – assuming a speed of 10 knots, it would reach Peleliu on the 11th. We should be on station by the 10th.
09 DEC
Attack #5
At 0935, 60 nm West of Peleliu, we picked up a single contact: speed 9, course 295° true. It was headed in the wrong direction to be the vanguard of the convoy – it was also too early. We began feeding radar data into the TDC.
Set up for a surface attack 1200 yards off track. Upon sighting ship, determined it was a small Taihosan Maru class. This baby only needed one torpedeo.
Attack was routine…except that target commenced turn just as the torpedo was fired. It missed but was close enough to alert the target. Searchlights came on and began playing about in our vicinity. Making a quick adjustment, fired a second torpedo. This caught her in the stern, blowing it off.
We left the scene at 2 engine speed.
10 DEC to 12 DEC
Patrolling.
Received orders to proceed Molucca Passage and patrol.
13 DEC
Attack #6
At 1058, 40 nm SSE of Peleliu, radar found a small convoy. Range 37000 yards, speed 10, course 122° true. Convoy consisted of 6 ships of unknown type in two columns of 3 with escorts at the head and tail of the port column.
Refined the target solution and closed for the attack. Moon was rising – waning gibbous and quite bright. Closed to 2200 yards off track of starboard (near) column. Because of the bright moon and clear weather, went to radar depth.
The convoy came within visual range. Dived the boat to periscope depth – there was too much moonlight. The lead two ships in the starboard column were Zinbu Maru class. Targeted trailing Maru with Mark 18’s in tubes 1 and 2 and the leader with the Mark 14’s in tubes 3 and 4. Right after firing the first spread the convoy executed a slight turn to port. Made a rapid “Kentucky windage” adjustment on the leader and let fly.
The Mark 18’s missed but both the Mark 14’s found their target. We dove to 400 feet and withdrew. The target was heard to explode and sink
http://imageshack.us/a/img337/7692/194312131244z.jpg
We were not harassed by the escorts. However, when we surfaced, radar picked up both escorts – one was at 6000 yards bearing 180 and the other was at 7500 yards bearing 220. We went to flank speed to exit the area but this proved to be a mistake. The near escort caught sight of us and began to pursue. The far escort quickly joined. The moon was too bright! We crash dived and made a 45° starboard turn. The escorts approached within 1000 yards or so but never came closer.
We spent the next several hours submerged, finally surfacing at 1901. A small blip at 22000 yards was traveling at 10 knots on 280. Probably not one of the original escorts.
Set course for Molucca Passage.
14 DEC to 15 DEC
In transit to patrol zone.
15 DEC to 18 DEC
Patrolled along Molucca Passage.
Had to dive because of enemy aircraft at 2156 16 December and 0200 17 December.
Reported to ComSubPac, 18 December at 2018. Ordered to return to base.
18 DEC to 3 JAN 44
Transit to base.
(C) Fuel Consumption
83%
(D) Weather
Nominal.
(E) Torpedoes expended
22 – 7 ships sunk, estimated tonnage 43,166.
(F) Reference
See Patrol_2 (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?t=201958).