Battle of Leyte Gulf, what would you do?

[SuperEtendard]

Hi everyone :salute:

I was assigned to patrol the China Sea around the Phillippines, to clean the sea of all IJN warships in preparation for the Allied invasion of the Phillippines. (September 20th, 1944).

In the coast of Luzon, near the Manilla Bay, i sunk 2 big passanger ships converted into troop transports (each one of them was beign escorted by 4 DDs), and some days later I sunk 2 little anti-sub TFs of 2 DD each. I patrolled the area without succes for a couple of weeks. When i was retourning to Brisbane (October 18th), i was in the Sulu Sea, i received the Fox Traffic saying that American and Japanesse fleets were converging at the Phillippines Sea , and all patrolling ships near were ordered to assist the Allied flleet. At 10 knts (full fuel economic) i arrived the San Bernandito Strait (23rd), at midnight. but there was not a single ship there.

I was really angry, thinking that this of the din campaign was bul*****, that i dumped a lot of precious fuel, and now i would have to retourn at 10 ktns trough all Oceania, taking the double of time to reach the nearest refit point. But 1 hour later my radar detected 20+ big contacts heading for the San Bern strait fast. It was Kurita 's Central Force.

My eyes shined, In my mind, only a single sentece repeteaded again and again and again: "It´s my moment":arrgh!:

In a couple of minutes i manuevered to get the perfect attack postion:
90° from the path of the TF, like 1000 mts from the farest ship and 300 mts from the nearest one (estimated course). Depth 100 mts. Speed: 0

The DD s never knew i was there, and when they got away i blowed balast to climb quickly and then level to PD. I observed the ships with the scope: Lots of Cruisers, like 5 BB (Yamato and Mushashi were there !!) and very few DDs. Some DDs ran aground on the strait s coast and were set on fire.

What would you do in such situation? Try to sink the most cruisers you could ? Use all of your torps with the BBs, hoping one or two would sink?

In the end i sunk 6 ships: I spent all torps remaining.

3 Takaos: (2 torps to the first one (Kurita's one, leader of the formation), 1 torp for the 2nd one, and the 3rd was sunk later by 2 "lost" cuties)

1 Mogami: 1 torp (Magn det, 6 mts depth, took a while to sink)

1 Maya: 1 torp

Kongo BB: 4 cuties.

I almost got sunk by the Yamato, haha. I was at pd firing torps and then i decided take a look around for incoming DDs, what i found it was more than i expected. The Yamato was heading for me at fulll speed very very close range. i crash dived, and when i reached 30 METERS, the Yamato hit my submarine (cunning tower), thanks to the unrealistic collision damage of the game she inflicted no damage to me, but the sub almost do a 180° roll because of the impact. I retourned to Brisbane some days later with 0 torps left and more than 100.000 tons of shipping, MISSION ACCOMPLISHED, haha. I have to admit i was very lucky of sunking the Cruisers with so few torps hits

[Armistead]

It's a fun battle, I'm assuming you're playing stock, which does have the group coming through the San Bern, although RSRD has it to historical perfection and is surrounded by about 12 DD's. With stock the DD's often do dumb things.

Depending if I can I go for BB's, if I'm not detected I go for the Yamato, if I get detected before, whatever capital ships I can shoot at.

[Hinrich Schwab]

Sounds like a spiffy patrol. Well done.:yeah::arrgh!:

The thread name implies a question, but there was only one thing to do; jump 'em! That's exactly what you did. :)

As far as Yamato grazing your boat, you said you were at 30 meters. At 30 meters, the only boats that should be hitting yours are sinking ones you got too close to. If it were 30 feet, I would see Yamato colliding as its draft is around 36 feet or so. At worst, it would have destroyed your periscope shears and both scopes.

Are you running mods? These really alter damage the damage models and may or may not explain the anomaly with the collision.

[MKalafatas]

Great story! Historically, wasn't one submarine presented with your view in the periscope? Musashi was hit prior to entering the San Bernadino Strait --- I think by Halsey's carriers --- but wasn't there a submarine on station that wired the first sighting?

I should look that up....

Edit: Darter and Dace spotted and trailed Kurita from Palawan into the Sibuyan Sea.

[I'm goin' down]

Armistead knows all about Leyete Gulf. Just ask him.

[Armistead]

Great story! Historically, wasn't one submarine presented with your view in the periscope? Musashi was hit prior to entering the San Bernadino Strait --- I think by Halsey's carriers --- but wasn't there a submarine on station that wired the first sighting?

I should look that up....

Edit: Darter and Dace spotted and trailed Kurita from Palawan into the Sibuyan Sea.

Darter and Dace spotted the Center Force in the Palawan Passage and I believe attacked on 10/23 in the passage sinking two CA's. They also damaged another CA, but why trying to get in postion to finish it..I think it was Darter that ran aground on some shoals. Darter called Dace and Dace let the CA go and went and saved the crew of Darter, they never followed into the Sibuyan Sea.

Musashi was attacked by carrier planes in the Sibuyan and sunk later. That's one mistake of most mod traffic, both the Y and Mus come together through the Bern, but to rework the group, you would have to despawn it and respawn it in the Sibuyan, which could be done, but would stink if you were attacking it and it vanished before your eyes. RSRD has the nice battle of mass carrier plane attacking the Center Force, fun to watch and a good time to attack it.

I know of no other sub spottings of the Center Force other than Darter and Dace, but gave enough info that the US figured it was coming through the Bern. After it was attacked, Kurita turned back, so we thought the group retreated, but Kurita turned back again to attack, but Halsey had already went north by then. Could have been a major disaster had Kurita stuck with the battle plan, but our DD's gave such a good fight with the planes from the jeep carriers that Kurita got scared, most likely thinking Halsey was in the area....Had he pressed the attack, it would've been a disaster for the US.

[WernherVonTrapp]

The Battle of Leyte Gulf is one of the most exciting engagements in this game, right alongside the Third naval Battle for Guadalcanal. I usually try to get into a position somewhere in the area denoted on the map below. That's where Kurita's Center Force (the largest in this battle) makes it's foray down the Sibuyan Sea and does a complete 360°.
You get two cracks at it here!:up: If you damage a ship and shes dead in the water, she'll be left behind for an easy ambush.
http://i1045.photobucket.com/albums/b456/archangel501/d87cd42e.jpg

[Dread Knot]

I've always liked the analogy that the battle resembled the final round of a heavyweight prize fight, with both boxers barely able to remain on their feet. The Americans exhausted from weeks of 3rd Fleet support operations. The Japanese exhausted from the beating they took just coming to grips with the US fleet.

[WernherVonTrapp]

I've always liked the analogy that the battle resembled the final round of a heavyweight prize fight, with both boxers barely able to remain on their feet...
This also was the largest naval battle in world history and the Battle of Surigao Strait was the last ever, Battleship .vs Battleship engagement in history.;)

[Dread Knot]

Had he pressed the attack, it would've been a disaster for the US.


Had Kurita continued on he would have faced 450 American aircraft (more than the Japanese used at Pearl Harbor) and 60+ destroyers in the invasion support fleet. While trying to survive that hailstorm he would have had around four hours to defeat the aforementioned destroyers, fight off the 450 aircraft, advance around 30 miles, and then done whatever damage he could (with AP shells that would not even detonate when they hit the ships in the landing force) before Halsey had a couple hundred more aircraft, loaded for bear on him.

The Japanese might have scored a temporary setback on the US timetable, but nothing of the IJN would have made it home. In the actual event the lousy muddy terrain on Leyte for building airfields was probably the bigger impediment in the long run. Most historians feel MacArthur couldn't have picked a worse spot to start liberating the Philippines.

[SuperEtendard]

It's a fun battle, I'm assuming you're playing stock, which does have the group coming through the San Bern, although RSRD has it to historical perfection and is surrounded by about 12 DD's. With stock the DD's often do dumb things.

Depending if I can I go for BB's, if I'm not detected I go for the Yamato, if I get detected before, whatever capital ships I can shoot at.

Yes, i'm playing stock :cry:. And im stuck with it until the old pc (mine) gets actualized. i cant download things on this one, it s new and I have "no permission to full it with downloads, when the old one gets actualized, you can do whatever you want with it, but not with this one", superior orders.

I once spotted one Yamato at the Bismarck Sea on Feb 1943, it was in a little TF with some DDs and a Fuso, also a few big merchats maybe. I fired 12 torps at him with my gato, all of them reached the ship, but nothing happened. Then i realized that 1 sub hardly would sink the Yamato, i think you must hit it with 15 or more torps to cause some damage to that mountain of steel. I know that it tooked 17 aerial torp and 19 bombs to sink the Mushashi.



by Hinrich Schwab :
As far as Yamato grazing your boat, you said you were at 30 meters. At 30 meters, the only boats that should be hitting yours are sinking ones you got too close to. If it were 30 feet, I would see Yamato colliding as its draft is around 36 feet or so. At worst, it would have destroyed your periscope shears and both scopesYes, it was strange. The indicator says the "keel depth", i dont know what is the full vertcal lenght (from the scopes to the keel) of the balao, the Yamato had a 11 mts draught. The keel was at 30 mts, but the scopes could have been at 10 mts when we crashed.

Do you know the Histoy Channel's program "Dogfigths" ? Mostly it shows aerial battles, but sometimes its about naval battles, one is about the Leyte Gulf Battle, it tells how the DDs and planes could defeat the Central Force BBs. With some vet's testimony. here are some links:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YQzxsFtNdk Part 1/5
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70EZTktTETM&feature=relmfu Part 2/5
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6U3IdqfuXCQ&feature=relmfu Part 3/5
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jlqQ1GpKv0k&feature=relmfu Part 4/5
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZsdPDQjDGNY&feature=relmfu Part 5/5

[MKalafatas]

The charge of the destroyers and destroyer escorts at the Yamato and company was the American "Charge of the Light Brigade." It was hopeless, and heroic. The commander of the USS Johnson (I think?) won the Medal of Honor for his charge.

So much of war turns on the mental state of the on-scene commander. Kurita was fished out of the sea when his flagship Agato was sunk by Darter. Then he was strafed by American fighters and charged by destroyers.

He concluded that this boldness was justified by a nearby US carrier group --- a not unreasonable conclusion.

I agree with the prior note, saying that Kurita could have achieved more by pressing into the Gulf --- at the cost of his entire force.

But I'll bet the Japanese high command preferred such a result. After all, Yamato was wasted less than a year later, sent on a mission just hoping for the same desperate opportunity that Kurita spurned.

[Armistead]

Had Kurita continued on he would have faced 450 American aircraft (more than the Japanese used at Pearl Harbor) and 60+ destroyers in the invasion support fleet. While trying to survive that hailstorm he would have had around four hours to defeat the aforementioned destroyers, fight off the 450 aircraft, advance around 30 miles, and then done whatever damage he could (with AP shells that would not even detonate when they hit the ships in the landing force) before Halsey had a couple hundred more aircraft, loaded for bear on him.

The Japanese might have scored a temporary setback on the US timetable, but nothing of the IJN would have made it home. In the actual event the lousy muddy terrain on Leyte for building airfields was probably the bigger impediment in the long run. Most historians feel MacArthur couldn't have picked a worse spot to start liberating the Philippines.


Not hardly, Of the 450 aircraft, they came from the small jeep carriers, most were fighter Wildcats and Torpedo bombers, many of them not armed. Most of the Pilots were trained in ground support, not fleet engqagement. All the Wildcats could do is make strafing runs and many of the Topedo planes loaded depth charges for lack of Torpedos. I recall reading that only 75 planes actually had torpedos. From one of my books

"THE WILDCAT PILOTS WERE GIVEN A FREE HAND TO STRAFE WITH THE HOPE THAT THEIR STRAFING WOULD KILL PERSONNEL ON THE JAPANESE WARSHIPS, SILENCE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, AND, MOST IMPORTANT, DRAW ATTENTION FROM THE STRUGGLING ESCORT CARRIERS.
SOMETIMES TWO, OR FOUR WILDCATS WOULD JOIN UP FOR A STRAFING RUN. AGAIN, A WILDCAT WOULD JOIN UP AND RUN INTERFERENCE FOR AN AVENGER. THEN, LIKELY AS NOT, IT WOULD TURN OUT THAT THE AVENGER HAD NO TORPEDO OR BOMB AND WAS SIMPLY MAKING A DUMMY RUN. WHEN THEIR AMMUNITION GAVE OUT, THE FIGHTERS MADE DRY RUNS TO TURN THE PURSUERS."THE WILDCAT PILOTS WERE GIVEN A FREE HAND TO STRAFE WITH THE HOPE THAT THEIR STRAFING WOULD KILL PERSONNEL ON THE JAPANESE WARSHIPS, SILENCE AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, AND, MOST IMPORTANT, DRAW ATTENTION FROM THE STRUGGLING ESCORT CARRIERS.
SOMETIMES TWO, OR FOUR WILDCATS WOULD JOIN UP FOR A STRAFING RUN. AGAIN, A WILDCAT WOULD JOIN UP AND RUN INTERFERENCE FOR AN AVENGER. THEN, LIKELY AS NOT, IT WOULD TURN OUT THAT THE AVENGER HAD NO TORPEDO OR BOMB AND WAS SIMPLY MAKING A DUMMY RUN. WHEN THEIR AMMUNITION GAVE OUT, THE FIGHTERS MADE DRY RUNS TO TURN THE PURSUERS."

However, what the planes did is cause Kurita to change from Battle formation into AA coverage formation, which put his group in disorder, but he thought he was facing fleet carriers, this gave the US Jeep fleet their time to retreat, luckily into a squall that probably saved them.

Not sure where you're getting 60 DD's, Taffy 3 had maybe 5 DD's and a few DE's that could attack, basically knowing they would die as was the story of the famous US Johnson. They did some damage, slowed them dowsn, but couldn't stop Kurita who eventually caught up and started shelling the rear units of the jeep carrier force sinking one and damaging others, but instead of pressing the attack, he turned North. I believe the Yamato got seperated from the group from dodging DD torps or planes. Even with all the confusion caused by the US, Kurita'a CA'a and DD's had the range, was shelling and doing damage.

"But then, entirely unexpectedly, and although his cruisers and destroyers were now on the verge of annihilating Taffy Three, Kurita at 0911 ordered his ships to break off action."

Kurita then thought, maybe he got a message that their were major fleet units North of him. Some historians saying he feared fleet carriers, retreated, others believe he turned North to fight them.

I think most historians agree that had Kurita pressed the attack, he could've easily wiped the jeep carrier group out . This was an all or nothing battle, the IJN used their carriers north to pull Halsey away, it worked, they were to be sacrificed to get Kurita in, instead of pressing he went off on a ghost hunt North, by then the US was more organized, out of danger and the jeep planes kept attacking, taking more damage he retreated...

He had plenty of time to deal his blow and escape before Halsey could return, in fact as the Battle of the Bern ended Halsey had just started his attack North.

In reality, Kurita faced hard decisions, but he really didn't follow orders, the US fought back hard with little. Both sides made terrible mistakes, the US got lucky that day.

Overall, even if Kurita wiped out Taffy 3, it wouldn't have stopped the invasion for long, if at all, but who knows, if he rid himself of Taffy 3, he certainly had other options of attacking other groups, but he had only a day that he could do damage before Halsey would return. Some historians think he would've continued south, possibly engaged US units in Surigao, but by then many of the landing craft had turned and run, others better protected...With the failure of the Southern Force, not much they could do against the remaining fleet, but think if he would've wiped out 16 escort carriers, over 20,000 men....

[Armistead]

The charge of the destroyers and destroyer escorts at the Yamato and company was the American "Charge of the Light Brigade." It was hopeless, and heroic. The commander of the USS Johnson (I think?) won the Medal of Honor for his charge.

So much of war turns on the mental state of the on-scene commander. Kurita was fished out of the sea when his flagship Agato was sunk by Darter. Then he was strafed by American fighters and charged by destroyers.

He concluded that this boldness was justified by a nearby US carrier group --- a not unreasonable conclusion.

I agree with the prior note, saying that Kurita could have achieved more by pressing into the Gulf --- at the cost of his entire force.

But I'll bet the Japanese high command preferred such a result. After all, Yamato was wasted less than a year later, sent on a mission just hoping for the same desperate opportunity that Kurita spurned.

Those few DD's probably saved T3, the story of the US Johnson is a great read whatever the book, Evans knew he would die, told the men and went in....put up a hell of a fight.

Most reports show that Kurita was to press the attack regardless of what happened, once the Philippines fell the Japanese fleet was useless. Still, I don't see him doing much further damage even if he wiped out T3.

[I'm goin' down]

I, in my magficient Barb, went north, just like Admiral Halsey. I found the decoy Japanese carrier force off Cape Engano. That is when I got down on my knees in front of my computer and thanked God that lurker modded RSRDC.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Armistead is right. The Jeep carriers of Taffy 3 were there for ground support and ASW duties only. They had no armor piercing (anti-ship) bombs, only HE fragmentation bombs and depth charges, which they did use against Kurita's force nonetheless but to little effect. Still, the confusion and havoc they caused on Kurita's force appears to have been significant. The biggest problem for the IJN was their inflexibility in maintaining radio silence. The left hand had no idea what the right hand was doing, or even if any success was gained by Nishimura's Southern Force. Kurita wasn't even sure if Halsey had taken the bait of Ozawa's Northern Force.

Regardless, Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf's 7th Fleet was too far away (at Surigao Strait) to come rushing to the aid at Leyte. Though some historians still question/ponder Kurita's decision to withdraw, the general consensus is that, much confusion was caused by the smoke-screens and attacks by Taffy 3's DDs/DEs in addition to the bombing/strafing runs from her Escort Carriers. This coupled with a lack of communication and coordination between the IJN's Northern, Central and Southern forces lead Kurita to retire, fearing he was being drawn into a trap by the U.S. Navy. He had already lost a number of Heavy Cruisers either sunk or put out of the action and consistently mistook the ships of Taffy 3 for their larger counterparts. Aside from all that, he was not thrilled about using his fleet against meager transports and cargo ships rather than in a glorious battle with U.S. warships. Had he continued instead of turning about, he could've wiped out the entire invasion fleet and still have had time to escape.

[Armistead]

I, in my magficient Barb, went north, just like Admiral Halsey. I found the decoy Japanese carrier force off Cape Engano. That is when I got down on my knees in front of my computer and thanked God that lurker modded RSRDC.

Is that when you got sunk..:haha:

Last time I attacked it, the US planes came in, got mad because they sunk a few carriers I had hit robbing me of soon to be kills

[Dread Knot]

Not sure where you're getting 60 DD's,

Escort carriers - Three CVE-based task groups, all equivalent or larger than Taffy 3; Kurita hadn't even really gotten "past" Taffy 3 when he decided to break off;

Surface ships I: Oldendorf's battle line had re-deployed to the mouth of Leyte Gulf (Hibusan Island) by mid-morning, before Kurita's force could have made it TO the Gulf, much less inside;

Surface ships II: The close escort in the transport area included the cruiser Nashville (MacArthur's flagship) and almost 50 DDs, DEs, etc.

TF 38 (McCain) was coming up fast from the east, with (IIRC) four fast carriers and escorts to match;

Other US aviation assets within range included USN VP and VPB and USAAF heavy bombers;

[Armistead]

Escort carriers - Three CVE-based task groups, all equivalent or larger than Taffy 3; Kurita hadn't even really gotten "past" Taffy 3 when he decided to break off;

Surface ships I: Oldendorf's battle line had re-deployed to the mouth of Leyte Gulf (Hibusan Island) by mid-morning, before Kurita's force could have made it TO the Gulf, much less inside;

Surface ships II: The close escort in the transport area included the cruiser Nashville (MacArthur's flagship) and almost 50 DDs, DEs, etc.

TF 38 (McCain) was coming up fast from the east, with (IIRC) four fast carriers and escorts to match;

Other US aviation assets within range included USN VP and VPB and USAAF heavy bombers;

Tha'ts the point, he shouldn't have broke off to go chasing a TF north that didn't exist, he had T3 in his hands.

Your ignoring historical facts, all those assets were not there during the actual battle with T3, cept the planes of T1&2 which were attacking. None of the heavy assets could arrive in time to have any outcome on the battle of Samar. All 3 T groups had combined nine destroyers, and fourteen destroyer escorts, only a handful attacked. If Kurita had destroyed T3, he could've possibly caught and destroyed T1&2 and had plenty time to do it before other assets came into play. Also must remember the Kamikazes attacked T1&2 shortly after Kurita retreated, if he had stayed, with now jap plane attacks, no telling..many think it possible or think he should've wiped out all 3 CVE groups and had he not retreated he could've done it.

Remember, Kurita surprised the group, he was spotted by a plane and visuals from T3 almost the same time and already had shells coming at them.

I agree Kurita could only do so much, he certainly couldve wiped out T3 and no telling about T1&2, but he had time, course he didn't know it.

Had he plowed through the Jeep Carriers and headed south and battled Oldendorf's group, who knows, with planes of 1&2 helping him, he certainly would've hurt Kurita. I do think Kurita could have done great damage, but lost all in the process, but that would've certainly prolonged the war.

My point is he could have and should've destroyed T3...that he could've done. I do agree in reality he probably couldn't have done much more.

[Dread Knot]

Had he continued instead of turning about, he could've wiped out the entire invasion fleet and still have had time to escape.


Oldendorf had sent a force of cruisers and destroyers down Surigao Strait in pursuit of the Japanese survivors of the night action, but his battle line was still close enough to Leyte Gulf to easily bar the entrance before Kurita could get close. Interestingly enough, had Kurita chosen to contine on towards the Gulf, Oldendorf would have had an excellent chance to cross the enemy's "T" for the second time in two days! Oldendorf's fuel state was not nearly as bad as Kurita's, who had been in two major air/sea battles in the last 48 hours. And Oldendorf had the prospect of refueling from tankers once the battle was over, a luxury Kurita could only wish for.

Kurita might have required another hour to finish off Taffy 3, but he wasn't even close to engaging Taffy's 1 and 2. They were far off on the horizon to the southeast of Kurita, and steaming away from the direction that Kurita would have to take to get into Leyte Gulf. Regardless of what happened to the CVE's of Taffy 3, Kurita would still have to deal with close to 500 carrier planes from the three Taffies, plus about another 240 from McCain's TG 38.1. At about the time Kurita made his decision to break off the attack on Taffy 3, McCain was 335 miles distant, coming on at 30 knots, and and launching a strike aimed at Kurita. This strike arrived just as Kurita turned north to, as he claimed, seek another reported American task force. Had Kurita decided to head for Leyte Gulf instead, McCain would have been inside 200 miles just about the time Kurita would have reached Leyte Gulf.

So the answer is, Kurita would have had no window of opportunity to shell either the transports or the beachhead free of massive air attack, assuming, of course, he managed to get past Oldendorf's battleline (a very dubious assumption)

[Armistead]

I would have to agree with Dread that it's doubtful Kurita could've done much damage to the landing force if any. Kurita even later stated

Q: {Kurita under interrogation } So that the reason for changing course to the north was the threat of a heavy air attack if you entered the Gulf, is that correct?
A. It wasn't a question of destruction that was neither here nor there. It was a question of what good I could do in the Bay. I concluded that under the heavy attack from ship and shore-based planes, I could not be effective. Therefore, on my own decision, I concluded it was best to go north and join Admiral OZAWA."

He aslo stated he knew he couldn't manauver in the gulf. However, he had no clue what had happened in the battle of Surigao, for all he knew they got through, but he decided not to close the pincer, plus he really had no idea what assets the US had there.

T3 did a hell of a job to confuse the Center Force, one DD, the Johnson took out two CA's, but to turn back north just as his CA's and DD's were gonna overrun T3, doesn't make sense, cept he had lost tactical control and probably had no real idea.

Had Kurita made it to the gulf, I see no way he couldn't retreated back north, he would've had to exit back through Surigao, question is how much damage could they have done to the landing force and would it have been enough to matter before he became trapped in a pincer himself.

Interesting read is Kurita's interrogation after war, although much of it conflicts with previous reports, but it's obvious he had little clue what was going on around him.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/IJO-9.html

Still, he could've destroyed T3 and maybe the others...since he wasn't following orders anyway..:haha:

[Armistead]

Not to forget, Oldendorf had old BB's, but they had updated radar fire control, something the japs were way behind in.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Not to forget, Oldendorf had old BB's, but they had updated radar fire control, something the japs were way behind in.Yes, indeed it is doubtful and why I said he "could have", though I should've said he "might have" to avoid confusion. The fact that Center Force made it through the San Bernardino Strait and caught Taffy 3 completely by surprise is commensurate with the unknowns of battle. Still, despite not having armor piercing bombs, Taffy 3 showed how hard it is to defend against simultaneous air and surface threats. I'm sure if somehow, Kurita managed what seemed impossible, by wiping out the landing force, his postwar comments would've been adjusted accordingly. I noticed in my last post, I ended with a sentence that could be misconstrued by my hasty and poorly structured paragraph. The last sentence should be omitted from the general consensus of "most historians".;) It was meant to be my own speculation. BTW, only the BBs West Virginia, California and Tennessee had advanced radar directed fire control systems. The other three BBs has less advanced systems that had difficulty arriving at a firing solutions during the battle of Surigao Strait.

[Armistead]

Yea, we have the glory of hindsight and can only speculate, but imagine if Kurita got to the gulf the panic among 100's of piled up landing craft.

I assume the southern force had no clue, but what a bad mistake to have to come up through a narrow straight in a single line....However, the southern force was also attacked by planes earlier that day with damage, but least they made a sincere effort to follow orders.

The other issue is that because of plane attacks on Kurita and him turning back before coming back again was it put him behind about 6 critical hours, course had he not retreated Halsey would've hung around so I guess it's mute.

Remember Stonewall Jackson, he became famous for defeating large armies by "get there first with the most" and defeated them piecemeal. Kurita was certainly there with the most for Samar.

[Dread Knot]

In retrospect it's hard to believe that the Japanese Navy that fought at Leyte Gulf was the same institution which conceived and executed the attack on Pearl Harbor, which sank the British warships Prince of Wales and Repulse, which crushed the ABDA force at the Java Sea, which performed such feats of skill and daring in the early years of the war. At Leyte Gulf the commanders of Japan's greatest warships revealed stunning ineptitude. Their ship recognition skills were shockingly poor, their tactics primitive, their gunnery woeful, their spirit feeble. None of this diminishes the American achievement at Samar, but it does invite the bewilderment of history.

Perhaps the best example of the fatalism that gripped the Japanese is the ambush of Kurita's force on October 23rd by the submarines Darter and Dace. This first US success was made possible by a tactical carelessness amounting to apathy. Five battleships and ten heavy cruisers were steaming in three columns at sixteen knots without an anti-submarine screen. This is all more astonishing since the Japanese had intercepted US radio transmissions, and knew the subs were in their path. Like many aspects of the battle, Japanese behavior suggests a resignation to an inevitable crushing defeat much stronger than a will to fight.

[Daniel Prates]

At Leyte Gulf the commanders of Japan's greatest warships revealed stunning ineptitude. Their ship recognition skills were shockingly poor, their tactics primitive, their gunnery woeful, their spirit feeble.

(...)

Perhaps the best example of the fatalism that gripped the Japanese (...)

Like many aspects of the battle, Japanese behavior suggests a resignation to an inevitable crushing defeat much stronger than a will to fight.

'tis exactely Liddell Hart's ideas shown in a very good practical example. Wars are won with psicology, not with force per se, so your force should be employed in such a manner as to bring down the enemy's will, not so much its means. Its the indirect approach principle, and kudos to the americans for having done just that with the japanese.

[Diopos]

The Japs were steadily reaching a point of not being able to replace capital ships and carriers if lost. Losing irreplaceable capital ships/carriers meant that the IJN would be downgraded as a "strategic" player in the Pacific. Eventually USA would be able to release assets and recources that were "dedicated" to check the IJN in other activities. In itself, delaying the demise of the IJN bought time for the Emperor, me thinks :hmmm:

,

[Armistead]

The question for me, course it was for many after the war is for what reason did Kurita turn back. He gave some good answers, but US answers, his answers don't make sense from a jap perspective.

Obvious he didn't know if Halsey took the bait, he even thought at first the jeep carriers were fleet carriers from a distance. Having been attacked the day before I can see why he would think this, but he went back in, surely he had to think Halsey may be there to attack him in daylight. His goal and orders were the gulf, so we have to assume he was going to try to fight through whatever was there to get to the gulf, he even stated as such.

He had no info on the southern force, he has to assume they got through.

Even though the T's put up a good fight, he got into position enough to wipe T3 out, but turned........

Everything from a jap perspective says he should've gone through T3 and headed to the gulf... do all the damage you can and get out when you can. He admitted he expected over 50% loses before the battle.

Did he really get a message that possible carriers were just about 100nms north, history isn't so sure.. but as he turned north just the plane attack from the Taffies and some land planes scared him off. If he planned to go attack the carriers, he should've expected that anyway and worse.

Not sure if he lost his nerve, got confused, etc..but he knew this was a all or nothing battle....retreat shouldn't have been an option in his mind.

[Dread Knot]

Not sure if he lost his nerve, got confused, etc..but he knew this was a all or nothing battle....retreat shouldn't have been an option in his mind.

Kurita later produced a range of excuses for his disengagement decision. After three days and nights without sleep his said his mind was extremely fatigued. He claimed a judgement of exhaustion. He talked (unconvincingly) about a signal of American ships to the north of which no record can be found.

It could be there was no good solution for Kurita. Pressing on would merely have meant throwing away the lives of his officers and crewmen without accomplishing much at all in terms of damage to the Allies. Time was running out, or rather had run out, for the IJN, but it was a case of having thrown the dice and lost by the time Kurita was able to engage the CVE's off Samar. There was no sense sacrificing his men, because the result for the IJN would be the same, either way. At least they wouldn't be killed under his watch. He also may have thought he had sunk a few fleet carriers in the bargain and that was enough for one day.

Just prior to sailing for the battle, at a conference of his commanding officers, Kurita spoke of miracles occurring. I think he realized that the IJN needed one (if not several) to have any chance of even delaying the inevitable Allied victory, and he also realized, on the morning of October 25th, 1944 that the Gods had failed to provide one.

[WernherVonTrapp]

It could be there was no good solution for Kurita. Pressing on would merely have meant throwing away the lives of his officers and crewmen without accomplishing much at all in terms of damage to the Allies. Time was running out, or rather had run out, for the IJN, but it was a case of having thrown the dice and lost by the time Kurita was able to engage the CVE's off Samar. There was no sense sacrificing his men, because the result for the IJN would be the same, either way. Ahh, and here I think you've touched upon the crux of the matter. This, more than anything else (I think) is the most likely reason that Kurita broke off the engagement. I also think I read that somewhere in one of my books, maybe Japanese Destroyer Captain, don't recall. Either way, there were those inside the Japanese military machine who had heartfelt compassion for the men who served under them, probably more prevalent in the IJN than the IJA. The early IJN victories were (in retrospect) to be expected. They had a vastly superior Navy, with regards to modern design, training and experience. Their opposition was an enemy whose pilots, personnel and tactics were outdated, inexperienced, and in inadequate numbers.

I believe, early in the war, the Japanese plans for expansion were quite contrived, but like Yamamoto said, beyond one year of war, he could not guarantee victory. The Japanese simply were not prepared for a long, drawn out, protracted war of attrition. They were betting on a soft America to sue for peace, giving them a greater status/position in Asia.
I often wondered about their overall tactics, and even more so after reading Shattered Sword. Starting with the Battle of Midway, their strategy seemed to lack focus, purpose and heart. Another great book I read, "The Eagle And The Rising Sun: The Japanese-American War 1941-1943" by Alan Schom, also raises questions about Japanese tactics, and more so of early American Tactics. After reading this book, I got the impression that, although the IJN rattled it's sword and talked the talk (about drawing out and defeating the US Navy), they did not walk the walk in terms of true intent set forth by their strategies.

Anyway, I'm getting long winded here, and beyond my typing skills. The point is, Leyte Gulf, Surigao Strait, etc., and the ensuing Battle of the Philippine Sea was an act of desperation commensurate with the comment by one Japanese military leader who said, "So goes the battle of the Philippines, so goes the war". Acts of desperation are usually rife with poor judgement, devoid of any real strategy and apt to fail, barring the "Hail Mary" football pass. In reality, an act of desperation is an act that would not usually be carried out under other circumstances. Kurita probably knew it was all in vain and wasn't about to sacrifice Japan's remaining Navy and personnel on an act that he believed was futility.

[Armistead]

I don't know, but heck, nor does history, but I can't figure Kurtia's thought processes. The Japs did believe the lose of the Philippines would be dire, because it would seperate them from their oil south at Singy and Java.
I don't read enough into history that this was to be an all or nothing battle, not sure Kurita had orders to sacrifice all, reports show he was somewhat confused how far to push it, but the fact they were going to sacrifice the carriers shows it was a give all battle.

The crux of the oil is what started this plan anyway, jap carriers in Japane, most BB's south where the oil was. THe lack of oil had split the fleet.

Still, Kurita based his plans on what he thought was happening, not what was happening. Just think if he realized he could wipe out T3, if he did what he should've, he probably then would've headed to the gulf, maybe more confidant...Halsey, nor McCain's plane should have been a problem that day, not sure how far McCain was, but Halsey didn't turn back until almost 11:30, Kurita should been near the gulf by then. With that confidence, he would've ran into Oldendorf why still fighting the bees of the Taffies, if by some miracle he got through Old, he probably would have no ammo left for the landing craft. I believe Old set up two battle lines for him, but I see no way he makes it past Old, even if he did, there was another 40 DD/DE's waiting for him

Look at it this way, T3's fight might have saved Kurita, causing him to turn back, had he won there easily as he should, I bet he would'be gone south to his doom.

Course the battle of the Philippines was stupid, a give me to McAuthor, we could've accomplished the same thing by taking Formosa...
Still he could've sunk T3:O:

[andy_311]

I have never encounter T3 in any carear I played the only TF I have encountered and attacked is the 1 that went throught st bernedo straights but i always attacked it as it passes two Islands to the south (FORTS) I don't always get a BB,but I try to get a cruiser down b4 TF 58 planes arrive at the scene (and there's loads of them)

[MKalafatas]

Great thread, excellent posts from all.

[Armistead]

I have never encounter T3 in any carear I played the only TF I have encountered and attacked is the 1 that went throught st bernedo straights but i always attacked it as it passes two Islands to the south (FORTS) I don't always get a BB,but I try to get a cruiser down b4 TF 58 planes arrive at the scene (and there's loads of them)

If you use RSRD mod, it does the battle of Leyte to almost perfection, if you're in postion you can watch the Center Force and Jeep Carriers come near, but he keeps them far enough apart not to do battle, however once I used my sub to pull the enemy escorts closer and closer until they came in contact, then both sides got fairly engage.

Course it wouldn't be historical, but for the fun of it I'll run the Center Force to the gulf and see how it would handle it in game...:har:

[I'm goin' down]

If you use RSRD mod, it does the battle of Leyte to almost perfection, if you're in postion you can watch the Center Force and Jeep Carriers come near, but he keeps them far enough apart not to do battle, however once I used my sub to pull the enemy escorts closer and closer until they came in contact, then both sides got fairly engage.

"Jeep Carriers?" Is that a carrier group transporting jeeps? I would love to sink one of those!!!! Tell me when and where?:D

[Daniel Prates]

IGD's halk eyes sure miss nothing!

It would be my guess that THIS is a jeep carrier:

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h97000/h97015.jpg

[I'm goin' down]

IGD's halk eyes sure miss nothing!

As you now have observed, I do not discriminate. (exception: special dispensation for Brazilians.) (Plus Armistead knows that if it were not for his expertise with RSRDC I would not have located Yamamoto's fleets that attacked Pearl Harbor.)

[Hylander_1314]

Here ya' go IDG:

US Navy Escort (Jeep) Carriers

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=3

Btw, how much is a "Brazilian"?