Silent Victory - tactics discussion

[Roger Dodger]

I've just started reading "Silent Victory: The US Submarine War Against Japan" (2 volumes), 1975 by Clay Blair, Jr. The Introduction to the book pointed out that the faulty Mk-14 torpedoes were not the only problem the Navy had to explain the rather poor showing during the first year of the war. With your kind permission, I'll post some of the Introduction, and invite your discussion. Since we're getting a little off-topic with the Mk-28 torpedo, I'll also repost this under a new topic.

During the naval conflict in the Pacific between the United States and Japan, 1941-1945, there was a little-known war-within-a-war: the US submarine offensive against Japanese merchant shipping and naval forces. A mere handful of submariners, taking a small force of boats on 1,600-odd war patrols, sank more than 1,000 Japanese merchant ships and a significant portion of the Japanese navy, including one battleship, eight aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, and eight light cruisers.
A strong merchant marine was vital to the economy and war making potential of the island nation of Japan. Its ships imported oil, iron ore, coal, bauxite, rubber, and food stuffs; they exported arms, ammunition, aircraft and soldiers to reinforce captured possessions. When submarines succeeded in stopping this commerce, Japan was doomed.
. . . .
Even so, it was no easy victory. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had sworn in various international treaties never to engage in "unrestricted submarine warfare," that is, submarine surprise attacks against merchant vessels. During peacetime years, U.S. submariners hoped to become part of the US battle fleet mostly concentrated their training on tactics aimed at sinking important enemy men-of-war - carriers, battleships, cruisers - and their boats known as fleet submarines, were designed with this goal in mind. After December 7, 1941, however, the United States abandoned its high-minded moral position and ordered unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. By an accident of history, the fleet submarine proved to be the ideal weapon for war against the Japanese merchant marine. However, the shift in missions caught the submarine force flat-footed. It required new strategy and tactics. Many months went by before the submarine force got the hang of this new role.

There were other problems. Peacetime exercises, most of them unrealistic and artificial, had let submariners to believe that aircraft, sonar gear, and powerful depth charges made the submarine highly vulnerable to enemy counterattack. This belief in turn had led to extreme caution in the submarine force. The best way to survive, the peacetime submarine commanders believed, was to make an attack from deep submergence, using sonar apparatus. The daylight periscope attack, the night periscope attack, and the night surface attack were considered hazardous, and for a submarine to operate on the surface within 500 miles of an enemy airbase was considered fatal. Too many months went by before submariners discovered these preconceptions to be wide of the mark.

The cautious peacetime training leg to serious personnel problems in wartime. In peacetime bold, reckless, innovative skippers who were "caught" in war game maneuvers were reprimanded, and older, conservative, "by-the-book" officers, who were strict disciplinarians and conscientious with paperwork, rose to command. When war came, too many of these older men failed as skippers. During the first year and a half of the war, dozens had to be relieved for "lack of aggressiveness" (a disaster, both professionally and emotionally, for the men involved) and replaced by brash and devil-may-care younger officers, some of whom would never have attained command in peacetime. This general changeover took months to accomplish, and many valuable opportunities were lost before it became effective.

The failure in leadership extended to the highest levels of the submarine force. When the war began, the forces were commanded by officers who had risen to the top by the safest and most cautious routes, who did not understand the potential of the submarine. They placed a premium on caution; bring the boat back. Yielding to higher authority, they allowed their forces to be fragmented and employed in marginal, fruitless diversions. At least a year and a half went by before these command problems were ironed out and men with a good grasp of how submarines could be most profitably employed took over the top jobs.

. . . . Countless times, US submarine captains were vectored to such (high value military) targets only to find that, because of navigational errors on the part of the Japanese or themselves, these high-speed prizes passed just beyond attack range and could not be overtaken. Months went by before it dawned on the force commanders that a Japanese tanker - easier to find and sink - was as valuable to the overall war effort as a light cruiser.

Last - but not least - the submarine force was hobbled by defective torpedoes. Developed in peacetime but never realistically tested against targets, the US submarine torpedo was believed to be one of the most lethal weapons in the history of naval warfare. it had two exploders, a regular one that detonated it on contact with the side of an enemy ship and a very secret "magnetic exploder" that would detonate it beneath the keel of a ship without contact.

After the war began, submariners discovered the hard way that the torpedo did not run steadily at the depth set into its controls and often went much deeper than designed, too deep for the magnetic exploder to work. When this was corrected, they discovered that the magnetic exploder itself was defective under certain circumstances, often detonating before the torpedo reached the target. And when the magnetic exploder was deactivated, the contact exploder was found to be faulty. Each of these flaws tended to conceal the others, and it was not until September 1943, twenty-one months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, that all the torpedo defects were corrected.

Had it not been for these command weaknesses, misconceptions, and technical defects, the naval war in the Pacific might have taken a far different course. Intelligently employed, with a workable torpedo, submarines might have entirely prevented the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and the Netherland East Indies. Skippers emboldened by swift and certain torpedo success, instead of puzzled and dismayed by obvious torpedo failure, might have inflicted crippling damage on the Japanese navy much earlier. The war in the Pacific might have been shortened by many, many months.

Clay Blair, Jr. (May 1, 1925 - December 16, 1998) was an American historian, best known for his books on military history. He served on the fleet submarine Guardfish (SS-217) in World War II.

[Bilge_Rat]

yes, great book, I just started re-reading it now. The introduction is a bit excessive compared to the book itself.

The U.S. sub service did start the war saddled with unworkable tactics, but that was sorted out pretty quickly as skippers came back from patrol and shared what worked.

It was the same issue with the Mk XIV. Officially, the magnetic exploder was in use until summer 43. Unofficially and reading between the lines, you see that skippers were sharing a lot of info "off the record". Many skippers were setting their torps shallower/turning off the magnetic exploder and not recording it in their patrol log.

The skipper problem was a issue, since it generally took a few patrols until you could figure out if there was a problem, but the sub service was always careful in the choice of their skippers. Mush Morton and Dick O'Kane were exceptions.

[TorpX]

I'll try not to drag the thread to far from submarine tactics, but I think it's worth remembering, that the outbreak of war in the Pacific was, for the Allies, a harsh, brutal, and ugly introduction to modern maritime warfare. In the avalance of defeats that followed, most of the Allied plans, tactics, and weapon systems were found to be less than adequate. If USN torpedos and tactics had fallen short in '45, this would have been much less a problem. These failures, occuring in '41-'42, when the Allies were desperately scrambling to stitch together some sort of defense, were an unmitigated disaster. Very few popular books or movies, drive home the scope of the catastrophe.

[Roger Dodger]

yes, great book, I just started re-reading it now. The introduction is a bit excessive compared to the book itself.

The U.S. sub service did start the war saddled with unworkable tactics, but that was sorted out pretty quickly as skippers came back from patrol and shared what worked.

It was the same issue with the Mk XIV. Officially, the magnetic exploder was in use until summer 43. Unofficially and reading between the lines, you see that skippers were sharing a lot of info "off the record". Many skippers were setting their torps shallower/turning off the magnetic exploder and not recording it in their patrol log.

The skipper problem was a issue, since it generally took a few patrols until you could figure out if there was a problem, but the sub service was always careful in the choice of their skippers. Mush Morton and Dick O'Kane were exceptions.

The 'unworkable tactics' combined with the 'skipper problem' probably caused the poor showing in unsuccessful patrols more than the faulty Mk-14 torpedoes. Early skippers were chosen for being careful more than ones that were more aggressive. Safety of boat and crew counted higher than tonnage sunk. Also, the mission of the subs changed so fast that the 'big wigs' couldn't comprehend what was really needed to accomplish the mission. For safety, skippers were ordered NOT to sail on the surface during daylight hours when in enemy waters. Since the entire Pacific Ocean west of Hawaii was considered 'enemy waters', that would really slow the boat down just getting 'on station' for a patrol.

Unfortunatly for the skippers, if they followed orders and had a nice 'safe' patrol, they would be transferred to a desk or destroyer as 'not being aggressive' enough. "Catch-22"

[Platapus]

It is also important to keep in mind that at the start of the war, all the submarine captains were peace time captains.

How does a peace time captain keep his job or get promoted?

1. Not making mistakes
2. Making sure the boat passes all the inspections
3. Making sure that the crew does getin to trouble
4. Score high on exercises meaning do exactly what the exercise designers think you should do -- predictability.
5. Don't make organizational waves or take political chances.
6. Maintain your boat within the budget allotted to you

You can't blame the peace time captains from acting like peace time captains. That was how the Navy rewarded them. Those captains that did not act like peace time captains either never got promoted to captain or they were removed.

In peace time there are no ships to sink, no chances of heroism except for instances of accidents and then the captain would probably be fired anyway. Little chances to shine other than better inspection and exercise scores. :yawn:

In peace time all you have is peace time bureaucracy. That was the "enemy" that our captains had to "fight". And our peace time captains did rather well operating in the hostile bureaucratic theater of operations.

7 Dec 41, a day which completely changed everything. Suddenly we needed a different kind of captain. Literally over night.

One who recognizes appropriate risks, ones who are aggressive. Perhaps even a little nuts helps. Probably not a captain that would have had a stellar peace time career.

It is only with a little hyperbole that I say that, in the context of 1940, a good war time sub captain is the exact opposite of a good peace time sub captain. But unfortunately, all we had were good peace time sub captains... who did the best they could.

Blair wrote of several good peace time captains who were so dedicated to their country that they voluntarily resigned their commend because they recognized that while they were good peace time captains they sucked at war time. That is a pretty heroic thing to do in my book.

[Torplexed]

In retrospect it's hardly surprising that things worked out as they did. Peacetime service requirements emphasizing drill and discipline did not necessarily select leaders best suited for the exacting conditions of real submarine warfare when lone COs could rationalize the need to withdraw, unhindered by the presence of higher brass who had their own periscope view of the situation. Not only did USN submariner training exaggerate caution, it also failed to instil the tenacity required simply to patrol for any length of time under war conditions. One CO returning from his failed attempt to penetrate the Gulf of Lingayen reported that his crew had been aboard under trying conditions since December 8th, "and an opportunity to rest and relax in the sunshine is rapidly becoming imperative for the maintenance of good health, morale and efficiency." His was a boat with air-conditioning, refrigerated food, separate messrooms and washing facilities and two bunk cabins called staterooms for officers and petty officers. Imagine him in command of a U-Boat!

Only actual combat can weed the passive commanders out, and in all navies the aces were a select group. It does appear however that US training and promotion methods, together with lack of previous submarine battle experience, and perhaps the American outlook on life, combined at the start of the war to cause a higher proportion of unsatisfactory submarine COs than were found in other major navies. But torpedo failure can't be omitted from the equation. Repeated misses and misfires were bound to lower morale, as they had among Donitz's U-boat COs in 1940.

[CapnScurvy]

At the start of the war, this "older service personnel" issue wasn't only confined to the USN.

At age 19, my dad enlisted into the Army Armor Division in 1940 (along with a brother and several cousins) at Fort Knox. From where they were from (SouthEast Kentucky), their only alternative for a future was farming or coal mining. Dad, and a cousin were AWOL after 3 months, heading back to their mountain homes. Both realizing the Army was made up of older WWI veterans that enjoyed the bottle too much. The veterans ran roughshod over them, having the boys do anything they didn't want to do. The new recruits where the first young enlisted men the veterans had seen in years.

After arriving home, they were taken back to the base voluntarily by family. After meeting the base commander their punishment was a little KP duty, but placed back with the same old farts that drove them away the first time. By the spring of '41, dad and his cousin both received deferments to leave service, helping on their family farms.

Both reenlisted early 1942, after the break of war. Dad spent two tours of duty in the South Pacific as a Tank Commander, Platoon Sergeant. Just under three years overseas. Recieving a Purple Heart and Bronze Star Medal along the way. His cousin was declared MIA in the beach head invasion of North Africa. They both made up for their youthful enlistment trouble, brought on by veteran service personnel that used the service as an "old age home" for WWI veterans.

[donna52522]

I have read that book several times, and I am always sad/pissed off, that so many skippers were relieved of command for "lack of aggressiveness" when it was truly the fault of the torpedoes.

Sure misses happen, due to miscalculations...and even near the end of the war when the torpedoes were supposedly fixed there were still misses, and even malfunctions.

What did come from that is truly a US navy that listens to it's front line officers. Now if there is a weapons or any other problem, no bureau can or should just brush it aside.

[Frank the tank]

I have Clay Blair's books on the u-boat war The Hunters & the Hunted. I forget the exact title, although I could get off my back side and dig them out. They are magnificent accounts of the U-boat campaign from start to finish. Very well researched and written. I imagine the books on the U.S subs are the same quality.

I'll go looking for them on line, sound like a great read.

[denny927]

damn,i cant find a valid book, i would read some submarine books, but im too lazy read an entire book in english:O:

anyway, maybe in these days ill get a look in a some bookstore here in mexico.

:salute:

[indy]

One of the decisions that our leaders made which i don't understand, was were they chose to send the fleet-boats. Take for instance the Jap base at Rabaul, instead of concentrating our fleet-boats at the entrance and exit of this area, and other known bases, they spread them out all over the Pacific. Leading some of the Captains to be relieved of duty because of bad patrol areas. Not because of anything the Captains did, they were just given bad patrol sectors. Now I do understand the boats were sent to this and other areas but certainly not in the quantity that you would think they should have been. Both ULTRA (breaking of Japanese operational codes) and MAGIC (breaking of Japanese diplomatic codes) were in process by this time and the decisions of our leaders, still mystify me. Indy

Books I've Read.
http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?p=1609402#post1609402

[Torplexed]

One of the decisions that our leaders made which i don't understand, was were they chose to send the fleet-boats. Take for instance the Jap base at Rabaul, instead of concentrating our fleet-boats at the entrance and exit of this area, and other known bases, they spread them out all over the Pacific. Leading some of the Captains to be relieved of duty because of bad patrol areas. Not because of anything the Captains did, they were just given bad patrol sectors. Now I do understand the boats were sent to this and other areas but certainly not in the quantity that you would think they should have been. Both ULTRA (breaking of Japanese operational codes) and MAGIC (breaking of Japanese diplomatic codes) were in process by this time and the decisions of our leaders, still mystify me. Indy

A large part of what stifled the American submarine effort is that there was no "Donitz" to argue for an all-out tonnage war on the slowest and easiest targets in the most profitable areas. The American effort was divided among three admirals (Lockwood, Christie, and Fife) all of whom were subordinate to higher-ups like Nimitz, Halsey and MacArthur. In all theaters the campaign against merchant shipping was pursued almost by default after other military requirements had met, such as photo-reconnaissance, intelligence-gathering, life-guarding, dropping off commandos behind enemy lines or supporting Philippine guerrillas. Without a grand admiral in charge of an all-out submarine offensive, the American effort against Japanese commerce remained ill-thought, disjointed and unscientific. Eventually, the increasing number of US submarines rolling off the stocks compelled more and more of them to be devoted to to a purely anti-shipping as all the ancillary military requirements were more than met. Even ULTRA didn't help as American submarine COs were often pulled from anti-merchant patrols into hopeless goose chases against capital ship targets that were too fast or well-escorted.

[nikimcbee]

If I recall, the book discusses in detail the torpedo scandal. That must have been really frustrating to know what the problem was and have the higher ups blame you for not being ablt to shoot straight.:shifty:
Career officers.:down:
:salute: Hats off to those early war skippers.

[nikimcbee]

We were really lucky that the Japanese (in the early war) didn't take undersea warfare seriously.

[Torplexed]

We were really lucky that the Japanese (in the early war) didn't take undersea warfare seriously.

You could make the case that we lulled them into a false sense of security. :D

At the war's beginning the Japanese had no overall shipping protection organization nor any standard communication plan or escort doctrine. Escorts were on the bottom of the priority list for building. However, for the first two years due to poor US torpedoes and lack of submarine numbers this system seem to work in their eyes. Once the torpedo defects were ironed out and US submarines began showing up deep behind enemy lines in increasing numbers it came at a bad time for the Japanese, who were still trying to make up for losses suffered at Midway and in the Solomons. The mass-produced purpose built escorts which Japan finally starting rolling out in 1943-44 were too little and too late to stem the tide and were often poorly built due to lack of proper resources and shipyard space. For example the hulls of the Kaikoban Type Cs were of a very simple design having neither sheer or camber to simplify building, and some had to be modified to burn coal. And forget radar, there weren't enough sets or qualified technicians to go around.

[Bilge_Rat]

I think that was partly an issue of Japanese doctrine or culture. The Japanese did not spend a lot of time on "defensive" issues, like ship damage control or air-sea rescue. That was part of the reason why they did not setup a proper convoy organisation until late 43.

[nikimcbee]

I think that was partly an issue of Japanese doctrine or culture. The Japanese did not spend a lot of time on "defensive" issues, like ship damage control or air-sea rescue. That was part of the reason why they did not setup a proper convoy organisation until late 43.

You can thank Alfred Mahan for a good portion of this. It just amazes my how rigid they were to clinging to their naval doctrine. They don't adapt for anything.

[Torplexed]

You can thank Alfred Mahan for a good portion of this. It just amazes my how rigid they were to clinging to their naval doctrine. They don't adapt for anything.

Karl von Clausewitz's famous maxim that "No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy," probably never had a less enthusiastic audience than the Imperial Navy or the Japanese military as a whole. The Japanese were not prepared almost to the bitter end to admit that had made a mistake. Throughout the war, the Japanese preferred sticking with a plan, even a bad plan than to question one. In their military ethos, dying in the act of undertaking hopeless orders was seen as preferable and far more honorable than exercising initiative and defying higher authority. When they succeeded they scored highly by determination. When they failed they paid heavily for a lack of flexibility.

[nikimcbee]

A good example of how the US adapted and learned from the past was the "unrestricted submarine warfare" change in tactics.

Post WWI, everybody was outlawing the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, but the second the US was attacked, we dropped that law/rule. Atleast somebody in the naval college had paid attention to what Germany was almost able to achive with u-boats. The Japanese were married to the "subs-as-fleet-support" strategy.

[Bilge_Rat]

A good example of how the US adapted and learned from the past was the "unrestricted submarine warfare" change in tactics.

Post WWI, everybody was outlawing the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, but the second the US was attacked, we dropped that law/rule. Atleast somebody in the naval college had paid attention to what Germany was almost able to achive with u-boats. The Japanese were married to the "subs-as-fleet-support" strategy.

An interesting bit of trivia is that the skipper of the first boat to make a patrol to Japan in dec. 41, Joe Grenfell in USS Gudgeon, carried a written order personally signed by his commander to carry out unrestricted submarine warfare. They were worried that they could technically be tried as pirates if they were captured by the Japanese.

[Randomizer]

I think that you guys are, in general being far too hard on the pre-war USN. If they were wedded to the false god of A.T. Mahan, they were certainly not alone and in many respects the USN proved to be doctrinally superior to everybody else where it mattered.

It was the belief that the submarine could act in concert with the Battle Fleet that lead directly to the design of the Fleet Boat. This resulted in the near perfect marriage of submarine design and unrestricted warfare doctrine that made the USN's operations in the Pacific the only truly successful submarine campaign to date. Without the extraordinary range, firepower and growth potential that was built into the Fleet Boat designs it is arguable that the submarine war against Japan would have been much different. Admiral Hart, himself a submariner who had studied German sub ops in the Great War, wanted smaller boats, S-Class sized but the Navy General Board insisted that only bigger boats would be compatible with fleet operations. Thus it was a happy coincidence that designs produced for a role they could never effectively fulfill were superbly adapted for duties that had been inconceivable before Pearl Harbor.

So, while it's easy to laugh at the Gun Club with 20/20 hindsight, it's important to recall that after 27-months of total war no battleship had been sunk by aircraft while at sea and only one sunk by submarine when under weigh, HMS Barham lost a month before Pearl Harbor.

Also one should not forget that the peacetime USN got it's air-sea doctrine pretty much on target. Seven months after Pearl, Midway, fought with pre-war aircraft using pre-war doctrine, training and commanders won perhaps the decisive naval battle of the war at Midway.

At Midway, submarines on both sides contributed to the outcome of the battle performing as adjuncts of the Fleet much as envisioned by the pre-war theorists. With I-168 scoring essentially the only Japanese success of the battle; sinking Yorktown and Hammann this tended to reinforce Japan's battlefleet oriented submarine doctrine. Meanwhile the Silent Service's lack of results in the battle provided the USN with further evidence that submarines were largely ineffective in the fleet support role and could serve best as commerce destroyers.

[Platapus]

It is also interesting to note that up until the war, the primary target of the submarine was the combat ship.

There had been no serious preparation for attacking merchant ships in prewar training; only one of thirty-six exercises conducted during 1940-1941 by the submarines of the Pacific Fleet had simulated an attack on a convoy of cargo ships. During the interwar period most naval officers assumed that in the event of war, submarines would be used for reconnaissance and attacking enemy battle fleets. -- Struma, M., (2011) Surface and destroy. University Press of Kentucky p. 16.

I am working on a review of this book to be posted in the book forum.

[nikimcbee]

Nevermind Silent Victory, bring on Roscoe's book:
http://books.google.com/books?id=5lTI_dF4jocC&pg=PA35&lpg=PA35&dq=lingayen+gulf+submarine+attack&source=bl&ots=z7OXlm_CSh&sig=IhuT1HPiWZSNZ7f6wQ5ARBeItek&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7hFET6u5FpHbiAKElNWuDg&ved=0CEMQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=lingayen%20gulf%20submarine%20attack&f=false

S38 vs the odds:rock::Kaleun_Periskop:. I just did this in my career. I sank 1 minesweeper, 1 transport 7000 tons, and 1 sub chaser.:Kaleun_Party:

[Roger Dodger]

I found an interesting observation about the early use of SD RADAR in Blair's book, "Silent Victory": Pearl Harbor, December, 1941; First Patrols to Empire Waters":
". . . In addition to her Mark VI magnetic exploders, Plunger carried another secret weapon into combat: a primitive radar set known as the SD. The SD was new. It had extremely limited range, 6 to 10 miles. It was "nondirectional," useful primarily for detecting enemy aircraft. Its mast could be poked up before the boat surfaced.
Like many submarine skippers, (Dave) White was leery of the SD. In limited tests, he had found it temperamental and unreliable. It gave off a powerful signal which could be picked up by Japanese RDF stations. Unsparing use of the SD, White believed, was tantamount to breaking radio silence. It would make his presence known and reveal his exact location. The Japanese could send antisubmarine vessels or aircraft to attack him and route their shipping well clear of him. White preferred to depend on alert lookouts for spotting Japanese planes."

Now I know why those pesky patrol/float planes always seem to be vectored right at me - THEY ARE! :damn: The SD RADAR is always on in the game while surfaced, and I regularly do a search for aircraft with extended antenna at periscope depth before surfacing.
If I spot a plane while submerged, I just lower the antenna and dive to around 150'. If I spot a plane on the surface, then I crash dive and make a 90 degree turn to right or left at 40' and continue down to 160' at flank speed, then slow to 1/3 ahead and continue down to below 200'. The planes do sometimes drop bombs or DCs, but I haven't been hit yet. :rock:
This is the first time I've seen the RDF triangulation problem noted anywhere.

[Platapus]

Karl von Clausewitz's famous maxim that "No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy,"

I always thought that was from Helmuth von Moltke. :hmmm:

Anyway it was some old dead guy with von in his name. :up:

[Roger Dodger]

Nevermind Silent Victory, bring on Roscoe's book:
http://books.google.com/books?id=5lTI_dF4jocC&pg=PA35&lpg=PA35&dq=lingayen+gulf+submarine+attack&source=bl&ots=z7OXlm_CSh&sig=IhuT1HPiWZSNZ7f6wQ5ARBeItek&hl=en&sa=X&ei=7hFET6u5FpHbiAKElNWuDg&ved=0CEMQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=lingayen%20gulf%20submarine%20attack&f=false

S38 vs the odds:rock::Kaleun_Periskop:. I just did this in my career. I sank 1 minesweeper, 1 transport 7000 tons, and 1 sub chaser.:Kaleun_Party:

Thanks for the link. I got so jazzed after reading this that I ordered the book (Used - Good Condition) from one of the dealers on Amazon.com
United States Submarine Operations in World War II

by Theodore Roscoe
$32.95
Link to this title: http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/0870217313/ref=dp_olp_used?ie=UTF8&condition=used

More books are available at a similar price. Thanx again :salute:

[Rockin Robbins]

You have to factor in the achievement there: The US won our submarine war and the Germans lost theirs. I think that was not due to the quality of the brass, but to the quality of the submariners themselves. Who ever heard of an American sub coming to the surface to scuttle, largely undamaged? Happened so much with the U-Boats that Admiral Daniel Gallery actually planned on it when setting up to capture the U-505. In the event it worked out just as planned. The U-Boat was pounded a bit and came up to scuttle. Gallery pounced and had himself a trophy.

But I really believe that the largest reason the Americans succeeded and the Germans failed was one of strategy, not tactics. In the Atlantic, U-Boats were not an appropriate weapon because they could not attain victory in any event. British supplies came in on neutral shipping. Sinking the neutral shipping guaranteed they wouldn't be neutral any more. Wonder what side they would come in on?

As the enemy became stronger as more and more neutral nations were pushed into the war by the U-Boats, the end of that story was pretty obvious. Had the money and men wasted on U-Boats been used to other purposes, at least Germany could have fought longer and had more success.

Japan, however, brought all supplies to Japan on Japanese bottoms. We were already at war with Japan. There was no downside to sinking the supplies. In that case, we actually were denying them what they needed to fight more effectively and the submarines were an important part of the eventual victory there. In the Pacific, submarines were an appropriate weapon which could contribute to the overall war effort.

Regardless of the better American submarines and perhaps better sub commanders as a whole, those differences were small. The strategic situation, to which the Germans were entirely blind, trumped everything and guaranteed German defeat.

[Armistead]

I disagree RR, don't think Uboats failed so much on strategy as they did technology and not given enough resources. I think had they gotten the support they needed from Hitler, who knows, certainly it was a waste for Germany to build BB's, CA's, etc...


The biggest failure was Germany didn't figure out we could read their code.

Anyway, no matter what they did, it would be a matter of time nonetheless.

[Dread Knot]

I disagree RR, don't think Uboats failed so much on strategy as they did technology and not given enough resources. I think had they gotten the support they needed from Hitler, who knows, certainly it was a waste for Germany to build BB's, CA's, etc...

I tend to agree with RR. If Pearl Harbor hadn't abruptly brought the US into the war, then eventually the U-Boats would have as they did previously in World War One. The USN and Kriegsmarine were already trading heavy blows in the fall of 1941. The indiscriminate sinking of ships just brought the Reich more enemies when it already had more than it could handle.

One wonders if the resources poured into U-Boats and the German Navy as a whole might have been better spent on a few extra armored divisions on the Eastern Front where the land war was really decided. The Germans were basically outnumbered from the opening day on the invasion of the Soviet Union and eventually Russian quantity caught up with German quality.

[Rockin Robbins]

I disagree RR, don't think Uboats failed so much on strategy as they did technology and not given enough resources. I think had they gotten the support they needed from Hitler, who knows, certainly it was a waste for Germany to build BB's, CA's, etc...


The biggest failure was Germany didn't figure out we could read their code.

Anyway, no matter what they did, it would be a matter of time nonetheless.
That would be an arguable point except that there WERE no more resources. Almost from the beginning of the war the Germans were playing a zero sum game. Adding resources here meant taking them from there.

Had they put twice as many resources in the submarines it would have made no difference. They sank less than 1% of total cross-Atlantic shipping. Making that 2% would have changed what? Then what results? No tanks for Rommel? No, something had to give and it should have been U-Boats.

Donitz and Raeder didn't give a hoot about plans for winning a war. All they were concerned with was expanding their particular realms to the largest extent possible. They continually pressured for a larger navy in spite of the fact that a navy only made sense from a coastal defense standpoint.

Without control of air and water surface somewhere, the U-Boats were doomed. A plurality were sunk before they had downed even a single target. An appalling number were sunk before firing a single torpedo in anger.

Of course, we are reasoning here and World War II was not the product of reason. It was the product of a raving madman without the capacity for rational thought. All he had was irrational desires.

[Armistead]

I think it was a bad failure not to put more Uboats at sea. We have to remember that the so called "Happy Times" where Uboats did great damage lasted to basically 43, with Churchill stating that his greatest fear was Uboats. The problem was even during this period where Uboats did great damage, they never had more than 30 boats at sea, the entire North Atlantic, imagine if they had say 100 or more what they could've done, certainly more than Rommel. The other key of course was having France to port out of. Had Hitler put the resources into Uboats early, who knows the amount of damage that could've been done, with no more than 30 boats on patrol at one time Germany almost sunk Britian.

No, Germany was failed to lose in the end when they declared against America, that was the big mistake.

[WernherVonTrapp]

In the beginning, the Germans didn't need to put more U-Boats to sea. They were sinking record numbers of vessels right off the American coast during 1942:

"America's first year in the war ended with the loss of 1,027 Allied ships to U-boat action. This was more than half of all the ships lost by all the Allies in the U-boat war, in all areas, all through the war years from 1939 to 1945."
-The Tenth Fleet pg.60

"The Strategic Situation in 1942:
This was a phenomenal and unprecedented episode in the whole history of warfare-a major and potentially decisive victory being scored by a tiny force of submarines...
...Doenitz's U-boats wrought havoc, not merely with the material strength of the Allies during this crucial period of their build-up, but indeed with their whole planning and the grand strategy of the war."
-The Tenth Fleet pg.61-62

"December, 1941, brought the crisis to a head in the U-boat arm. It came abruptly and dramatically in the wake of the first indubitable defeat of the U-boats: in a convoy battle west of Gibralter three British ships were sunk, but five U-boats were lost. Five more U-boats were sunk in other operations in waters around the Azores. Only twice before had Doenitz lost five boats in a single month and never ten in a thirty-day period. For the first time, defeatism swept the U-boat Command. Doenitz's staff openly voiced the opinion, and in no uncertain terms, that the U-boats had had it and were no longer capable of combatting the reinforced convoys."
-The Tenth Fleet pg.63

[Armistead]

Not about records, think if they had double the numbers what the effect and possible outcome could've been.

[Mush Martin]

This book and Silent Service for 8 bit nintendo were what started
it all for me. :up:

[WernherVonTrapp]

Not about records, think if they had double the numbers what the effect and possible outcome could've been.It's not about records, indeed. That (records) wasn't my point. I wasn't trying to criticize you, or anyone else for that matter.
I was just posting some general facts, that seemed to be on a general par with a lot of things that everyone else was saying. You made me think of a particular fact when your last post alluded to U-boat numbers, that's all.

[ReallyDedPoet]

This book and Silent Service for 8 bit nintendo were what started
it all for me. :up:

Nice to see you back in these parts M :up:

[DrBeast]

Nice to see you back in these parts M :up:

I second that! :yeah:

[Rockin Robbins]

Not about records, think if they had double the numbers what the effect and possible outcome could've been.
Then instead of sinking a little less than 1% of total Allied merchant tonnage during the war they would have sunk something less than 2%. The U-Boats were not a factor. The fact that the first quarter score was in their favor only encouraged them to waste more resources in a losing strategy.

There is no scenario where the U-Boats in any quantity, sinking neutral shipping on an ocean they could not control under skies that they could not control could attain victory in the Battle of the Atlantic. Period. Read Admiral Daniel Gallery's U-505 to see the casual way in which the U-Boats were swept from the sea by hunter-killer groups centered around jeep aircraft carriers. They could operate in an almost leisurely way, controlling the ocean surface and the skies above completely and securely. It was like killing fire ants in your lawn. Nothing strenuous.

Any particular reason to believe a public statement by Churchill regarding the U-Boats? He certainly was bright enough to lie when the results of the lie would be to build more German coffins.

At the beginning of the war Donitz said that they did not have anywhere near enough U-Boats to win the war. He tried as hard as he could to postpone the starting kickoff for another four or five years in order to have the number necessary. Of course, the war was not begun with a rational plan at all and no effort by higher authority (see how nice I am there?) to determine what requirements for victory were. The corporal was blind, convinced he had x-ray vision and nobody could see what he saw. Therefore he listened to no assessments, whether from the army or navy. He was superior to the war professionals, therefore they were wrong.

See how that worked out?:D

Donitz wanted about three times more boats than he had. And he planned on keeping the US and other neutral countries out of the war. I don't know how he planned to do that. Either he sank the tonnage and sucked all neutrals into the war against Germany or he did not sink the tonnage and Britain won anyway. The number of boats was irrelevant. The only possible way would be to subdue Britain so quickly that nobody could come to her aid.

But the British government was already ready (read A Man Called Intrepid) to run the British government out of a skyscraper in New York City. Any defeat would have been very temporary as the resulting US entry would still have ensured the defeat of Germany. You cannot sink tank factories in Detroit. Or wheat fields in Kansas. There was no way Germany belonged in a war with the United States. But with the U-Boats in play, how were they to avoid it?

The U-Boats were inappropriate for German use and should have been all scrapped in 1938, except for a small coastal defense fleet.

[Armistead]

Nothing would'be brought them victory in the Atlantic, but bang for the buck and what had effect, I would pick uboats.

As Winston Churchill said "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril".

He was there, I'll take his word over yours anyday..lol

[Dread Knot]

You often hear it said that if Admiral Doenitz had his magical number of 300 U-Boats at war's start he could have brought Britain to it's knees.

For Donitz to have 300 active boats at the war's start, it would mean those designs proven and ready BEFORE the war meaning many would be type II models and only a few type VII's and certainly not many of the longer ranged type IX's. The type II and type VII lack the necessary range to cruise into the western Atlantic where they could operate outside the range of aircover from Iceland, Newfoundland and Britain... so maybe the happy time is a little longer or more severe (assuming the early torpedo problems are worked out) But if the British sense 300 U-Boats in production they will cancel some of their capital ship construction and build more sloops, frigates and destroyers.

Plus, you're going to at least double the amount of commanders, and crews in training over the number that was already being hurriedly trained during the same period in and you're going to cram all that additional training into the same number of days and in the same number of limited areas. With everyone, new construction, new commanders, repairs, and refreshers alike, all vying for the time on the limited number of firing ranges in the Baltic you're going to have to cut back on the amount of firing time any one boat, commander, and crew actually can get.

There may be an increase in the total number of live test firings but there's going to be a decrease in the number of live test firings any one boat, commander, and crew get to make.

Congratulations. You've got more boats now, but you've also you've diverted scarce materials and supplies away from other activities and diluted the overall training level of your U-boat fleet.

[Sailor Steve]

The actual number of u-boats built by year:

1935 (14)
1936 (21)
1937 (1)
1938 (9)
1939 (18)
1940 (50)
1941 (199)
1942 (237)
1943 (284)
1944 (229)
1945 (91)
http://uboat.net/technical/shipyards/

If the Germans had only had the Type XXI/Me262 in 1939, things would have been different! Possibly, but nothing happens in a vacuum. It has been pointed out that if the Germans this, then the Allies that, so there's no need to go over it again. It has also been argued that the Germans could not possibly have produced more u-boats, and that if they could and had it would have taken from other parts of the war effort, since resources are finite.

I agree with all of those, so I'm not adding anything new, just summing up.

[edit] As for "never had more than 30 boats at sea", in 1943 the average was indeed right around 100 boats at sea for some months. Here is a listing of number of boats at sea and number of merchants sunk.
http://www.mistari.com.au/u-boats/ships_u-boats_per_month.htm

Note that even with that many boats at sea, the number of merchants sunk per boat never exceeded 6, and during the time when the most boats were available the average only once reached one merchant per boat.

[WernherVonTrapp]

1942 (taken out of context):

"During the first four months of the new German offensive, there was a daily average of 111 U-boats at sea in the Atlantic. Although their campaign was losing the savage force of the March slaughter, they were still doing reasonably well. By sinking forty-four Allied ships in April, they brought the year's score up to 218 ships of better than 1.3 million gross tons.
According to the Admiralty's conservative assessment, the Germans lost only fourty-four boats U-boats in those same four months. In actual fact, their losses totalled fifty-five boats--but even that higher number seemed to be bearable in the face of the results achieved and eighty-three new constructions."
-The Tenth Fleet pg.182

"Fateful Misconceptions":
"Doenitz's most serious trouble at this stage accrued from major deficiencies in his own basic planning and his management of the U-boat war. If he had a grand strategic concept at all, to match tangibly his ideas about the presumably decisive role of the U-boat in World War II, it revolved around his "integral tonnage theory". Firmly believing that ultimate victory depended on his ability to sink more ships per se than the Allies could build, he went for tonnage in sheer quantity, disregarding the crucial factor of quality in the effort. According to his theory, a westbound freighter in ballast was as valuable a target for his U-boats as an eastbound troopship, for example, chock full of soldiers, or a Liberty ship heavily laden with war material consigned to Britain or to North Africa.
Moreover, he had no acute appreciation of the relative importance of the various operational areas. Instead of emplying his U-boats when and where they could have inflicted the greatest damage, he assigned them to areas where he expected the best results in numbers at the lowest cost to himself. He thus built up his score without regard to the value of the sinkings to the overall German war effort."
-The Tenth Fleet pg.251

[Armistead]

Info may vary, but my statement was during the beginning or "Happy Times" Germany never averaged more than 30 Uboats at sea and did mass damage.

At any one time during the so-called 'Happy Times' for U-boats, there were only ever a maximum of 30 at sea. For an area the size of the northern Atlantic, this was not many. Despite this, they managed to wreak havoc. Individual U-boat captains like Kretschmer were responsible for the sinking of 200,000

{above doesn't include uboats in the med, indian, etc..}

Complete link
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/u-boats.htm

The debate as I see it is a comparison to how resources could be best used. Most know high command still preferred the big guns on BB's over Uboats and mass resources were used and we all know the failure of the few BB's compared to Uboats. Imagine early if they would have allocated all those resources to U-boats. If more Uboats would'vbe been built early on, britian may have been brought to her knees.

Churchill also said it was only Uboat damage Britain would have to contemplate surrendering.

To those that argue resources could have been better used, then where would you have used those resources and got comaparable damage? In fact Uboats got lil resources overall and almost brought Britian to her knees..

[Sailor Steve]

Info may vary, but my statement was during the beginning or "Happy Times" Germany never averaged more than 30 Uboats at sea and did mass damage.
But you extended the "Happy Times" to 1943, and we all pointed to 1942, which falls within the specified time frame. In fact, the Happy Times were over by mid-1941, and the "New Happy Times" started with the attacks on the American coast in 1942.

The debate as I see it is a comparison to how resources could be best used. Most know high command still preferred the big guns on BB's over Uboats and mass resources were used and we all know the failure of the few BB's compared to Uboats. Imagine early if they would have allocated all those resources to U-boats. If more Uboats would'vbe been built early on, britian may have been brought to her knees.
The Naval High Command also wanted to delay the start of the war for several years. Would that have made a difference? As was pointed out, If the Germans had more u-boats it's entirely likely that the British would have taken a different tack as well. Conjecture is always fun, but there is no way of knowing exactly how any scenario would have played out.

Looking at the numbers involved, i.e. merchants sunk per u-boat at sea, merchants sunk vs merchants at sea etc., I don't think Britain was exactly "brought to her knees". Wartime propaganda is a wonderful tool. Positive propaganda can inspire people, and negative propaganda can drive them to strive harder. I've read several books on the Battle Of Britain from during and immediately following the war, and they insist that on one hand Britain was "on her knees" and on the other the Germans never had a chance, often in the same book and sometimes in the same chapter.

[TorpX]

U-boats may not have won the war for Germany, but it is hard to see how they would have been better off without them. (Unless, you avoid war with UK entirely.) The problem for Germany, as I see it, is that their ambitions simply exceeded the resources they had available. But, if their objectives had been scaled back, different strategies would have been possible.

A more rational plan for Germany would have been to prosecute an air/sea war against UK. Use U-boats, but do not go into US waters. Do not declare war against US, even if Japan's feelings are hurt. Be friendly to the USSR, even if you want to kill them; one war at a time. FDR wanted to help UK, but that doesn't mean people in the US were eager to send troops to europe; a shadow war on the high seas was a real possibility here. At the very least war with US might have been delayed for months or years. Such a strategy would have, at least, given Germany a chance of success.

General points to think about:

In 1938, when Germany was putting the finishing touches on their plans (at least they should have been), nobody knew that Japan would bomb Pearl Harbor.

The effectiveness/ineffectiveness of the U-boat was a matter of speculation. This was also true of the asw elements. The RN thought their ASDIC was much better than it was shown to be. The KM could not be sure of the U-boats abilities in the forthcomming war, but there was reason to be optimistic. More U-boats could have been built at a fraction of the cost of the big capitol ships, and would likely contribute more in a war with UK. Trying to match battleships with the UK and US was a losing proposition. Donetz had no way of knowing the Allies would have RADAR in ships and even worse, planes in the near future.

It is all good and well to make light of the 1 or 2 % of allied ships sunk in the whole war, but in '40, '41 and '42, it was no laughing matter. Allied loses overall may have been low, but during the crisis period, the losses were alarming.

A few quotes from THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC:

The charts demonstrated that before the war total imports of food and raw materials, excluding oil, were close to 60 million tons. By the end of 1940 they had fallen to 45.4 million tons and in the following year to just 30.5 million tons.

The grim figures pouring into the Statistical Branch's spartan offices suggested that nearly 4 million tons of shipping had been lost to the enemy in 1940. British and Canadian shipyards were quite incapable of keeping pace with this rate of loss.....

[Armistead]

But you extended the "Happy Times" to 1943, and we all pointed to 1942, which falls within the specified time frame. In fact, the Happy Times were over by mid-1941, and the "New Happy Times" started with the attacks on the American coast in 1942.


The Naval High Command also wanted to delay the start of the war for several years. Would that have made a difference? As was pointed out, If the Germans had more u-boats it's entirely likely that the British would have taken a different tack as well. Conjecture is always fun, but there is no way of knowing exactly how any scenario would have played out.

Looking at the numbers involved, i.e. merchants sunk per u-boat at sea, merchants sunk vs merchants at sea etc., I don't think Britain was exactly "brought to her knees". Wartime propaganda is a wonderful tool. Positive propaganda can inspire people, and negative propaganda can drive them to strive harder. I've read several books on the Battle Of Britain from during and immediately following the war, and they insist that on one hand Britain was "on her knees" and on the other the Germans never had a chance, often in the same book and sometimes in the same chapter.

Propaganda certainly played it's role, but we're also judging based on hindsight.

The question still remains, what resources would you trade uboats for that would've had the same effect....., another BB? We know early German command still thought the big ships were more important than Uboats, what a mistake.

Think if Germany would've put those resources into uboats, not declared on America and continued it's campaign against Britian, instead of turning against Russia, the Uboats would've brought Britian to her knees. Who knows, but I see no other resource for the buck that did as much damage as Uboats did

[magic452]

What would I trade U boats for? Me.262's

Two or three hundred U Boats may or may not have brought Britain to her knees but three or four hundred Me. 262's put into service before the Battle of Britain just might have. Had they pushed it's development this could have been done. At 652 miles range that is more than a 109 with drop tanks. (621)

Operation Sea Lion just might have succeeded if Germany had air superiority and all those merchant ships would have had nooo place to go.

Britain wasn't in all that good a position to fight a big invasion and the US, no doubt would have declared war but we weren't in a very good position to be much help right away. The British would have had to hold out for quite some time before we could do much.

Magic

[Dread Knot]

Propaganda certainly played it's role, but we're also judging based on hindsight.

The question still remains, what resources would you trade uboats for that would've had the same effect....., another BB? We know early German command still thought the big ships were more important than Uboats, what a mistake.

I'd put the resources into the battle on the Eastern Front that eventually consumed the German Army and the Reich. On the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union the German Wehrmacht had about 5,200 tanks overall, of which 3,350 were committed to the invasion. This yields a balance of immediately available tanks of about 4:1 in the Red Army's favor. Although the Germans destroyed most of Russian's initial tank pool it took a toll and replacements were never produced at a high enhough rate to make good the losses. Plus, the lack of enhough panzer divisions severly impacted German planning and flexibility for Barbarossa.

[Sailor Steve]

The question still remains, what resources would you trade uboats for that would've had the same effect.....,
That is a question I always avoid, primarily because I'm no good at it. I have a hard time believing anyone else is, because there is just no way to know.

What would I trade U boats for? Me.262's

Two or three hundred U Boats may or may not have brought Britain to her knees but three or four hundred Me. 262's put into service before the Battle of Britain just might have. Had they pushed it's development this could have been done. At 652 miles range that is more than a 109 with drop tanks. (621)

No, it couldn't have been done. Your four hundred jets would have been sitting on the ground waiting for the Jumo 004 engines, which were not ready for a test flight until July 1942.

Of course you'll say that they could have poured more time, money and effort into engine development, but they made them as fast as they could, and nothing was going to change that.




Useless speculation is useless.

[Rockin Robbins]

I'll land in Dread Knot's corner. Just as Germany had nothing to gain with a war against the US, it also shared much and had much to lose by going to war with Britain. So long as they kept the British and Americans out of the war, owning the entire continent and Russia too was well within their capabilities.

I believe that even as late as Dunkirk, a rational Germany could have played nicey-nice, saying that they allowed the British to escape for humanitarian reasons and that they had no quarrel with the British people. They could have offered and held to a non-aggression treaty with Britain, granting them most valued trade status. I don't believe Britain's obligation to Poland would have justified hundreds of thousands of casualties if they continued at war.

This would have left Germany with a secure continent, actually protected and secured by the British, leaving them full access to all of their military means to attack Russia. They wouldn't have needed their subs any longer. A 100% effort would be focused eastward.

That would have left Russia, a communist country with no real friends, to be roasted like a Thanksgiving turkey.

After the war, we would have learned that there were much worse things to deal with than Soviet Russia...

[donna52522]

I believe, from all I have read, that Hitler made it well known that he did not want "this" war with the UK, even considering the Brits as Nordic cousins, and through diplomatic chains had sent many peace feelers to the UK after the fall of France.....Britain adamantly would have nothing to do with that. After all, Germany didn't declare war on Britain or France, they declared war on Germany.

Churchill knew FDR would eventually enter the war on the UK's side. After all the US aide was very open and had most in the world wonder just how neutral America actually was. The U-Boat crews seen for themselves the US escorts providing screen for the British convoys.

As for Hitler declaring war on the United States, I've read he had done it for two reasons, one was the knowledge of all the US aide crossing the Atlantic to the UK. The second is that he was hoping Japan would return the favor by surging it's huge Manchurian army forward into eastern Russia....

We now know that Stalin's spies in Tokyo informed him that Japans ambitions were elsewhere and that allowed Stalin, even before Pearl Harbor, to move about 40 highly trained and winter equipped divisions westwards to save Moscow in the winter of 41/42.

In the book 'Barbarossa, The Russian-German Conflict 1941-45' by Alan Clark, the author repeatedly states that Hitlers personal strategies were sound, but his Field Marshalls (all of whom were primadonnas) constantly sent him false information about their own armies abilities in order to do only what they pleased. After the war they all blamed Hitler for his meddling, because of course, dead men can't defend themselves.

[Torplexed]

After Pearl Harbor, Hitler should have sent the USA condolences and sent the Japanese ambassador packing, in disappointment for not having joined the Russian campaign earlier. The Tripartite Pact is dissolved! This would have put Roosevelt over a barrel as he would have to then struggle to get Congress to declare war on a neutral Germany after being attacked by a hostile Japan. It also would have shown Hitler's confidence in eventual German victory after the winter setback, and possibly underscored any peace overtures to Great Britain if Hitler announced that he would not adopt unrestricted submarine warfare and further provoke the Americans who had tried to help their cousins. Rumors about making a separate-peace with Russia might have been unsettling for the British too, as Stalin had no guarantees that the German offensives in 1942 would fail. You want your enemies to scramble with each other to be the first one seated at the peace table.

In seeking to cement his entangling-alliances, Hitler unified his enemies instead.

[Rockin Robbins]

But the central fact is that Hitler was not rational. His plans were NOT sound. He did not act in his own best interest at all, especially in his persecution of the Jews. The entire thing was a maniacal tirade, illogical, irrational, insane and without sense.

Hitler was operating solely as an emotional bomb, exploding continuously from 1939 through his death in 1945. There is not sense to be found anywhere in his actions. Therefore, analyzing them is just an exercise in frustration.