Mk-48 Torpedo Results

[Roger Dodger]

I thought some of you would like to see how our torpedoes have improved since WWII. Too bad the Mk-14's magnetic exploders didn't work this well. :rock: Use the links to view the video.

http://s204.photobucket.com/albums/bb239/RogerDodger1946/?action=view&current=SubmarineSinksDestroyer-Australiano.mp4

You have never seen footage where a single torpedo does damage like this. It's a US made (non-nuclear) torpedo that is in use today by our submarines. Very precise, very accurate and very powerful.

This is the Australian Submarine Navy doing a live torpedo practice shot on one of their decommissioned ships. They used a MK 48 torpedo developed in the USA .

It is not a contact weapon. It is designed to go off directly underneath the ship at about 50 feet under the keel. The effect is devastating as you can see from the video. This lethal weapon can break the back of ships much larger than the one shown in this video. They don't even have a chance of survival.


http://s204.photobucket.com/albums/bb239/RogerDodger1946/?action=view&current=SubmarineSinksDestroyer-Australiano.mp4

Wikipedia article on this torpedo: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_48_torpedo . Lots of interesting specs including the $3.8 MILLION cost per EACH. NOTE: the Mk-14 cost around $10,000 each, and were thought to be too expensive for 'live' testing. "Don't worry, they work fine in the blueprints."

[Sailor Steve]

That video is several years old now, and it's been put up here a dozen times or more. I'm sure there are some newbies who will appreciate it, though. :sunny:

[Stealhead]

[/QUOTE]Wikipedia article on this torpedo: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_48_torpedo . Lots of interesting specs including the $3.8 MILLION cost per EACH. NOTE: the Mk-14 cost around $10,000 each, and were thought to be too expensive for 'live' testing. "Don't worry, they work fine in the blueprints."[/QUOTE]

They did test the Mk.14 but with the magnetic detonator they did not test a live round and it was off the east coast the reason they did so little testing was because they wanted to keep it secret (this was in the late 30s) the problem with the mk.14 was that it went through a very limited and unrealistic testing program.Once they ran tests in Fremantle and Hawaii the submariners solved the mk.14s problems without the help of engineers.

That is $10,000 in 1941 dollars it would be much closer to the cost of the current Mk.48 do not forget that in 1940 the Mk.14 was cutting edge.Its cost in modern dollars would be about the same as the Mk.48. A Mk.14 torpedo would cost about $155,446.10 in 2011 dollars.A mk.48 would cost about $257,323.92 in 1941 dollars.

People would be shocked if they knew how much weapons cost one JADM costs $35,000-70,000 depending on the bomb size one B-2 bomber costs 2 billion dollars can you believe that for just one plane a US Navy carrier you could almost argue is priceless if you counted the value of the its crew and aircraft warfare is very expensive and that is just in monetary terms not mention in the lives makes you think about Eisenhower's famous speech .

inflation calculator actually very interesting: http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm

[kstanb]

Yes, at $3.8M it is expensive, but it is a +90% sure kill; Mark 14s were expected to be launch in salvos and a 10% success rate more than acceptable according to :
http://www.hnsa.org/doc/subsinpacific.htm#pg9

"Number of Torpedoes Fired by U.S. Submarines

Total number fired = 14,748
Average number fired per attack = 3.586 Average number fired per ship sunk = 14,748 /1,392 = 10.59.
(8 in 1942; 11.7 in 1943; 10 in 1944) "


Something interesting I recently read: at the Java Sea battle, the Japanese launched 92 torpedos in one salvo and achieved 1 hit ! ... and that was in some ways successful since in the end they won the battle with fewer losses than if those torpedoes would not had been fired

[Roger Dodger]

Wikipedia article on this torpedo: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_48_torpedo . Lots of interesting specs including the $3.8 MILLION cost per EACH. NOTE: the Mk-14 cost around $10,000 each, and were thought to be too expensive for 'live' testing. "Don't worry, they work fine in the blueprints."[/QUOTE]

They did test the Mk.14 but with the magnetic detonator they did not test a live round and it was off the east coast the reason they did so little testing was because they wanted to keep it secret (this was in the late 30s) the problem with the mk.14 was that it went through a very limited and unrealistic testing program.Once they ran tests in Fremantle and Hawaii the submariners solved the mk.14s problems without the help of engineers.

That is $10,000 in 1941 dollars it would be much closer to the cost of the current Mk.48 do not forget that in 1940 the Mk.14 was cutting edge.Its cost in modern dollars would be about the same as the Mk.48. A Mk.14 torpedo would cost about $155,446.10 in 2011 dollars.A mk.48 would cost about $257,323.92 in 1941 dollars.

People would be shocked if they knew how much weapons cost one JADM costs $35,000-70,000 depending on the bomb size one B-2 bomber costs 2 billion dollars can you believe that for just one plane a US Navy carrier you could almost argue is priceless if you counted the value of the its crew and aircraft warfare is very expensive and that is just in monetary terms not mention in the lives makes you think about Eisenhower's famous speech .

inflation calculator actually very interesting: http://www.dollartimes.com/calculators/inflation.htm[/QUOTE]

Interesting calculator! A dollar today = 7 CENTS in 1942.

A USS Virginia class sub today runs around $2 Billion ($14 Million in 1942). What was the price of a Gato/Balao class sub in WWII? Of course the new subs are 'somewhat' more sophisticated than they were in WWII. :yeah:

God Bless Electric Boat

[PacificWolf]

Wow that was an amazing split-in-half explosion, i'd like to see how the battleship or aircraft carrier "reacts" to this beauty.

[Sailor Steve]

Wow that was an amazing split-in-half explosion, i'd like to see how the battleship or aircraft carrier "reacts" to this beauty.
Not as well. They have much thicker, stronger keels and are much harder to break. A destroyer is a lightweight by any standard.

[PacificWolf]

Not as well. They have much thicker, stronger keels and are much harder to break. A destroyer is a lightweight by any standard.

Yes youre right, but i wonder how many of them needs to hit a battleship to sunk.
And another question, was there a battleship that was split in two in any war? Im just curious.

[kstanb]

google "HMS Barham" ; it didn't split in half, but looks kind of scary

i think BBs were too strong to split in half ... most of the spectacular sinkings were due to magazine explosions

[Sailor Steve]

Yes youre right, but i wonder how many of them needs to hit a battleship to sunk.
Musashi was hit by 17 bombs and 19 torpedoes. Yamato was hit by 12 bombs and 7 torpedoes. Both cases were probably overkill, and I would guess it would take not more than four of five Mk 48s to sink them. Their sister Shinano was turned into an aircraft carrier which was sunk by 4 torpedoes from USS Archerfish, but there were special circumstances contributing to her sinking.

And another question, was there a battleship that was split in two in any war? Im just curious.
Hood, of course. Any ship suffering a main magazine explosion involving firing charges for 80-100 shells will certain crack the keel and break the ship in two.

[Stealhead]

I think a Gato cost about $400,000.00~$450,000.00 that was just for initial build each refit might cost $100,000.00 or more so talking 1940s dollars around $6,217,843.97 in 2011 dollars.

[TorpX]

Yes, at $3.8M it is expensive, but it is a +90% sure kill; Mark 14s were expected to be launch in salvos and a 10% success rate more than acceptable...

How does torpedoing a small, uncrewed, ship at anchor prove a weapon is capable of giving 90% sure kills in battle? This sort of test strikes me as being no more serious than those done with the Mk 14's and others before WWII.

They did test the Mk.14 but with the magnetic detonator they did not test a live round and it was off the east coast the reason they did so little testing was because they wanted to keep it secret (this was in the late 30s) the problem with the mk.14 was that it went through a very limited and unrealistic testing program.Once they ran tests in Fremantle and Hawaii the submariners solved the mk.14s problems without the help of engineers.

In 1926, they did two live tests with a Magnetic Influence exploder. In the first one, the torp ran under the target without exploding, it being considered to have run too deep. When the torpedo was adjusted and fired again, it exploded under and sank the target (an obsolete sub). It should be noted that these were not production Mk 14's and Mk 6 exploders, but rather prototypes that were modified later, so these were not really "battlefield" tests of frontline weapons. Nevertheless, they were impressive enough to be considered a success.

I believe the main reason for such skimpy testing was the expense, not secrecy. Not only were the torpedos themselves very expensive, but suitable "targets" were nearly impossible to obtain. Further testing was done with test warheads, using "electric eyes" and recording devices and the like.

IMO, proving the effectiveness of the MI exploder would be almost impossible without blowing up a large number of ships. The Navy would have been much better off to focus on impact detonation, which could be tested and didn't have all the messy unknowns of MI. Verification of running depth was easily done with net shots, and testing of impact exploders can be done by dropping test warheads against steel plates and the designs analyzed afterwards. Impact forces can be calculated and this does not require live shots, or mapping magnetic forces around a ship, or adjusting for the earth's magnetic field.

[Roger Dodger]

IMO, proving the effectiveness of the MI exploder would be almost impossible without blowing up a large number of ships. The Navy would have been much better off to focus on impact detonation, which could be tested and didn't have all the messy unknowns of MI. Verification of running depth was easily done with net shots, and testing of impact exploders can be done by dropping test warheads against steel plates and the designs analyzed afterwards. Impact forces can be calculated and this does not require live shots, or mapping magnetic forces around a ship, or adjusting for the earth's magnetic field.


Ah, you must have seen the movie "Operation Pacific" (1951). That John Wayne is such a hero :woot:. The film is supposed to have been based on real events (except the sappy love interest :down:).

From IMDb:
During WWII, a submarine's second in command inherits the problem of torpedoes that don't explode. When on shore, he is eager to win back his ex-wife.

[Bilge_Rat]

To be fair, the magnetic influence exploder was the "wonder weapon" of submariners in the pre-war period and was being developped by the Kriegsmarine and the Royal Navy as well. The same concept was used in British, American and German magnetic mines. It was not all the U.S. Navy's fault since Congress had cut military budgets to the bone in the 20's (disarmament) and 30's (depression) which severely limited live testing. The Kriegsmarine which had an unlimited budget after 1933 still wound up with a malfunctioning torpedo MI in 1939.

[kstanb]

What was completely US navy's fault was to stick to this magnetic detonator for one year and a half; even after numerous reports from captains... There is a big problem when you put more trust on office bureaucrats than front line captains.

[Stealhead]

What was completely US navy's fault was to stick to this magnetic detonator for one year and a half; even after numerous reports from captains... There is a big problem when you put more trust on office bureaucrats than front line captains.

That is not necessarily true subs where getting hits and kills with Mk14s the entire war and alot of human error can occur with a torpedo attack there a numerous things that can cause a torpedo to miss that have nothing to do with the quality of the torpedo itself.They should have tested the mk.14 more this is true but it is very common for front line units to grossly over rate or underrate hardware.The other thing many forget to take into consideration was that there was another unrelated issue of the torpedoes not running at proper depth this was caused by the reduction in manufacturer quality from pre-war to wartime production and was unrelated to the magnetic detonator.Also the US Navy was fighting with subs in a manner and on a scale not tried previously there was alot of trail and error going on with submarine operations and not matter what you are always learning.Also they stuck with the magnetic detonator 0 days after the problem was verifiable they stopped using them.

[TorpX]

Ah, you must have seen the movie "Operation Pacific" (1951). That John Wayne is such a hero :woot:. The film is supposed to have been based on real events (except the sappy love interest :down:).

From IMDb:
During WWII, a submarine's second in command inherits the problem of torpedoes that don't explode. When on shore, he is eager to win back his ex-wife.

Yeah, I did see the movie a long time ago, but I was thinking of a more "faithful" type of test. One where you had a warhead moving horizontally to impact a steel plate. (Think of a child's swing, or a ballistic pendulum.) In this way you could use any angle and check compound angles, without even getting wet. I believe it was Adm. Lockwood who ordered the drop tests done (like in the movie).


... subs where getting hits and kills with Mk14s the entire war and alot of human error can occur with a torpedo attack there a numerous things that can cause a torpedo to miss that have nothing to do with the quality of the torpedo itself...

I will agree with this up to a point, but there was a long series of failures by the USN in this matter. We know comprehensive testing was possible, since it was eventually done. Lack of funds was perhaps a valid excuse in the '30's, but not in the era when the Navy was in the midst of an ambitious submarine building program. That excuses were still being made for not doing meaningful tests, after we were at war, is almost beyond belief.

[Platapus]

I will agree with this up to a point, but there was a long series of failures by the USN in this matter. We know comprehensive testing was possible, since it was eventually done. Lack of funds was perhaps a valid excuse in the '30's, but not in the era when the Navy was in the midst of an ambitious submarine building program. That excuses were still being made for not doing meaningful tests, after we were at war, is almost beyond belief.

I think you are being a bit harsh

Remember that after the attack on Cavite , the US Navy lost a good number of torpedoes. About half in the PTO If my poor memory serves. This meant that there was a critical shortage of torpedoes in the early years of the war.

There was a choice. Fight with the weapons you have, or keep the subs berthed. During wartime the latter is not a popular decision.

There was not a lot of money or spare torpedoes for testing, even during the war. Sure with 70 years of hindsight the decision is self-evident. But when evaluating historical decisions, it is important to only evaluate them with the data that was available to the decision makers at that time.

The Mk 14 had checked out satisfactory in testing. That is a documented fact. However, as found out later, the testing process was flawed. But at the time no one knew about it.

The Mk6 exploder also checked out satisfactory in testing. But as discovered later, the testing was not a rigorous or as extensive as was needed. But no one knew that at the time.

It is very hard to diagnose errors in a system of systems when there may be multiple things wrong with it. Also, the shooting skill of early sub captains was rightfully suspect in the early years of the war.

Early war patrol reports showed that torpedoes simply missed. Who knows of those missed torpedoes ran deep, or had a faulty pistol?

Rockin Robins and others can tell us more than we ever wanted to know about how much the captains did NOT know about their targets or how to hit them.

Given only the information available at the time, and not having the advantage of 70 years of after action research, the Navy did not do all that bad. Were there political influences concerning torpedo development. Oh boy yes (Check out the book, Hellions of the deep). Where there bureaucratic fighting between BuOrd and ops. Double oh boy yes.

But there were no traitors involved, not even Capt English. Every one involved was making the best decision based on the limited data they had access to.

That is the tricky part about historical research. It is so important to segregate any and all knowledge that the people you are studying did not have. This is party of my professional job and it is tough. We lose a lot of analysts who can't segregate. :yep:

Wrong decisions were made. That is undeniable. But they are also, at the same time understandable.

[Bilge_Rat]

yes, hindsight is always 20/20.

We also have to remember that pre-war, few people seriously thought there would be a war with Japan or that the Japan would be a serious threat if there was one. Everyone was focused on Germany and the possible U-Boat threat. Pre-1939, there were also many USN/RN officers who thought subs were obsolete because of advances in sonar and depth charges. So even though there was more money for the Navy, the submarine service was still way down on the priority list. They had to fight just to get new subs built, never mind re-testing an existing weapon system.

Plus in 39-41, German successes seemed to prove the magnetic exploder worked. U-Boats were racking up impressive kills. It was known the Germans were using magnetic exploders. The British had captured and examined a German magnetic mine in 1939 and a magnetic mine had severely damaged HMS Belfast, so there was no serious reason to doubt the concept.

[Sailor Steve]

Plus in 39-41, German successes seemed to prove the magnetic exploder worked. U-Boats were racking up impressive kills. It was known the Germans were using magnetic exploders. The British had captured and examined a German magnetic mine in 1939 and a magnetic mine had severely damaged HMS Belfast, so there was no serious reason to doubt the concept.
Gotta love the difference betwee perception and reality. Everything above is true, except for the Allies having no clue of the nightmares the Germans were having with those same exploders. :sunny:

[Stealhead]

Another factor to take into consideration some blame could also be laid at the feet of the SUBRON commanders they also dragged their feet a little as well they should have listened to the crews much sooner than they did and had feild tests done sooner than they did.

We also as Platapus and Bildge Rat point out have the benefit of hindsight.Also there are alot of factors not simmed in the game that give us a very opaque view.

[TorpX]

I think you are being a bit harsh

Remember that after the attack on Cavite , the US Navy lost a good number of torpedoes. About half in the PTO If my poor memory serves. This meant that there was a critical shortage of torpedoes in the early years of the war.
Yes, this is true. BuOrd used this as an excuse to avoid live testing. So, for month after month, torpedos (and opportunities) were wasted because of a defective exploder. It would have been much better to sacrifice a few torps to put the matter beyond doubt, than continue adrift, wondering why enemy ships aren't being hit.

There was a choice. Fight with the weapons you have, or keep the subs berthed. During wartime the latter is not a popular decision.
I agree keeping subs berthed would have been unacceptable. The torps could have been fixed, however. Really, there was no good reason why it couldn't have been done before the outbreak of war.

There was not a lot of money or spare torpedoes for testing, even during the war. Sure with 70 years of hindsight the decision is self-evident. But when evaluating historical decisions, it is important to only evaluate them with the data that was available to the decision makers at that time.
I agree people had to use the tools available at the time, but the notion that testing could not be done, even after the defense budget increases in the late 30's is absurd. What does it cost to build whole squardrons of state-of-the-art fleetboats?

The Mk 14 had checked out satisfactory in testing. That is a documented fact. However, as found out later, the testing process was flawed. But at the time no one knew about it.


The Mk6 exploder also checked out satisfactory in testing. But as discovered later, the testing was not a rigorous or as extensive as was needed. But no one knew that at the time.
The point is they should have known. There was almost no testing of the exploder, and little testing of depth control. Nor was such testing especially difficult; they simply chose not to do it.

It is very hard to diagnose errors in a system of systems when there may be multiple things wrong with it. Also, the shooting skill of early sub captains was rightfully suspect in the early years of the war.
All the more reason to put the matter beyond doubt with proper tests. Net shots are childishly simple, and impact testing of the exploder need not be difficult either. I'll grant you the MI feature of the Mk 6 was probably, given the tools available, impossible to adequately test. That being the case they should have made darned sure the impact mechanism worked properly.
Early war patrol reports showed that torpedoes simply missed. Who knows of those missed torpedoes ran deep, or had a faulty pistol?
Indeed. Without any real testing you can only guess.

Rockin Robins and others can tell us more than we ever wanted to know about how much the captains did NOT know about their targets or how to hit them.

Given only the information available at the time, and not having the advantage of 70 years of after action research, the Navy did not do all that bad. Were there political influences concerning torpedo development. Oh boy yes (Check out the book, Hellions of the deep). Where there bureaucratic fighting between BuOrd and ops. Double oh boy yes.

But there were no traitors involved, not even Capt English. Every one involved was making the best decision based on the limited data they had access to.
I have read the book. I don't see how anything in it excuses the failures of BuOrd or the Navy.

That is the tricky part about historical research. It is so important to segregate any and all knowledge that the people you are studying did not have. This is party of my professional job and it is tough. We lose a lot of analysts who can't segregate. :yep:

Wrong decisions were made. That is undeniable. But they are also, at the same time understandable.
Again, I don't see how these things can simply be written off to "understandable mistakes". It is one thing, if you test a device to the limits of your ability, and defects get by. It is something else, when you just refuse to make any worthwhile tests of a grossly defective device. (I am of course speaking of the exploder, not the torpedo as a whole.)

It is worth pointing out that Adm. Lockwood thought the matter important enough to make live test shots at Pearl Harbor. That he needed to take time and effort away from his regular duties, in a time of war, is a disgrace, IMO. What was the response from BuOrd? Did they promptly get to work fixing the defects shown? No, their response was to criticise the tests.



Really, the Mk 6 exploder, was not the Manhattan Project. The Army (and Navy) managed to come up with ways to get bombs and shells to explode on target. The 'VT' proximity fuze was fielded. It is hard to see why the Navy could not have done the same with their torpedos.

[Roger Dodger]

I've just started reading "Silent Victory: The US Submarine War Against Japan" (2 volumes), 1975 by Clay Blair, Jr. The Introduction to the book pointed out that the faulty Mk-14 torpedoes were not the only problem the Navy had to explain the rather poor showing during the first year of the war. With your kind permission, I'll post some of the Introduction, and invite your discussion. Since we're getting a little off-topic with the Mk-28 torpedo, I'll also repost this under a new topic.

During the naval conflict in the Pacific between the United States and Japan, 1941-1945, there was a little-known war-within-a-war: the US submarine offensive against Japanese merchant shipping and naval forces. A mere handful of submariners, taking a small force of boats on 1,600-odd war patrols, sank more than 1,000 Japanese merchant ships and a significant portion of the Japanese navy, including one battleship, eight aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, and eight light cruisers.
A strong merchant marine was vital to the economy and war making potential of the island nation of Japan. Its ships imported oil, iron ore, coal, bauxite, rubber, and food stuffs; they exported arms, ammunition, aircraft and soldiers to reinforce captured possessions. When submarines succeeded in stopping this commerce, Japan was doomed.
. . . .
Even so, it was no easy victory. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had sworn in various international treaties never to engage in "unrestricted submarine warfare," that is, submarine surprise attacks against merchant vessels. During peacetime years, U.S. submariners hoped to become part of the US battle fleet mostly concentrated their training on tactics aimed at sinking important enemy men-of-war - carriers, battleships, cruisers - and their boats known as fleet submarines, were designed with this goal in mind. After December 7, 1941, however, the United States abandoned its high-minded moral position and ordered unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. By an accident of history, the fleet submarine proved to be the ideal weapon for war against the Japanese merchant marine. However, the shift in missions caught the submarine force flat-footed. It required new strategy and tactics. Many months went by before the submarine force got the hang of this new role.

There were other problems. Peacetime exercises, most of them unrealistic and artificial, had let submariners to believe that aircraft, sonar gear, and powerful depth charges made the submarine highly vulnerable to enemy counterattack. This belief in turn had led to extreme caution in the submarine force. The best way to survive, the peacetime submarine commanders believed, was to make an attack from deep submergence, using sonar apparatus. The daylight periscope attack, the night periscope attack, and the night surface attack were considered hazardous, and for a submarine to operate on the surface within 500 miles of an enemy airbase was considered fatal. Too many months went by before submariners discovered these preconceptions to be wide of the mark.

The cautious peacetime training leg to serious personnel problems in wartime. In peacetime bold, reckless, innovative skippers who were "caught" in war game maneuvers were reprimanded, and older, conservative, "by-the-book" officers, who were strict disciplinarians and conscientious with paperwork, rose to command. When war came, too many of these older men failed as skippers. During the first year and a half of the war, dozens had to be relieved for "lack of aggressiveness" (a disaster, both professionally and emotionally, for the men involved) and replaced by brash and devil-may-care younger officers, some of whom would never have attained command in peacetime. This general changeover took months to accomplish, and many valuable opportunities were lost before it became effective.

The failure in leadership extended to the highest levels of the submarine force. When the war began, the forces were commanded by officers who had risen to the top by the safest and most cautious routes, who did not understand the potential of the submarine. They placed a premium on caution; bring the boat back. Yielding to higher authority, they allowed their forces to be fragmented and employed in marginal, fruitless diversions. At least a year and a half went by before these command problems were ironed out and men with a good grasp of how submarines could be most profitably employed took over the top jobs.

. . . . Countless times, US submarine captains were vectored to such (high value military) targets only to find that, because of navigational errors on the part of the Japanese or themselves, these high-speed prizes passed just beyond attack range and could not be overtaken. Months went by before it dawned on the force commanders that a Japanese tanker - easier to find and sink - was as valuable to the overall war effort as a light cruiser.

Last - but not least - the submarine force was hobbled by defective torpedoes. Developed in peacetime but never realistically tested against targets, the US submarine torpedo was believed to be one of the most lethal weapons in the history of naval warfare. it had two exploders, a regular one that detonated it on contact with the side of an enemy ship and a very secret "magnetic exploder" that would detonate it beneath the keel of a ship without contact.

After the war began, submariners discovered the hard way that the torpedo did not run steadily at the depth set into its controls and often went much deeper than designed, too deep for the magnetic exploder to work. When this was corrected, they discovered that the magnetic exploder itself was defective under certain circumstances, often detonating before the torpedo reached the target. And when the magnetic exploder was deactivated, the contact exploder was found to be faulty. Each of these flaws tended to conceal the others, and it was not until September 1943, twenty-one months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, that all the torpedo defects were corrected.

Had it not been for these command weaknesses, misconceptions, and technical defects, the naval war in the Pacific might have taken a far different course. Intelligently employed, with a workable torpedo, submarines might have entirely prevented the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and the Netherland East Indies. Skippers emboldened by swift and certain torpedo success, instead of puzzled and dismayed by obvious torpedo failure, might have inflicted crippling damage on the Japanese navy much earlier. The war in the Pacific might have been shortened by many, many months.

Clay Blair, Jr. (May 1, 1925 - December 16, 1998) was an American historian, best known for his books on military history. He served on the fleet submarine Guardfish (SS-217) in World War II.

[Sailor Steve]

I'm not sure, but posting entire sections of a book may be considered a copyright infringement.

[CptChacal]

Nah, looks like fair use to me.
Especially when you post the reference.

[Stealhead]

I'm not sure on that to be honest it is word for word you would not be allowed to do that in a paper or separate book by a different author use a citation like that.

I dont know what the forum rules are about this sort of thing though.

[Platapus]

The tragic thing is that compared to the Mk 13, the Mk 14 was a work of perfection. :D

For anyone interested in reading about torpedoes I can highly recommend

- Hellions of the deep by Gannon - Nice coverage of political influence on torpedoes
- Iron men and tin fish by Newpower - nice description of Germany's problems with torpedoes (almost identical to our problems)
- Ship killers by Wildenberg and Polmar - The best book I have read so far on the history and especially the Navy policy on torpedo development and implementation.

There is also

Slide rules and submarines: American scientists and subsurface warfare in world war II by Meigs. But I warn you, this was written with a rather snarky bias and is definitely an example of revisionist history based on hindsight. But still an interesting read.