Sea Stories

[19Herr_Rapp86]

Captains Log:
09 Dec 1941

Set sail this morning from Pearl Harbor. The reminders of the events of the past 2 days are still half sank in the harbor. A feeling of pride in my crew came over me as I watched them remove their covers and place them over their hearts as we sailed by. As we departed Pearl I had my radio chief tune into some music for the crew to listen to. Smooth sailing so far. As we head for the Marshall Islands I can only pray that my mission will be a success, as I'm sure Tojo is all around these waters.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Welcome abroad, 19Herr_Rapp86.:salute:

[Rockin Robbins]

Remember to tear those torpedo firing mechanisms apart and put 'em back together like they were supposed to be in the first place. I heard a rumor (baseless I'm sure) that some caps were disconnecting the magnetic exploder on the sly, but I'm sure that's not happening because that exploder is top secret. Could get in trouble if you try to fix it. Of course you could die if you don't. Sure is tough to decide what to do, isn't it?:D

[19Herr_Rapp86]

?? Torpedo Firing Mechs?

[Arlo]

http://diodon349.com/Torpedoman/Torpedoes_USN/mark_14_3A_torpedo_Mk_6_exploder.htm (or maybe not) :D

[Daniel Prates]

"The defects existed mainly in the Mark VI magnetic exploder which was developed under extreme secrecy just prior to the war. It was so secret that the operating submarine force was kept largely unaware of its existence. The device was tested by the experts at Newport under carefully controlled conditions instead of firings from operating submarines, and as a result it was not discovered that the exploder would only work if it passed close to the bottom of the target. When installed on torpedoes in the war zone, the exploders failed to detonate, but the operating forces were forbidden to disassemble them to look for the problem or even to conduct firing tests. The torpedo specialists refused to believe reports that something was seriously wrong with the weapons until the problem grew into a major scandal. It was ultimately discovered that the magnetic exploder, the torpedo depth control mechanisms and the contact exploder were all defective."


"
The Problems
The depth control mechanism worked just fine on the Mk 13 which ran at thirty three knots. The technicians simply stuck the same mechanism on the Mk 14 when it came along. No one considered the fact that the Mk 14 would run at 46 knots at high speed. Certainly, no one thought that the difference between hydrostatic pressure and hydrodynamic pressure increases exponentially as the speed of the torpedo increases. The difference between calibration depth and real depth was twice as great at 46 knots as at 33 knots. The boys at Newport thought that heavier war heads might be the cause and suggested a three foot difference. As it turned out the submariners in the field were right. The actual depth difference was somewhere between ten and eleven feet. This meant the fish were running much deeper than what was being set on the spindles.
The magnetic exploder didn't work because the experts in Newport were at sixty degrees latitude and the boats in the southwest Pacific were operating around the equator. The difference in the horizontal component of the magnetic perturbation at the equator is effectively less than half that at Newport.
When the deeper running fish passed under the keel of a ferrous metal ship near the equator the signal simply wasn't strong enough to actuate the thyratron.
The contact exploder was crushed on impact before it could function when the strike angle was near perpendicular. The casing was flimsy and the parts not substantial enough to withstand the punch. The fast Mk 14 torpedo had a higher inertial impact that caused the firing pin to miss the exploder gap. In a typical MOT, aft, fwd spread the MOT shot was least likely to explode.
Any of these problems could have been solved were they to have been presented in singles. Submarine torpedomen scratched their heads over problems that went far beyond their ability to make a poorly designed exploder work.
The Macro Problems
Newport had its eye on economics during the years of exploder development. It used recoverable torpedoes and minimized testing.
Newport kept the exploder super secret. This kept any potential problems hidden from view until it was too late.
No facility other than Newport had any authority in torpedo development.
Simultaneous problems tend to cover each other so that an outside source for the problem is sought, in this case, the commanding officers of operating submarines."

ha-ha!

[Daniel Prates]

Still, one should imagine that such failures would account for a 100% ratio of duds, when in fact, it was closer to 50%, wasn't it? So the mechanisms were not so terribly awful.

[Rockin Robbins]

Well, Mush Morton embarked in Wahoo with a load of torpedoes, and after having multiple failures with no successes, argued Admiral Lockwood into letting him return to port with the remainder of his torpedoes for testing. That started the rotten fruit flying, resulting in testing of the torpedoes at Pearl and the discovery of the overlapping problems.

So, the torpedoes WERE that bad. Basically unless you achieved a contact detonation at an angle much lower or higher than 90º it was a near 100% probability there would be no boom.

Actually that is totally wrong. There would be no torpedo boom. However, the enemy, now fully alert and able to trace the torpedo path back to its source was now able to make its own much more dependable booms.:o

[Daniel Prates]

So, the torpedoes WERE that bad. Basically unless you achieved a contact detonation at an angle much lower or higher than 90º it was a near 100% probability there would be no boom.


That bad, eh? Ouch.

[19Herr_Rapp86]

So, in essence, we were having the same problem as the Germans basically