Why the Submarine is the unsung hero at Midway -- true story.

[I'm goin' down]

Here is a copy of a PM I sent to Double R (Rockin Robbins.) It is true, if the Military Channel can be believed.

Originally Posted by I'm goin' down on 10/3/2011:
I saw a special on the Enterprise role at Midway on the Military channel. It was quite interesting. The USS Nautilus fired a torpedoe at a battleship or cruiser in early stages of the battle, but missed the shot. A Japanese aircraft spotted the sub and strafed it, trying to damage it or force it to dive. A Japanese destroyer saw the airplane's attack on the Nautilus and sailed to it, trying to find and sink the sub with its 26 depth charges. The Nautilus got away, and a after a couple of hours the destroyer quit the hunt and headed towards the Japanese carriers, which were sailing NE to contact the main US force which had been spotted by Japanese search planes. Meanwhile, dive bombers from the Enterprise showed up to the coordinates where the American torpedoe bombers had radioed that the Japanese carriers were located. The American planes were almost out of gas, and were close to having to turn for home. But there were no carriers spotted in the location where the American dive bombers expected to find them. The carriers had left, heading NE to find the American force. However, the dive bombers saw the destroyer that had been hunting for the Nautilus, which was now steaming NE (to join the main body of the Japanese force which was looking for the American main body) and decided to follow it. One American pilot said the dd was travelling at least 30 kts. and on a straight course. After a few minutes of following the destroyer, the main Japanese force was located. The rest is history. Even though the Nautilus did not score any hits, its role at Midway proved pivitol.

[Armistead]

Have you ever read the book "Shattered Sword"?

It will blow your mind with what really happened at Midway, most of what we've been taught is totally debunked.

A great read.......

[peabody]

Why the Submarine is the unsung hero at Midway -- true story.

There was also another sub at the Battle of Midway but it was Japanese. The Yorktown Carrier after recieving major damage in the Coral Sea was taken to Pearl and hasty repairs were made to get it seaworthy and was sent to Midway.
During the battle Yorktown had sustained massive damage and was listing about 10 degrees, but as it reached 26 degrees the Carrier was abandoned.
But the Yorktown refused to sink. So the next day crews were returned to the Yorktown to attempt to get enough repairs done to enable it to be towed back to port. They were making headway when a Japanese sub fired at it and the destroyer Hammann. Hammann sunk almost immediately and two torpedoes hit the Yorktown. The tow ship released the Yorktown and picked up survivors from Hammann and Yorktown.
The Yorktown remained afloat the night of the 6th but on the 7th at about 05:30 it finally rolled over and sank.

Peabody

[I'm goin' down]

I read a book about the Battle of Midway a long time ago. One sailor from the Yorktown was rescued by the same destroyer twice. Once after he abandoned ship from an air attack, and again when he abandoned ship after it was torpedoed. He was a cook. When the destroyer picked him up the second time he reportedly said, as he came on board, "Don't tell me. I know where the galley is.":DL

[Randomizer]

Have you ever read the book "Shattered Sword"?

It will blow your mind with what really happened at Midway, most of what we've been taught is totally debunked.

A great read.......
Agree 100%

However, in stripping away the myths the book does nothing to depreciate the actions of the men who actually fought the battle. Rather the opposite really.

Objective history is a rare thing and always better than myth or legend although with written with warts and all it loses some of the feel-good glitter that comes from a good story. Shattered Sword is a model of analysis and objectivity in my subjective opinion.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Yes, that IJN DD was the Arashi. There was also a second U.S. sub in the vicinity that not only failed to take any aggressive action, but failed to send a prompt contact report. I don't remember the sub's name, maybe Armistead can elaborate, but Nimitz was furious with it's skipper and subsequently relieved him of his command. BTW, Nautilus was not unsung, hence it's inclusion in the Battle 360 series and the book Shattered Sword. It's skipper was cited for his aggressive and relentless pursuit of the enemy.

[Daniel Prates]

"Don't tell me. I know where the galley is.":DL


Hehe. Anecdote, or true story?

[I'm goin' down]

Uhh. How would I know? I wasn't on the destroyer.:D

[joea]

Agree 100%

However, in stripping away the myths the book does nothing to depreciate the actions of the men who actually fought the battle. Rather the opposite really.

Objective history is a rare thing and always better than myth or legend although with written with warts and all it loses some of the feel-good glitter that comes from a good story. Shattered Sword is a model of analysis and objectivity in my subjective opinion.

I really, really have to get that book.

[Dread Knot]

I really, really have to get that book.

It's definitely worth it. To me the most interesting passage was near the end after summing up. The authors make a case that had the Japanese even won the naval battle, they almost certainly would have been decimated in the land battle. The Japanese landing forces were without proper maps, landing craft or even amphibious doctrine for a landing on Midway against a force that, unbeknowst to them actually larger and better armed than their own. The most successful Japanese amphibious landings of the war up to that point had taken place at deserted, undefended beaches far from their objectives, such as in the Philippines and Malaysia where the Japanese would then march overland to their objectives. The Japanese forces at Midway would be landing in front of a reef they didn't know was there, straight against the teeth of bristling US Marine defenses, which included tanks and would likely have suffered the same fate as the intial Japanese landing at Wake, if not worse.

[soopaman2]

History is always written by the victor, and will always do so to make themselves look as noble as possible. The man in my signature attempted that with purges and propaganda. As did the Brits and Americans (minus the purges).

Just an educated hypothesis...

Maybe the thinking at the time was because Germany favored "cheap" sub warfare, and they were the enemy, it automatically makes it evil. (even if we partook in the same behavior)

The carrier battles, and devastating warship salvos are always highlighted at Midway, because it is head to head, rather than hit and run, sneaky "dishonorable" fighting. Hence the nobility re-write I mentioned.

Maybe that is why they call it the silent service, not because you are isolated, but because you are behind the scenes and underacknowledged.

[Randomizer]

History is always written by the victor, and will always do so to make themselves look as noble as possible. The man in my signature attempted that with purges and propaganda. As did the Brits and Americans (minus the purges).

Just an educated hypothesis...

Maybe the thinking at the time was because Germany favored "cheap" sub warfare, and they were the enemy, it automatically makes it evil. (even if we partook in the same behavior)

The carrier battles, and devastating warship salvos are always highlighted at Midway, because it is head to head, rather than hit and run, sneaky "dishonorable" fighting. Hence the nobility re-write I mentioned.

Maybe that is why they call it the silent service, not because you are isolated, but because you are behind the scenes and underacknowledged.
I do not think that is the case at with regards to Midway at all. It's been a while since I read Shattered Sword but as I recall the authors go into some detail on the historiography of the battle from wartime accounts until publication of their book. It's fascinating to read the staples, Walter Lord's Incredible Victory, Fuchida's Midway; The Battle that Doomed Japan, Prange's Miracle at Midway etc. and see how the narratives match so very well while several glaring logical contradictions are present but ignored. The knife edge timeline of the conventional account makes too good drama to discard.

Likewise all the English language accounts mention Narwhal's relentless but unsuccessful attack on the Kido Butai and how it ultimately paid off for the Enterprise air strike. So it's disingenuous in the extreme to state that she represented some "unsung" asset. The subsequent loss of Yorktown and Hammann to the boldly handled I-168 was a great embarrassment to the USN, particularly as she got away clean and so was played down in early versions of the story. It however, provided for the Japanese, one of the few bright spots in an operation where the Imperial Navy was batting well below average overall.

Nevertheless, the story did change considerably as the War retreated into the past. Morrison's official version in his Naval Operations omits much compared with the much later Prange, who benefited by being allowed to use classified material and Fuchida's book is nothing short of an apologia that has all the pitfalls of an eyewitness account and 20/20 hindsight while lacking much of the primary source data that could back up his version of events. Still all are important to build the overall picture and worth reading even today.

The USN always had problems with PR that were deeply institutionalized from the top down. So they tended to keep things close to the vest as it were and miss some opportunities to set the record straight or suffer from attempts to camouflage disasters even long after the event. An example of this effect can be found in 1964's Clear for Action: The Photographic Story of Modern Naval Combat 1898-1964 by Hailey and Lancelot. Even two decades after the battle the book repeats much of the wartime Air Force canard that land based air intervention was almost as important to the victory as the carrier strikes. This myth grew out of the reluctance of the Naval press office to initially release too much info in the wake of the Battle for security reasons, a mistake that the media savvy Army Air Force jumped on with both feet. Of course the Air Force knew that for all their efforts and losses they never even scratched the paint on a Japanese warship but why let facts get in the way of creating a legend. Particularly at the expense of an inter-service rival.

The evolution of the Midway narrative, from wartime propaganda to the release of Shattered Sword provides excellent lessons for anybody who might be interested in how information regarding a historically significant event can be manipulated, distorted and controlled. Even without any sinister or conspiratorial motives.

[WernherVonTrapp]

During the battle of Midway, as ineffective as they were in actually causing any physical damage to the IJN, the land based planes are nevertheless credited with disrupting/dispersing the IJN carrier TF and preventing the carriers from spotting their deck with torpedo planes and dive bombers. They kept the fighters on deck, landing, refueling and launching again and again. So they did contribute in an ironic but significant way.

[Randomizer]

During the battle of Midway, as ineffective as they were in actually causing any physical damage to the IJN, the land based planes are nevertheless credited with disrupting/dispersing the IJN carrier TF and preventing the carriers from spotting their deck with torpedo planes and dive bombers. They kept the fighters on deck, landing, refueling and launching again and again. So they did contribute in an ironic but significant way.
The key is everybody contributed.

I quote from Clear for Action page 205:

On word of the incoming attack every plane that could fly was sent into the air from Midway. These were twenty-seven dive bombers, six new Grumman Avenger torpedo planes, four B-26 medium bombers armed with torpedoes, sixteen B-17 Army bombers and twenty-seven Navy fighters, most of them outmoded Brewster Buffaloes. Because the fighter planes were needed for the defence of the island, the American attack groups had to carry out there mission without fighter protection. In that first attack, five of the torpedo planes and two of the B-26's failed to come back. They heavily damaged and set afire the carrier Kaga and an unidentified cruiser. It was during this attack that Major Lofton Henderson of the Marines dived his disabled plane into Kaga, proving that American's too, knew how to die.

This is not wartime propaganda, it's from a serious American naval history book published 22-years after the battle and conforms almost perfectly to the "official" Air Force version of events. That said, it's almost but not quite fictional.

[soopaman2]

You almost have to take multiple testimonies from differring sides and draw your own reality based on the events during and the overall outcomes.

I'm sure Nimitz and Yamamoto have differing opinions on why Midway turned out the way it did, but the overall outcome is all that mattered,

The losses were incurred on the warships and aircrews and not so much on the subs, so their (surface vessels) roles were magnified in relation to the subs.

[WernherVonTrapp]

This is not wartime propaganda, it's from a serious American naval history book published 22-years after the battle and conforms almost perfectly to the "official" Air Force version of events. That said, it's almost but not quite fictional.
According to Shattered Sword, Major Lofton Henderson crashed into the sea, along with 5 others from his squadron. He was the first Marine aviator KIA during WWII, hence his namesake for Henderson Field.
In fact, Henderson and his men of VMSB-241 were attacking the Hiryu and the Soryu on the port side of the carrier formation, and there is was no damage to Kaga caused by B-26 bombers.

In this respect, it is very fictional and goes to show how many embellishments permeated the history of WWII, though this is nothing new. In the book, The Tenth Fleet, there were deliberate fabrications by the U.S. concerning U-Boat sinkings that never occurred. I suppose it was done sometimes for morale, sometimes for glory and sometimes for accolades but in all such cases, it was nothing but fiction.

You almost have to take multiple testimonies from differring sides and draw your own reality based on the events during and the overall outcomes.

I'm sure Nimitz and Yamamoto have differing opinions on why Midway turned out the way it did, but the overall outcome is all that mattered,...


Undoubtedly, you must always take multiple testimonies if you have more than one witness, and even then, you have to weigh what the witness says against the known variables of physical evidence that exists. This is the only path to the truth. Surely, one can always rationalize their own reality to conform to what they want to believe, but drawing a reasonable conclusion based on the totality of the facts will be the concensus. Yamamoto and Nimitz had differing opinions even before the battle of Midway began.;)

[I'm goin' down]

And, Ladies and Gentlemen, the the Oscar goes to the NAUTILUS! (Thunderous applause.)

[soopaman2]

And, Ladies and Gentlemen, the the Oscar goes to the NAUTILUS! (Thunderous applause.)

Your supposed to do an honorary montage before the announcement ya silly goose!:O:

Here it is:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Nautilus_(SS-168)

[Randomizer]

And, Ladies and Gentlemen, the the Oscar goes to the NAUTILUS! (Thunderous applause.)
The Oscar should go to the air groups from Enterprise and Yorktown with a Best Supporting for the HYPO code breakers.

Nautilus can have the daytime Emmy for Best Supporting.

Yamamoto gets the Razzie.

[soopaman2]

Famous Actress sold for scrap:

Nautilus completed her 14th, and last, patrol at Darwin on 30 January 1945. From Australia, she was routed on to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philadelphia,_Pennsylvania), where she arrived 25 May for inactivation. Decommissioned with a bottle of champagne over the forward six-inch (152 mm) gun on 30 June, she was stricken from the Naval Vessel Register (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Vessel_Register) 25 July and sold 16 November, to the North American Smelting Company (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=North_American_Smelting_Company&action=edit&redlink=1) of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for scrapping.

[I-25]

Have you ever read the book "Shattered Sword"?

It will blow your mind with what really happened at Midway, most of what we've been taught is totally debunked.

A great read.......

This is undoubtedly one of the BEST books i have ever read, i'd recommend it to anyonehttp://174.123.69.202/~subsimc/radioroom/../../%7Esubsimc/radioroom/images/smilies/thumbsup.gif


There was also another sub at the Battle of Midway but it was Japanese. The Yorktown Carrier after recieving major damage in the Coral Sea was taken to Pearl and hasty repairs were made to get it seaworthy and was sent to Midway.
During the battle Yorktown had sustained massive damage and was listing about 10 degrees, but as it reached 26 degrees the Carrier was abandoned.
But the Yorktown refused to sink. So the next day crews were returned to the Yorktown to attempt to get enough repairs done to enable it to be towed back to port. They were making headway when a Japanese sub fired at it and the destroyer Hammann. Hammann sunk almost immediately and two torpedoes hit the Yorktown. The tow ship released the Yorktown and picked up survivors from Hammann and Yorktown.
The Yorktown remained afloat the night of the 6th but on the 7th at about 05:30 it finally rolled over and sank.

Peabody
[/B]

The I-168 Under Lt Commander Tanabe

[Dread Knot]

The I-168 Under Lt Commander Tanabe

Midway was such a lopsided victory as it was. One wonders how much easier the Guadalcanal campaign would have been for the USN with an addition carrier had Yorktown survived. However, she would have had to see a lot of time in a dockyard first.

One benefit of Yorktown's slow motion demise was that the vast majority of her trained crew got away. Specifically, the mechanics and remaining aircrew. In addition to the loss of the carriers, that's what made Midway so devastating for Japan. In a small industrial country the loss of so many highly trained aviation mechanics at one time, in those burning carrier hulls was exceedingly difficult to make up.

[I'm goin' down]

And, Ladies and Gentlemen, the the Oscar goes to the NAUTILUS! (Thunderous applause.)

The Oscar should go to the air groups from Enterprise and Yorktown with a Best Supporting for the HYPO code breakers.

Nautilus can have the daytime Emmy for Best Supporting.

Yamamoto gets the Razzie.

:up:

[J0313]

After reading all these post's it is amazing that so little is known by so many about a battle that was so important to American history, Excluding those who aren't American of course. I've known about most of these little tidbits of info about the Battle of Midway Since I was a kid, and I'm 45 years old. My Grand father was a plank owner on the USS Grenadier. He was with her from the time she left the shipyard till they had to scuttle her in the Indian Ocean thanks to a Jap aerial depthcharge. His boat was part of the cordon at Midway. History is very important and should be taken seriously by everyone. That is how we honor our past and that is the way we keep from repeating our mistakes in the future.

[TorpX]

I was watching a PBS channel the other week, and I caught part of a program which featured a lecture by Craig Symonds. It was about the battle of Midway and covered many of the details talked about in this thread. One thing in particular that I didn't know before, was that Yamamoto was personally involved in Japan's decision to declare war on the U.S. He said Japan's original plan was to conquer the DEI and leave the US alone, but Yamamoto insisted that if they wanted to attack the DEI, they had to also attack the Philippines and US. Otherwise, the Americans would be interfering in everything and this would not work. He threatened to resign if his plan was not adopted, and won the argument. This, of course, meant there had to be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Am I the only one who never heard this before?

[WernherVonTrapp]

Am I the only one who never heard this before?
I always thought he was against the PH attack until I read Shattered Sword. According to the book, "Shattered Sword: The True Story of the Battle of Midway", Yamamoto was also intent on invading the island of Midway with a secondary strategy of drawing out the remaining U.S. carriers. The invasions of Attu and Kiska were no sideshow/diversion either. The US carriers had been a thorn in Yamamotos side ever since Pearl Harbor and had been making quite a nuisance of themselves, popping up where they were least expected (Doolittle's raid, Coral Sea, etc.).
In the battle of the Coral Sea, the Shukaku and Zuikaku were either badly damaged and/or had lost most of their pilots and therefore had to stay behind for repairs or pilot replacements during the battle for Midway. One cannot help but wonder what the outcome at Midway would've been, had the Shukaku and Zuikaku been present.

[Torplexed]

One cannot help but wonder what the outcome at Midway would've been, had the Shukaku and Zuikaku been present.

Or if the Japanese had had the flexibility to mix Shokaku's remaining air group with Zuikaku's. The Zuikaku was fully operational, just short of planes after the Coral Sea scrape. Even one carrier more with a mixed air group would have made a big difference.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Or if the Japanese had had the flexibility to mix Shokaku's remaining air group with Zuikaku's. The Zuikaku was fully operational, just short of planes after the Coral Sea scrape. Even one carrier more with a mixed air group would have made a big difference.Good point. If I remember correctly, I think the fact that Zuikaku was left behind, was merely a case of operational (S.O.P.) inflexibility on the part of the IJN. They traditionally felt compelled to keep a carrier's air wing with it's original carrier (or something to that effect). It just goes to show how operational procedures can have a profound effect on battles.:up:

[Torplexed]

Good point.

Well, I owe that point to the book Shattered Sword. :03:

Another point brought up in the book, as that not only was an ambush waiting for the Japanese at sea, but on land as well. Even if Japan had managed to wring out a win at sea the Japanese would have been impaled on the Marine defenses. Given the reef surrounding the island the invasion barges (diahatsu) would have had to discharge troops 200-300 yards from the shore while under murderous fire. It's not certain in their planning if the Japanese even knew if the reef was there.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Well, I owe that point to the book Shattered Sword. :03:

Even if Japan had managed to wring out a win at sea the Japanese would have been impaled on the Marine defenses. Given the reef surrounding the island the invasion barges (diahatsu) would have had to discharge troops 200-300 yards from the shore while under murderous fire. It's not certain in their planning if the Japanese even knew if the reef was there.Indeed, history made little note of just how formidable those defenses were, not to mention the exposed coral reef. I forget now, but the marines had something in the neighborhood of 2 tank platoons hidden in the only wooded area found on that island. I was amazed, when I read that book, to learn the true (real) extent of the island's defenses.:yep:

[Torplexed]

I was watching a PBS channel the other week, and I caught part of a program which featured a lecture by Craig Symonds. It was about the battle of Midway and covered many of the details talked about in this thread. One thing in particular that I didn't know before, was that Yamamoto was personally involved in Japan's decision to declare war on the U.S. He said Japan's original plan was to conquer the DEI and leave the US alone, but Yamamoto insisted that if they wanted to attack the DEI, they had to also attack the Philippines and US. Otherwise, the Americans would be interfering in everything and this would not work. He threatened to resign if his plan was not adopted, and won the argument. This, of course, meant there had to be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Am I the only one who never heard this before?


It is a fascinating speculation, how events might have unfolded if the U.S. and it's Philippines dependency had been excluded from Japanese war plans in December 1941. Had Tokyo confined itself to occupying British Malaya and Burma, along with the Dutch East Indies.(where all the oil and rubber was) Roosevelt would certainly have wanted to enter the war and confront Japanese aggression. The question is whether Congress and public sentiment would have allowed the president to declare war in the absence of a direct assault on American national interests. Certainly, without a surprise attack on a sleeping fleet there would not have been the sense of national outrage that unified the country overnight. Going to war to defend European colonies and possessions in the far east wouldn't have had the rallying effect of "Remember Pearl Harbor."

However, since the Japanese couldn't see any way of keeping the US from getting involved if they descended on British and Dutch colonies they went ahead and including knocking out the U.S. Pacific Fleet on their war plans. A poor move if Yamamoto endorsed doing it. But then I always thought he was overrated anyway.

[nikimcbee]

The USN always had problems with PR that were deeply institutionalized from the top down

Funny you should mention that. I read in a book about the USS Pampanito about an account of the " Take her down" action with the Growler and H Gilmore's death. In that book, a crewmember mentioned that how it is potrayed in the official story, Gilmore cries taker her down and he dies, but in the book it says he was killed out-right and none of that happened like the Navy potrayed it:hmmm::dead:. I had never heard this before except in this book (from a crew member who served on the Growler(?) )


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Howard_W._Gilmore


Simultaneously, the Japanese crew unleashed a burst of machine gun fire at Growler’s bridge, killing the junior officer of the deck and a lookout,[4] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Howard_W._Gilmore#cite_note-3) while wounding Gilmore himself and two other men. “Clear the bridge!” Gilmore ordered as he struggled to hang on to a frame. As the rest of the bridge party dropped down the hatch into the conning tower, the executive officer, Lieutenant Commander Arnold Schade — shaken by the impact and dazed by his own fall into the control room — waited expectantly for his captain to appear. Instead from above came the shouted command: “Take her down!” Realizing that he could not get himself below in time if the ship were to escape, Gilmore chose to make the supreme sacrifice for his shipmates. Schade hesitated briefly — then followed his captain’s last order and submerged the crippled ship.

[nikimcbee]

However, since the Japanese couldn't see any way of keeping the US from getting involved if they descended on British and Dutch colonies they went ahead and including knocking out the U.S. Pacific Fleet on their war plans. A poor move if Yamamoto endorsed doing it. But then I always thought he was overrated anyway.

It would have been interesting if Yamamoto had lost out to the "old guard" of the IJN and they used Battleships to attack PH:hmmm:. If i recall, the Yamato was brand new. She would have eaten our fleet for lunch (and want seconds).


On a side note, I wish somebody would make a movie about the midget subs there.:hmmm: That has always been my favorite aspect of PH.

[Sailor Steve]

If i recall, the Yamato was brand new. She would have eaten our fleet for lunch (and want seconds).
The only battleships in the Pearl Harbor strike force were Hiei and Kirishima. Yamato wasn't even in service, being commissioned into service on the 16 of December.

It wouldn't have mattered, because almost all the US battleships were powered down and couldn't have used their main batteries.

[Torplexed]

The only battleships in the Pearl Harbor strike force were Hiei and Kirishima. Yamato wasn't even in service, being commissioned into service on the 16 of December.


Even worse she wasn't deemed operational until May 27th, 1942 due to delays and setbacks in training her crew, particularly on the new 18.1 inch guns.

[Sailor Steve]

Even worse she wasn't deemed operational until May 27th, 1942 due to delays and setbacks in training her crew, particularly on the new 18.1 inch guns.
I think this is a good time to mention that the super-ship has always been a myth. Yamato would almost certainly have had no trouble at all with any of the battleships present at Pearl, but seven of them, even though most dated to World War One, would probably have not boded well even for a ship that new and powerful.

[Torplexed]

I think this is a good time to mention that the super-ship has always been a myth.

Yamato was always an eye-catcher but her reputation never lived up to the myth. In many respects her size worked against her. In late 1942, the IJN toyed with idea of sending her down to the Solomons to bombard Henderson Field on Guadalcanal but couldn't make it work due to fuel and ammo constraints. You could have Yamato parked in a developed base like Truk, but if you send her out on one Tokyo Express run to Henderson field staging out of Simpson Harbor in Rabaul, she with her consorts would burn as much bunker grade fuel as the Combined Fleet would be allocated in a month and it took multiple runs to get anything done. Given the logistical strains on Japan's merchant fleet on just keeping the four old Kongo class battleships at Rabaul fully replenished in what had been a colonial backwater port before the war was proving a headache. Plus, there were probably not proper facilities for reloading Yamato's massive 18.1 inch guns, each round weighing 3,200 pounds. The Japanese were not adept at setting at up new logistical staging areas to support the consolidation of new territories. In terms of base construction and improvement it took them years to do what Allied forces could do in a month. The result was that in the primitive South Pacific a "super-ship" like Yamato was often constrained in where she could go and what she could do.

[Horus3K]

It is a fascinating speculation, how events might have unfolded if the U.S. and it's Philippines dependency had been excluded from Japanese war plans in December 1941. Had Tokyo confined itself to occupying British Malaya and Burma, along with the Dutch East Indies.(where all the oil and rubber was) Roosevelt would certainly have wanted to enter the war and confront Japanese aggression. The question is whether Congress and public sentiment would have allowed the president to declare war in the absence of a direct assault on American national interests. Certainly, without a surprise attack on a sleeping fleet there would not have been the sense of national outrage that unified the country overnight. Going to war to defend European colonies and possessions in the far east wouldn't have had the rallying effect of "Remember Pearl Harbor."

However, since the Japanese couldn't see any way of keeping the US from getting involved if they descended on British and Dutch colonies they went ahead and including knocking out the U.S. Pacific Fleet on their war plans. A poor move if Yamamoto endorsed doing it. But then I always thought he was overrated anyway.

Well, and why do you think Japan attacked USA in the first place?...Because USA basically left no other choice for Japan, esp when you consider japan was to 80% relying on US oil, cutting that of they HAD to invade the oil rich nations/colonies!

In my view Roosevelt was anticipating the japanese attack somehow, even wanting it! Japan planned to declare war to US and attack PH some hours later...but they messed that up nicely, so Roosevelt had the best propaganda argument ever with the socalled "Day of Infamy" to get US citizens enraged enough to enter war(most US people didnt want any war involvement whatsoever), without being the aggressor but the attacked one!

As said im very sure they anticipated an attack somewhere somehow...maybe not as severe as the actual attack

You think Yamamoto was overrated? I think you wrong there, his MAIN goal with attacking PH was to eliminate the US carriers, which where "luckily" not there...on receiving the message that no carriers where found/hit he said that from now on it will be impossible to beat the USA, esp after its industrial moloch starts to gear up....and maybe you dont know but he studied in the UK and im sure he was often in the USA, so i guess he could judge the overall situation well enough to do what he did!

Both sides knew a conflict was inevitable, but Roosevelt played his deck much better than the japs did, and as others here said already, the winner writes the history, for Roosevelt surely wanted to enter the war to help Britain on one hand and to keep the upperhand in the pacific!

Well the following maybe a bit of a conspiracy theory, but the similarities between Pearl Harbour and 9/11 are striking...they knew something was to happen so they could manipulate public opinion to reach their goals!

But where Roosevelt played his deck like a real pro, Bush administration just acted very plumb and stupid!

I guess some of you want to sacrifice me for what i wrote here, its just my personal opinion...being a "modern" german i get sceptical when thing fit too nicely to be just coincidance...

Damn i didnt want to produce epic wall of text, but i kinda had to ;)

Edit: Totally forgot what i wanted to write in the first place :P...the ONLY major players in the pacific was Japan, the USA and UK empire(busy/bound by germany)

[Sailor Steve]

Well, and why do you think Japan attacked USA in the first place?...Because USA basically left no other choice for Japan, esp when you consider japan was to 80% relying on US oil, cutting that of they HAD to invade the oil rich nations/colonies!
We left Japan with a choice, even more than one. There is no way Japan was going to get US oil by attacking the US directly. The Pearl Harbor attack was to prevent the US from interfering with Japan's plans in the South Pacific. Japan could have got the signal that they should get out of China. They could have cooperated with their neighbors and done pretty much what they ended up doing after the war. They could have just gone after the oil in their region, and we might not have interfered at all.

As said im very sure they anticipated an attack somewhere somehow...maybe not as severe as the actual attack
Of course they expected it. There are plenty of documents from the time discussing US expectations. The problem is that they expected the attack on the Philippines and varioius areas around the South Pacific, not at Pearl Harbor.

Well the following maybe a bit of a conspiracy theory, but the similarities between Pearl Harbour and 9/11 are striking...they knew something was to happen so they could manipulate public opinion to reach their goals!
And like all conspiracy theories neither one has ever been backed up by any real evidence.

I guess some of you want to sacrifice me for what i wrote here, its just my personal opinion...being a "modern" german i get sceptical when thing fit too nicely to be just coincidance...
Are you paranoid? Expecting trouble? No one here wants to sacrifice anyone. For the most part we like a good debate. In answer to your skepticism, things only fit "too nicely" in your own mind. Coincidence is like luck - things happen the way they happen, and people see something more than there is because they want to. I'm not saying you're wrong, but as always some real evidence would be nice.

[Dread Knot]

In all my years of listening to people who spout the Pearl Harbor conspiracy theory, I've never heard one who could explain how Roosevelt got Hitler to go in on the conspiracy. By his declaring war on the US he relieved Roosevlet of a lot of political headaches. Roosevelt certainly wanted the US in the war---the war in Europe. Under the terms of the Tripartite Pact, Hitler was under no obligation to declare war on the US if Japan did so. Frankly, Hitler wasn't exactly know for honoring pacts even if it had. And Japan certainly hadn't endeared itself to Hitler when they didn't declare war on Russia.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Actually, Hitler declared "War" on the U.S. as a direct result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, in support of his new Asian ally.
Not that I believe in any conspiracy theory, but you should read a book titled "Infamy" by John Toland. It presents (with evidence) some very compelling arguments supporting Roosevelt's knowledge of an impending attack on Pearl Harbor. Billy Mitchell was not the only one who predicted just such an attack, Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner did too.

[Bilge_Rat]

I have studied this area extensively, since the WW2 Pacific Theatre has always been my favorite, and I never saw any compelling evidence that Roosevelt or anyone else in the U.S. high command "knew" Pearl harbour was coming.

Many people suspected in the fall of 1941 that Japan would not back down and would make a grab for the Dutch Indies but everyone thought the attack, if there was one, would be against the Philippines. No one thought the japanese had the capability to strike PH.

As to the interesting what ifs, there are a few:

1. what would the U.S. have done if Japanese forces had bypassed U.S. and British territory entirely and just invaded the Dutch East Indies? Could Roosevelt have convinced Congress to declare war to protect a european colony? after all, the US did not react when the Japanese took over french Indochina in sept. 1940.

2. what would the U.S. have done if on dec. 8, 1941, Hitler who had been kept in the dark about PH had disavowed his ally and declared war on Japan? Hitler was quite capable of turning on an ally if it suited him.

Roosevelt did not need PH to take the U.S. into WW2. Don't forget that in the fall of 1941, the U.S. was already fighting an undeclared war against Germany. U.S. Navy ships were escorting convoys in the North Atlantic and had depth charged U-Boats. The U.S. destroyer Reuben James was sunk by a U-Boat in october 1941. Many historians believe that Roosevelt was getting U.S. public opinion ready to declare war on Germany in the spring of 1942. PH just accelerated the process.

[MKalafatas]

You think Yamamoto was overrated?....and maybe you dont know but he studied in the UK and im sure he was often in the USA...

I had not heard that Yamamoto studied in the UK. I know that he attended the London Naval Conference. He studied at Harvard and was a naval attache in Washington. He certainly knew the US. [Perhaps 'UK' was a typo, and you meant to say 'US'.]

As an aside, I was surprised to learn recently while reading his autobiography that retired US Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens was one of the code-breakers responsible for the information resulting in the ambush and death of Yamamoto.

[Dread Knot]

Actually, Hitler declared "War" on the U.S. as a direct result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, in support of his new Asian ally.
Not that I believe in any conspiracy theory, but you should read a book titled "Infamy" by John Toland. It presents (with evidence) some very compelling arguments supporting Roosevelt's knowledge of an impending attack on Pearl Harbor.

I did read it. Thirty years ago when it came out. That's part of the problem. 70 years on and no uncovered forgotten orders or deathbed confessions. No one cashing in on the story of the century in their old age. No smoking gun to produce a breakthough that gets the PH conspiracy out of the shadowy crackpot realm of JFK assassination plots or faked moon landings.

As for Toland, he has always been a somewhat controversial figure in historical circles. A writer of biographies and histories, Toland has no formal training in history--no advanced degrees, and not even an undergraduate course to his name.

Toland makes no pretense of being a professional historian. He relied heavily on personal interviews for his information, gladly granting anonymity to his sources--a practice that drove documentation-driven historians wild. His books were structured with drama in mind, and read more like exciting novels than dry history. Readers embrace him but historians tend not to.

[Horus3K]

I wrote my i some kind of prework-hurry, so i may have overshooted a bit :)

I think PH wasnt a real conspiracy, just very cleverly used by Roosevelt to reach his goals...i just wanted to say that in both cases, PH and 9/11, US government knew that something was about to happen, and after it did happen you can use those incidents to reach the political goals you couldnt reach by "normal" means, which in my eyes isnt a "real" conspiracy theory, just very hard to judge nowadays by either lack of evidence or/and clouded by propaganda from all sides...

Per definition, conspiracy theories even ignores hard evidence...for example that the moon landing was a fake ;)

Quote fron Sailor Steve:
"We left Japan with a choice, even more than one."

Your are basically right here, but those choices were unacceptable for the Japanese for many reasons, may it come from traditions or their weird code of honour, but mostly because the Japanese were transformed from a "normal" nation to a rigid Imperialistic and very militaristic nation with ever growing military, and for that you need so many ressources that from a certain point you cant aquire those by peaceful means!

In germanys case, getting rid of national unemployment and ever growing military, germany was basically bankrupt and to go on with that, their first action in any invaded country was to plunder its gold reserves...

Also in their religious belief Japan was created by the gods, and if one nation should rule the world it should be them...and im sure if the Emperor didnt stopped the war they would have fight to the last men, even if all their cities got nuked.

I also love a good debate and im not paranoid hehehe...i just wasnt sure how people would react on my post

[Sailor Steve]

I also love a good debate and im not paranoid hehehe...i just wasnt sure how people would react on my post
You don't have to worry about that around here...up to a point. 9/11 discussions are better left to the General Topics forums, but anything war-related is welcome. Just be ready to back up any claims for the wilder stuff. You won't be pilloried, but you will get demanding arguments. :sunny:

[Torplexed]

You think Yamamoto was overrated? I think you wrong there, his MAIN goal with attacking PH was to eliminate the US carriers, which where "luckily" not there...on receiving the message that no carriers where found/hit he said that from now on it will be impossible to beat the USA, esp after its industrial moloch starts to gear up....and maybe you dont know but he studied in the UK and im sure he was often in the USA, so i guess he could judge the overall situation well enough to do what he did!



Sorry, but that's just my opinion. I have no doubt about his impressive credentials in America and at Harvard, but they didn't seem to serve him well in command of the Combined Fleet. He engineered the the attack on Pearl Harbor, the most politically disastrous naval operation in modern history. He used his prestige to push through the Midway operation, a stunning and avoidable setback. He also presided over the catastrophic air war of attrition against American forces in the South Pacific, which gutted Japan's air power. He did have the forbearance to see troubled times ahead for Japan, but seemed to do things that made that trouble worse.

For some strange reason he never used his considerable political clout to relieve the witless and indecisive Admiral Nagumo, although he enjoyed upbraiding him for his shortcomings. If Yamamoto was indicative of Japan's best, perhaps it explains the sad state the IJN eventually found itself in.

[Sailor Steve]

A friend of mine used to say that these Japanese officers had visited places like Alabama, Georgia and West Virginia, where folks keep their relatives chained up in the basement, they might have thought twice about messin' with the U S of A. :stare:

[Torplexed]

A friend of mine used to say that these Japanese officers had visited places like Alabama, Georgia and West Virginia, where folks keep their relatives chained up in the basement, they might have thought twice about messin' with the U S of A. :stare:

When I look at the weirdness of modern Japan, I'm not so sure I wanna mess with them anymore either. :D

http://www.thenextbarstool.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/japan021.jpg

[Sailor Steve]

Well, during the heyday of Japanese imports (Honda, Sony, Datsun, Yamaha) it was looking like we might actually lose, but pictures like that show that, in the end, yes - the west won the war. :D

[Admiral Von Gerlach]

This thread has been an interesting read and several cross winds are blowing thru many of the posts.

Fact is that the Imperial Japanese Navy was far superior to the USN thorughout the war in every way except materiel, in that area alone the USN won the war, they out built and out manned the fleet and IJN had never a chance to replace war losses...and the IJN submarine campaign was a total mis use of a fine fleet arm. To belittle the abilities of the IJN High Command has been the traddional approach to Japan from the Commodore Perry expedition in the 1800s which most western nations found to their loss over the decades since.

They have in fact a superior culture in many ways, our country lacks much of the moral fibre that allowed us to prevail in that war...but our services did their best. Facts in action are hard to establish at times for many reasons. One must assume people do their best in their own way.

Yamamoto counted on the Japanese Diplomatic service to serve the Declaration of War BEFORE the attack on Pearl, when they failed in this the attack was rendered a disaster, no matter what the results were. He knew that and knew what the result would be.

Though I lost family members in the war and had many others who served, most of them in the Navy and Marines, we never had illusions about the enemy, or their abilities or their honour and worthiness.

[Torplexed]

Yamamoto counted on the Japanese Diplomatic service to serve the Declaration of War BEFORE the attack on Pearl, when they failed in this the attack was rendered a disaster, no matter what the results were. He knew that and knew what the result would be.

The 14-part message which the Japanese diplomats tardily delivered to ambassador Hull on December 7th has been characterized as a declaration of war, but it was much more ambiguous than that. The message simply repeated Japan's position, rejected the American position, and expressed the view that further negotiation seemed pointless. While this was certainly ominous, and its significance was not lost on the American cryptanalysts or administration, the note did not formally declare war or even present an ultimatum.

Recently, Japanese historian Iguchi Takeo has cast further light on the 14-part message with the discovery of Japanese archival material showing that the Japanese Army and Navy insisted that the language of the 14-part message be toned down to deliberately avoid giving any warning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He further speculates that the transmissions to the Washington embassy from the Tokyo Foreign Office were deliberately garbled to ensure that the embassy staff would be unable to deliver a clean copy to the Americans before the attack took place. Iguchi also found a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations and they clearly prevailed."

A formal declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8, but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.

Frankly, even a formal declaration of war had been delivered a half hour before the attack I think it would have made little difference. Which scenario is more despicable? Someone attacking you and saying "I'm declaring war on you" or someone declaring war on you and then punching you in the mouth immediately after? It's a sneak attack versus a sucker punch.

By the way if anyone wishes to read the 14-part message that was meant to be on Cordell Hull's desk before the attack it's here...

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/Fourteen.html

[WernherVonTrapp]

Sorry, but that's just my opinion. I have no doubt about his impressive credentials in America and at Harvard, but they didn't seem to serve him well in command of the Combined Fleet. I'm inclined to concur with your opinion here, and admittedly, it has been my opinion ever since I read Shattered Sword.

@Dread Knot:
As to my ealier reference involving John Toland's book, as I alluded, I don't believe in the conspiracy theory either. BTW, Toland was a graduate of Williams College (undergraduate degree ) and did win a Pulitzer Prize for "The Rising Sun". Yes, "Infamy" was controversial when it first came out 30 years ago (also when I first read it). Books like this inevitably will be controversial. But Toland is, by no means, the picture you have painted of him. I suppose Billy Mitchell was deemed just as controversial when he said that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor.
As my English Lit professor used to say, "Bad reviews are not necessarily a bad thing for a writer. It is when your work receives no reviews, that you should start to worry".:03:

[gmuno]

For the question why Hitler declared war on the US:
- convoys were escorted by US-DEs and DDs
- large deliveries of weapons and other goods to the Sowjets (i read a statement of one German general after war. He believed that only the US deliveries held the Germans troops from getting Moscow in '42) and the Brits (ships)
- new happy hunting grounds (Oil of the West Indies) without the risk of a diplomatic war with the US
- being a total nuthead

The largest mistake by the Japanese (after the one with the PR) in the attacks on PH and Midway was their limited trust in their submarine force.
By placing a sub cordon at the endrances to PH they would have suffered loses, but also would have gotten some straglers.
By scouting Midway, they might have gotten some useful intel on the shore defences and by using their submarine force to the fullest, they could have had some inclination about the approach of the US carriers.

[Sailor Steve]

By the way if anyone wishes to read the 14-part message that was meant to be on Cordell Hull's desk before the attack it's here...

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/Fourteen.html
Thanks for the link. I've never read the actual document, and you're right - there is nothing there that even looks like a declaration of war, or even an ultimatim. There is a lot of nonsense ("Stabilizing the region..."). The link within to other documents is great as well.

[WernherVonTrapp]

The largest mistake by the Japanese (after the one with the PR) in the attacks on PH and Midway was their limited trust in their submarine force.
By placing a sub cordon at the endrances to PH they would have suffered loses, but also would have gotten some straglers.
By scouting Midway, they might have gotten some useful intel on the shore defences and by using their submarine force to the fullest, they could have had some inclination about the approach of the US carriers.The Japanese did, in fact, dispatch a rather large submarine force to Midway for the purposes of reconnaissance and/or engagement. I do not recall all the specific particulars involving the operation's failure, but many of the Japanese subs arrived late, they lacked coordination and (if I remember correctly) they were out of position. But, this all goes back to the overall planning strategy employed for the battle of Midway.

[Torplexed]

By placing a sub cordon at the endrances to PH they would have suffered loses, but also would have gotten some straglers.


The Japanese did place a sub cordon around Pearl Harbor preliminary to the attack there as well. On December 7th, 1941 there was a virtual Japanese submarine armada in position around Oahu. Although the subs sank several merchant ships and made two unsuccessful attempts to torpedo the carrier Enterprise, no US warships fell victim to this submarine pack. On December 10th, 1941 aircraft from the Enterprise caught the Japanese sub I-70 on the surface 200 miles from Oahu and sank it with all hands, making it one of the first Japanese warships lost.

http://pyxis.homestead.com/Japanese-sub-dispositions-dec-7-1941.jpg

[TorpX]

The 14-part message which the Japanese diplomats tardily delivered to ambassador Hull on December 7th has been characterized as a declaration of war, but it was much more ambiguous than that. The message simply repeated Japan's position, rejected the American position, and expressed the view that further negotiation seemed pointless. While this was certainly ominous, and its significance was not lost on the American cryptanalysts or administration, the note did not formally declare war or even present an ultimatum.

Recently, Japanese historian Iguchi Takeo has cast further light on the 14-part message with the discovery of Japanese archival material showing that the Japanese Army and Navy insisted that the language of the 14-part message be toned down to deliberately avoid giving any warning of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He further speculates that the transmissions to the Washington embassy from the Tokyo Foreign Office were deliberately garbled to ensure that the embassy staff would be unable to deliver a clean copy to the Americans before the attack took place. Iguchi also found a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations and they clearly prevailed."

A formal declaration of war was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8, but not delivered to the U.S. government until the day after the attack.

...

I never heard of this before, but it does not surprise me. If you plan a knockout blow that rests heavily on having complete surprise, it stands to reason, you are not going to risk tipping your hand.

All this makes me wonder: What might have changed if the US had somehow gotten a 2 hour warning of the attack? Would that have been enough to significantly change the outcome?

[MKalafatas]

The Japanese did, in fact, dispatch a rather large submarine force to Midway for the purposes of reconnaissance and/or engagement. I do not recall all the specific particulars involving the operation's failure, but many of the Japanese subs arrived late, they lacked coordination and (if I remember correctly) they were out of position. But, this all goes back to the overall planning strategy employed for the battle of Midway.

If I remember correctly, they also sent subs to Pearl Harbor --- expecting reconnaissance on the US fleet when the Japanese attack at Midway became known. Alas, the US already knew about the attack. I think the Yorktown sailed mere hours before the Japanese subs arrived....

[gmuno]

Didn't know.

So, it boils down to bad planning and coordination? To much trust in your cojonnes ain't good and the Japanese had to learn it apperently.

[Dread Knot]

@Dread Knot:
As to my ealier reference involving John Toland's book, as I alluded, I don't believe in the conspiracy theory either. BTW, Toland was a graduate of Williams College (undergraduate degree ) and did win a Pulitzer Prize for "The Rising Sun". Yes, "Infamy" was controversial when it first came out 30 years ago (also when I first read it). Books like this inevitably will be controversial. But Toland is, by no means, the picture you have painted of him. I suppose Billy Mitchell was deemed just as controversial when he said that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor.
As my English Lit professor used to say, "Bad reviews are not necessarily a bad thing for a writer. It is when your work receives no reviews, that you should start to worry".:03:

Sorry, didn't mean to imply you were a PH conspiracy believer. I've read Toland's Rising Sun tome as well. I recall it was in two hardcover volumes when it was first published. His literary style makes for great and fast paced reading although he did tend to concentrate on some parts of the war and skim on others. :salute:

As regards Infamy, I know that other students of the Pearl harbor attack have criticized his thesis severely. David Kahn, a well-known authority on the history of intelligence questions the reliability of Toland's evidence. Kahn points out that the Japanese Pearl Harbor striking force maintained complete radio silence from the time it left harbor in the Kuriles. It never transmitted any messages, even on low-power ship to ship channels. Toland's informants had, in all likelyhood, picked up naval transmissions originating from Japan and nearby waters. Shipboard direction finding was notoriously unreliable then, with a likely error of 11 to 20 degrees in a bearing. Enough to throw of the calculations of the SS Lurline radio men.

I guess it just points out while that there will always be tantalizing clues and coincidences, in the absence of real smoking gun evidence we'll never be sure.

[joea]

For the question why Hitler declared war on the US:
- convoys were escorted by US-DEs and DDs
- large deliveries of weapons and other goods to the Sowjets (i read a statement of one German general after war. He believed that only the US deliveries held the Germans troops from getting Moscow in '42) and the Brits (ships)
- new happy hunting grounds (Oil of the West Indies) without the risk of a diplomatic war with the US
- being a total nuthead




The point is though why would FDR think Hitler would declare war, he surely knew the Tripartite accord as another mentioned didn't require it. Why would the other factos you mentioned suddely become good reason after a Japanese attack and not before? Hitler was not exactly predictable you know.

As to the factors you lsited I only take issue with the huge amount of supplies sent to the Soviets-I pretty sure LL shipments didn't hit huge quantities til 1943 and nearly nothing had arrived during the battle for Moscow in 1941.

As to the forcing Japan into war theory-well perhaps but they need not have invaded China, ally with the Third Reich, or threaten DEI and SEA. If I were advising Hirohito I would have told him to keep Manchuria as a base to subvert and spread influence in China that way - keep friendly with the US perhaps even to the point of seeking economic partnerships in China and Manchuria while shutting out the Europeans and use lots of propaganda against them. good relations with the Soviets as well. No open military adventures except limited attacks against one adversary at the most.

Yes off topic but this is interesting.

[WernherVonTrapp]

Kahn points out that the Japanese Pearl Harbor striking force maintained complete radio silence from the time it left harbor in the Kuriles. It never transmitted any messages, even on low-power ship to ship channels. Toland's informants had, in all likelyhood, picked up naval transmissions originating from Japan and nearby waters. Shipboard direction finding was notoriously unreliable then, with a likely error of 11 to 20 degrees in a bearing. Enough to throw of the calculations of the SS Lurline radio men.

I guess it just points out while that there will always be tantalizing clues and coincidences, in the absence of real smoking gun evidence we'll never be sure.Yes, I do vaguely recall that point of controversy, now that you mention it. I do believe, though still am not certain, that "Seaman-Z" has since come forward, as well as some other anonymous sources, and corroborated Toland's story. Still controversial, nonetheless.:up:

This thread has been an interesting read and several cross winds are blowing thru many of the posts.

Fact is that the Imperial Japanese Navy was far superior to the USN thorughout the war in every way except materiel, in that area alone the USN won the war, I have to respectfully disagree here, admiral. The advent of technology involving the application of radar and inflexibility of protocol/tactics is what doomed the Japanese Navy. However, I do agree that the IJN was far superior than the USN, up until the Solomons campaign. I believe it was during the battle of Vella Gulf (for one example), where 6 American Destroyers took on 4 IJN Destroyers (an American disadvantage in numbers up until this point) in a torpedo attack which left 3 IJN destroyers sunk at no loss to the Americans. Even Capt. Tameichi Hara, in his book "Japanese Destroyer Captain", was astonished at the accuracy of the U.S. torpedo attack. In fact, the U.S. destroyers caught the IJN completely by surprise. This was all due (for once) to the proper application and understanding of the use of radar in an attack. The Americans were still learning and adapting to IJN tactics which, by this point, had become completely predictable. The Solomons Campaign, during which the U.S. Pacific Fleet was able to replace but had still not reached parity in numbers with the IJN, came of age in superior tactics and marksmanship, all compliments of new young officers with a more complete respect and understanding of the use of radar. It wasn't until about mid 43 that U.S. numbers in the Pacific really swung into high gear, and seemingly overnight. By the end of 43, beginning of 44, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was larger than the navies of all the warring powers, combined!

[gmuno]

It hit quantities high enough to be considered as a reason. At least as a reason considered by some high ranking Germans (also nutheads - but strung-up nutheads). Look at the Nuremberg-Trials protocols. A lot of reasons were named, including "I can't remember.""Followed only orders".
I still don't get it, why Dönitz didn't buy his ticket too.

I believe, that the Kriegsmarine high-ups promised Hitler, that the U-Boats could starve England if they got the official permission to go after US-freighters too.
The Nazis didn't want a war against the US in the beginning (see the SS Athenia follow-ups), they tried a lot to prevent it. When it became obvious, that Operation Seelöwe wasn't an option anymore, GB had to be starved. But how to accomplish, when a large part of essential goods are ferried by neutrals? A good reason for FDR to believe, that Hitler would declare war at the US.
When the US-forces would be tied up in the pacific, things would have to develop rather good for the Nazis. At least in their eyes.
When FDR brought up his Europe-first-speech, some people suddenly got very pale and cold sweat broke out, i expect. :D
When Midway happened the way it happened, it must have been getting obvious to the Kriegsmarine (and the Nazis) that their gamble had gone bad.

[WernherVonTrapp]

It hit quantities high enough to be considered as a reason. Well, the USN was always outgunned or outnumbered through the early years of the war. It was in the Solomons campaign where the ability to replace it's losses, became a factor for the USN. Most of the new USN warships were deployed piecemeal into battles there, just narrowly averting disaster. It's one of the major reasons why the battle for Guadalcanal took 6 months. The USN just didn't have the warships to support the resupply missions. It was also during the Solomons campaign that the IJN really showed it's prowess in night engagement tactics, usually overwhelming their American counterparts.
Now, if you want to factor-in the replacement abilities of the U.S. war machine, including the warships at the bottom of Iron-bottom Sound, into the overall numbers counted, I suppose that point might be arguable.:hmmm:

[Dread Knot]

I have to respectfully disagree here, admiral. The advent of technology involving the application of radar and inflexibility of protocol/tactics is what doomed the Japanese Navy. However, I do agree that the IJN was far superior than the USN, up until the Solomons campaign. I believe it was during the battle of Vella Gulf (for one example), where 6 American Destroyers took on 4 IJN Destroyers (an American disadvantage in numbers up until this point) in a torpedo attack which left 3 IJN destroyers sunk at no loss to the Americans....


Another area in which the Japanese Navy was subpar was in anti-aircraft defense. Japanese AA fire control was lousy throughout the war. The Japanese started the war with the Type 94 director for heavy antiaircraft, which proved much too slow for tracking dive bombers. After the disaster at Midway the Japanese Navy rushed development of the Type 3 director, but the prototype was never completed. The Type 95 director for light antiaircraft was available only for triple 25mm mounts, all others having to rely on simple open ring sights. The low quality of Japanese antiaircraft fire control was pretty apparent at the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea, when only 18 Allied aircraft were shot down out of hundreds attacking a Japanese task force (which included the monster BBs Yamato and Musashi) carrying literally hundreds of antiaircraft barrels

[WernherVonTrapp]

I cannot help but think of all the early war battles between the USN & IJN, where the USN was predominantly outnumbered and/or outgunned, yet the Americans still, fearlessly pressed home the attack, sometimes achieving a strategic victory, even if not a tactical one. On the other hand, the IJN, which usually outnumbered and outgunned their counterparts, didn't seem to have the heart to press-home the attack. This in fact, IMO, seemed to be the order of the day for the IJN throughout the entire war. I suppose some could argue that there is some bias in my opinion on this point, but I've searched my heart and believe I'm being truly objective with this analysis. Look at the battle of the Coral Sea, Midway or Leyte Gulf (for a few examples). From all the Pacific naval battles I've read about, and I'm not saying in every single instance, but it just seems like the IJN was far too timid and missed a lot of possibilities by tossing in an early towel.

[Diopos]

They were saving up on steel ... :hmmm:

.

[MKalafatas]

I think "timid" is too strong. The "Tokyo Express" runs through the Solomons were a bold concept. Pearl Harbor was a bold concept. It may be fair to say that at key moments, certain commanders lacked the courage of their convictions. But such criticism could be leveled at commanders in nearly every theater of war from the dawn of time.

The death of Yamato makes an interesting counterpoint to the "timidity" argument.

[WernherVonTrapp]

I think "timid" is too strong. The "Tokyo Express" runs through the Solomons were a bold concept. Pearl Harbor was a bold concept. It may be fair to say that at key moments, certain commanders lacked the courage of their convictions. But such criticism could be leveled at commanders in nearly every theater of war from the dawn of time.

The death of Yamato makes an interesting counterpoint to the "timidity" argument.The Tokyo Express wasn't a bold concept, IMO. It was an absolute necessity (for a people that could not accept defeat) if they were to have any chance of holding onto a valuable asset. As time when on, it became an act of desperation, despite the fact that defeat was staring them in the face. Guadalcanal was called "Starvation Island" by the Japanese while the Tokyo Express was still running, and the IJN eventually had to rely on Destroyers as fast, armed, transports since all of their merchants and barges were being sunk.
No doubt, Pearl Harbor, IMO, was the most carefully contrived Japanese operation of the entire war, but quite possibly the only one. Every successive offensive stroke (again, IMO) was under the pretense of "Bold". All their other conquests of the time, were against positions defended by poorly trained and supplied armies, and/or poorly defended positions. The fact that the Philippines held out against the Japanese for so long, despite the poorly trained and equipped defenders using outdated weapons and tactics, was more a tribute to "Bold" American spirit than bold Japanese initiative. If a mugger chooses to attack an old lady as opposed to the 6 foot tall young man, is he being bold, or choosing an easy opportunity?
I don't think timid is too strong, but again, as I said earlier, I wasn't speaking of every instance.