What was the point of Force Z?

[the_tyrant]

ok, so as we all know, Britain sent Force Z to Singapore in an attempt to "halt" Japanese advances

thing is though, what was the point?

Even in a traditional battleship duel they wouldn't have stood a chance

Japan's combined fleet could have easily totally destroyed force Z

I'm pretty sure the British naval leaders knew Force Z didn't stand against the Japanese combined fleet.

So why did they even bother to send Force Z to Singapore?

[TLAM Strike]

The Japanese were conducting operations across the Pacific and every battle they fought around that time they were out numbed in.

Plus I think it was intended that Force Z would operate along side US, Australian and Dutch forces once everyone got their act together. With Force Z ABDA Com would have had something like 1 CV (Force Z was intended to have one), 2 BBs, 3 Heavy Cruisers, 3 Light Cruisers, 13 Destroyers. Not bad really.

[Raptor1]

Force Z was mostly a deterrent, it was sent to reinforce the Eastern Fleet in case Japan decided to move against British colonial possessions (They invaded French Indochina the previous year), but it wasn't really meant to tackle the entire Combined Fleet. Along with the HMS Indomitable, which was supposed to be there as well, it would've been a fairly viable force for smaller actions.

[Bilge_Rat]

There were some other factors at work as well which explains why Force Z was thought to be adequate:

1) In 1941, most naval officers thought battleships at sea were fairly safe from air attack;

2) its remains unspoken even today, but in 1941, most british and american officers looked down on the japanese as an inferior (i.e. non-white) race and thought the IJN was not as competent as the USN/RN. At most, it was thought the japanese would only be able to strike in one place, probably the Philippines. Needless to say, Pearl Harbour and the next 3-4 months turned out to be a huge shock.

[CCIP]

I don't really question the force - I think as deterrent, they were justified in being stationed where they were. The problem, really, is in the planning and execution of their ill-fated sortie - that was a serious blunder and the ships should have never sailed where they did. I think the underlying factor was the vast under-estimation of what land-based air can do to battleships. Which is very ironic, seeing that it was British planes proved quite the opposite earliest on in the war, playing such a crucial role in the Bismarck hunt and raids on the Italian fleet. Why the British thought they could but others couldn't probably does lie with the blatant disregard and disrespect of the Japanese military.

[Tribesman]

The real question is why force Z went ahead.
All through the planning stage it was dependent on a carrier being part of the group.
As the carriers were in turn made unavailable the deployment should have been stopped as they knew it was vital to the task.
In the end it was simply an empty gesture of bravado which threw away a lot of lives for negative benefit

[Freiwillige]

Didn't it also have something to do with shelling the Japanese beach head? Or was their invasion after?

[Raptor1]

Didn't it also have something to do with shelling the Japanese beach head? Or was their invasion after?

The objective of the sortie that led to the destruction of Force Z was to destroy Japanese ships landing troops on Malaya. The squadron was sent to Singapore before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, though.

[Jimbuna]

Force Z was initially created to bolster the guns at Singapore and oppose any Japanese invasion of Malaya.

The rest is history...lack of air cover etc.

[Growler]

If you've not already, read Flyboys (James Bradley). It offers some plausible insight into Japan's militarism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and does fair justice to explaining the Imperial military's mindset going into and during WW2.

It also explains why, in many ways, the west was entirely unprepared to fight the Japanese; the deployment and eventual destruction of Force Z is ample example of this.

[the_tyrant]

thanks guys:salute:

too bad I can't quote subsim radio room forums on my essay

[Torplexed]

British plans, such as they were, rested on the hope of American involvement. Churchill even made invitations to Roosevelt to base US ships at Singapore. American plans on the eve of war, however assumed an initial defensive posture in the Pacific. Ultimately, due to the growing strains of a world wide conflict, British planning for the defense of Malaysia was based on inexperienced troops holding air bases for which there weren't enough planes in order to defend a naval base for which there weren't enough ships. Bottom line was that the British were in an impossible situation. Their position as an imperial power and good faith with their Far Eastern dominions required them to mount some sort of defense, but by 1941 it was an improvised and incoherent defense to which no one in London was paying much attention.

Churchill was the driving force in sending in Prince of Wales and Repulse, but realized that should war come Force Z could only survive by making itself scarce. However, he may have picked the wrong man for command as Vice-Admiral Tom Phillips was one of those who remained a true believer in the capital ship in the age of air power. Phillips was counting to some degree on fighter support from land bases and intended to stay out of range of Japanese bombers. Unfortunately, fighter support became unavailable almost as soon as hostilities commenced, and the Japanese Nell and Betty bombers had a much greater range than suspected by the Allies.