Merchants vs Warships

[Gargamel]

DesirableRoasted made a comment in another thread (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showpost.php?p=1578444&postcount=19) that I think deserves it's own thread, as it would derail the original topic, and by god, we don't go OT here at Subsim.

I always wonder why people use high speeds (my temptation is to go slower, but that's just as inefficient). And shoot at destroyers (the two seem to go hand in hand).

Your job is to sink as much merchant tonnage as possible with the ammunition you are given. So it should be a given you do that as efficiently as possible. Don't waste torpedoes and shells on warships.Yes, I agree our primary mission is the sinking of merchant shipping in hopes of blockading the British Isles.

But is it really a waste to attack a warship or two when that will allow us to sink more merchant shipping? If we find a weakly escorted convoy, or during a harbor raid, we sink the lone ASW craft, allowing us free reign of the docked merchants.

Ie, from a patrol I did early in the war:

17.9.39.
1039 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! HMS Brazen (A&B classes), 1350 tons. Crew: 190. Crew lost: 1
1059 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! HMS Resolution (Revenge class), 31000 tons. Crew: 1199. Crew lost: 11
1107 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! MV Teakwood (Modern Tanker), 7292 tons. Cargo: Crude Oil. Crew: 51. Crew lost: 38
1109 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! SS Ole Wegger (Whale Factory Ship), 12017 tons. Cargo: Aviation Fuel. Crew: 126. Crew lost: 5
1110 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! SS N. T. Nielsen-Alonso (Whale Factory Ship), 12016 tons. Cargo: Aviation Fuel. Crew: 131. Crew lost: 128
1122 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! SS Port Auckland (Ore Carrier), 8085 tons. Cargo: Bauxite. Crew: 86. Crew lost: 15
1127 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! SS Manaar (Large Merchant), 5459 tons. Cargo: Machinery. Crew: 107. Crew lost: 39
1132 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! SS Ixion (Ore Carrier), 8083 tons. Cargo: Iron Ore. Crew: 86. Crew lost: 67
1142 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! SS Talthybius (Ore Carrier), 8084 tons. Cargo: Coal. Crew: 96. Crew lost: 82
1218 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! SS Raranga (Large Merchant), 5460 tons. Cargo: Machinery. Crew: 98. Crew lost: 24
1242 Grid BE 64 Ship sunk! SS Krasnoe Znamya (Tramp Steamer), 2432 tons. Cargo: Coal. Crew: 22. Crew lost: 0

If I had left the lone DD alone, then at best I would have gotten a shot at the Battleship, or maybe the two whale ships. But by taking out the escorts first, I could decimate the convoy.

Opinions? And I'm talking both historically, and game wise, which we know are two separate realities.

[Hottentot]

we sink the lone ASW craft, allowing us free reign of the docked merchants.

Historically speaking I think a sub doing this would have been sunk as soon as they could find someone in the harbor who hadn't died of laughter. In game it's of course a different matter.

Sinking a destroyer does indeed often seem like a waste of resources in most cases, though it is satisfactory to say the least. And I agree that if a convoy has very weak escort and is in the middle of nowehere, then it might be a good idea too. I remember doing it occasionally on Mediterranean when I kept bumping into convoys consisting of only two or three merchants and just one destroyer. Then again, for some reason I often liked sinking the biggest merchant from under their noses anyway.

[danexpat]

1939-vintage British BBs cost about 12,000,000 pounds sterling to manufacture, or $48,000,000 1939 USD, ~ $750 million 2010 USD.

Liberty ships cost about $1.6 million 1941 USD/400,000 pds sterling to manufacture, plus value of cargo, much more than cost of the ship.

But of course, there were only 19 British BBs worldwide and thousands of Liberty ships, so you have to factor in strategic target value. Just talking BBs here, not CVs or CAs.

Here's an excerpt from a good read:

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/history/wwii-campaigns.html

Note that the $$ value of allied military shipping destroyed by Uboats was about 66% of merchant shipping/cargo NOT INCLUDING cost of major capital ships sunk.

APPENDIX 1: CALCULATION OF BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC COSTS
Allies:

A. Merchant Ships:
1. Cost of merchant ships lost to sub attack: 14,687,231 tons lost at $420 a ton.
2. It is assumed that 50% of destroyed ships had cargoes and I have estimated the value of each cargo as equivalent to the price of the ship.
3. American Maritime Commission constructed 5,777 ships of 39,920,000 tons during the war that cost $14.2 billion. It is estimated that only 2/3 were used in the Atlantic (this accords well with 61% reported in Leighton's Global Logistics 1940-43 (p.662) which was prior to the increase in lift necessary to handle Overlord).
4. The English and Canadians produced 11.9 million tons during the war. It is assumed their cost of production was as low as in the U.S.
5. The English started the war with 17,430,000 tons. The Americans started with 8.5 million tons (again only assumed 2/3 used in Atlantic). Additionally the Allies seized 3 million tons of shipping from nations occupied by the Axis.
6. It is assumed that 33% of the total merchant fleet was lost due to inefficiency of convoying. That is 11.36 million tons at $420/ton.
7. Repair costs from U-boat attacks were not included.
8. Total: $14.65 billion.

B. Warships:
1. The Americans had 140 destroyers stationed in the Atlantic. Each cost approximately $10 million. Additionally, they had 56 frigates assigned to the Coast Guard. I've estimated their cost as similar to a new frigate ($2.3 million).
2. During the war, the U.S. produced 520 destroyer escorts (DDE) and 96 frigates (FF) for convoy protection. A DDE cost $5.5 million and a FF cost $2.3 million apiece.
3. The Allies built 61 escort carriers that participated in the campaign at a cost of $12 million a piece.
4. The English and Canadians built or seized 169 DDEs. I've estimated their costs as equivalent to a Hunt class DDE ($6.4 million). They also built 156 frigates, 63 sloops (estimated to cost $4 million), 306 Corvettes, 27 other ASW vessels, and 15 armed merchant cruisers (all estimated at $3 million).
5. The English employed about 302 fleet destroyers during the war.
I've estimated that only 50% of their missions were related to ASW and that they cost the equivalent of an U.S. destroyer (a probable underestimation).
6. The cost of coastal defense craft and minesweepers used for ASW missions was not estimated.
7. The cost of major warships sank by submarines was not used in the estimate. [N.B. - see commens above re: BB cost of manufacture]
8. Total: $10.15 billion.

[desirableroasted]

Game Tactics

The example Gargamel presents is an excellent example of "the theoretical exception proves the rule." If I encountered one ASW escort guarding a BB and a flock of large merchants, whalers, etc., in 1939, then of course the escort is the first target -- I don't care the convoy is alerted, as even their zigzagging presents no great challenge.

But I would have to know in advance it was the only escort, and I am scratching my head trying to recall an instance when I would have had that perfect knowledge.

Even in broad daylight, clear visibility, you rarely can see to the far end of the convoy, unless you use the "X-ray vision lock" exploit. So how are you to know there are no escorts? And in optimal attack conditions (dusk, moderate visibility), you sure aren't going to know.

So, without that knowledge, what do you do? You take down the sheep, not the border collies. If there is only one escort on the flock, that will become apparent soon enough.

Reality

Here, it's just logic. If the merchants are being guarded so carefully by sophisticated escorts, it must mean they are valuable and worth sinking.

And here, the price of replacement, etc, is not particularly relevant. Even cargo value is not necessarily relevant. A box of machine tools, while costing far less than a destroyer, might be essential to making 20 new ones. A merchant and a cargo of wheat don't cost much, but losing 2-3 a week can be the crucial thing in public morale. far more demoralizing than the loss of a destroyer (which might not even be reported in the papers until weeks later).

Game tactics + Reality

Escorts are just a part of the day at the office, and a distraction. My job is to sink merchants. If doing that means I have to sink an escort -- perhaps once out of 25 patrols -- fine, but it is out of necessity. I consider it a wasted torpedo.


But

I like seeing the pesky maggots go KaBoom as much as anyone. But only once in 25 patrols.

Edit

BTW, if you do like taking on escorts and battleships, be up in Narvik on April 10-13, 1940. You will get your fill of both and you will learn more than you want to know about shallow-water defense tactics.

[danexpat]

Very well put, agree 92.6% :03:

It's a bit of a quibble to say cost of replacement isn't necessarily relevant. Obviously, it's as good a proxy as we have to try to get a handle on the value of what you destroy. Let's put it this way: if a kaleun sank the HMS Hood, would it really matter what he did the rest of his career? Of course not.

Personally, I wouldn't engage one of these wandering DD groups any more than I engage coastal merchants. I don't go after anything less valuable than a C2 unless I'm on the last leg of the trip home.

I'm of two minds on targeting the convoy escort thing for the reason you gave: you usually don't know what else is in there unless you've shadowed the thing for a long time. But at the same time, I'm usually greedy and plan on reloading and taking another bite at the apple in a few hours, so taking out the border collie is very tempting.

[U777]

Did anyone ever take a warship down by accident, as in it took the torpedo meant for a merchant?

[Gargamel]

Very well put, agree 92.6% :03:

It's a bit of a quibble to say cost of replacement isn't necessarily relevant. Obviously, it's as good a proxy as we have to try to get a handle on the value of what you destroy. Let's put it this way: if a kaleun sank the HMS Hood, would it really matter what he did the rest of his career? Of course not.

Who sank the Courageous?

Who's the leading Kaleun in tonnage?

which of those two do most people (subsimmer's) know off the top of their heads.

[desirableroasted]

Very well put, agree 92.6% :03:

It's a bit of a quibble to say cost of replacement isn't necessarily relevant. Obviously, it's as good a proxy as we have to try to get a handle on the value of what you destroy. Let's put it this way: if a kaleun sank the HMS Hood, would it really matter what he did the rest of his career? Of course not.


Well, now you are talking apples and oranges. Hood isn't an escort, it is a national icon, and a capital ship, albeit an aging one. And, for game purposes, you can see it as a 36K ton merchant, because it reacts like a merchant. So of course you sink it.

When I say "escort" I mean naval ships that carry out anti-submarine warfare against you in the game. DDs, ASW trawlers, corvettes, etc. As I said, going after them is like going after the border collies rather than the sheep.

[Missing Name]

Most of the small warships (DD, DDE, FF, trawlers...) listed in my sig were self defense. Others were guarding convoys or ports, allowing me to reload torpedoes or even engage on the surface without fear. I would rather use my fish on a merchant or large warship (CV, CVE, CA, CL).

That said, destroyers have such low health that a torpedo makes nice fireworks.

[Tinman764]

There's a line from a documentary I watched recently that stuck in my head. It went along the lines of -
"It was a tonnage war - the aim of the KM and specifically the U-Boat fleet was to sink tonnage at a faster rate than Britain could replace it, either through building or buying."
ASW ships don't normally tip the scales as high as a merchant, therefore to stick with the "big picture" merchant shipping should always be the primary focus - in my opinion.

[reignofdeath]

But in the same respect, as I thing the OP had asked it, in a quite large convoy with around 4 DDE's (I quite usually spot them with this many) you spend one torp on each escort, and its open season on the convoy. Ive done this a few times, and the funny thing is (This is early war mind you), after one sinks, they come after you in a one by one basis which is handy. Ive done it before and once only and I do say it paid off.

But as desirable said, realistic?? Very hardly

Put yourself in the shoes of that Kaluen, is firing at that 1,000 ton escort from open water worth the chance of your life??

or is sneaking in and sinking the 10,000 ton large merchant then using the confused convoy to as a screen to slip away untouched worth it more??

^This is of course if you play DiD

[Gargamel]

Another thing to consider, The kreigsmarine surface fleet was stuck in port most of the time, due mainly to them being vastly outnumbered.

If the Uboatwaffe had made a concerted effort against the warships of the RN, that may have allowed the surface raiders of the OKM to sail more often, the cruisers and battleships could inflict vast more damage against a convoy than a couple u-boats.

Of course, with Donitz only having 20 or so U-boats at the start of the war, this wasn't practical.

[reignofdeath]

Another thing to consider, The kreigsmarine surface fleet was stuck in port most of the time, due mainly to them being vastly outnumbered.

If the Uboatwaffe had made a concerted effort against the warships of the RN, that may have allowed the surface raiders of the OKM to sail more often, the cruisers and battleships could inflict vast more damage against a convoy than a couple u-boats.

Of course, with Donitz only having 20 or so U-boats at the start of the war, this wasn't practical.

So its kind of a grey area? Because one one hand realistically, the U boats should have gone after war ships, less warships means more easy targets for all surface ships. on the other tonnage is what they were supposed to focus on not to mention, intsead of sinking a convoy of easy 'targets' they could have just as easily threatened them to change course and brought them to Germany to use the supplies for them instead. As well as the ships. a cheaper more effective way! lol

[Iranon]

I'm not dogmatic about this. I won't attack lone destroyers, or spend several eels on escorts if I fear there will be new cover before I have made a dent into a convoy.

However, I'll spend the torpedos if blowing up an escort or two means I can sink merchants with my deck gun or when it seems a lot safer than to disengage and sneak away. DiD, and I try to get boat and men back in one piece - I'm not having trash cans dropped on my head if I can avoid it.

Capital ships will be targeted over anything else.

[kapuhy]

I doubt the strategy of going after warships in order to strip merchants of escorts would have worked even with much more U-Boats available. After all, it doesn't cost that much to churn out something like Flower class or ASW Trawlers - just take cheap civilian ship design, mount a gun, DC rack and ASDIC dome and you've got a vessel capable of taking on a U-Boat while being much less expensive. I suspect Allies could produce cheap ASW ships faster than Germans could destroy them, even if they go after warships alone.

Also, for taking out the lonely escort to finish off entire convoy with deck dun - AI is not flexible enough to scramble every plane from nearby airfields, every warship from nearby port and half the escort of other convoys to rescue ships in danger, to disperse a convoy if necessary or to make good attempt at ramming the "clever" U-Boat to death. Or, to start giving out machine guns to every merchant crew before leaving the port. That's why we can try it and real U-Boats couldn't.

[Axeman3d]

In the Grey Wolves Expansion the merchants open up with everything they have on board when they see a surfaced U-boat, including AA machine guns. The deck gun is a much less attractive option then. Lets remember that the window of opportunity is also rather small for this, since the Allies catch on quick and begin putting deck guns on everything large enough to take one. In real life you also had the additional fun of the merchant choosing to try and ram, despite your speed and agility advantage. Anything other than just sit and get shot.

[Randomizer]

I will go out on a limb and observe that the OP demonstrates how much the game can differ from the historical, for whatever reasons and this strikes at the heart of two great mythologies of the submarine wars of the 20th Century.

Myth #1: The Royal Navy in 1917 was against the idea of convoys; and

Myth #2: In 1942 Ernest King was a complete idiot for refusing to convoy American shipping off the Atlantic seaboard.

Well, in WW1 the RN instituted convoys practically from 4 August 1914 to the end and the USN ran troopships in convoy to Iceland, the UK and other Atlantic destinations starting immediately after Pearl Harbor. The problem was that in both cases there was an official belief that an attacking submarine would be able to make multiple attacks on a poorly protected convoy with similar results to what Gargamel achieved in the game.

The reality was somewhat different however as multiple attacks by a single U-Boat proved remarkably rare and required both a skilled, determined and effective U-Boat captain, suitable weather conditions, convoy cohesion. escort effectiveness, the availability of torpedoes to reload and U-Boat fuel state. Only when all these factors (and others) came together were successive attacks by the same boat practical.

In WW1 the RN knew convoys could protect against surface raiders but believed the U-Boat's theoretical ability to attack again and again would make convoys ineffective as an anti submarine measure. They were wrong.

Ernest King, as a submariner himself and steeped in peacetime doctrine (that to all appearnces he treated as dogma) believed that a poorly escorted convoy was worse than no convoy at all because of the theoretical ability of a single submarine to make multiple attacks. He ignored the RN experiance that multiple attacks were the exception rather than the rule and that even an unprotected convoy decreased the likelyhood of any one merchant being detected and so attacked. He too was wrong.

Gargamel's gaming experiance shows that when multiple attacks are possible and the escorting force is less than effective, gunning for warships in the first attack can facilitate subsequent attacks and so is a good tactic in the game. However the game makes multiple successive attacks far easier than they were historically so shooting merchants should have priority in a one-off attack except in self-defence.

The Allies built far more escorts than the German's could build U-Boats. Sinking warships might be great for propaganda purposes and getting that Ritterkruize but with only a few exceptions, it does little substantive for the war effort. Success in the Tonnage War is measured in Gross Registered Tonnage of merchant shipping and not displacement tonnage of warships.

Just $0.02, disregard as desired...

[danexpat]

My earlier comments related back to a literal reading of the thread title, which refers to "warships," not escorts. I don't think there's any serious dispute here among the kind of folks who find this kind of discussion fun/interesting about whether it's a good idea in-game or historically, for a U-boat to ALWAYS take on the convoy escorts first. Clearly it's a situational call. Whatever the limits of the game, my bet is if you've spent any time at all subsimming (I'm a Silent Service II guy from way back) escort ships have given you a boatload of "Game Overs." The fun/horrifying thing about playing sims (for most of us) is that they can be so abruptly unforgiving if you forget Dirty Harry's warning that "A man has to know his limitations." :DL

My take on the question was getting more into a strategic-level discussion of targeting merchant shipping vs. capital ships and whether you can argue that the slider should have been moved one way or the other. Recognizing that the loss of a few extra carriers/BB/BC would have required shifting of assets from different theaters (notably Far East and the Med), changes in fleet composition in theaters where surface battles played a major role wouldn't have been trivial in the big picture.

Personally, I'm fascinated by Roosevelt's decision to overstep his constitutional authority and escalate to de facto hot war with Germany in the Atlantic pre-Pearl Harbor. And I'm not a Pearl Harbor conspiracy theorist, but what was happening in the Atlantic in 1941 dovetailed oh so conveniently with turning the screws on Japan in the run-up to Dec. 7.

Does anybody know of any online sources that show maps of the Atlantic War Zone as defined by the White House from 1940 - 1941?

[Randomizer]

Battleships were entirely irrelevant in the Atlantic except as propaganda tools. They were of course percieved as effective and the trained, experianced lives that were lost when one was sunk were very important but the ships themselves were strategically useless. Legions of manufactured Bismarck mythology notwithstanding.

When the topic of the battleship comes up on the Internet nobody seems to note that the arbiters of sea control had become the submarine, mine, torpedo and airplane way back in WW1. Most battleships spent their entire wartime careers swinging around their anchors, too valuable to use but politically impossible to decommission as the public (and too many admirals) believed that they were still the coinage of sea-power. Those that did sail into combat all too often failed to accomplish their missions and ended up killing their crews when their own ammunition exploded in action. The really effective warships, the carriers, cruisers, destroyers, escorts, submarines and light forces found themselves being worked to death while the battleships sedately acted as "fleets in being" from their secure moorings.

Find any objective historical instance after 8 December 1914 when a exclusively gun-armed capital ship force established and maintained unambiguous sea control.

The greatest harm the U-Boot Waffe did the RN was sinking, in order of value, Ark Royal, Courageous, Eagle, Avenger and the cruiser Edinburgh, the latter not because she was particularly important but her cargo of Soviet gold certainly was. The torpedoing of Royal Oak and Barham had zero impact on the RN's combat capability but made outstandingly bad press nontheless.

Standing by awaiting the flames with Nomex suit and anti-flash cream on...


Does anybody know of any online sources that show maps of the Atlantic War Zone as defined by the White House from 1940 - 1941?

I don't have an on-line source but The Battle of the Atlantic (John Costello and Terry Hughes) has a good visualization of the Pan-American Neutrality Zone and Western Hemisphere Defence Zones from April to 7 December 41. No maps but this might be of interest:

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Framework/ch05.htm

[Gargamel]

I doubt the strategy of going after warships in order to strip merchants of escorts would have worked even with much more U-Boats available. After all, it doesn't cost that much to churn out something like Flower class or ASW Trawlers - just take cheap civilian ship design, mount a gun, DC rack and ASDIC dome and you've got a vessel capable of taking on a U-Boat while being much less expensive. I suspect Allies could produce cheap ASW ships faster than Germans could destroy them, even if they go after warships alone.

Actually, not true. An ASW ship had to be fast and maneuverable. It needed to be able to turn on a dime to make repeated attacks on the same position. How many times in game have you been able to sneak away when the escort DC'ing you made a wrong turn and lost acquisition of you? A slow merchant ASW ship would be nothing but a minor nuisance to a sub.

And they couldn't produce the ships fast enough. PArt of the reason Operation Drumbeat was so successful was that the Americans couldn't start a convoy system fast because they didn't have enough ships to do the job. Even at the outset of the war, The RN had to 'loan' 50 WWI era destroyers from the US because they couldn't produce enough. Also, a lot of the destroyers they initially had were fleet boats, not ASW specialists. While they could do the job, they didn't do it very well.

Roosevelt and other's at the DoW forced King to use multiple various types of ASW work, just like you propose, against King's stern objections. They failed miserably. The most successful boat, it seemed, from the American fleets were Coast guard cutters. They had a lot of success when they became operational.

Most of the shipyards in the US and Britain were mainly tasked with churning out Merchant ships, repairing merchants, repairing Capital Ships, and building new Capital ships, escort carriers seemed to be a favorite. Building ASW escorts became a problem as they just didn't have the logistics to do so quickly.

Another prblem leading to availability of ASW escorts was the War in the pacific. Initially King pledged something like 19 (yes only 19) destroyers to be assigned to the Atlantic convoy system. He ended up sending only like 12, due to transfers into the Pacific and other issues. While the brits were upset about this, King had no choice. The US was fighting a 2 front naval war, in which the majority of the front line forces in one theater had just been decimated.

They actually had to slow down the convoys. Halifax convoys sailed like every 5-6 days, but they had to extend that to every 7-8 days due to a lack of escorts.

I know I'm off slightly on the numbers, not exact quotes, but I'm damn close. This is all off the top of my head after recently reading Blair's first volume.

My point is, IMO, if the germans had made a concerted effort to attack warships in convoys, I think the battle of the atlantic may have turned out differently. BUT, in order to do that, they needed more u-boats and capital ships, and more coordination between the Kreigsmarine and Luftwaffe. For that, the war would have to been delayed a couple years. And that falls back onto the "genius" at the top. If, If, If....

I'm not saying anybody is wrong on their opinions here, we are kind of playing the What if game. But I would like to see more critical thinking on strategic points. Argument for the sake of enlightenment, if you will.

[danexpat]

Find any objective historical instance after 8 December 1914 when a exclusively gun-armed capital ship force established and maintained unambiguous sea control.

No doubt we always fight the last war, don't we? With the advent of carrier task forces and naval aviation, I don't think you should get many (or any) takers on that one. Success at Midway was accomplished really without any U.S. BB presence, so that tells you something right there.

Thanks for the link. Definitely some good clues about how Roosevelt was drawing the map in the Atlantic. Here's the wiki entry for the 38th meridian west. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/38th_meridian_west (Hitler's expansion in March 1940 -- Anybody remember the old Treaty of Tordesillas???) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_tordesillas and here's the 26th meridian west: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/26th_meridian_west (cutting the Atlantic in half)

My point is, IMO, if the germans had made a concerted effort to attack warships in convoys, I think the battle of the atlantic may have turned out differently. BUT, in order to do that, they needed more u-boats and capital ships, and more coordination between the Kreigsmarine and Luftwaffe. For that, the war would have to been delayed a couple years. And that falls back onto the "genius" at the top. If, If, If....

I'm not saying anybody is wrong on their opinions here, we are kind of playing the What if game. But I would like to see more critical thinking on strategic points. Argument for the sake of enlightenment, if you will.

The H-man was definitely a genius -- but with more than a few fatal "issues" and blind spots, eh? One of his critical self-delusions was pointed out by Donitz in lamenting that Hitler somehow thought war with England was avoidable and so didn't build up the Type VII fleet pre-war. Per Donitz, the 1942 U-boat fleet was only 10% of projected due to losses and competing priorities by that time.

[desirableroasted]

Battleships were entirely irrelevant in the Atlantic except as propaganda tools.... the ships themselves were strategically useless.

When the topic of the battleship comes up .... nobody seems to note that the arbiters of sea control had become the submarine, mine, torpedo and airplane way back in WW1. Most battleships spent their entire wartime careers swinging around their anchors, too valuable to use but politically impossible to decommission.... Those that did sail into combat all too often failed to accomplish their missions and ended up killing their crews when their own ammunition exploded in action. The really effective warships, the carriers, cruisers, destroyers, escorts, submarines and light forces found themselves being worked to death while the battleships sedately acted as "fleets in being" from their secure moorings.

Find any objective historical instance after 8 December 1914 when a exclusively gun-armed capital ship force established and maintained unambiguous sea control.

I cannot think of a single example (assuming you meant 1941, not 1914). No comparison is possible between the carrier-plane platform and a battleship -- and Taranto and Pearl Harbor proved it.

Did any major power lay down a battleship/battlecruiser keel after 1945?

[Randomizer]

No doubt we always fight the last war, don't we? With the advent of carrier task forces and naval aviation, I don't think you should get many (or any) takers on that one. Success at Midway was accomplished really without any U.S. BB presence, so that tells you something right there.
Just as a sidebar, the date 8 December 1914 was not a typo for 1941 but rather a nod to the first Battle of the Falkland Islands where Sturdee's battlecruisers destroyed von Spee's East Asia Squadron. This represented arguably the last instance where the big gun established unchallenged sea control.

As for SH3, if you want medals, sink battleships, if you want to help the war effort target merchants or aircraft carriers.

Although I disagree fundimentally with Gargamel's argument re targeting escorts early in the war, it is well articulated and sound in a very narrow sense.

Escorts exist because the things they are escorting are intrinsically more valuable than themselves. This applies to everything from personal bodyguards to billion dollar AEGIS destroyers as part of a CVBG. If you shoot the escorts you are, by definition, letting the high-value targets escape.

Off Okinawa the Kamakazi's did great damage to the USN but the ships to suffer most were the picket escorts and other warships, the Japanese largely expended their resources attacking low value escorting warships while the vital transports recieved much less damage. Had they targeted the troop transports and supply ships they may just have rendered offensive operations on the island impractical. Warships made glamourous targets but the vital ones carried soldiers, Marines, beans, bullets and gas.

In 1982, the loss of the STUFT merchant Atlantic Conveyer and RFA Sir Galahad were almost decisive but most of the Argentine combat power was expended attacking the destroyers and frigates in the sound.

Remember the fifth of Wayne Hughes' Principles of Naval Warfare, The Seat of Purpose is on the Land. The only targets in convoy worthy of a torpedo were merchant ships that allow for the transport of war materal (provided you can sink more than can be built) or aircraft carriers which represent significant threats to the agressor submarine and act as significant force multipliers for the convoying side. Escorts in and of themselves make lousy strategic targets for submarine warfare and prioritizing attacks on them indicates a strategy of desperation rather than victory.

Just $0.02 Ch'ching...

[kapuhy]

Actually, not true. An ASW ship had to be fast and maneuverable. It needed to be able to turn on a dime to make repeated attacks on the same position. How many times in game have you been able to sneak away when the escort DC'ing you made a wrong turn and lost acquisition of you? A slow merchant ASW ship would be nothing but a minor nuisance to a sub.

And they couldn't produce the ships fast enough. PArt of the reason Operation Drumbeat was so successful was that the Americans couldn't start a convoy system fast because they didn't have enough ships to do the job. Even at the outset of the war, The RN had to 'loan' 50 WWI era destroyers from the US because they couldn't produce enough. Also, a lot of the destroyers they initially had were fleet boats, not ASW specialists. While they could do the job, they didn't do it very well.

Roosevelt and other's at the DoW forced King to use multiple various types of ASW work, just like you propose, against King's stern objections. They failed miserably. The most successful boat, it seemed, from the American fleets were Coast guard cutters. They had a lot of success when they became operational.

Most of the shipyards in the US and Britain were mainly tasked with churning out Merchant ships, repairing merchants, repairing Capital Ships, and building new Capital ships, escort carriers seemed to be a favorite. Building ASW escorts became a problem as they just didn't have the logistics to do so quickly.

Another prblem leading to availability of ASW escorts was the War in the pacific. Initially King pledged something like 19 (yes only 19) destroyers to be assigned to the Atlantic convoy system. He ended up sending only like 12, due to transfers into the Pacific and other issues. While the brits were upset about this, King had no choice. The US was fighting a 2 front naval war, in which the majority of the front line forces in one theater had just been decimated.

They actually had to slow down the convoys. Halifax convoys sailed like every 5-6 days, but they had to extend that to every 7-8 days due to a lack of escorts.

I know I'm off slightly on the numbers, not exact quotes, but I'm damn close. This is all off the top of my head after recently reading Blair's first volume.

My point is, IMO, if the germans had made a concerted effort to attack warships in convoys, I think the battle of the atlantic may have turned out differently. BUT, in order to do that, they needed more u-boats and capital ships, and more coordination between the Kreigsmarine and Luftwaffe. For that, the war would have to been delayed a couple years. And that falls back onto the "genius" at the top. If, If, If....

I'm not saying anybody is wrong on their opinions here, we are kind of playing the What if game. But I would like to see more critical thinking on strategic points. Argument for the sake of enlightenment, if you will.

Well, I'll try. A note though - it's just my personal opinion, and I realize that a good chunk of Subsim forums' members knows a lot more about WW2 naval warfare then myself, so if it turns out I'm totally wrong, I'll be more than happy to be corrected and learn something new :)

1) An ideal ASW ship had to be fast and maneuverable, yes, but it still could be quite cheap compared to traditional surface combatants, like full-size destroyers. I may have been unclear in my earlier post - I wasn't aiming at arming random merchants with DC racks, but rather mass producing something like Flower corvettes (the "take civilian ship design" part was referring to the fact that Flower was based on a whale catcher and designed in such a way that it could be built in small civilian shipyards), as a probable counter to German submarines concentrating on escorts. This scenario is a pure attrition warfare, and the side that builds ships faster will win.

2) The idea of concentrating on attacking warships - the problem, as I see it, is that this would practically be delegating a task of wrestling sea control from RN, which was deemed impossible to Kriegsmarine surface fleet, to the U-Boats. And U-Boats, for all their advantages, make poor battle-ships. They can't take on even small warships while surfaced, and while submerged they're too slow to act as a unit (and thus, force a battle and destroy enemy unit). While thay might be effective ambushing warships, this is again situational - the warship in question has to sail into the ambush in first place. Their main advantage is the ability to bypass the escorts and take out escorted ships despite protection - here we order them to forgo that advantage and duke it out with enemy fleet in a war of attrition.

3) On the fact that there were too few escorts - the question is, too few to do what? Their task was to protect merchant ships, and there were many times more merchant ships than warships so they had to split their forces very thin. This doesn't mean that there were so few escorts that U-Boats could easily make a dent big enough to invalidate entire convoy system. Especially if you take into account that actively engaging warships is bound to result in more losses on German side as well. After all, even if we triple the number of U-Boats available at the start of the war, RN escorts alone still outnumber them.

I agree that there may be many specific scenarios when attacking convoy escort instead of trying to sneak past them would have given better results. However, basing entire strategy on the rule that U-Boats (and other Kriegsmarine assets) should try to concentrate on attacking warships and through that diminish their numbers to a point where convoy system would be no more viable - this would be, in my opinion, worse solution for Germans then what they were doing in real life.

[Gargamel]

1) An ideal ASW ship had to be fast and maneuverable, yes, but it still could be quite cheap compared to traditional surface combatants, like full-size destroyers. I may have been unclear in my earlier post - I wasn't aiming at arming random merchants with DC racks, but rather mass producing something like Flower corvettes (the "take civilian ship design" part was referring to the fact that Flower was based on a whale catcher and designed in such a way that it could be built in small civilian shipyards), as a probable counter to German submarines concentrating on escorts. This scenario is a pure attrition warfare, and the side that builds ships faster will win.

I disagree on this point, if you're using the Flower Class as your example.

They were designed for inland/coastal escort duty, and were never intended for ocean going work. They were too small, too slow (A surfaced U-boat could easily, and frequently did, out run them), did not have sufficient DC racks, could not handle storms (crews were rendered ineffective during heavy weather). The RN used Flowers only out of dire neccesity. (Blair, U-boat war I, Index 5600 (sorry, only have kindle version, no page number, but about 30% in)).

Producing an ineffective escort is almost as bad as no escort. The point to sinking escorts first, is because they pose a serious threat to the U-boat. If the escorts being used are a mere nuisance to the attacker, then there is no need to attack them, and just focus on valuable targets.

You can build all the useless ships you want, but If they deemed value-less by the enemy, then it's just a waste of resources. 121 were built, which could have instead made 60-80 destroyers (guessing), which were much more valuable.


For pt 3, my argument could be boiled down to the fact that a poorly escorted convoy is worse than no convoy. You don't see many convertible armored cars do you?

[Sailor Steve]

You can build all the useless ships you want, but If they deemed value-less by the enemy, then it's just a waste of resources. 121 were built, which could have instead made 60-80 destroyers (guessing), which were much more valuable.
The problem is that it takes a lot longer to build a destroyer, and that is amplified by the fact that dock space is limited, and a dock that can outfit one destroyer can outfit two corvettes at the same time. As you say, a matter of necessity.

The Flowers sank or assisted in the sinking of 47 u-boats and 5 Italian submarines.

[Gargamel]

Well, I'll try. A note though - it's just my personal opinion, and I realize that a good chunk of Subsim forums' members knows a lot more about WW2 naval warfare then myself, so if it turns out I'm totally wrong, I'll be more than happy to be corrected and learn something new :)


What he said :D

If you guys haven't figured out, I like in depth discussions that make people think, do research, etc.

But to Steve's comment, how many of those were against rookie subs that a guy in rowboat with some dynamite could have sank? And how many of those were assisted by destroyers with radar?

[Sailor Steve]

But to Steve's comment, how many of those were against rookie subs that a guy in rowboat with some dynamite could have sank? And how many of those were assisted by destroyers with radar?
A good point, and 47 isn't really much compared with the total number of u-boats sunk. And most flowers were part of a team lead by a destroyer. I think it's mainly due to what I said about necessity and dock space. And while a Type VII was one knot faster than a Flower, and a Type IX two knots faster, neither was that fast submerged, and a Flower could follow a sub and drop depth charges just as well as any destroyer. And every destroyer was needed for the fleet, as only they could cruise at the 'Standard' 15 knots.

(see what I did there?)

[danexpat]

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/ASW-51/ASW-10.html

Here's a nifty de-classified summary of ASW tactics during WWII.

Note Fig. 6 "Effect of number of escorts on convoy losses"

One of the biggest problems was that Atlantic convoys' max speed was 9.5 kts.

Here's an interesting table:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/ASW-51/ASW-13.html#table10

Where ASW craft lost sub signal for ~ 22 min, odds of reacquiring were 53%. But only 25% after 90 min of lost signal.

But check out how screwed the U-boats were with the advent of SERIOUS ASW aircraft search techniques c. 1943. Table 12 shows results of 18 sub hunts by U.S. aircraft. Sample size of 18 sub hunts with an average length of 59 hours (!) per hunt. And here's the kicker: they could lose the subs for 14 hours and still reacquire them with an overall hunt success rate of 61%. Ouch. :ping:

So you might be better off manning your flak guns and taking out those PBYs than bothering with destroyers!

[Capt. Morgan]

I believe the debate over the wisdom of stripping convoys of their escorts would never have occured within the real u-boat command.

The accepted tactic employed to deal with escorts was to attack in number (not alone - as SH3 compels the player to do), thus forcing the escorts to divide their attention and leave entire sectors of the convoy undefended.

In-game it is a legitimate tactical decision as wolf-pack attacks are not possible. In the war, you would have radioed in a contact report, and waited for a few of your buddies to arrive.

[danexpat]

The accepted tactic employed to deal with escorts was to attack in number (not alone - as SH3 compels the player to do), thus forcing the escorts to divide their attention and leave entire sectors of the convoy undefended.

In-game it is a legitimate tactical decision as wolf-pack attacks are not possible. In the war, you would have radioed in a contact report, and waited for a few of your buddies to arrive.

Great point.