Did Gemans invent...

[NightCrawler]

Hydrophone? if yes , did the Americans had there own hydrophone, or they copy that when they capture a german U boot?

[Yoriyn]

I read somewhere that the british invent hydrophones to protect convoys from german u-boats in WWI and germans copy british idea in WWII. Don't think americans invent hydrophone, even Blair in Silent War point that the america was far behind europe before WWI in submarine/anti-submarine weapon.

[Tonga]

Regarding hydrophones, I think the Brits were pretty innovative since they already had this technology in WWI and then later refined it to what came known as the ASDIC or active sonar. If I remember it correctly, it was even Rutherford (the guy who is famous for his nuclear research) who invented the hydrophone. Sounded a bit odd to me in the first place, but that's probably why I remember his name in connection to hydrophones.
Concerning ASDIC however the story is a different one. The British had improved their technology and had ASDIC even when WWII started - however it was still rather ineffective, had some flaws and was then greatly improved during the war - necessity is the mother of invention. However they gave this technology to the US for free when WWII broke out and both countries then conducted further research on that basis. Wouldn't deny though that the US had their own hydrophones by that time, and if not, they then definetly got it from the Brits.

[Randomizer]

The British developed the hydrophone during WW1, Von Hesse is correct, one of the key individuals involved was Nobel prize winning physist Ernest Rutherford. Rutherford developed a piezoelectric device that converted sound into an electrical impulse which could be used to create a visual trace of the sound on paper.

By the end of WW1 hydrophones had been widely fitted to ships as small as ASW trawlers and fixed hydrophone arrays had been planted in the Channel to detect transiting submarines. These were the direct forerunners of the Cold War SOSUS arrays placed in the Atlantic and Pacific.

Contrary to popular myth there was no Anti-Submarine Detection Investigation Committee and the fiction that there was gave ASDIC it's name for the same reasons that tanks were first called Tanks, as a deception to camouflage the true function. See Hackman's Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Royal Navy 1914-54.

I believe that the RN shared hydrophone technology with the USN from the winter of 1918 since the former got a big slice of the escort duties in the Atlantic. The first operational ASDIC set did not go to sea until 1920 or so.

[NightCrawler]

So the British came up with hydrophone, and the German use it against them?
Because Hydrophone had a longer range than Sonar.. so the German knows who ever is nearby than the Destroyer....

Specially in early years 39, till the Sonar pops up...

Another question that i stated, what and how did the Americans check underwater when there is a ship nearby? do they pop the scope and look around every 30 minutes?
Or they have there own kind of hydrophone, after all the British invent the hydrophone, and don't want to share with the Americans???

OT,
I know Germany invented V1, V2 rockets, and rocket-fuel, and Jetplanes(Messerschmitt Me 262)
And for the American lucky to bring over Wernher von Braun, to continue making rockets for the NASA....

[Yoriyn]

Submarine in WWI and WWII was more surface ship with ability to dive. So all submarines was sailing at the surface and dive only when needed. I don't think they have other metod in WWI then scope and listen underwater sounds without any devices.

[CCIP]

So the British came up with hydrophone, and the German use it against them?
Because Hydrophone had a longer range than Sonar.. so the German knows who ever is nearby than the Destroyer....


Let's not confuse the terminology and function too much. The difference you're suggesting here is between hydrophone aka. passive sonar, versus ASDIC aka. active sonar. The two have very different methods of detection, although fundamentally both do use sound waves and piezo-electrics to do their job. They are crucially meant to be used in a way that's complimentary.

Nearly all escorts you encounter are equipped with passive sonar/hydrophone, and they're listening just as carefully as you are. Just that the sub can generally afford to be a lot quieter than surface warships, and being far away from the "messy" surface waves does help clarity and range for hydrophone contacts. However this does not mean that surface escorts wouldn't be listening. Now, it's useful as long as whatever you're hunting is making a sound. As soon as it stops - you're kind of on your own there...

Active sonar, on the other hand, can detect large objects irrespective of the noise they're making. These can be also mounted on anything, but for obvious reasons the WWII submarine is not best-advise to emit the loud sounds needed by active sonar to work, because they'll be picked up by those hydrophones that ASW ships are listening for you with.

The submarine always has an advantage in terms of acoustic stealth, but not because of its hydrophones being superior. You can more or less assume that enemy ASW ships will have the same kind of hydrophones as you. It's mainly because the submarine is a quiet platform in normal modes of operation that you have advantage - yeah, you'll hear those escorts first, not because your "hearing" is better because they sail faster and make a heck of a lot more noise than you do. And there's not much they can do about that except outright stop. Which was by the way a tactic used by persistent sub hunters.

Otherwise, at the start of WWII, hydrophone capabilities weren't too far apart between nations. These were a well-established technology, and at least on submarines, did not really evolve much until after the war, when passive sonar operation became a much finer art. The german U-boats maybe had a slight edge, but it was mostly because of the number and quality of 'mics' in their hydrophone arrays, and their cleverly overlapped use of two different different sets of sensors on the top and bottom side of the boat for listening (the GHG and KDB). Everyone else had reasonably good hydrophones available though, both for submarines and ships hunting them.

As far as the Americans, aside from generally operating near the surface or on the surface, there were a few advantages they had. Firstly, US subs' hydrophones consisted of rotatable 'mics' mounted on the bottom of the sub. In theory, they worked on the surface, though in practice the sub needed to be both running slowly and in reasonably calm seas for that to work. Otherwise they certainly had listening capability approaching that of Germans.
But the real strength for the American subs was their radar, which among other things could be operated from periscope depth. The US subs relied extensively on their radars, rather than acoustics, for detecting enemy ships. This is something Germans were far behind in, and unlike the US subs, U-boats never received effective radar capability in any numbers.

[Randomizer]

So the British came up with hydrophone, and the German use it against them?
Because Hydrophone had a longer range than Sonar.. so the German knows who ever is nearby than the Destroyer....

Specially in early years 39, till the Sonar pops up...

Another question that i stated, what and how did the Americans check underwater when there is a ship nearby? do they pop the scope and look around every 30 minutes?
Or they have there own kind of hydrophone, after all the British invent the hydrophone, and don't want to share with the Americans???

OT,
I know Germany invented V1, V2 rockets, and rocket-fuel, and Jetplanes(Messerschmitt Me 262)
And for the American lucky to bring over Wernher von Braun, to continue making rockets for the NASA....
Actually hydrophones = passive sonar. ASDIC = active sonar.

Only US Fleet Boats could cruise submerged using air search radar (SD), surface search radar (SJ) and periscopes for target and threat detection, something not even a Type XXI could do. This in addition to passive and active sonar. The British did share hydrophone/sonar technology with the USN in the early years but American electronics made their sets smaller and generally more reliable.

American Robert Goddard invented the liquid fueled rocket without which the V2 would have been impossible. Von Braun was probably luckier since the agency that he was responsible for made much use of slave labour from concentration camps. Had he not been whisked off the the USA he may very well have ended up in the Soviet Union or Spandau prison for crimes against humanity.

A serving RAF officer named Frank Whittle developed the turbo jet engine at the same time as German university student Hans von Ohain. The German's flew the first jet powered aircraft but the British were close behind and Whittles' design was superior to Ohain's in many respects.

The German navy's active sonar was inferior to the RN sets in most respects from the start but German passive sets (hydrophones) were first class.

[CCIP]

It's also worth mentioning that hydrophones were never a primary detection method for submarines in WWII. Everybody at the start of WWII relied on submarines to hunt down their prey by first spotting it on the surface, either by periscope or by lookouts on the bridge. This was especially true of the Germans, and all their successful tactics (most notably the wolfpack) relied on submarines being able to keep visual contact with their prey, without diving.

Americans pioneered the use of radar, and it was very much the primary means of detection for their submarines through the later half of the war.

Sonar as such came into its own with the advent of true submarines after WWII. Once it became clear that subs would never be able to rely on being able to sneak up on a target through visual contact on or near the surface (because radars could pick up not only surfaced subs, but even periscopes sticking out) or radar (with the advent of effective RW receivers that would make sending radar signals towards your target as attention-drawing as sending loud pings of sound towards it), sound detection became the only viable means for them to work. Then things got really fancy with sonar, even though most of the basic principles of how it works remained essentially the same - it was mostly the depth and versatility of tools for analyzing sounds picked up by the sub's hydrophones that changed, along with ever-improving quality of microphones. However until that kind of sophistication made them important, basic hydrophones were really only of secondary importance to subs.

[Randomizer]

It's also worth mentioning that hydrophones were never a primary detection method for submarines in WWII. Everybody at the start of WWII relied on submarines to hunt down their prey by first spotting it on the surface, either by periscope or by lookouts on the bridge. This was especially true of the Germans, and all their successful tactics (most notably the wolfpack) relied on submarines being able to keep visual contact with their prey, without diving.
With all respect I don't think that is entirely accurate since as I understand it, American pre-war submarine doctrine included provisions for submerged detection, approach and attack by passive sonar alone with active sonar just used for getting the final bearing and firing range.

The problem was that without the computer support for solving the target motion analysis problems that were developed post-war, the technique was theoretically sound but practically useless. As far as I know not one submerged sonar attack was successful, at least in the Pacific.

[CCIP]

With all respect I don't think that is entirely accurate since as I understand it, American pre-war submarine doctrine included provisions for submerged detection, approach and attack by passive sonar alone with active sonar just used for getting the final bearing and firing range.

The problem was that without the computer support for solving the target motion analysis problems that were developed post-war, the technique was theoretically sound but practically useless. As far as I know not one submerged sonar attack was successful, at least in the Pacific.

Ah yeah, fair enough, I had heard of that, although this is why I also point out "successful german tactics" in the same paragraph later. I'm definitely talking about practice more than theory - a tactic in the books doesn't mean a successful tactic. I don't doubt that theories about making submerged-only approaches have been floating around since sonar was first invented, and might have even been in doctrine and on the books. However like you say, without more sophisticated TMA among other things, these were not a practical success.

I'm sure many a useful contact was picked up by hydrophone first, too. But all in all, I think all successful uses of WWII-era large submarines capitalized on them being able to survey the surface by eyeball or radar. As soon as they were unable to do that (like u-boats were unable to do once the Allied radar got sophisticated and widespread enough), these submarines became instantly obsolete along with their whole doctrine. Attempts to work around that with things like snorkels were marginally successful at best.

[Randomizer]

...this is why I also point out "successful german tactics" in the same paragraph later. I'm definitely talking about practice more than theory - a tactic in the books doesn't mean a successful tactic. I don't doubt that theories about making submerged-only approaches have been floating around since sonar was first invented, and might have even been in doctrine and on the books. However like you say, without more sophisticated TMA among other things, these were not a practical success.
This is very true and one should never forget that military theory all too often fails when confronted by military fact. According to RN pre-war ASW theory, ASDIC rendered the submarine essentially harmless. How did that prediction turn out for them?

[NightCrawler]

So, that's means that German U-boots are far advantage than the American submarine i mean in 1939?

I think Germans was pretty advantage not only in U boots, but also in planes, machine guns, tanks.

Even if you want to compare with VII class and Gato or Class SS33...

I think VII class u boots are tights, compare with the Gato class, nice and spacey...

please correct me if I'm wrong.

[Yoriyn]

You right.

But pacific war do not force americans to build smaller submarines. The bigger distances between the patrol-home and weaker japanese ASW tactic give them bigger construction tolerance ratio.

From the other hand WWII is a example when quantity is more important then quality.

[Randomizer]

So, that's means that German U-boots are far advantage than the American submarine i mean in 1939?

I think Germans was pretty advantage not only in U boots, but also in planes, machine guns, tanks.

Even if you want to compare with VII class and Gato or Class SS33...

I think VII class u boots are tights, compare with the Gato class, nice and spacey...

please correct me if I'm wrong.
My take is that it is futile to compare the 1939 U-Boat waffe with the submarine force of the USN. There only similarities is that both used diesel-electric submersibles designed to perform certain duties.

The former was created specifically for war on commerce and in the North Atlantic. All equipment, doctrines and training focused on that operational goal. When war came, they were ready and subject to politically imposed restrictions that eventually fell away, were generally able to fight the war that they had prepared for. When the U-Boats had to act in conjunction with the surface forces as in Norway during 1940 and in support of the Bismarck sortie and with surface forces in the Arctic, they can be judged an epic failure as is only reasonable to expect.

The USN's submarine force was trained and equipped to act in concert with the Battle Force's aim of fighting and winning a decisive battle using battleships supported by aircraft carriers. Their role was scouting and their targets exclusively enemy warships. Hence the large long-ranged, fast and well armed Fleet Boat had evolved to fill this particular tactical niche. America had totally rejected commerce war using submarines, the U-Boat campaign in 1917 had brought the USA into WW1 and in 1939 acting in a like manner was unthinkable. Pearl Harbor changed all that and over night the US submarine arm had to switch gears and fight the kind of war that was unanticipated and for which they lacked even basic doctrinal and training preparation.

It says a great deal for the overall flexibility of the USN that they were able to become as effective as they were, despite huge and painful errors of which the 1941-43 MkXIV torpedo crisis was only one. The Fleet Boats proved to be superb commerce destroyers in the vastness of the Pacific. Had the USN gone the route of the KM pre-war (and there were some on the Navy General Board who advocated smaller submarines), the story of the only successful unrestricted submarine campaign may have been written differently.

Many people around here like to compare the Type VII with the Fleet Boats but they are similar only in that they represented what their respective navy's considered to be the ideal weapon for their specific tactical role. The only U-Boat that was similar in size and capabilities to the Fleet Boat was the Type IXD2 U-Cruiser and it was inferior in speed, torpedo armament and habitability.

As for pre-war aircraft, it is good to remember that with only a few exceptions, every USAAF aircraft was a pre-war design. Thunderbolt, Mustang, Hellcat, Avenger, Lightning, B17, B-29, B-24, B-25, B-26, Dauntless and others, all pre-war designs and all equal or superior to anything of pre-1941 design flown by the Luftwaffe.

Can already feel the flames approaching for posting this so it's on with the NOMEX and apologies for droning on...

[Yoriyn]

You not correct about this some of the aircraft. Maybe they pre-war designed but build later. First Mustang flight in Oct1940 but introduced 1942, lightning introduced in 1941. Same situation was in germany and other countries. FW190 pre-war design introduced in 1941, even jetengine Me262 disigned in april 1939 (still pre-war) introduced in 1942.

[Randomizer]

You not correct about this some of the aircraft. Maybe they pre-war designed but build later. First Mustang flight in Oct1940 but introduced 1942, lightning introduced in 1941. Same situation was in germany and other countries. FW190 pre-war design introduced in 1941, even jetengine Me262 disigned in april 1939 (still pre-war) introduced in 1942.
I said designed and meant designed. Virtually every belligerant fought primarily with weapons that were built or on the drawing boards before they entered the war. That many of these changed beyond recognition (the BF-109 being an good example) indicates a soundness of design that allowed later versions to incorporate wartime improvements. As for the ME-262 it was certainly a pre war design but you reject the P-38 Lightning and it was in squadron service fully two years before the Messerschmidt; You cannot have it both ways.

I never said there are not exceptions, there are always some and a number of them were significant.

[Jimbuna]

With reference to OP....a short article:

http://www.ob-ultrasound.net/hydrophone.html

[NightCrawler]

I didn't say about German are better, i mean as "ADVANTAGE"...

I didn't say that Mustang(plane) are crappy, they pretty fast, maybe faster than ME109...

How about B17, there is no German plane that big and to many guns on board LOL..

Advantage also mean Technology.. i know that ME262 flew a couple of test flight but didn't make the war because the Allies bomb the hell out of RUHR.

In comparing with 2 difference boots, ok try a difference boot like the IXB vs Gato class???

[Hans Uberman]

The P-51 was much faster than the BF-109 (ME-109) once it had the merlin engine installed. (P-51D having 437 mph vs the BF-109 G-6 with 398 mph) Some late war variants came close though, but they still lacked the range of the P-51 and due to increased weight, lost some of the maneuverability that they once had. In spring of 1945 they are said to have tested a BF-109 K-14 with only one 30mm cannon, but it could reach 460mph. The ME-262 pilots claimed about 500+ kills, and had more been produced they might have actually stopped daytime bombing raids for a time.

Don't get me wrong though, I love the Messerschmitt BF-109. It's a really neat plane.

[CCIP]

Haha, the old "U-boats win!" vs. "Fleet boats win!" argument. Never gets anywhere...

The "advantage" is very relative, because for one thing, the US and German submarines were not weapons designed to fight against each other in any way, or even to fight in the same theater and for the same purpose. You can argue all you want about technology, but technology is never separate from (a) doctrine; (b) how well that doctrine survives contact with actual combat.

In many regards, US Fleet Boats were more technologically sophisticated than U-boats. They had a much more powerful and versatile propulsion system; they had sophisticated electronic control of diving systems whereas most U-boats still relied on turning valves by hand. Finally, the US boats had radar more or less available at the start of the war, or soon thereafter. This is something that they used to devastating effectiveness. But all those pieces of technology were, initially, designed for a role very different than German boats, and this was reflected in performance. You have to keep in mind that the Fleet Boat, going by the name, was designed mainly to keep up with a battle fleet, serving as scouts and ambushers - something that looked good on paper but in practice was hardly useful. However they had all the fittings of a fleet unit, including speed, range and stability needed for their envisioned mission. They were generally a more versatile platform, being designed to fill a few possible tasks within fleet operations - scouting, ambushing, rescue, special operations, radio relay, and so on and so forth. And they had to be able to hunt all manner of prey, from super-dreadnought to junk.

U-boats' advantages included a much smaller profile, rugged construction, and all your classic stereotypes of German engineering - they really were much simpler machines, but made no compromises on performance and precision. They did everything possible to cut down the profile of the boat and enhance the crew's ability to be able to see and strike the enemy first, and fight primarily on the surface at night without ever diving except to evade after being spotted. They, particularly the smaller Type VII boats, also proved far better suited to surviving determined ASW efforts of the allies than larger boats were. The large WWII U-boat, whether VII of IX, was always designed as a commerce raider. There was no demand for it to keep up with fleet units. There was demand to build as many of them as possible, and the fact that the German leadership dragged their feet on building them frustrated Doenitz. The bar for German boats, as it were, was a lot lower - unlike fleet units, they only really needed to be good at one thing and one thing only: sinking merchant ships in the Atlantic. As such, they were the most simple and practical solution to this task, without any frills.

But the real difference was suitedness to theater and doctrine, where there is also no clear 'advantage' or winner. The u-boats' advantage early in the war had little to do with technology in and of itself - but rather with how well they suited Doenitz's doctrine on the one hand, and how effective that doctrine was until defeated by radar and other ASW methods. Doenitz correctly guessed what kind of boat was best-suited to wolfpack tactics in the North Atlantic, and as soon as he had enough of them (by 1941), he got them doing what they were designed to do. However the doctrine didn't evolve fast enough. By 1943, this advantage turned into a massive disadvantage, because the boats were hardly suitable for the conditions that existed in the Atlantic theater from then on. In the theater(s) they were designed for, U-boats were ultimately obsolete and doomed to fail by the end of the war. It truly did not help that they were a small, single-minded, single-objective design that left little room for technological 'frills' that could have made some difference.

The US Fleet Boat doctrine, on the other hand, was massively flawed at the beginning of the war and much of the equipment and layout of the boats initially proved badly-suited to success. It took a realization that the submarine was not a fleet scout but primarily a commerce raider to deploy them effectively. Once this realization came, US boats proved to be extremely capable weapons for their task, vastly technologically superior to their opponents (i.e. the Japanese ASW), with overwhelming advantage in detection ability that U-boats could only dream of.

So, in their respective theaters, while the German U-boats were designed around an effective doctrine early on, the US boats were quickly adapted to an effective doctrine. Whereas, compared to their true opponents (enemy ASW) the U-boats were technically obsolete, ineffective and thus defeated, US boats were technologically superior, devastatingly effective, and ultimately won in their campaign.

But again, comparing boats directly is useless. They were never designed to fight each other or fight in the same theater, with the same goals. All other comparisons, taken outside a strategic context, just become "my boats are better"! pissing contests...

[NightCrawler]

I never red or heard anything about a sea battle between IXB vs Gato class close to NY coast...

I think most US subs are in the pacific fighting agains the japs...
CCIP is right...

[CCIP]

Subs in WWII were never really built to hunt other subs - not to say that some didn't. But all of the sub sinkings (that I know of) by other subs were essentially ambushes, with one sub never knowing of the presence of the other or intending to fight back. The British subs were generally masters of ambushes like this, using their subs as traps outside of German ports, and indeed achieved some success against U-boats this way.

American subs did operate in the Atlantic, if only temporarily. They did not achieve much success, not because they couldn't, but because there weren't any German targets left in the Atlantic by late 1942.

[Yoriyn]

Whereas, compared to their true opponents (enemy ASW) the U-boats were technically obsolete, ineffective and thus defeated, US boats were technologically superior, devastatingly effective, and ultimately won in their campaign.

You forgot to say about one very important thing. This thing is ULTRA, that mostly decided who lose and who won.

Allies know every u-boat position, course, speed in the atlantic campaign in effect they form special hunter-killer groups, or sent planes to destroy the germans boat.

The USA was in completly oposite situation, they know the japanese ships position, thay sent boat to intercept the convoy ot task force.

You just can't say germans u-boats was bad thats why they lose. They was (Kriegsmarine) on defeted position even before a war start.

From the other hand crappy sherman tanks won the war with germans tanks. This negate your conclusion.

[razark]

You just can't say germans u-boats was bad thats why they lose. They was (Kriegsmarine) on defeted position even before a war start.
Which would be why he said:
The "advantage" is very relative...
...technology is never separate from (a) doctrine; (b) how well that doctrine survives contact with actual combat.
There's a lot going on in a war. You can't really just look at one aspect and say "this is why they lost/won". The u-boats has a lot going for them early on, but they couldn't adapt to the new situation. The fleet boats had to adapt to a new role, after a bad start to the war. They really had to change their doctrine, as most of the battle fleet was sitting on the bottom of Pearl Harbor.

From the other hand crappy sherman tanks won the war with germans tanks. This negate your conclusion.
And that has what to do with the submarine war?


Haha, the old "U-boats win!" vs. "Fleet boats win!" argument. Never gets anywhere...
But everybody has so much fun! (And maybe it's a chance for fans of one side to learn something about the other side.)

[Draka]

The point about the tank situation is one constantly brought up by amateur historians - the remark by a captured German officer upon being accosted by a snotty American junior officer about "Not such a master race, huh?" or words to that effect was "We ran out of tanks before you ran out of anti-tank shells". The point being that American production so vastly out-produced losses by "inferior" equipment that quantity won out over quality.

It of course is a lot more complicated than that - but people always like to reduce complex situations to simple slogans/solutions.

[Yoriyn]

I do not see the point of this discussion. I don't believe someone can persuade something to anyone. Instead of arguing I recomend to turn our interest into the history books and try to find the ansewrs there. :timeout:

[nikbear]

And as everybody knows,Fleetboats had 'Icecream' machines on them!!!:woot::yeah::rock:
Anyone who fits that to a war machine is always gonna win!:arrgh!::sunny::03:

[Ducimus]

And as everybody knows,Fleetboats had 'Icecream' machines on them!!!:woot::yeah::rock:
Anyone who fits that to a war machine is always gonna win!:arrgh!::sunny::03:

It's not like this was standard equipment. They were actually jury rigged by the crew. To get a better understanding of the whole ice cream machine, you should read chapter 7 from this book. (http://books.google.com/books?id=tCjTUVCa6H4C&lpg=PA105&ots=nBxNCnpN6-&dq=officer%20in%20charge%20of%20ice%20cream&pg=PA102#v=onepage&q=officer%20in%20charge%20of%20ice%20cream&f=false)

[NightCrawler]

American forces or British SAS captured a U-boot just for Enigma code machine, or was that a fairy tale?
I'm pretty sure i red somewhere, in 1943 an American Special forces captured a u-boot for enigma machine, to break the code later and than the US & UK knows whereabouts the U Boot locations...

Like the movie U-507 so basically U-boot battle vs a Milk cow(which normally unarmed), unless they use another VII class to send it out to help another U boot to fix(which i doubt).

As CCIP already said, there is no way to attack a submerged uboot fire a torp to another u boot..

I know movies everything is possible, even the using a Deckgun to shoot off the "RADIO-SHACK".. lesser than 500 feet lmao, normaly they will shoot with MG42 at ya.. but U 507 is a very good action movie....

But "DAS BOOT" beats them all, even it was an anti-war movie, just a movie "how is life on a tight u-boot"...

[Gargamel]

American forces or British SAS captured a U-boot just for Enigma code machine, or was that a fairy tale?
I'm pretty sure i red somewhere, in 1943 an American Special forces captured a u-boot for enigma machine, to break the code later and than the US & UK knows whereabouts the U Boot locations...

Like the movie U-507 so basically U-boot battle vs a Milk cow(which normally unarmed), unless they use another VII class to send it out to help another U boot to fix(which i doubt).

As CCIP already said, there is no way to attack a submerged uboot fire a torp to another u boot..

I know movies everything is possible, even the using a Deckgun to shoot off the "RADIO-SHACK".. lesser than 500 feet lmao, normaly they will shoot with MG42 at ya.. but U 507 is a very good action movie....

But "DAS BOOT" beats them all, even it was an anti-war movie, just a movie "how is life on a tight u-boot"...

:doh:

[frau kaleun]

American forces or British SAS captured a U-boot just for Enigma code machine, or was that a fairy tale?
I'm pretty sure i red somewhere, in 1943 an American Special forces captured a u-boot for enigma machine, to break the code later and than the US & UK knows whereabouts the U Boot locations...


Bits and pieces of the Kriegsmarine's crypto-technology had been obtained by the British from various sources as early as August 1939, but they got hold of a working Kriegsmarine Enigma machine (and much of the "secret" documentation that went with it) when the Royal Navy attacked and captured U-110 in May 1941. They did not engage U-110 with the intention of seizing items which would allow an intelligence breakthrough, they were just doing their job by attacking the enemy. Getting what they did off the boat before it sank was a bonus.

The Kriegsmarine altered their system later in 1941 and it took a couple years before Allied intelligence caught up completely. The only u-boat captured by US forces was U-505, and that was in summer (?) 1944 - at which point German naval communications were already being deciphered and read almost in "real time" so I doubt that the seizure of U-505 was of much importance with regard to unraveling Enigma. And once again the attack on this boat was not instigated for the purpose of obtaining vital military intelligence.

I do seem to remember reading somewhere that British attacks on German weather-reporting ships might have been undertaken in the hopes of getting hold of some of the crypto-stuff they carried... but I'm not sure. Some of what the British had did come from attacks on ships other than u-boats, but AFAIK no u-boat was ever attacked for the specific purpose of trying to obtain an Enigma machine or other related items.

[Jimbuna]

American forces or British SAS captured a U-boot just for Enigma code machine, or was that a fairy tale?


http://hubpages.com/hub/U-110-and-the-Enigma

[nikbear]

It's not like this was standard equipment. They were actually jury rigged by the crew. To get a better understanding of the whole ice cream machine, you should read chapter 7 from this book. (http://books.google.com/books?id=tCjTUVCa6H4C&lpg=PA105&ots=nBxNCnpN6-&dq=officer%20in%20charge%20of%20ice%20cream&pg=PA102#v=onepage&q=officer%20in%20charge%20of%20ice%20cream&f=false)

Thank you Ducimus:salute: Reminds me,I really should be buying more Sub books:up:

[Madox58]

Not to derail this whole thread.........
But who the hell is Gemans?
:hmmm:

[frau kaleun]

Not to derail this whole thread.........
But who the hell is Gemans?
:hmmm:

I'm not sure, but I think he's the guy who invented suspenders.

[Tessa]

Bits and pieces of the Kriegsmarine's crypto-technology had been obtained by the British from various sources as early as August 1939, but they got hold of a working Kriegsmarine Enigma machine (and much of the "secret" documentation that went with it) when the Royal Navy attacked and captured U-110 in May 1941. They did not engage U-110 with the intention of seizing items which would allow an intelligence breakthrough, they were just doing their job by attacking the enemy. Getting what they did off the boat before it sank was a bonus.

The Kriegsmarine altered their system later in 1941 and it took a couple years before Allied intelligence caught up completely. The only u-boat captured by US forces was U-505, and that was in summer (?) 1944 - at which point German naval communications were already being deciphered and read almost in "real time" so I doubt that the seizure of U-505 was of much importance with regard to unraveling Enigma. And once again the attack on this boat was not instigated for the purpose of obtaining vital military intelligence.

I do seem to remember reading somewhere that British attacks on German weather-reporting ships might have been undertaken in the hopes of getting hold of some of the crypto-stuff they carried... but I'm not sure. Some of what the British had did come from attacks on ships other than u-boats, but AFAIK no u-boat was ever attacked for the specific purpose of trying to obtain an Enigma machine or other related items.

U-110 was one of the cases in history where a fumble and deriliction of duty can be directly connected to the deaths of 100's of sailors. Lemp was a fool to assume that the sub was going to sink from the flooding, they didn't bother to set any of the charges or go to the engineering panel that opens all the ballast tanks to flood when he jumped ship.

Since they were abandoning ship there was no reason not to open the hatch to the aft compartment which they thought was full of acid fumes from seawater flooding the batteries; its true there was some when the crew boarded the ship but it was nothing close to being fatal. He was just scarred to open that hatch; the least he could have done while his men exited the ship. Had the compartment really been flooded with gas it would have started ventilating as almost all the crew was out, if that were the case he would have likely passed out and died from drowning instead.

If he waited until there was only just the officers or last few crew left waiting to exit to open the hatch he would've discovered it wasn't full of gas, then would have had ample time to properly turn the switches on the special panel (forget what exactly it was called, basically was used to help further ensure scuttling of the ship as it opened up all the tanks to flood with water and kept the vents from closing so water would rush into the sub extremely fast) that would have likely prevented the boarding party from getting inside the sub at all. Had he been a real captain he would've stayed there and manualy destroyed the enigma rotors and gone down with the ship; he would have been a hero.

When the other POW's found out that U-110 was captured they held a tribunal so to speak and the decision was to execute him once he came into the camp. They had to segregate him from the other POW's when the got wind he was to be hung once the lights went out and he was in the camp. Kretschmer remarked something to the likes of "so many hundreds of sailors could have been saved if Lemp fullfilled his ultimate responsibilty (in scuttling) as the captain and ensured all secret documents and materials were destroyed before leaving the ship, else he should go down with them to ensure they didn't fall into enemy hands."

Which they did so the British got to read ALL the Kriegsmarine's mail for next year and then some. If you ever wondered why all the supply ships like the Belchen one or the Corrientes (and some other ones not in the game) suddenly disapear it was because of Lemp's failure. These supply ships were starting to cause major problems in Africa and caused them to divert a lot of ASW resources to that area; so they decided to one by one take each of the supply ships out and sank the next couple that were sent out to replace the lost ones. They were originally setup to supply the Bismark and the commerce raiders, since the surface fleet was a large failure they ended up being an enormous asset to the u-boats and Donitz began to rely on them to help extend patrols and keep boats more boats out at sea. Right when they were starting to be used to their full potential the British were quick to take action and sweep the ocean clean of all of them.

[frau kaleun]

When the other POW's found out that U-110 was captured they held a tribunal so to speak and the decision was to execute him once he came into the camp. They had to segregate him from the other POW's when the got wind he was to be hung once the lights went out and he was in the camp.

I'm pretty sure you're thinking of someone other than Lemp here - although there have been different theories as to how and what became of him, he did not survive to be taken prisoner when U-110 was lost.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz-Julius_Lemp#U-110

Hans-Joachim Rahmlow, however, was "convicted" of cowardice by other POWs in a makeshift trial presided over by Kretschmer, who was already a POW by the time U-570 was captured. Unlike U-110, U-570 did not sink and was towed back to Britain - this was the u-boat that the Brits salvaged and recommissioned into the RN as the HMS Graph.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Graph_(P715)#German_response

[Tessa]

I'm pretty sure you're thinking of someone other than Lemp here - although there have been different theories as to how and what became of him, he did not survive to be taken prisoner when U-110 was lost.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz-Julius_Lemp#U-110

Hans-Joachim Rahmlow, however, was "convicted" of cowardice by other POWs in a makeshift trial presided over by Kretschmer, who was already a POW by the time U-570 was captured. Unlike U-110, U-570 did not sink and was towed back to Britain - this was the u-boat that the Brits salvaged and recommissioned into the RN as the HMS Graph.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Graph_(P715)#German_response (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Graph_%28P715%29#German_response)

Forgot actually that Lemp was shot in the water and wasn't taken prisioner at all actually. This was from CB that I remembered about why the blame was squarely on his shoulders,

"Peter Hansen, wrote that Lemp's "irresponsible disregard of the standing orders to destroy all secret matters is directly responsible that thousands of U-Boat men died needlessly and hundreds of U-Boats were destroyed as a consequence. While the radio shack staff and officers were also partially responsible for this disaster, the principal culprit was Lemp himself. If the English did not shoot Lemp, the he should have been put up against a wall be Germans for his irresponsibility and neglection of duty.

Harsh words, these, but the thrust is correct. Lemp has a duty to protect Enigma at all costs, including if necessary his life. He should not have left U-110 until he was certain beyond any doubt that she was going down-and going down fast" pp287 v1

Since the explosives couldn't be setup in time due to the circumstances and being peppered by gunfire he could have at least done what a other previous captians had done and broken open the Enigma and taken out it rotors, giving one to each officer and have them toss it overboard. In water that deep there would have been no chance to of a diver retrieval operation and in water that cold it would have been suicide for anyone on the boarding ships to dive in the water and dive after them.

Trying to spot underwater, at night one particular object amist all the debris already in the water is a huge longshot. Had someone by lucky and plucked one as it was sinking I doubt they would have made it back in that freezing water being forced to dive underwater and swim submerged just accelerates the freezing process and likely would have died before they could swim to the surface and throw it on board a nearby ship; or die clutching it so tightly that (assuming that they were still buyout enough) that when they floated to the surface the body would be cluching the rotor.

[Randomizer]

"Peter Hansen, wrote that Lemp's "irresponsible disregard of the standing orders to destroy all secret matters is directly responsible that thousands of U-Boat men died needlessly and hundreds of U-Boats were destroyed as a consequence. While the radio shack staff and officers were also partially responsible for this disaster, the principal culprit was Lemp himself. If the English did not shoot Lemp, the he should have been put up against a wall be Germans for his irresponsibility and neglection of duty.

Harsh words, these, but the thrust is correct. Lemp has a duty to protect Enigma at all costs, including if necessary his life. He should not have left U-110 until he was certain beyond any doubt that she was going down-and going down fast" pp287 v1
It is always handy to have a scapegoat, one that can absorb all of the blame while being unable to answer the charges of the Monday morning quarterbacks.

Anybody who has ever been in a life and death situation and survived can replay the available options after the fact until the cows come home but what was done was done. We cannot know what ran through KL Lemp's mind as he struggled in the icy Atlantic, we know he died but the actual details are in dispute and will never be known for certain.

In any event, when it comes to the RN cracking ENIGMA there was a vast amount of "blame" within the KM establishment to go around. There was the absolute denial on the part of Doentiz and his staff that ENIGMA could be broken. There was numerous instances of the Luftwaffe and the Army retransmitting naval messages in less secure code that were priceless "cribs" for the decoders in Britain and the USA. And of course there was the radical brilliance of Roger Winn and his staff in the Submarine Tracking Room that, even without the text of BdU's messages were able, more often than not, to see where the U-Boats were and anticipate what they would do next.

Blaming one man for the failures of an entiire system is just wrong.

The capture of the ENIGMA from U-110 was very important, no argument there but the personification of responsibility solely on the shoulders of KL Fritz-Julius Lemp is both superficial and inaccurate.

See the book Very Special Intelligence by Betchley Park codebreaker Patrick Beesley to get an idea of how great the signal intelligence failures of the Nazi's really were. Blaming one U-Boat skipper for all the systemic signals errors committed by the Werhmacht does nothing to improve the understanding of what actually happened and why.