Speculate for $h!t$ and giggles... [Archive]

WernherVonTrapp

08-19-10, 07:10 PM

In my opinion, I think the war with Japan was inevitable and, if not on Dec. 7th, 1941, then in a proximity not far from that date. You have to remember Japan's overall sentiment toward the United States at the time. Besides feeling as if the Washington Conference (of 1921/22 I think) was directed specifically toward them, by the U.S., in an effort to stem Japanese interests in the Pacific (I know, an oversimplified perspective), they also felt left out and betrayed after their WWI alliance with the U.S./Great Britain (i.e., Treaty of Versailles stuff). Add to that the oil and steel embargo, which the Japanese desperately needed at that time, being (after all) an island, they had really no choice but to time the Dec. 7th attack with their desire to capture the oil reserves of the Dutch East Indies. Don't forget, the Japanese people were in an increasingly impoverished state at the beginning of their expansionist efforts in 1935 China. This, they attributed to the betrayal by the U.S. for their efforts in WWI. The Washington Conference and the Oil/Scrap Metal embargo that followed raised Japanese anti-American sentiments to a feverish state.
Had all these factors come to a head earlier, or perhaps later, in history, then I think there might be some question as to the timing of a war with Japan, and if that war would have ever occurred. Why do you think Gen. Billy Mitchell and Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner were already predicting a war with Japan many years before 1941 in the first place? Because, under all the circumstances at that time, it was inevitable and, in the foreseeable future. Ahh, but we're just speculating right?
Anyway, a great book which spells it all out in great detail is, "The Eagle and the Rising Sun" by Alan Schom.;)

Sailor Steve

08-19-10, 09:00 PM

Fixed. :D Meh. Brit's, tommy's, whatever. :O:
Well, technically "tommies" is the plural. "Tommy's" indicates something owned by Tommy.

Same goes for "Brits" and "Brit's".
:rotfl2::O:

Stealhead

08-19-10, 10:47 PM

Let us not forget about War Plan Orange which had its origins way back even before WWI.I think the US got concerned long term about Japan after they beat the Russian Navy in 1905 this event proved they where a threat way back then.

We really got lucky at Pearl as well sorry I am not into the conspires we new an attack was possible but not the exact time and place and at the same time we where very complaisant and looked down on the Japanese as being inferior and not capable of such tact(they often had the same view of us),had they have destroyed our carriers at Pearl or been able to sink most of them in 1942 they would more or less have had total domination of the Pacific WWII in the Pacific was much closer than many people realize.

Randomizer

08-19-10, 11:56 PM

Couple of thoughts...

After the battle at Nomonhan in August 1939, war with the United States became inevitable in my opinion. With the Soviet Army trouncing the Japanese in Outer Mongolia, the Imperial Army's Northern Strategy was discredited completely so there was nowhere to go but south. Any incursions towards NIE or Malaysia meant a threat to the Philippines and that would have been unacceptable to America.

Defecation and comedy aside, you might want to frame your speculation as to how and what factors that made hostilities an option in the real world changed to take war off the table. Otherwise we're just tilting at windmills and this could get General Topics ugly real fast.

For example:

What if Wendell Willkie beats Roosevelt in the 1940 election?

What if Japan offers concessions or cease fire in China in exchange for a free hand in French IndoChina?

What if the government in NEI appeased the Japanese government by breaking the US oil embargo?

Something would have had to have happened very differently to prevent an Japanese-American war. Pure speculation is generally less flammable when cause can follow effect.

tater

08-19-10, 11:58 PM

Presumably I'm the cause of the flickering politico meter ;)

I think what I said is true, however. We must not forget that Japan was a good fix with the Axis. They had engendered a feeling of racial superiority and a sort of manifest destiny for Asia. Years of propaganda (within education as well) resulted in a feeling of racial superiority that mirrored that of Nazi Germany. The brutalization of "lesser" peoples was the unambiguous result of this kind of racism. Germany owned (and owns) theirs, post war Japan, never really has, sadly.

There is another analogy to Germany. When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, there were indeed many who welcomed them (in France, too, actually ;) ). The Nazis blew any good will they had very quickly, of course, once the locals got to know them.

I think that a scenario where the primary focus of Japanese military action is INDIA is an interesting one. The military being used to eject thye British in return for an Indian Client State (protectorate, whatever).

Randomizer

08-20-10, 12:18 AM

I think that a scenario where the primary focus of Japanese military action is INDIA is an interesting one. The military being used to eject thye British in return for an Indian Client State (protectorate, whatever).

This is a good point and had the Japanese adapted a strategy aimed at India, it might have made Roosevelt's desire to contain Japan very difficult. Highly unlikely they could not have done it without giving up their aggressive war on mainland China however. I don't think that any American President could have sold a war to preserve the colonies of the European powers, either the NEI or Malaysia, Burma and India.

Peace in China with an open door there for American business interests might have complicated Winston's job of maintaining the Empire, making it far more "interesting".

tater

08-20-10, 12:32 AM

Yeah, some sacrifice in China a likely trade off.

That would not have pleased the IJA. No at all.

A good book on the background of the changes in Japan WRT the military culture is Soldiers of the Sun.

WernherVonTrapp

08-20-10, 06:53 PM

China was a primary objective for the Japanese. It's natural resource alone were enough to raise the eyebrows of even the staunchest (potential) objector to their mission there. That doesn't even consider the potential factory workers, slave labor, what have you, that they could bring to bear upon their war machine. There was no way they'd have overlooked China. The Japanese also, did in fact have their eyes on India but, by the time they took any initiative, they were already overextended on all fronts and could not sustain their momentum.

CaptainMattJ.

08-20-10, 09:55 PM

If some of the theories of Quantum physics are true in some universe the US and Japan never went to war and every other possibility.

Though the US was generally isolationist there where a number of Americans that supported the Chinese in the 30's in fact some thought that in 30s that we might go to war with Japan over China.

That and Japan had such limited resources she had to either attack the US or the Dutch(Dutch East Indies) England and that fate was sealed when the US placed the embargo against Japan due to its actions in China.

Basically Japanese need for land and resources made warfare with the US un-avoidable.The Japanese also considered the US as a Colonial power in Asia we controlled the Philippines which also had many useful resources that Japan needed and felt they had the right to control by any means."An Asia for Asians" was a Japanese motto at the time though really it should have been "An Asia for the Japanese". The only way it could have been different would be if perhaps a different power had been in control of Japan during the first half of the 20th century.

Quantum physics doesnt address the theory of alternate universes. thats the string theory. And no. if the Japanese hadnt been rapped up with us so early, they wouldve taken all non U.S islands. if the U.S didnt declare war by then considering them as a major threat, they most likely wouldve built up, and attacked russia perhaps. the russians barely won vs the germans. only strategic victories were won by the russians. overwhleming forces came later. if the russians had to fight the japs AND germans.......? well..... im not sure. the japs had naval power. their army was ****, and they had BAD tanks. Air power wouldve solved that problem, though. zero vs yak/Ilyushin the zero would probably win. the surface fleet would sail on ruskies coast, hitting them wherever they could. providing closer air support with carriers.

The russians wouldve had their tanks go against the germans for the most part. but the russians kept their tank factories and ammo facs on the east coast, so the japs would bomb them down. the russians wouldve probably lost. then the U.S would pretty much assuredly get into the war. if britain hadnt been completely destroyed, they mightve had a chance. after russia was conquered the germans would be able to divert more towards britain and africa. either one or both wouldve fell. africa most likely, then Hitler would get access to the suez, get more supplies, and be even stronger. plus the U.S would also have to face the japs, cept they wouldve had their battleships. not like it wouldve mattered though unless they gave them adequate air cover.

after that i wouldnt have a clue what could happen

Stealhead

08-20-10, 11:25 PM

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation

read the entire page please.

I see no reason why Japan would have gotten into a major war with the Soviets they easily could have during most of the war but they did not neither did the soviets declare war against Japan until they new they would win after both atomic bombs ask yourself why neither side went to war with each other until the very end.

Russia is so vast Japanese aircraft would not have been able to reach the regions of the Soviet Union had its factories they where not stupid they realized the Neutrality Pact aka Non-Aggression Pact might fall through with Japan at anytime and there are not very many large Soviet cities very close to Japan anyway only Vladivostok at that time so there is very little for the Japanese Navy to have done along the Russian coastline.Further more the Soviet Union always had the numerical advantage they had very poor leadership at the top and through out most of their officer corps early thanks to Stalin's purges(heck of a guy you just had to get know him) in the war and the Germans fought better against an a first poorly motivated,poorly trained enemy.

Japan did not do so well in the small border war against the Soviet Union called Khalkhin Go in 1939 so they felt like avoiding conflict with them at least for several years was wise.This was very helpful to the Soviet Union because in meant that they did not have to consume much manpower defending from Japanese attack.

The Japanese Army was not **** they where actually pretty good extremely aggressive fighters look at Singapore they where outnumbered I believe 5 to 1 by British and Common Wealth troops yet they took over rapidly the entire peninsula with acceptable casualties.The same can be said about the Philippines in 41,42 though the US and Filipino troops where able to delay the Japanese victory for months.

Next taking all non-US controlled areas in the Pacific would not have worked when the Japanese had no way to prevent the US government to consider attacks on Brit and Dutch colonies an obvious threat to our own. There is not an easy way to get around the European and United States strongly disliking the idea of Japan wanting any territory in the Pacific they did not already have after WWI.

Sorry but your theory sounds pretty unsound and not based on much factual data.

Randomizer

08-20-10, 11:55 PM

Steelhead wrote:

...neither did the soviets declare war against Japan until they new they would win after both atomic bombs ask yourself why neither side went to war with each other until the very end.
At Yalta, Stalin undertook to declare war on Japan three months after the defeat of Germany which would have been 8 August 1945. As it was they declared war at midnight on the 8th, almost 12-hours before Fat Man fell on Nagasaki and less than two days after Little Boy detonated over Hiroshima. However, combat operations by the Red Army preceded the official declaration of war in some sectors of the front by several hours.

Being as how the Soviets had assembled in Mongolia, Ussuri and Amur provinces north of Manchuria and in Maritime Province well over one and a half million combat troops, 26,000 guns, 5500 tanks and about 3800 combat aircraft, it's a pretty good bet nukes had very little to do with the Soviet Union coming in when they did. The evidence indicates that the Bomb was coincidental rather than causal to Russia's attack on Japan.

Other than that minor peccadillo, agree 100%.

Edited to correct date error

Stealhead

08-21-10, 01:12 AM

True, Id would say that the primary factor effecting the Soviet Union declaring war was the threat from Germany once that was gone it was game on.Stalin was never a fan of "keeping" non-aggression pacts he just used them to gain time Germany beat him to the punch in 41 and of course had as much intention of following that pact as the Soviets did.:shifty:

Sorry to be so aggressive towards CaptainMattJ. post I know this is a speculative topic but one does have to consider actual conditions and he seems to have little knowledge of Japanese-Soviet relations in 30-40's and their military capabilities as well.

I have read extensively on WWII and related history particular about the Soviet Union and Japan in my 30 or so years so sometimes my stuffed brain gets a little excited I guess.

Edit:heck yeah check out my new digs!! I hope it does not last just one post:yeah:

WernherVonTrapp

08-21-10, 05:56 AM

The Japanese army did, in fact, clash with Soviet troops along the Manchurian-Siberian border as early as 1938. On July 11th of that year, w/o orders from Tokyo, Japanese troops of the 19th division attacked Soviet troops holding a hill along the northeastern frontier. The Japanese suffered heavy losses and were forced to withdraw. In May of 1939, they again clashed with the Soviet army near Nomonhan on the northwestern frontier between Manchukuo and the USSR's Mongolian Republic. Long story short, the Japs had their heads handed to them. In fact, their entire 23rd Division was annihilated. The fighting ended in Sept. of 39 with a full Japanese retreat and the signing of a humiliating truce with Moscow on Sept. 15, 1939.

Randomizer

08-21-10, 09:50 AM

Japanese troops and forces of the Red Army border guards and the NKVD started trading shots across the frontier as early as June 1935. The battles at Nomonhan in the summer of 1939 were the climax of years of aggressive actions by Kwantung Army units essentially out of control of the IJA General Staff. In fairness though, it is doubtful that the Soviets were entirely innocent victims in some of the clashes.

The bloody nose administered by Zhukov on the Khalkin Gol left a huge impression on the Japanese high command and drove both a military and political imperative to keep the Soviet Union neutral at all costs.

Always found it a bit odd that, after Corregidor, American ground forces defeated the Japanese in virtually every engagement but the senior Japanese generals were openly contemptuous of the United State's fighting ability. Yet the Russian's, whom were defeated time and again in 1904-05 were seemingly held in fear and awe after the disaster at Nomonhan by these very same officers.

Excellent English language book on the subject is Nomonhan; Japan against Russia, 1939 by Alvin Coox.

WernherVonTrapp

08-21-10, 11:05 AM

The bloody nose administered by Zhukov on the Khalkin Gol left a huge impression on the Japanese high command and drove both a military and political imperative to keep the Soviet Union neutral at all costs.

That was precisely my point.:up: The Japanese learned that the Soviet army was a force to be reckoned with and, in the best interest of their immediate objectives, one to avoid. As far as the Japanese deprecating US soldiers as opposed to the Soviets, I think that had more to do with the proximity of the Soviet's resources to their own, and to avoid any more non-sanctioned attacks upon them by over-zealous commanders.

sergei

08-21-10, 11:09 AM

Always found it a bit odd that, after Corregidor, American ground forces defeated the Japanese in virtually every engagement but the senior Japanese generals were openly contemptuous of the United State's fighting ability.

It's amazing really isn't it?
They judged the US as not having the will or ability to fight, and didn't really change their view as the war progressed, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

WernherVonTrapp

08-21-10, 11:19 AM

It's amazing really isn't it?
They judged the US as not having the will or ability to fight, and didn't really change their view as the war progressed, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.There was a "special circumstances" clause to that which invoked a deep passion set aside just for US.

Randomizer

08-21-10, 12:26 PM

There was a "special circumstances" clause to that which invoked a deep passion set aside just for US.
Would be interesting to get an idea of what these were.

As a general rule Warrior cultures do not generally deal with decisive defeat too well and indulge in all sorts of collective delusions to explain it away. That, or the leadership folds up and collapses when their mythological bubble bursts.

As Sergei points out they were defeated time and again by the American's and had plenty of combat evidence in the form of repeated disasters that their contempt for the U.S. forces was unjustified and yet overall, the IJA leadership revelled in that contempt*. Yet the Red Army beat them once before the battles in August of 1945 and like a school yard bully, the generals were terrified of Ivan.

Perhaps as pointed out above, it was something to do with proximity of the Soviet Union or maybe some cultural component that I'm missing. One thing is for sure, the Japanese armies in Manchuria collapsed almost completely under the Soviet offensive, shedding prisoners by the tens of thousands and vast territories in an entirely conventional rout of epic proportions. The exact military opposite of the American experiance on Okinawa only a few months before.

Wonder if the IJA had actually reached their breaking point at Okinawa and were internally ripe for disintegration in spite of bamboo spears and an Army of 100-Million Bayonets of General Staff propaganda.

Also wonder why the O.P. hasn't bothered to pop in to see what he started.

Edit: explanetory note added.

* Note: This apperant contempt for American arms was not just rhetoric, it actually shaped Imperial strategic operations and so was in all likelyhood sincerely held as true. Likewise fear of the Red Army also shaped strategic thinking and so also must have been founded in the worldview of the Imperial leadership. And yet the German experiance in 1941-42 and their own experiances in '42-43 did nothing to modify their dogma. Odd indeed.

tater

08-21-10, 01:02 PM

Basically, in the PTO things went very well for the Japanese only during the phase of operations that was meticulously planned before hostilities.

Once they started to have to extemporize, things went down the crapper.

IMHO, it's odd given the sheer audacity of the initial expansion that their commanders in the field were so very conservative at the sharp end.

Partially it was realism, I suppose. the inital advance went so well precisely because they did stick to the plan. In some cases (Malaya, for example) they actually did everything right confronted with mistakes by the enemy. Again, as long as it was going their way.

They seemed to systemically be incapable of dealing with setbacks, however. Perhaps that goes to the very plan to start with. They sort of assumed anyone dealt the setbacks we were confronted with would be paralyzed.

Odd.

Stealhead

08-21-10, 04:05 PM

At the start of the war the Japanese knew exactly what they needed to do the territories they needed to gain so on and so forth so they had been planning this action for several years.

Then take into account that they where obviously observing what they could about each possible enemy in Asia its military capabilities in the region and they also had to know the general prejudices towards them many truly believed that Japanese where near sighted and that their bodies where not capable handling advanced maneuvers in an aircraft there was a huge and foolish belief that the Japanese where inferior from a military standpoint and that was a very foolish and costly mistake and it always is such a thing to underestimate your enemy or potential enemy.I guess Japan just felt very confident at the start of the war and some high ranking leaders never lost that feeling.

The Japanese where very keen observers of other nations military success they where very impressed with the Royal Navy raid on the Italian Naval base in Taranto.And they also changed their tactics as the war progressed they learned to build complex very well inter connected defenses rather than the earlier war tactics that they had on Guadalcanal. A very good book that can give you a great impression of their later war tactics is "With the Old Breed" by E.B. Sledge himself a US Marine.

As to the Japanese failure to deal with sets backs who knows but I believe it can partly be blamed on the bitter rivalry between the IJA and the IJN.One could not look weak in front of the other needless to say they had a lot of problems and not very many real solutions beyond by the later part of the war making each gain of land by the US so costly that eventually a peace treaty seem a better option and this was not overly unrealistic though it did not work out that way in the end.

CaptainMattJ.

08-21-10, 04:07 PM

the Japanese army sucked in comparison is what i meant. and there's things called airfields that are set up on land and let airplanes fly off of it. the Germans came DAM close to beating the Russians. if they had to fight a 2 front war it would've most likely finished them. the Japanese would either capture soviet airfields or build their own. the Japanese may have been aggressive, but they were a poor fighting force in terms of their army in comparison with others. the Russians also had control of very rich oil reservoirs. The Russians won mainly because of numbers. they had the AWESOME PPSH and their tanks could easily be manufactured and could take on the Germans tanks. They may have had good equipment and numbers, but yet they still lost 25 MILLION soldiers alone.

the REAL challenge was taking out Britain. the royal navy was unstoppable. the Germans couldnt defeat them, the Italians couldnt either. however i often wonder what would happen if the royal navy and the Japanese navy clashed. disregarding air cover i wonder who wouldve won a ship vs ship cannon battle.

sergei

08-21-10, 04:13 PM

They may have had good equipment and numbers, but yet they still lost 25 MILLION soldiers alone

The USSR actually lost in the region of 8-10 million military casualties.
That's still a hell of a lot though.

CaptainMattJ.

08-21-10, 04:18 PM

The USSR actually lost in the region of 8-10 million military casualties.
That's still a hell of a lot though.
oops. that was all military personnel of all countries in the war. still the russians shoudntve lost that many.

tater

08-21-10, 04:23 PM

Sure, Japanese defensive tactics improved, but to what end? They lost every battle. Winning is the only thing that matters. So all that effort was for nothing.

The Axis in general failed in the one real test of professional military effort. The backbone without which nothing else matters. Tactics? Bah.

LOGISTICS.

Germans sucked at it, so did the Japanese. In their initial assaults, both powers did well because they were "the firstest with the mostest." They covered for their abysmal logistical capability with the luxury of being able to load the game board before hostilities. Once the fight was on, they had to have follow up, and depth in logistics. Both Germany and Japan failed utterly in this respect.

Look at Stalingrad. The entire LW bent its will to air supply of the "kessel." They needed something like 700 tons a day to just keep up. They were incapable of this. The 5th AF built and supplied airbases in NG entirely by air, and they were a very poor stepchild of an AF. Heck, the initial invasion might have gotten Moscow with any sort of modern logistics (they still used HORSES for christ's sake, lol)—many of the trucks used on the Eastern Front were captured from France.

In the PTO, the japanese started with a deficit in shipping. They conscripted able-bodied men willy nilly, and decimated the stevedores, and other merchant marine related workers. As a result, loading and unloading was crippled. One ship making three trips instead of two in a given time period is the same as have 1/3 more ships. One ship making 1 trip instead of 3 because of inefficiency, is like have 1/3 as many ships as you actually have.

This is why the USN submarines (and anti-shipping aircraft, both Navy and USAAF) were so terribly effective. They hit the most critical element of the japanese military very hard, and it was teetering to begin with.

Diopos

08-21-10, 04:24 PM

oops. that was all military personnel of all countries in the war. still the russians shoudntve lost that many.

Excuse my asking but how many should they have lost exactly? :hmmm:

.

Stealhead

08-21-10, 04:33 PM

I did say that the Japanese won very many battles merely that they did make a notable change in their tactics perhaps if they had done this change much sooner it could have made a difference well not really they did have rather poor merchant shipping indeed and it only got better thanks to US Navy subs and air power.

I think what let the Axis side down was much more their high leadership they where idiots and forced bad decisions that their troops had to obey.The German solider,airman,sailor was very professional even at the very end of the war for the most part.

Take Stalingrad the original plan was to take the oil fields but Hitler had to take Stalingrad so he split an army to do so this was a stupid idea and cost them.You should never split your forces like this go after one target destroy it then go after the next.

Quote:
Originally Posted by CaptainMattJ. http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/smartdark/viewpost.gif (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/showthread.php?p=1473763#post1473763)
oops. that was all military personnel of all countries in the war. still the russians shoudntve lost that many.

Excuse my asking but how many should they have lost exactly? :hmmm:

Slaps knee,

Anyway enough of this let us all hear the ever so wise CaptainMattJ. He seems to be the smartest guy on subsim let us stop with our know nothingness and let him enlighten us all as to what went down in WWII.

tater

08-21-10, 04:40 PM

Tactics wins battles. Logistics wins wars.

Stealhead

08-21-10, 04:43 PM

More like both Tactics and logistics win wars without one you cant have the other really.Both are of equal importance.

Diopos

08-21-10, 04:45 PM

Tactics wins battles. Logistics wins wars.

And the navy does the party afterwards! :D

.

CaptainMattJ.

08-21-10, 04:46 PM

Excuse my asking but how many should they have lost exactly? :hmmm:

.
Less. they lead massive suicidal charges against battle hardened germans. they shot whoever came back, they got the **** kicked out of them. 10 million? the U.S lost only 416,000 men, fighting 2 wars on land sea and air. Russians lost 10 million, and they had MUCH better tanks. as for how many they SHOULDVE i dont know. they just shouldve lost less.

CaptainMattJ.

08-21-10, 04:52 PM

MGR1

08-21-10, 04:57 PM

"Quantity has a quality all of it's own."

Did anyone figure out if it was Stalin or Zhukov that coined that one? It sums up the Soviet attitude to war very well.

I'm not overly familier with what happened on the Eastern Front in WW1, but remember the Schleiffen plan? The Germans wanted to knock out France before Russia could fully mobilise it's armies. The Kaiser's Staffers obviously appreciated that the Russians would have been a "bear" to deal with.

Going back to the PTO, have a check of this book:

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Rising-Sun-Victorious-Alternative-Japanese/dp/185367446X/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1282427661&sr=8-2

It does have a number of duff scenarios, but the first chapter deals with an alternate joint German-Japanese attack on the USSR. It also has a chapter dealing with the possiblity of a succesful Japanese invasion of India.

Mike.:)

Stealhead

08-21-10, 04:58 PM

Because you are not giving a fair comparison.The Soviet military and the US military where in vastly different situations during WWII. The only thing in common that we had was that both where largely unprepared for war when it came.

And I am just shinning you on a little you don't have to get so antsy.This is subsim after all dont take anything someone says to you on here too seriously.
I call things as they are if i thought you where being rude I'd say so.

@@MGR1:
I believe that it was Lenin who coined this term not 100% sure though.
Needles to say though they made a lot of gear just look at the T-34 they where like ants it did not matter how good a Tiger of Panther was because they simply got overwhelmed.
Combine that with the fact that Russian soldiers like get up close and personal in combat and you have a nasty enemy one that should never be underestimated.They just have a different philosophy towards warfare than most Western European countries do and their massive population allows for that style of fighting.

Diopos

08-21-10, 05:01 PM

Less. they lead massive suicidal charges against battle hardened germans. they shot whoever came back, they got the **** kicked out of them. 10 million? the U.S lost only 416,000 men, fighting 2 wars on land sea and air. Russians lost 10 million, and they had MUCH better tanks. as for how many they SHOULDVE i dont know. they just shouldve lost less.

I'll only say this:
1. It sometimes comes down to one thing. Hold the line at all cost. The key word here is "all cost".
2.The US didn't have to fight for and on its homeland and never had its industrial base threatened.

.

tater

08-21-10, 05:18 PM

More like both Tactics and logistics win wars without one you cant have the other really.Both are of equal importance.

For winning wars, logistics trumps tactics, IMHO.

An army with adequate tactics, and superior logistics can beat the tar out of one with superior tactics and inferior logistics.

It's important to note that historically, there is evidence of many excellent (tactically) armies with terrible logistical support, and they always lose. Any army with excellent logistics seems to invariably have at the very least adequate tactics. I don't think you can be disciplined enough to have excellent logistics without having basic competence in the other military skills.

Tactics in effect requires a handful of bright minds at the top, logistics is systemic, you either have it or you don't. So you can drop an Alexander in a **** army, and win a battle, but you'd be hard pressed to win any war with crappy logistics.

As an excercise, name a war won by a force with great tactics, but crappy logistics.

tater

08-21-10, 05:24 PM

The russians lost many men because they didn't care about their men. Stalin murdered ~50 million of his own people, throwing away a few million troops? Meh.

The US occupies a unique geopolitical position in the world, which is why we are a super power. We have direct access to the ATO and PTO, but are isolated from foes by those same oceans. So no, we didn't have to defend the US directly because no one on earth had the capability to do so at that time (or now, for that matter).

The japanese never really learned amphibious landing techniques (they landed almost always on unoccupied beaches, and even with gross superiority on Wake, facing largely civilian opposition, they nearly lost). The Germans alsoi had no such capabilty, and didn't even have a basic understanding of it---they thought in 1944 that d-day would happen at a dawn high tide, so they discounted the real day (dawn LOW tide). This is proof they had no idea in the world how to invade by sea (land at high tide and your landing craft are stranded as the tide drops). This is why the notion of Sea Lion as a serious threat is so absurd. They didn't have 2 clues to rub together.

sergei

08-21-10, 05:28 PM

Heck, the initial invasion might have gotten Moscow with any sort of modern logistics (they still used HORSES for christ's sake, lol)—many of the trucks used on the Eastern Front were captured from France.

I know.
It boggles the mind when one realises that the bulk of the Wermacht was actually foot borne (with horse drawn artillery).
Most of them marched the 1000 miles to Moscow/Stalingrad/Leningrad.
The fully mechanised Panzer divisions that got all the press made up a small percentage of the overall force.

Stealhead

08-21-10, 05:28 PM

"The US occupies a unique geopolitical position in the world, which is why we are a super power. We have direct access to the ATO and PTO, but are isolated from foes by those same oceans. So no, we didn't have to defend the US directly because no one on earth had the capability to do so at that time (or now, for that matter)."

Indeed very true well said.

CaptainMattJ.

08-21-10, 06:02 PM

Very true that we have a very strategical point in the world. and even though the russians were getting attacked on their own soil, with a "surprise" attack, they still shouldnt have lost so many men.

Sailor Steve

08-21-10, 06:10 PM

...im not showing off, im not acting like i know all, and im not being rude...
Actually you were just a little condescending here:
and there's things called airfields that are set up on land and let airplanes fly off of it.
Attempting to show a point by lecturing and talking down to people never goes over very well.

sergei

08-21-10, 06:17 PM

WernherVonTrapp

08-21-10, 06:21 PM

and they also had to know the general prejudices towards them many truly believed that Japanese where near sighted and that their bodies where not capable handling advanced maneuvers in an aircraft there was a huge and foolish belief that the Japanese where inferior from a military standpoint and that was a very foolish and costly mistake and it always is such a thing to underestimate your enemy or potential enemy.I guess Japan just felt very confident at the start of the war and some high ranking leaders never lost that feeling.

The Japanese where very keen observers of other nations military success they where very impressed with the Royal Navy raid on the Italian Naval base in Taranto.And they also changed their tactics as the war progressed they learned to build complex very well inter connected defenses rather than the earlier war tactics that they had on Guadalcanal. A very good book that can give you a great impression of their later war tactics is "With the Old Breed" by E.B. Sledge himself a US Marine.

As to the Japanese failure to deal with sets backs who knows but I believe it can partly be blamed on the bitter rivalry between the IJA and the IJN.One could not look weak in front of the other needless to say they had a lot of problems and not very many real solutions beyond by the later part of the war making each gain of land by the US so costly that eventually a peace treaty seem a better option and this was not overly unrealistic though it did not work out that way in the end.You bring up some good points. Points that I felt would inevitably become apparent. Has anyone ever watched old Popeye or Looney Tunes cartoons, just to name a few. Or has anyone ever visited YouTube to explore the "Banned Cartoons" category. Deprecation is a very effective tool of war and, one not lost on the American populous during WWII. Don't forget that Japan blamed the U.S. for many of it's problems and this dates back to WWI, if not further. Children see, hear, and eventually inherit the predjudices of their parents. Probably, at first, their deep resentment toward the U.S. crept up slowly as it does with all forms of predjudice, before it culminated into precisely directed propaganda toward a nation that they knew could not be defeated. Even Yamamoto knew that. It was he who informed the Emporer and his war staff that, after Pearl Harbor, he could not foresee military victories against the U.S. beyond a 6 month (approximated) time frame. Guadalcanal was proof evident of that prediction. Japan's alliance and assistance to the allied nations of WWI was viewed as a way to extend their position in the Pacific (the payback for services rendered effect) without the necessity for war. When their position did not materialize as expected, then the resentment began to set in. You have to realize just how close to poverty the Japanese people were after WWI and with each successive setback (e.g., the Washington Conference, Oil/Scrap Metal embargo, etc.) their prejudice toward this nation grew with a passion. After Yamamoto's prediction began to materialize (proof evident), their overall strategy became fixed on creating defenses that the United States would throw itself up against, and eventually tire of the high losses. But, when this too failed to stop US, true to their Bushido code of die rather than surrender, their passion, contempt and disdain for the US Military became fanatical, obviously under false hopes again.
Will the troops stand fast and fight more against an enemy they know will obliterate them, or, will they stand fast against an enemy that is possible to defeat? It's one of the basic rules of war.

Randomizer

08-21-10, 06:34 PM

The japanese never really learned amphibious landing techniques...
I submit it is fair to say that the Japanese never really learned anything once the war broke out. The Way of the Warrior ensured that those who might have been able to pass on new knowledge died gloriously while wireless communications from the isolated island garrisons carried far more homages to the Emperor than any real combat lessons learned.

Despite possessing radar they never developed the concept of controlled fighter direction or an operations centre were information could be analysed and acted on and the Army's sole effective reaction to American combat firepower was to dig deeper, a purely passive response that could never bring victory. Their operational command and control doctrine would not have been out of place on the Western Front in 1917 while as noted, their logistical arrangements were sloppy and inefficient.

Pushing beans, bullets and gas down to the troops was a duty unworthy of Samurai even when they actually had stocks of those commodities.

Once the orgy of quick successes passed, the Japanese armed forces failed to adapt and learn and soon all they knew was how to die. With no real institutional memory and doctrines based upon wishful thinking, mythology and percieved racial superiority the doomed any chances of adapting the the American way of war.

I think you will find that the quote "Quantity has a quality all its own" is generally attributed to Stalin, but perhaps that is apocryphal. I understand that Fleet Commander Sergei Gorshkov also used it to silence his critics when questioned about the many diesel boats in the Red Banner Fleet built after the USN submarine force went nuclear.

tater

08-21-10, 11:45 PM

CaptainMattJ.

08-22-10, 12:01 AM

Maybe you don't know this CaptainMattJ, but out of the 4.5 million German military casualties during the war, about 3.5 million of those were on the Eastern front.

So, given that about 75% of Germanys losses were in the East, how many should the USSR have lost?
The fact that stalin and his officers didnt have enough respect for their soldiers lives has no relevance? They sent them on mass suicidal charges, without enough support. the Soviets couldve easily shaved a couple million. The germans may have been better trained, but they still suffered flaws. like under eqquiped for winter fighting. and their tanks often needed repairs and the panzers were no match for the T252. The Soviets couldve saved lives, but did they? not really. They had Quantity and for the most part quality. They just didnt value their troops enough. as for what they SHOULDVE lost, i dont know. Maybe 5-7 million. It depends on certain thing that couldve been done differently and mistakes avoided. what i WAS trying to say is that that number of casualties was unnessecary and not ALL those Soldiers had to die. still the soviets wouldve lost a considerable amount even if the right measures were taken.

CaptainMattJ.

08-22-10, 12:25 AM

I agree about the quantity statement. I think that the US is often (in the ETO) accused of having loads of inferior stuff, and winning by "mass." I think this is a disservice. Military technology doesn't exist in a vacuum. It exists in the context of doctrine. US technology during the war fit very well with US doctrine. Yeah, we had a lot of "stuff" at the sharp end, but that was a product of the "culture" of our military which put a premium on logistics, and where possible, expending "stuff" in place of men. The latter being a doctrine that any democracy should support, and which most autocracies could not care less about.

As an aside, the IJNAF is usually given false credit for having a technological lead in aircraft at the start of the war. The prowess of the Zero is grossly exaggerated, IMO. Read Lundsrom, and it's clear that the USN never suffered a negative kill ratio during any statistically meaningful stretch of combats. They were even, or even better from the very first engagement—flying the F4F. Jap air forces did very well at the start primarily due to mass. 50 Zeros meet a handful of operational planes over Malaya, and the outcome is a foregone conclusion, regardless of aircraft quality.
very true that the corsair was in ways better then the zero. however the corsair wasnt always available, especially at places like wake. they had wildcats go up against zeros and they were totally outgunned. The reason the zero was so ferocius was its maneuverability. when a plane can outmaneuver a zero, it was over. the zero had no armor. the hellcats and corsairs and my personal favorites the P51 Mustangs were quite capable of downing a zero easily. especially as the quality of pilots reduced as more of them were getting killed. but the japs developed much MUCH better planes, like the Ki-84 Frank and the J7W Shinden. both these fighters were WONDERFUL! Awesome fighters. the shinden didnt get to see action though. they also developed pretty good bombers too.

I'm goin' down

08-22-10, 12:27 AM

Excuse my asking but how many should they have lost exactly? :hmmm:.

I have it on good authority that they should have lost 7,999,999. :D Unfortunately, I was unable to avoid being squashed alive by a Panzer because I slipped on a banana peel in Berlin, and that pushed the number to an unacceptable level.

tater

08-22-10, 12:42 AM

I'm goin' down

08-22-10, 01:06 AM

tater wants the seat belt laws repealed....:D

CaptainMattJ.

08-22-10, 02:11 AM

The F4F is not the corsair, that is the F4U.

BuAer named planes by type, number (serially) of said type from manufacturer name code.

F = fighter

4F = 4th procured from supplier code letter F (Grumman) = "Wildcat"

F-4th from supplier U (Vought) = "corsair"

F-6F (6th from Grumman = "Hellcat"

(there were F5F prototypes built for the USN, but they were not built in production---procured even included prototypes).

Anyway, the lowly F4F never had a negative K/D vs the zero.
oh well then. Wildcats didnt fare well enough against zeros. sorry about the mix up. the wildcat just didnt have the speed, maneuverability, range, or climbing a zero could get. however these problems were quite easily overcome in the F6F Hellcat. and it still had great armor.

sergei

08-22-10, 03:27 AM

the wildcat just didnt have the speed, maneuverability, range, or climbing a zero could get

Well, you're right about that.
But as soon as US fighter pilots stopped trying to 'dogfight' the Zeroes, they started to enjoy considerable success, despite their 'inferior' aircraft.
Heard of the Thatch Weave?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thatch_weave
It's interesting stuff.
Don't fight the enemy on his terms. If he has an aircraft that's more manoeuvrable than you, for the love of God don't try to out-turn him. You'll lose.

And there's the very important point that Japan did not have a proper system in place for replacing their combat losses.
The US would rotate some of their veteran flyers to other air groups, or back to the States, to train the new guys.
Japan never had any system like that, and would keep their combat vets flying until they got shot down. With each successive defeat they had less pilots with combat experience, and no-one to train the new guys.

Having superior equipment (be it planes, tanks, ships, whatever) is only one part of the equation.

tater

08-22-10, 08:47 AM

oh well then. Wildcats didnt fare well enough against zeros. sorry about the mix up. the wildcat just didnt have the speed, maneuverability, range, or climbing a zero could get. however these problems were quite easily overcome in the F6F Hellcat. and it still had great armor.

Actually, the F4F was a very close match to the Zero. The -3 was faster at sea level (just barely), and both the -3 and -4 were better armed and armored.

Regardless, the F4F fared very well vs the Zero in RL. As I said, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books go over every single air engagement during the first year of the war that the USN was involved in. His books are meticulous, and he usually manages to ID the specific japanese aircraft, pilots, even crew, and which attack was vs which aircraft. he compares US and Japanese records, and sorts out the overclaims from the actual kills.

The F4F was NEVER in the hole vs the Zero. never. From day one the USN pilots in the F4F held their own vs the Zero. So yes, on paper the Zero had several advantages as you mention, but in RL combat, it faired dead even to WORSE than the F4F.

Regarding Thatch, you need to remember that the first time USN pilots saw a Zero was the Coral Sea. The next time was Midway. The "learning curve" to figure out what NOT to do vs the zero was basically ONE combat (and they didn't do terribly at the Coral Sea).

Add up all the time involved, and it took the USN pilots what, 30 minutes to figure out how to counter the Zero?

The amazing thing is also that the F4U, and f6F—the two planes that WTF pwned the Zero—were both designed before the war started.

WernherVonTrapp

08-22-10, 09:05 AM

Well, you're right about that.
But as soon as US fighter pilots stopped trying to 'dogfight' the Zeroes, they started to enjoy considerable success, despite their 'inferior' aircraft.
Heard of the Thatch Weave?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thatch_weave
It's interesting stuff.
Don't fight the enemy on his terms. If he has an aircraft that's more manoeuvrable than you, for the love of God don't try to out-turn him. You'll lose.

And there's the very important point that Japan did not have a proper system in place for replacing their combat losses.
The US would rotate some of their veteran flyers to other air groups, or back to the States, to train the new guys.
Japan never had any system like that, and would keep their combat vets flying until they got shot down. With each successive defeat they had less pilots with combat experience, and no-one to train the new guys.

Having superior equipment (be it planes, tanks, ships, whatever) is only one part of the equation.Ah, I was about to mention that sergei, but you beat me to it. Indeed, the Thatch Weave was a very successful defensive, (perhaps even offensive), tactic that proved more than a match for the Zero. It allowed the F4F pilots to keep their guns sighted in almost any direction. Developed (I think) during the Battle for Midway, it was destined to work against a Bushido mindset where the (one on one, mano y mano) tactic was just too ingrained into their everyday lives, let alone their battle tactics. In this respect, it was a foregone conclusion. Add to that, the fact that a completely intact Zero was found somewhere in the vicinity of Attu or Kiska. It was repaired and made flightworthy, and then, tested to the very limits of it's capabilities. It was through this testing that the pilots learned of a weakness in the Zero, (I think it was) turning to the right while in a dive, or maybe vice-versa. The F4F did more than just hold it's own against the Zeros and Oscars.:up:
I remember reading something in one of my books that touched upon the reasons for Japan's inability to replace their seasoned pilots. It actually had more to do with their selection process than anything else. A lot of candidates, who probably would've made excellent pilots, were overlooked due to a, well, "technicality" best describes it in my mind.
On a side note, and with reference to the "quality vs. quantity" question, don't forget that by the beginning of 1944, the United States' Pacific Fleet was larger than the navies of all the warring nations, combined!

sergei

08-22-10, 09:11 AM

I remember reading something in one of my books that touched upon the reasons for Japan's inability to replace their seasoned pilots. It actually had more to do with their selection process than anything else. A lot of candidates, who probably would've made excellent pilots, were overlooked due to a, well, "technicality" best describes it in my mind.

I hadn't heard of that.
You've intrigued me Wernher.
Don't leave me dangling like that :DL
What was the 'technicality'?

EDIT:
Indeed, the Thatch Weave was a very successful defensive, (perhaps even offensive), tactic that proved more than a match for the Zero. It allowed the F4F pilots to keep their guns sighted in almost any direction. Developed (I think) during the Battle for Midway, it was destined to work against a Bushido mindset where the (one on one, mano y mano) tactic was just too ingrained into their everyday lives, let alone their battle tactics.
That's a very interesting point, I hadn't even considered that.

tater

08-22-10, 09:20 AM

US pilots had the luxury to learn from mistakes. As a result, US pilots could improve over time. Japanese pilots didn't have a lot of wiggle room for mistakes as their planes sacrificed all pilot protection for "offensive" capability. Also, the huge range of IJN planes—a big "plus" for their design, did have a bad side. It meant they operated FAR from any sort of help if they did go down.

Note that at Midway US CV operations doctrine was still very much a work in progress, informed by their one real combat experience, the Coral Sea. They had very little time to integrate their new information, but they did so, and damn fast.

If you have any interest in early USN vs IJN air combat, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books are obligatory reading.

Japanese pilot training brings us back on topic. They were in a mode in the Pacific War that required a SHORT conflict. Their pilot training could not rplace losses, they didn't have the resources to fight a long war, or replace losses. As such, an alternate strategic plan that could have used what they had better, without putting them in a war of attrition that they could not possibly win is interesting.

sergei

08-22-10, 09:55 AM

If you have any interest in early USN vs IJN air combat, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books are obligatory reading.

Thanks for that, I'm always on the lookout for good books.

And yep, that's what I've read. The Japanese gambled everything on a short war, with the US rolling over and suing for peace shortly after the Pearl attack. Oh boy, did they ever misread that.

I guess it comes back to the point made earlier, they seemed to view the 'decadent Americans' of being incapable and unwilling to fight them.

As soon as it became apparent that the US completely stymied their plans by not just rolling over and giving up they were screwed.

EDIT: US pilots had the luxury to learn from mistakes. As a result, US pilots could improve over time. Japanese pilots didn't have a lot of wiggle room for mistakes as their planes sacrificed all pilot protection for "offensive" capability. Also, the huge range of IJN planes—a big "plus" for their design, did have a bad side. It meant they operated FAR from any sort of help if they did go down.

Another very good point I hadn't considered.
But I do remember reading that the US went to great lengths to rescue downed pilots.
On the Japanese side the attitude seemed to be - if you go down, too bad. It's in the hands of the gods.
Another reason for the quick decimation of their top line aircrew.

tater

08-22-10, 10:03 AM

Really, the choice of planes in many ways was bizarre. They went to great lengths to try and create incredibly good pilots. The USN pilots also had excellent training, but they culled fewer, so call it many "very good to great" pilots vs a handful of "only the great" for the IJNAF.

The IJN had such an investment in aircrews, they really should have done whatever possible to keep them alive. Planes can be replaced... for Japan, pilots were virtually irreplaceable.

As the war progressed, Allied pilots got better over time, and Japanese pilots got worse. Add in better Allied aircraft, and the slaughter becomes inevitable.

WernherVonTrapp

08-22-10, 10:16 AM

I hadn't heard of that.
You've intrigued me Wernher.
Don't leave me dangling like that :DL
What was the 'technicality'?

:haha:I was afraid someone might ask me that so, I was reluctant to even bring it up.:D Ugh, I hate looking things up in the books. OK, I think it was touched upon in my book, "Japanese Destroyer Captain", written by an IJN Naval officer who was present during every major surface engagement with the USPF. I'm trying to remember, off the cuff, so that I don't have to go foraging through the pages.
Ahh, I found it! Not exactly as I described (though I could've seen it in another book) so I'll post it verbatim, right from the book: "The problems of aviator training and radar developement were also neglected too long. By late 1943, when most of it's crack pilots, who should've been teaching, had already been killed in action. When the Navy belatedly started to train aviators on a mass-production basis, it discovered that the aircraft factories were unable to keep pace with the demand for planes.
All 100 of my students at the Torpedo School were college and university graduates who had originally volunteered for flight training and duty. After three months of preliminary air training, these men were all switched to surface assignments, and thus to my torpedo-boat class, simply because of lagging airplane production."
That's all I could find thus far so, I stand corrected until then.;)

@tater: "Note that at Midway US CV operations doctrine was still very much a work in progress, informed by their one real combat experience, the Coral Sea. They had very little time to integrate their new information, but they did so, and damn fast."

Absolutely. The USN, during the early years, had not yet learned how to use their carriers in battle. They hadn't learned how to coordinate their carrier air groups and use them in tandem with one another (i.e., torpedo bombers, dive bombers and fighters) which, ironically, and some would argue, was one of the reasons for our decisive victory at Midway.

Stealhead

08-22-10, 12:23 PM

I agree with the overall advantage that American pilots had.I am a but surprised that none has yet mentioned another obvious advantage that US pilots had rotation,they only had to fly x amount of missions before they rotated away from the combat zone(unless they willingly wished to stay) and either received additional training and often trained newer pilots them selves.This simple fact gave American airman a huge advantage because they learned from combat pilots and also this boosted morale as well.

Japanese and German pilots had no such luxury the ones that survived fought the entire war in some cases.

Some have argued that the best fighter of the war for the Japanese was the N1K2-J Shiden Kai not many where made but it was well armed and did have some actual protection for the pilot as did the Ki-84 of course they stared making planes with some actual protection too late to matter.

I am not sure I fully agree with some of what had been said.I have read in many places that the Zero was still a very serious threat to most any plane if you attempted to get into a maneuver dogfight with one.The US Navy never made a plane that was more maneuverable than the Zero they made planes that where faster,stronger,more well armed,and safer for their pilots.They simply did not play to the Zeros strengths they made their own.

The Thatch Weave is a fine of example of what I mean this tactic was used to force a Zero not fight at its strengths.Of course even the highest scoring ace in history Eric Hartman loathed Zero style maneuver dog fighting he called it a useless ballet.Better to zoom in kill him and zoom out.

@WernherVonTrapp (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/member.php?u=247432) That is true we where mostly still flying the Devastator at Midway I think the only thing that plane ever devastated was itself:haha:.
Though the very brave runs that they did make on the Japanese carriers did keep their Zeros at low altitude which allowed our SBDs to do what they did that day.Sometimes the only thing that you can give is your best you have to respect the Devastator pilots for what they did that day weaker men might turned tail and run without even trying.

tater

08-22-10, 12:33 PM

The Zero was certainly deadly if a pilot fought on the Zero's terms. The thing is that they did not do this for the most part. Being good on paper, or for a type of fight that doesn't happen is meaningless. The rest of the world was already moving to higher wing-loading planes designed for "energy fighting" (to use a modern term).

The Mitsubishi factory was absurd... it was in a port area, and the streets were too narrow for trucks. It had no airfield. So every single plane they built was shipped in PARTS (after being assembled, then disassembled) with ox carts to a nearby airfield. Nearby as the crow flies, but several hours by ox cart. Then they had to be assembled (again)

WTF. Seriously, WTF?

Why didn't they just bulldoze a road through some houses?

Stealhead

08-22-10, 12:39 PM

Why is that absurd? Because the plane was not transported by truck or train it was bad?:hmmm:

The Germans where doing the same thing because of all the bombing.They pretty much turned their aircraft into a cottage industry and spread production everywhere.That is actually very clever it makes bombing you enemies production facilities impossible.My grand father saw many of these German underground and forest factories they where just as good as an American factory only smaller and spread out.

The Japanese began doing the same thing towards the end of the war.

I am not saying that the Zero was the best plane of the war but you are underrating it somewhat.If a plane inspires another nation to make a plane(or planes) that is better that is the sign of a good plane.Not sure why pilots where so happy to get either F6Fs or F4Us if the F4F was a better plane than the Zero overall but they where pilots maybe they did not know what they wanted.

And by your statement that makes the F4U a bad plane as well because it was not the most agile aircraft.Every plane is a design compromise in some way.You cant that one is bad for this reason but not another.

The Zero was a design compromise that they failed to improve in a timely manner when it was clear that opposing aircraft where getting better than it was as the war progressed.

tater

08-22-10, 12:44 PM

No, the Mitsubishi factory ALWAYS had to assemble, disassemble, cart with pack animal, then reassemble every single Zero they built from the very first one. This was not a response to US bombing, it was gross inefficiency.

In fact, they recognized it, then Nakajima ended up building most of the Zeros. They could have increased production just by knocking down some buildings, but they didn't want to harm some old, historic neighborhood apparently...

The USAAF had no problem knocking down the historic neighborhood, so they should have builldized it before the war started anyway ;)

sergei

08-22-10, 12:52 PM

I am a but surprised that none has yet mentioned another obvious advantage that US pilots had rotation,they only had to fly x amount of missions before they rotated away from the combat zone(unless they willingly wished to stay) and either received additional training and often trained newer pilots them selves.

I'm sure I said something like that ;)

The US would rotate some of their veteran flyers to other air groups, or back to the States, to train the new guys.
Japan never had any system like that, and would keep their combat vets flying until they got shot down.

Stealhead

08-22-10, 01:08 PM

Sorry Sergei did not read every single post.

@tater
You seem to be picking and choosing statements.I did not say that they did this because of US bombing I sadi that the Germans did and the Japanese did as well later in the war.I meant that how a plane gets where it going to fight is not a factor on how good or bad the plane is in combat.

Nakajima made the engines for the Zero and where also a secondary factory.I'd honestly like to know your source on this whole Mitsubishi factory us of oxen Ive never heard this before.Could you do that instead of TYPING IN CAPS? Try italics or bold they are much more gentlemanly.

Even if what you say is true according to "Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War" US Naval Institute Press, in a chart from US research post war the Japanese industry still increased aircraft production during the war peaking in late 1944 so it would seem that the pack animals did not have much effect.

P.S. Whatever did happen to the guy who started this thread in the first place.:hmmm:

sergei

08-22-10, 01:29 PM

P.S. Whatever did happen to the guy who started this thread in the first place.:hmmm:

Yeah I was wondering that.
He hasn't been back since it started.
Pity, this has been an interesting thread and I've learnt some new things, always a good thing.

tater

08-22-10, 01:42 PM

Zero Fighter by Akira Yoshimura

The factory in question was the Nogoya Aircraft Works. They built not just Zeros, either.

The oxcart trip from the Aircraft works to the airfield took 24 hours.

Every single plane built there made this trip by oxcart.

They increased production because they built more and more at other factories. Japan didn't have the resources to waste a valuable factory that was constrained by the speed of oxcarts.

The road was never improved, and the more planes they moved, the worse the road got. Part of the reason for the oxcarts was the size of the streets, part was that they vibrated the airframes less, apparently. The oxen were by mid 1942 trucked back closer to the factory to let them rest (the trip was 48 km to the airfield). They started with 50 oxen, by 1944, they were dying of exhaustion and they had only 30.

LOL. Oxen.

BTW, I'd use more complex formatting (don't EVEN get me started on that ;) ), but bold on this forum doesn't look good to my eye in most cases, and I think it is less legible. I liberally use italics as it is.

WernherVonTrapp

08-22-10, 02:36 PM

I think the Japanese may also have been hampered by an inability to adapt their tactics. Just as in the Banzai charges that lead countless scores of soldiers to an early grave, the Japanese failed to adapt their dogfighting tactics to meet the threat. Then again, maybe too few of them made it back alive to tell anyone.:D

Diopos

08-22-10, 02:46 PM

...
P.S. Whatever did happen to the guy who started this thread in the first place.:hmmm:

Well we certainly seem to do fine even in his absence...:D

Zero Fighter by Akira Yoshimura

The factory in question was the Nogoya Aircraft Works. They built not just Zeros, either.

The oxcart trip from the Aircraft works to the airfield took 24 hours.
...

If the production capacity of Nogoya Aircraft Works was 1 plane/day and the oxen delivered 1 plane/day then no problem at all. If the production capacity was 3 planes/day then you'd have a problem. So if Nogoya Aircraft Works was a "small shop" they accomplished this:
1. They saved transport fuel,
2. They preserved a historical neighbourhood
3. They "meshed" their installation in a urban/port environment
4. The location was near a port (great when you import raw material).
5. If their "botlleneck" was slow oxen they could always change to fast oxen.
6. If you were an american pilot that had just flown XXX miles through YYY enemy air defenses and ZZZ enemy fighters would you bomb an oxen convoy?

Some of the above for your amusement, some for consideration, choose your pick! :D

.

tater

08-22-10, 03:15 PM

The Nogoya Aircraft works was 495,000 square meters and employed 30,000 workers.

sergei

08-22-10, 03:31 PM

Well in that case I'm guessing that the ox cart section of the line was 'not necessarily to Japan's advantage'.

Man, that's the most delicate and roundabout way of saying 'we lost' I ever did hear.

Stealhead

08-22-10, 03:47 PM

I take that as a reasonable source on the oxen.

And it certainly true that Japan was never able to produce enough aircraft to meet demand.

Even tough a lot of Japanese pilots did die there where several very skilled ones that lived through the entire war like Saburo Saki he actually was not a bad guy really either he actually once observed a cargo plane that appeared to have a women abroad it so he flew in to look and there was so he deiced not to allow his flight to attack the plane. Another time post war i guess in the 80's or 90's he sent a letter to the Australian government explaining the actions of a RAAF Hudson and the pilot of this plane Warren F. Cowan turned and faced Saki and seven other Zeros head on and actually caused confusion amongst the Japanese until Saki shot him down Saki felt that Cowan was worthy of being rewarded for his actions but wrote the letter when he found the man had not and they never did award any metals despite Sakis letter.Saki was also an NCO not an officer and spent as much time fighting the poor treatment of enlisted men as he did the Allies which was another underlying problem in the Japanese military.

Maybe the OP is sitting there in shock thinking "What have I created?":haha:

Diopos

08-22-10, 03:51 PM

The Nogoya Aircraft works was 495,000 square meters and employed 30,000 workers.

Production capacity?
Other "products" and services?
Alternative roots? Shipping out he disassembled planes via train or ship?
And above all what's the payload of a japanese ox cart?
Having worked in factories I will not believe that they would tolerate a permanent "lag" between production capacity and delivery rates via those god damn cows! :D

Not wanting to dispute you in any way tater... just ... something doesn't click ... :hmmm:

.

CaptainMattJ.

08-22-10, 06:00 PM

All of this is Very true. While thw wildcat didnt have better capabilities, it made up for it with being heavily armored and using tactics. without self sealing fuel tanks and NO armor the zero might as well been a flying match. one quick strafe and it burst into flames and killed the skilled pilots.

Randomizer

08-22-10, 07:02 PM

Don't forget as well that Japan could not produce 115/145LL AVGAS and only very limited quantities of military grade 91/96LL AVGAS (early in the war) and so was unable to match the west in aircraft engine power. This is why they could never reliably intercept the B-29's when they operated at high altitudes and one of the factors that allowed the USAAF to strip the turrets and associated defensive gear off the Silverplate Superfortresses used to drop the Bomb.

In 1941 Japan's GDP was less than 18% of the United States and the US economy was still operating at less than 80% capacity when Pearl Harbor was bombed. They realistcally never had a chance and chose war as their foreign policy choice since their warrior code would not allow for compromise.

There is a solid trend which echos throughout history that when warriors meet soldiers, warriors lose. For sure they'll score a few wins and maybe even provoke a disaster or two, but the overwhelming results of warrior societies fighting professional military's has ultimately been defeat and destruction of the warrior cult. Warrior cultures are inherently vulnerable because they place the highest premium on individual excellence rather than teamwork and mundane aspects of warfare like mass-production economies, logistics and technical innovation. The culture of Bushido doomed Japan.

Sailor Steve

08-22-10, 09:38 PM

There is a solid trend which echos throughout history that when warriors meet soldiers, warriors lose. For sure they'll score a few wins and maybe even provoke a disaster or two, but the overwhelming results of warrior societies fighting professional military's has ultimately been defeat and destruction of the warrior cult.
:yep:

That's why the Romans did so well. They figured how to fight as a army, not as a group of champions.

Randomizer

08-22-10, 11:46 PM

:yep:

That's why the Romans did so well. They figured how to fight as a army, not as a group of champions.
Actually Steve you can go back even further, past the Spartan Army conquoring and enslaving the warrior tribes of Messenia and before that Darius I destroying the warrior city states of Mesopotamia with the perhaps the world's first conscripted regular army.

No doubt someone will come by and declare that Bushido's superiority in the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05 demonstrates the flaw in the argument but this war actually proves my point. Although Japan was fairly militarized in 1904, the cult of the Emperor worship was actually in its infancy. The military professionals in command of the Combined Fleet and Imperial Army in 1904 were largely foreign trained and brutally professional, as good as any produced in the West because they were inculcated in Western military thought. They were also far more apolitical and less inclined to hamstring the civilian government to get their way. The conscript soldiers and volunteer sailors operated in a highly discplined environment but corporal punishment was minimal. The Emperor was certainly revered but not specifically worshiped. The Japanese took thousands of Russian prisoners of war and there is no evidence of any abuse whatsoever.

Fast forward to 1935, discipline is now savage, doctrine has become dogma and innovation difficult to introduce unless it can conform to the mystical Way of the Warrior ethos. Junior officers murder politicians and their own superiors as secret societies flourish in an atmosphere of individuality and political intrigue. Unlike 1904 Officers could no longer come from middle class stock and required at least some Samurai heritage. The professional European style military imbued with the unique strengths provided by Japanese culture that thrashed the Czar's troops had taken a philosophical return to the 16th Century when the power of the Shogun ended all technical development to preserve the Samurai class from the scourge of firearms.

WernherVonTrapp

08-23-10, 11:15 AM

From, "The Eagle And The Rising Sun", an excerpt that explains quite a bit about the Japanese position upon entering the war. Unfortunately, it takes up a couple of pages but, it's very insightful.

"Japan's senior military officers and political advisors could have saved all the trouble they were about to heap upon themselves, and indeed on much of the world, simply by having asked a few elementary questions:

1. For such massive conquests, where were they to find enough educated men in Japan to provide the officers that this expanded military would require, not to mention the troops to fill th ranks? As early as 1937, before the new navy had begun to add hundreds of new ships, that service lacked 1, 021 officers. The situation for the much larger army was even more severe.
2. Preparations for the war anticipated with the Soviet Union or the United States and Great Britain (for the Japanese still failed to recognize a full-scale war with China) required the stockpiling of oil and the continuing of the same effort for scrap iron, iron ore, and coal. If coal and iron ore deposits available in China and Manchuria were sufficient, transport vessels to haul them were not, and Japan was always to suffer a shortage of shipping, including the transports needed for troops during the war. As for scrap metal, most of that had been coming from the United States, and when tensions reached a certain level, an American boycott would halt the flow overnight. This was a constant worry for Hirohito, who discussed it on several occasions.
3. Vast reserves of aviation and diesel fuel had to be prepared, sufficient to meet the needs of warships, the merchant marines, and warplanes. (This excluded the consideration of the needs of industry.) Eighty to 90 percent of all Japanese aviation fuel and oil now came from the United States. Once that source was cut off, what was Japan to do? As early as the mid-1930s petroleum products, and the lack thereof, became the navy's most nagging logistical problem. It is not that the chiefs of the Japanese navy had over-looked the necessity of anticipating oil reserves for a growing navy, they simply miscalculated the extent of the reserves needed, and then how to top them up. By 1936, the Imperial Japanese Navy was importing 1.2 million tons of oil a year and would soon have 3.5 million tons stockpiled, but was already burning 800,000 tons a year. And this was before the war in China had escalated. The aircraft that were to play such a dominant role in that war would consume large amounts of 100-octane gasoline, which would require emergency imports of as much as 43,000 additional tons of this fuel from America in 1938.
When the United States began restricting high-octane aviation fuel after 1939, the enormity of their future problems began to dawn on the leaders of the Japanese navy's planning department. The navy scrambled to stockpile even more petroleum products, and by December 1, 1941, the country as a whole would have 6.5 million tons of petroleum reserves for all users. The navy's share of those reserves would meet it's requirements (for ships and planes) for a two year period. This was a maximum storage figure, one that was going to drop rapidly thereafter. By 1940, the navy would be consuming one quarter of all the petroleum used in the whole of Japan. Although the country possessed 300,000 tons of oil tanker capacity, the navy alone required 270,000 tons of that. The army and industry had somehow to make do with a mere 30,000 tons, an utter impossibility.
In August 1940, senior naval officers would convene another emergency meeting when they came to the conclusion that at the current rate, Japan could not fight for more than another twelve months, and the war with the United States, anticipated in it's 1936 policy document, had not even begun. Once a complete cutoff of all American oil was in effect, Japan would have to seize the massive oil reserves in the Dutch East Indies and British North Borneo. As they were to discover by 1943, however, that did not quite work out as expected, due to the heavy toll of oil tankers sunk by American submarines. The result was that by 1943, the Japanese Fleet would have lost considerable strategic and tactical maneuverability when it found itself 'tethered to it's Southeast Asia oil spigot'.
Thus, ironically, by 1941 oil would prove to be 'the single most important reason for undertaking the risk of war'. The Japanese Navy reckoned that at any single major battle at sea it would be consuming a maximum of 500,000 tons of fuel. But three major battles--Midway, the Philippine Sea (the Marianas), and the battle of the Philippines--surpassed even that figure. All prewar navy calculations proved overly optimistic. So lacking in the strategic appreciation of petroleum and fuel were the Japanese planners that when Pearl Harbor was struck, they ignored and left untouched the U.S. Navy's huge, vulnerable oil and fuel storage depots. Within a matter of minutes Japanese bombers could have destroyed the U.S. Navy's entire oil reserves, thereby crippling all air and sea operations for months to come.
4. Japan's military would require enormous stockpiles of aluminum, especially for the manufacture of warplanes. These stockpiles did not exist now, nor would they in the future. And once hostilities began, where could Japan turn?
5. Spare parts for the army's many mechanized divisions and artillary would be needed, ditto for the warplanes and warships; but no sufficient provision was made for this. Stockpiles remained low or non-existent, which would compromise any major military operation in the future.
6. Apart from radio, modern electronics technology was lacking and not even considered a top priority by most of the Japanese military chiefs. In 1937, this was a very small, poorly developed industry in Japan, and thus proved quite incapable of providing for the country's military needs. New inventions, such as the various types of radar Britain was currently secretly developing, were not even taken into consideration. Only once war had begun with the United States would the japanese hastily send a team of scientists to the Third Reich for the basic instructions on that project, which the Germans were not altogether happy about revealing even to an ally. When the first elementary radar was eventually installed in wartime Japan, there were very few units available, and they were grossly inferior to the gradually more sophisticated radar employed by the Americans and the Royal Navy.
These are but a few examples of the most elementary questions that serious professional military officers should have been considering. After even a single day's study, they would have realized that the war they were soon expecting to launch with so much bravado would never be feasible, or at least, not for decades to come.
:03:
Kind of makes one wonder why they ever went to war in the first place, don't it? Very thought provoking facts, wouldn't you say?:yep:

tater

08-23-10, 11:37 AM

Combined Fleet Decoded offers some insights into the IGHQ before the war. They felt that they only had a 10% chance to win the war before they started, with a (their own words) "90% chance of national death."

They figured 10% was good odds, apparently.

Bottom line is that they would not back down in China, so in that sense they were compelled to go to war.

The OP notion, that an alternate strategy might have proved more successful is I think a good one. Given the requirement (in their own eyes) to secure oil (the NEI), how could they do this and have a better than 90% chance of "national death?"

The preferred grand strategy, IMHO, would be to feed on anti-colonial feeling, and establish friendly countries that way. At the same time, they might have changed the look of their activities in China. Fight a PR war. Make themselves as protectors of local nationalism vs European kingdoms (playing on US feelings regarding self-determination vs royalty).

It could have been done, I think.

Randomizer

08-23-10, 12:38 PM

... The preferred grand strategy, IMHO, would be to feed on anti-colonial feeling, and establish friendly countries that way. At the same time, they might have changed the look of their activities in China. Fight a PR war. Make themselves as protectors of local nationalism vs European kingdoms (playing on US feelings regarding self-determination vs royalty).

It could have been done, I think.
I would agree with this with the caveat that they would have had to given up in China, completely and unambiguously. Chang had too many highly placed friends in America and after the bombing of USS Panay and the Rape of Nanking, Japan's motives and propaganda spin was on the rocks in Washington. It would take more that a makeover to make the U.S. look the other way. They had to leave, period.

They probably could have maintained the status quo in Manchuoko but they would have had to give up mainland China to keep America sweet. Dropping out of the Axis would have probably helped relations with the US and Soviet Union both. Ultimately being a member of the Axis and Comintern hurt Japan far more than it helped. Had they concentrated on building their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the ashes of European colonialism they might just have made a go of it.

No American president would send the boys off to fight in order to save British India for Britain or the Netherland's East Indies for the Dutch.

America herself showed in 1917-18 that one could fight as a co-belligerant without being an ally so direct military support to end percieved injustices in the colonial territories might have just been sold to Uncle Sam provided the stink of Nazism and Fascism wasn't detectable.

The generals had to fight for cultural reasons however and considering a 90% chance of defeat an acceptable risk shows just how blind to reality Bushido had made them. Realistically not even Harry Turtledove could script a scenario where Japan and the USA don't go to war in the early 1940's.

There was no military solution to Japan's strategic situation in 1941 as shown by its post-war metamorphosus into an economic superpower. The generals and admirals were just too brainwashed to see this.

tater

08-23-10, 01:01 PM

I agree, it's amazingly unlikely, and they'd need to convince the IJA to seriously curtail China.

WernherVonTrapp

08-23-10, 01:13 PM

I would agree with this with the caveat that they would have had to given up in China, completely and unambiguously. Chang had too many highly placed friends in America and after the bombing of USS Panay and the Rape of Nanking, Japan's motives and propaganda spin was on the rocks in Washington. It would take more that a makeover to make the U.S. look the other way. They had to leave, period.

They probably could have maintained the status quo in Manchuoko but they would have had to give up mainland China to keep America sweet. Dropping out of the Axis would have probably helped relations with the US and Soviet Union both. Ultimately being a member of the Axis and Comintern hurt Japan far more than it helped. Had they concentrated on building their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the ashes of European colonialism they might just have made a go of it.

No American president would send the boys off to fight in order to save British India for Britain or the Netherland's East Indies for the Dutch.

America herself showed in 1917-18 that one could fight as a co-belligerant without being an ally so direct military support to end percieved injustices in the colonial territories might have just been sold to Uncle Sam provided the stink of Nazism and Fascism wasn't detectable.

The generals had to fight for cultural reasons however and considering a 90% chance of defeat an acceptable risk shows just how blind to reality Bushido had made them. Realistically not even Harry Turtledove could script a scenario where Japan and the USA don't go to war in the early 1940's.

There was no military solution to Japan's strategic situation in 1941 as shown by its post-war metamorphosus into an economic superpower. The generals and admirals were just too brainwashed to see this.I think that would've been difficult for them to do, even it they did avoid joining the Axis. They couldn't leave China because, besides the mineral resources they so desperately needed, they had to have the ports and coastal bases necessary to protect the vital shipping lanes from the Dutch East Indies and British North Borneo. There's no way the allied powers would overlook the fall of these rich petroleum resources and the Japanese were going to try to take them, come hell or high water. They knew Britain would fight to prevent this and that, according to the way things were going in Europe, America would eventually be drawn into war on the British side. They couldn't afford to overlook that eventuality, let alone possibility. That's why the Philippines were destined to fall too.

Randomizer

08-23-10, 01:49 PM

I think that would've been difficult for them to do... That's why the Philippines were destined to fall too.
Actually it would have been impossible I believe because the Japanese Army would never give up the territorial gains in China. Also the continued existance and Japanese dominion over Manchuoko would need to have been guarenteed.

Leaving China with a peace that establishes economic primacy for Japan would have secured these resources (most of which were already secure in their puppet state of Manchuoko anyway). If Japan ceased to be a threat to American interests and even facilitated American businesses at exploiting a now peaceful China, exactly what are the British and the Dutch government in exile going to do about it? Remember America is still neutral with her attention focused on Hitler and congressional approval required to make war.

Although the Philippines was a colony in all but name, the Japanese proved to be a pragmatic enough peoples to let this little contradiction slip through the cracks, at least temporarily. A gentler hand in French Indochina leading to independence under a Japanese hegemony followed by active subversion of colonial rule in the British and Dutch colonies and the Japanese cease to be aggressors and become agents of poltical and economic freedom for the poor oppressed colonials while growing filthy rich in the process.

Japan's leaders were incapable of seeing past their sword tips, far better to fight a war of aggression they knew they could not win.

tater

08-23-10, 02:02 PM

Well said, randomizer, I agree completely.

That was the gist of my statement way up the thread that it would require a cultural change starting with the Meiji Restoration. They really did set themselves on a path to extreme militarism that proved to be impossible to get off of (even though there were certainly many who opposed the militarism).

Stealhead

08-23-10, 03:41 PM

The preferred grand strategy, IMHO, would be to feed on anti-colonial feeling, and establish friendly countries that way.

I think the only problem here would be to convince these colonies that Japan was any better than their current master.I think many Asians looked at China and thought "Well I don't like being under British (example) rule but those Japanese don't seem any better they seem worse.

There may be others but the only notable nation to side with Japan in Asia willingly of the top of my head was Thailand of course this nation was under their own control.Still I think many of the nations under Brit and Dutch rule felt by and large that being in Japans pocket was of no benefit.Of course the Filipinos knew that the US was going to turn over their nation to full Filipino rule with in the next decade or so in the 30s.Also many true nationalists and patriots prefer to take their nation back as much as possible on their own.

I know that there was a number of Indians who sided with the Japanese but a far larger amount sided with the Brits though they obviously knew of the other option.

P.S. @ WernherVonTrapp (http://www.subsim.com/radioroom/member.php?u=247432) ha ha wild night in Bangkok you savage!:har:

WernherVonTrapp

08-23-10, 04:25 PM

The Japanese failed to capitalize on the anti-colonial sentiment in China after the Boxer Rebellion. I see now where you were heading with this, Randomizer. I have to remind myself that we're speaking of "ifs" here and speculating on what could've been. The whole thing boils down to the Japanese idealism of Bushido which was actually a warrior culture, not just an ism of courage, loyalty and discipline. The very existence of the term, "Imperial" in the various Japanese titles (Imperial Japanese Empire, IJN, etc.) is very telling here. As defined, Imperialism is: "The policy extending a nation's authority by territorial gain, or by the establishment of economic and political dominance over other nations. Back then, I suppose the latter half of that definition was only attainable (as far as the Japanese were concerned) with the implementation of the former.

I had to chuckle upon reading your specific comment regarding:
"A gentler hand in French Indochina leading to independence under a Japanese hegemony followed by active subversion of colonial rule in the British and Dutch colonies and the Japanese cease to be aggressors and become agents of poltical and economic freedom for the poor oppressed colonials while growing filthy rich in the process."
I suppose this is true despite being quite a stretch of the imagination. Yeah, they could've done alot of thing on a more diplomatic note but, being the culture that they were at the time, I think too many variables involving their history would've had to have been different.
The world today, in contrast, is diplomatic to the point of walking on egg shells and I believe that will only lead to more wars. There does come a point in time, with diplomatically inclined nations that is, where it's time to start wielding the big stick.
On another note, and commenting on something earlier in this post regarding warrior nations; monarchies, dictatorships and totalitarian states have had a longer run of history than democracies, when comparing how long the two have been around.

Randomizer

08-23-10, 06:58 PM

I suppose this is true despite being quite a stretch of the imagination. Yeah, they could've done alot of thing on a more diplomatic note but, being the culture that they were at the time, I think too many variables involving their history would've had to have been different.
That has been my take from the start. The thread starter's premise is flawed becuase when you peel away the reasons for a Japanese-American war, one or the other countries have to become something that would have been totally out of national character. Hence war between them was inevitable.

The world today, in contrast, is diplomatic to the point of walking on egg shells and I believe that will only lead to more wars.
War can certainly solve some things but realistically wieghing the risks of escalation and costs vs. benefits is vital. Remember in 1914 nobody really tried for a diplomatic solution to the July Crisis until it was too late and it's not unreasonable to state nobody actually "won" anything in that war. One could argue all day whether a bad peace is better or worse than a good war. Depends on the point of view I suppose.

On another note, and commenting on something earlier in this post regarding warrior nations; monarchies, dictatorships and totalitarian states have had a longer run of history than democracies, when comparing how long the two have been around.
Respectively need to disagree, Democracies have been around for some 2500 years and co-existed uncomfortably with the early oligarchies. Of course they went out of fashion for some 2050 of those years but American democracy still pre-dates all modern dictatorships and totalitarian regimes. The political trend since 1945 has been steadly moving towards representive governments of some type and real totalitarian states are probably rarer than at any other period although one could debate this until the return of the Cat and into next week without resolution.

Edited to correct a math issue. Forgot the Roman Republic. D'oh.

WernherVonTrapp

08-24-10, 12:39 PM

Respectively need to disagree, Democracies have been around for some 2500 years and co-existed uncomfortably with the early oligarchies. Of course they went out of fashion for some 2050 of those years but American democracy still pre-dates all modern dictatorships and totalitarian regimes. The political trend since 1945 has been steadly moving towards representive governments of some type and real totalitarian states are probably rarer than at any other period although one could debate this until the return of the Cat and into next week without resolution.

Edited to correct a math issue. Forgot the Roman Republic. D'oh.You don't think the Roman Empire was a democracy, do you? Or, the kings (monarchs) of England, the Persian Empire, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the Kings of Israel, the Shoguns of Japan, these were not democracies.

Randomizer

08-24-10, 01:50 PM

You don't think the Roman Empire was a democracy, do you? Or, the kings (monarchs) of England, the Persian Empire, Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the Kings of Israel, the Shoguns of Japan, these were not democracies.
We're drifting off topic but who said anything about the Roman Empire?

The Roman Republic lasted for over 400-years until 43 BC when the Senate declared the murdered Julius Caeser devine. However it took another 20-years before Augustus was declared the first Emperor.

If you do not believe republics are democracies, what does that make America in your opinion?

Athens was a democracy before Rome and is where the term (demos = people and kratos = power) comes from.

Nowhere did I declare any of the assorted shopping list of despotisms and oligarchies that you cite as being the least democratic but the English Parliament has existed for some 900-years and the Icelandic Althing even longer. You might not wish to recognize constitutional monarchies and limited electorate republics as democratic institutions but that's your choice.

After the American Revolution, democracy (most frequently in the form of republican governments or constitutional monarchies) again became popular and the number of repesentitive governments today far exceeds the number of dictatorships and totalitarian regimes.

Back on topic, even Japan was technically a constitutional monarchy before WW2 but in her constitution lay the doom of any democratic control. The Cabinet held all the real political power and had total control over policy. The members were appointed rather than elected and the positions of War Minister and Navy Minister had to be filled by serving members of their respective arms of service. This gave the military effective control over government since a resignation of a cabinet minister brought down the government. The popularly elected Diet had even less power than did the Kaiser's elected Reichstag before WW1.

WernherVonTrapp

08-24-10, 06:43 PM

We're drifting off topic but who said anything about the Roman Empire?

The Roman Republic lasted for over 400-years until 43 BC when the Senate declared the murdered Julius Caeser devine. However it took another 20-years before Augustus was declared the first Emperor.

If you do not believe republics are democracies, what does that make America in your opinion?

Athens was a democracy before Rome and is where the term (demos = people and kratos = power) comes from.

Nowhere did I declare any of the assorted shopping list of despotisms and oligarchies that you cite as being the least democratic but the English Parliament has existed for some 900-years and the Icelandic Althing even longer. You might not wish to recognize constitutional monarchies and limited electorate republics as democratic institutions but that's your choice.

After the American Revolution, democracy (most frequently in the form of republican governments or constitutional monarchies) again became popular and the number of repesentitive governments today far exceeds the number of dictatorships and totalitarian regimes.

Back on topic, even Japan was technically a constitutional monarchy before WW2 but in her constitution lay the doom of any democratic control. The Cabinet held all the real political power and had total control over policy. The members were appointed rather than elected and the positions of War Minister and Navy Minister had to be filled by serving members of their respective arms of service. This gave the military effective control over government since a resignation of a cabinet minister brought down the government. The popularly elected Diet had even less power than did the Kaiser's elected Reichstag before WW1.
Sorry, the Roman Empire was a misinterpretation due to an edit in your previous post. I think you misunderstood what I was originally implying in my comment on another previously posted comment (addressing subject change). I didn't comment, either way, about the current popularity of democracies. I said they had a longer run of history. My implication is that democracies haven't been around as long as monarchies, dictatorships (which includes monarchies) and totalitarian states (which include monarchies and dictatorships). It encompasses the earliest forms of government/rule right back to the days of tribal leaders, the Pharaohs of Egypt, the Incans, etc.. Ancient Greece was a series of city/states each under serperate rule and as far as the Roman senate, their rulings, if applied at all, were only directed toward their indigenous population. The majority of the people had no voice in their government. Every other nation that fell under their sword would hardly call it a republic or democracy. The clock is still ticking and in the early hours (at that) when considering all world history, as to whether democracies will fare as well. I will admit, democracies have evolved over the ages and that may be the difference between success or failure. But I was referring strictly to the timeframe within which the two have flourished.

I agree with your view on the Japanese government. There were too many warring factions within their own government and even among their own military disciplines. Eventually, the militarists began to assassinate any and all cabinet members who wouldn't play ball according to their rules. It's hard to say whether that's when thing really went downhill or whether it was the institution that allowed these assassinations to occur.