The "Fall X" - The Conquest of West-Berlin

[Skybird]

If you live in an area where you can receive German third regional TV Channel RBB, today, Thursday, at 2245 there is a promising docu, which later is planned to be published on DVD also. It is about the GDR's detailed plans on how to take Berlin in one swift, deceisive attack in case of a war with NATO - and in around just half a day.

German
http://www.welt.de/kultur/history/article8941089/Fall-X-Die-Angriffsplaene-der-DDR-auf-West-Berlin.html

Heart of the plan was to immediately take control of a key bridge that leads one of berlin's greatest and most vital traffic alleys over the city's Stadtautobahn. When this bridge (8 lanes plus 2 parking lanes) would have been beyond Allied control, French, British and American forces would not have been able to form one united strong fighting force in time (The American garrison sat in the south, the French garrison in the North and the British isolated and somewhat exposed on the other side of the river Havel in the West, lovely countryside that is). For Google Earthlings, check here: 52°30'36.55"N, 13°17'8.16"E.

The other major objective would have been, obviously, the two airports Tegel and Tempelhof, and the airfield in Gatow - to not allow again air-supply of the city. the GDR maintained an air assault regiment whose only objective was just this.

The planning began relatively late in 1969, but still was maintained in regular updates for the masterplan in 1985. Last big military exercises that were run especially with the purprose to train the assault on West Berlin were conducted 1988. The GDR planned to breach the wall at 59 locations simultaneously. Intelligence operations also had detailed plans for the time after the guarding Allied troops had been overwhelmed, to make sure that decision makers, heads of instititutions and any people who could potentially organise resistence, would be arrested or killed at the very beginning. The attack lanes for storming the citiy had been precisely documented on films shot by GDR "tourists".

Estimations for how long the Allies could have resisted and survived, are in the range of 6-8 hours, half a day. This estimation I have heared before, too, not just in the article.

"Der Fall X", channel RBB, Thursday 2245 local time.

[Raptor1]

Is Fall X a real codename? I always thought the attack was codnamed Operation Stoss...

[August]

I wouldn't put much faith in such estimates. After all Bastogne was only supposed to hold out for a few hours too.

[Oberon]

Impressive...although I think the destruction of the Allied forces in West Berlin in the outbreak of WWIII would have been a bit of a given, it was either that or they'd be isolated and contained (which would have been a bit daft really).
The GDR was more organised and ready for attack than most people realise. :doh:

[Raptor1]

I wouldn't put much faith in such estimates. After all Bastogne was only supposed to hold out for a few hours too.

Bastogne never really faced a determined assault, though.

IIRC most of the numbers I've seen on Operation Stoss usually count on a total of 12,000 NATO troops and 6,000 West German security forces facing approximately 32,000 Warsaw Pact troops (Comprising the Soviet 6th Motor Rifle Brigade and a whole bunch of DDR army and border units), however, I haven't seen conclusive figures on how many of the East German troops consititute security forces themselves, which means the NATO armies would have been outnumbered by anywhere from a factor of 1:1.5 to 1:2.5.

These odds aren't really overwhelming, so, despite huge Warsaw Pact superiority in firepower and artillery, I'd give the Berlin garrison quite a bit more than 6-8 hours to survive. My estimate is that the Berlin garrison would fall a day or a day and a half after the start of the offensive (With possible holdouts for a bit later), which means about 2 days after the start of the war.

[TLAM Strike]

These odds aren't really overwhelming, so, despite huge Warsaw Pact superiority in firepower and artillery, I'd give the Berlin garrison quite a bit more than 6-8 hours to survive. My estimate is that the Berlin garrison would fall a day or a day and a half after the start of the offensive (With possible holdouts for a bit later), which means about 2 days after the start of the war. Yea I would say they would last more than hours. Urban fighting is difficult for an attacker. Look what Col. Frost's men did at Arnhem. They held on for four days- two days of serous fighting with little supplies, plus stragglers were still being found by the Germans on day five.

[Jimbuna]

I'd have thought 2 days or even longer, depending on how much air support they were given.

[Raptor1]

I'd have thought 2 days or even longer, depending on how much air support they were given.

That far inside Warsaw Pact lines, I doubt it. The risk and cost of sending attack aircraft or supply transports that far through WP fighters and SAM cover outweighs the advantage of keeping the Berlin garrison around for a few more hours.

There may be a few surviving units for a day or two more, but I think the Berlin garrison's chances of surviving as a fighting force through the second day of the offensive are rather low.

[Skybird]

These estimate are not by amateurs, but old school politicians who witnessed WWII and were seen as high profiled defence experts. You have to take into account that the GDR attack would have chosen time and opporutnity, and their plan was uniknown to the west (else the risk for nuclear war - because the GDR was seriously preparing a preemptive attack on West Berlin - would have raised so seriously that the history books would have learned it by know). You also maybe ignore the laypout of the city. Each of the three garrisons was strictly separated, and the Brits already isolated themselves from the rest of the city when choosing Gatow - the wide river Havel (VERY wide) is a natural obstacle that you cannot bridge with ponton bridges or anything (and they did not have them in big nu,mbers anyway). the Laiserdamm bridge would have been object of a dedicated attack by elite forces that outnumbers all three garrisins together - and the Allied defenders would not have the opportunity to ready their three separated small forces and unite them into one big force - for that, you need time, and the infratsructure. the better the infrastructure, the shorter the time it takes. But in a surprise attack from almost 60 directions, by elite fordces that for 20 years have trained nothing else but just this taks of securing vicotry in their assigned combat sector of West Berlin, and the needed key node of infrastructure - the Kaiserdamm bridge - most likely falling to the enemy within the first 1-2 hours, or being destroyed, chances are that the combat bunits of the three allies would have been scattered around, desperately fighting for their survial and their tanks being taken out one by one by an onslaught wellprepared, by well-equipped and very well-trained forces. In many areas, the socalled Stadtautobahn in berlin is set inside an artifical canyon, an articial valley, it is several meters below the city's "sealevel". Beloieve me, I live din berlin for ten years, and I have driven on the Statdautobahn with my father and later alone very oftenb. Without key bridges, you seriously are in trouble if you want to move British forces from Gatow to the rest of the city, or want to move French and American forces from their garrisons into the center to unite. You could only do that at the price of moving them very slowly on secondary routes (so that they cannot fight united and with providing mutual support, or by exposing them to lethal fire when sending them into that artifical canyon that much of the Autbahn is - it essentially functions as a killing bag.

Anyhow, I'll see the docu this night, and then tell you about my impressions. The material is basing on surving notes and scripts by GDR officials, because the GDr tried to destroy eviodence for these plans before reunification. The authors of the docu are no nobodies. They are known for doing thorough researches. On the US Berlin briagde, I refer to Fred Franks (and Thomas Clancy's) book "into the storm", about the war 91. In the biography descprtion Franks tells how he took commandign post in Berlin at some time of his career - and was not impressed by the shape the bridge was in. He compared it to a theatre group, and took quite some effort to try turning it into combat group. I personally knew two American soldier famiklies back then, mwehn I was young and live din Berlin. A rare event, allied families and germans did noit meet usually and did not establish social contacts oftenb, but kept seperate. Back then I was maybe not aware of it, but seen from the perspective and with the mind of today I must say that they certainly did not expect to ever needing to fight in Berlin. But the GDR meant it bitterly serious, and it kept mobilised massive forces of elite grade for a longer time to turn its plans into reality. The Eastgerman forces were of better training and command standard than the standard Russian troups. I think you underestimate them. Also take into account that the airmobility of the Allies was limited, very very limited. And the GDR had reserved considerable airmobile units per objective.

I cannot see how the Allies, if being surprised, could have hold out for longer than jujst a couple of hours indeed. half a day I gave them, 12 hours, if the attack was decisive and a surprise. Many West- and Eastgerman insiders estimate just 6-8 hours. the Berliners themselves - did not trust the Alies' brigades anyway, they expected the city to fall within one day if the Soviets or Eastgermans really meant serious business. The airlift during the blockade really must have moitivated the GDR army. They would have moved all heaven and hell to prevent that story from repeating. I remember that bets were held in jokes which brigade would give up first and second. The bets were scaled in hours, not days.

Oh, and add two things to the overall situation of Fall X: the east would have had undisputed artillery superiority and total air superiority over Berlin.

[August]

Well surprising the Allies is doubtful. It would have been difficult for the DDR to amass that kind of combat capability without Allied intelligence getting wind of it.

Secondly the tunnels under the city were extensively mapped and improved by the Allies and their units trained to use them. This leads me to think that while West Berlin might have been quickly overrun the clearing of hold outs would have taken weeks and tied down an inordinate amount of WP troops doing it.

[Raptor1]

In the case of a total WP surprise, they might've collapsed in as little time, but that's a pretty unlikely scenario. Warsaw Pact forces would have to have several hours to reach their launch points and to prepare for the offensive, and NATO troops in West Berlin wouldn't need more than a short warning to start entranching and getting ready to defend.

You're also way overestimating the scale of WP forces assigned. From what I gather, Warsaw Pact forces had no overwhelming numbers in anything but artillery and aircraft, and possibly tanks (Which wouldn't be the most effective units ever against an enemy equipped with man portable AT weapons in an urban environment); the most likely manpower ratio was around 2:1 in favour of WP troops. Of all the troops assigned to the offensive, the only unit which was 'elite' was the 1st Battalion of the 40th Air Assault Regiment, which was to take Tegel and Tempelhof airports by air assault with 3 companies; similarly, this was the only apparent airmobile unit assigned to Operation Stoss. The rest of the WP troops fall into regular army, DDR border troops (About half of each) and several battalions of the so-called Kampfgruppen der Arbeiterklasse (And of course, security troops which would've followed the offensive).

Also, wouldn't the infrastructure problems impede the attacker's progress just as much if not more than the defenders?

Either way, West Berlin might have fallen in 6-12 had the Warsaw Pact achieved complete strategic surprise, otherwise the whole thing could've dragged on for a day or more. Indeed, when the exercises were run, the WP planned for 2 days to destroy NATO forces and another 2 days to take over the city.

[Skybird]

Statements from the film.

They were basing on NVA documents that are collected in a german library for GDR and NVA documents, and on surviving personal notes by Mielke that were the only evidence for other material that was destroyed by the GDR before unification.

The Soviet high Command calculated 24 hours for a fall of Berlin if any WP troops would conduct the attack. However, it only were Eastgerman troops that were assigned the task by the Eastgerman government, one airmobile elite regiment and additional batallions of the NVA equalling a force strength of at least 36000 men (the airmobile regiment not counted), breaching the wall at 59 locations, additionally to massive use of bombers, airmobile units, special units (infiltrators) and paratroops . At the time these numbers were laid down by the GDR, the american brigade had roughly 6000 men and 60 tanks. The air regiment 40 wa smeant to attack only the two major airports.

the air superiority over Berlin during the 60s was such that in the mid-60s a session of the Bundestag, that occaisonally met in Berlin, was made impossible by the noise of several hundred Russian and 5 Eastgerman fighters flowing low over the city. The noise was such that a debate was not possible. the meeting was stopped.

The NVA was to take care of Berlin. Russian troops would have pushed the southern front into the Fulda gap, the northern front was to be lead by the Poles (I did not know that they were given such a leading role, I only knew they were supoosed to comndict massiove amphibious assaults to flank NATO in the north). Preemptively using nuclear weapons always was part of the planning: due to the experiences of WWII, the Russian doctrine was to immediateoly annihilate the enemy in his own territory whenever there was a sign that conflict was imminent. Russian defence inevitably meant to attack first, and to strike for annihilation.

The GDR had reserved and set uo major forces to attack Berlin without warning. the goal was to split the city from West to East by quickly advancing on the west-east-leading alleys called Heerstrasse (from northern Gatow leading east through southern Spandau, crossing the Havel and hitting the Kaiserdamm bridge) and the Strasse des 17 Juni (leading east to west through the centre and also hitting the Kaiserdamm bridge). thatv would have mean that although there may have been an unified allied command, the american bridgade in the south and the french brigade in the north could not have united, and the Brits were isolated in the West first by the river Havel, and second by the North-south moving Stadtautobahn (if somehow they would jhave managed to bypass the Havel). thwre would not have been a unified allied fighting force (with the Allies having planned for such a unification and coordination).

the Eastgerman NVA forces reserved for the task of attacking Berlin, were highly trained in urban warfare and warfare behind enemy lines (!), specialised for the battlefield Westberlin with inimiate knowledge of the locations, and especially equipped. A massive offensive for sabotaging key installations and eliminating key personel in the West. Massive air raids against the Allied military command structure and headquarters would have destroyed these. they did not mention artillery in the film, but I again remind of the superiority the WP had in artillery pieces.

reconnaissance activities in Westberlin on the ground practically exclusively were conducted by the Eastgerman MfS - not the Russians.

A mission plan called "Operation Stoss" was not mentioned throughout the film.

the MfS had second keys for all official buildings and police stations in W-Berlin. 604 members of the StaSi specialised and were trained and maintained just for operations in Berlin once the city had been militarily secured, to make sure that it falls into line with Eastern administration standards within shortest possible time.

the last manouver by the NVA to simulate the attack on Berlin was conducted 11 months before the wall fell down, in autumn 1988. The replacement city was Magdeburg which was given three NATO brigades, a regierender Bürgermeister, and the Elbe serving as the river Havel. codename of the manouver was "Bordkante 88".

[Raptor1]

This is quite consistent with everything I heard of the WP planning for taking West Berlin so far. The only differences are that the number for WP troops I heard most often was 32,000, not 36,000, and that only the 1st Battalion of the 40th Air Assault Regiment would have participated in the attack (The rest of the Regiment, seeing as it was an elite force in the East German army, would probably have been kept as a theater reserve or something like that), assaulting Tegel Airport with two companies and Tempelhof with one. Could be newly discovered documents or a later revision of the plan that include these elements though.

The Polish army taking a frontline position in the attacks on the northern sections of the front is also consistent with what I've heard. IIRC the Polish army was either the second biggest WP army deployed on the Central Front or very close to it, which could be a major factor in that decision.

The documentary might not mention it as Operation Stoss, but practically every single mention I've heard of this operation named it as such.

[Platapus]

I wouldn't put much faith in such estimates. After all Bastogne was only supposed to hold out for a few hours too.

Attackers frequently "missunderestimate" the will to resist and overestimate their own ability to overrun.

[Skybird]

The capture of W-berlin was an explicit Eastgerman task, and the film gave me the impression that it was that exclusively: WP troops beyind the NVA were not intended,. nor wehre hey prepared for that and trained for that. The GDr was the player planning for it. The Russians/the WP in a whole, did not, not in this detailk, sand I assume their plannign was mostly for air support, and leaving the rest to the Eastgermans (whom they maybe did not trust to use them in the fronline assaults at fulda and northern Germany - after all, they were Germans). The GDR even continued to plan for attacking W-Berin after relations between NATO and the USSR were thawing up and Moscow did not want to push such aggressive polans and polkciesd anymore - the GDR nevertheless did not obey according demands from Russia. So, W-Berlin was an NVA task, not so much a WP or Russia-task (ignoring air support and artillery). and the NVA was better trained and motivated in general, and NVA forces for the attack on berlin were specialsijg for that task. when the Soviet high Command estimated that WP troops would need 24 hours to capture the city and break resistence, then one could and should assume that the better quality troops of the NVA specialising for that task for around 20 years probably would have needed less time for the same task. That'S why i still think after that film that estimating that the Allied would have held the city for half a day, not longer, still is reasonable a statement. Holding out up to several days, with undisputed air superiority and artillery superiority and numerical superiority on the ground in the range of 2:1 to 3:1, all in favour of the enemy and with disrupted supply lines and critical losses in installations and personnel alrerady in the first two hours? that is very optimistic an assessement, I think. even more so when considering how highly vulnerable and open the Allied installations and community buildings were.

[Skybird]

Attackers frequently "missunderestimate" the will to resist and overestimate their own ability to overrun.
In the forest of Bastogne, there were no 2 million civilians present. Nor had the Wehrmacht the intel like the NVA had on Berlin, or the superiority in air and ground firepower. Undisputed supply. decades of learning the enemy.

What I mean is: it does not compare, in no way. Not even the weather. Comparing any modern war to WWII does not make too much sense. It was tried with Iraq and Afghanistan, too. And again, such a comparison did not and does not work. but it is a trap military thinling time and again falls into: if it worked in the past war, then it necessarily works in the next war, too: the enemy does not learn, and the conditions do not change. the traditionalism of the military in this regard often tends to turn against it.

[August]

Attackers frequently "missunderestimate" the will to resist and overestimate their own ability to overrun.

Yep.

Another thing about these plans is that they are just contingencies. There are probably a dozen other plans to capture West Berlin in the archives of an equal number of countries, (including i'll bet one in ours on how to re-capture it from the East Germans if that scenario came to pass).

[Skybird]

It seesm there only was this masterplan by the NVA and GDR to take control of the city, and it was constantly updated and forces were constantly trained and equipped for it. All intel they gathered, changed this plan. Another one is not known,and has not been indicated ever by former NVA officers.

Once lost, I think recapturing W-Berlib would have been a very low, if any, priority for NATO High Command. They would have had other, far more pressing problems with the Russians appearing at the Rhine, than to send a divison four hundred kilometers through enemy territory just to get pinned down in fighting over Berlin. As a german defence poltiicans said in the film: the idea to resist in berlin was only to buy some hours of time for negotiations.

i am not too optimistic over NATO's chances to have stopped a determined Soviet onslaught, for several reasons.

[Raptor1]

The capture of W-berlin was an explicit Eastgerman task, and the film gave me the impression that it was that exclusively: WP troops beyind the NVA were not intended,. nor wehre hey prepared for that and trained for that. The GDr was the player planning for it. The Russians/the WP in a whole, did not, not in this detailk, sand I assume their plannign was mostly for air support, and leaving the rest to the Eastgermans (whom they maybe did not trust to use them in the fronline assaults at fulda and northern Germany - after all, they were Germans). The GDR even continued to plan for attacking W-Berin after relations between NATO and the USSR were thawing up and Moscow did not want to push such aggressive polans and polkciesd anymore - the GDR nevertheless did not obey according demands from Russia. So, W-Berlin was an NVA task, not so much a WP or Russia-task (ignoring air support and artillery). and the NVA was better trained and motivated in general, and NVA forces for the attack on berlin were specialsijg for that task. when the Soviet high Command estimated that WP troops would need 24 hours to capture the city and break resistence, then one could and should assume that the better quality troops of the NVA specialising for that task for around 20 years probably would have needed less time for the same task. That'S why i still think after that film that estimating that the Allied would have held the city for half a day, not longer, still is reasonable a statement. Holding out up to several days, with undisputed air superiority and artillery superiority and numerical superiority on the ground in the range of 2:1 to 3:1, all in favour of the enemy and with disrupted supply lines and critical losses in installations and personnel alrerady in the first two hours? that is very optimistic an assessement, I think. even more so when considering how highly vulnerable and open the Allied installations and community buildings were.

From what I know, the Soviet 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, independently attached to the 20th Guards Army, was both stationed in East Berlin and supposed to participate in the offensive. If this is so, there must have at least been some Soviet involvement in the planning and execution. Besides this unit, most of the forces involved would indeed have been East German.

Perhaps East German forces were specially trained for the attack on Berlin, but, since NATO had dedicated garrison brigades for West Berlin, I'd assume that they would have specially trained to defend it as well.

I agree that the Berlin garrison could not reasonably expect to hold for several days, but anywhere from a day to a day and a half would be certainly possible; it takes a lot of time to wipe out well trained troops dug into an urban environment, even with a very large superiority in equipment and troops.

Also, as I said, when they ran the exercises that much of the information about this offensive is based on, they took the first day to cut off the garrison units and the second to eliminate them, suggesting that the planning for the operation itself anticipated such a condition.

[August]

I also wonder why the WP would want to take West Berlin when putting it under siege would be far less costly in terms of military assets.

A leveled west Berlin is nothing but a rallying point for the Western resistance. A hostage west Berlin becomes a political bargaining chip.

[Platapus]

I also wonder why the WP would want to take West Berlin when putting it under siege would be far less costly in terms of military assets.

A leveled west Berlin is nothing but a rallying point for the Western resistance. A hostage west Berlin becomes a political bargaining chip.

Now that's strategic thinking. :yeah:

[Oberon]

Would probably be the only place in East Germany that wouldn't receive a nuke either when they started flying...however, I suspect that it's a propaganda victory piece for the DDR. 'After years of division, Berlin has been rid of the imperialists and the comrades in the so called 'West Berlin' have been liberated!', etc, etc, etc.
Would make more sense to just surround it and leave it though, after all, it's not as if you'll free up many more forces by capturing it because you'll need to keep divisions there for suppression...unless they planned to give that job to Category B or C divisions and any A divisions used in the attack would be transferred to the front.

[TarJak]

It should not be forgotten that this would have been part of a much larger european campaign so the West Berlin take over would need to be done to neutralise the NATO assets and protect USSR/GDR supply lines from attack deep inside their own territory.

In terms of how long the major factors would be



Who started the shooting and how and where it started. If NATO for some reason decided that they wanted to liberate GDR, then I'd give the Berlin based NATO forces good odds for staying active until reached by forces pushing from the West. If it was the Warsaw Pact forces doing the invading then good odds they'd be overrun within a day or two of the invasion starting.
What happens with the main front of the campaign on the West/East German borders. If that front was going well for the Warsaw Pact forces, then I'd give the estimates by the GDR experts some credence, if however things were turning in favour of NATO, then the likelyhood of survival would increase with every mile of ground taken by NATO.

Either way the result would have been ugly for both sides.

[Skybird]

Also, as I said, when they ran the exercises that much of the information about this offensive is based on, they took the first day to cut off the garrison units and the second to eliminate them, suggesting that the planning for the operation itself anticipated such a condition.
The film was not basing on that excercise. It was mentioned only briefly at the very ending. What they were basing on are doicuments by Mielke and the NVA, stored in a German archive for such stuff.

[Skybird]

I also wonder why the WP would want to take West Berlin when putting it under siege would be far less costly in terms of military assets.

A leveled west Berlin is nothing but a rallying point for the Western resistance. A hostage west Berlin becomes a political bargaining chip.
Ideologic reasons. There is no doubt that the west of Berlin was a thorn in their side, a piece of foreign territory inside theirs, which was seen as their terriotiry indeed by the GDR, just temporarily under foreign administration. Also, they wanted to get the thing with the airlift straight, which they considered to have been a humiliation - this had not to repeat,. under no costs.So, no siege, no rememerance of the airlift.

Also, there was the US ELINT base on the Berlin Teufelsberg. That at least needed to be wiped out.

The GDR was obsessed with taking westBerlin, and this obessession was maintained with German precison... even when Moscow wanted them to stop it, they still continued to prepare for it. Was it irrational? Maybe. The whole idea of WWIII was irrational.

[Skybird]

Who started the shooting and how and where it started. If NATO for some reason decided that they wanted to liberate GDR, then I'd give the Berlin based NATO forces good odds for staying active until reached by forces pushing from the West. If it was the Warsaw Pact forces doing the invading then good odds they'd be overrun within a day or two of the invasion starting..

What do you mean by "if NATO decided to liberate the GDR"? I think you overestimate NATO's chances in WWIII massively. with the thrust of major russian forces, numerically superior, and a doctrine planning with the use of tactcial nukes from day one on (they said in that film that this is documented in documents they were basing on), and NATO ammo supply also being thin (I read estimations saying that in a hot shooting war all their smart weapons would not have lasted for longer than 3-4 days at the beginning of the 80s, I also remember that in Gulf 91 they had to rely more and ore on the use of iron bombs because their smart ammo supply had started to run thin), I cannot see that there would have be any reserve, any serious opportunity to go onto the offensive and storm eastward to the Polish border. NATO, like the WP suffering high losses, would have fought a desparate fight to delay the Russians reaching the Rhine, and would have fought even more desperate to prevent them from crossing it or trying to keep them out of the North-Western plains (Holland, Belgium etc). I think this still would have been the most realistic scenario.

[Raptor1]

The film was not basing on that excercise. It was mentioned only briefly at the very ending. What they were basing on are doicuments by Mielke and the NVA, stored in a German archive for such stuff.

Most of what was known on this operation so far came from both information by former members of the East German army and based on the Bordkante series of exercises, specifically the one ran in 1986, which according to former East German officers most closely resembled the real operation. The actual operational plans were destroyed before German reunification, or so I heard.

The documentary might might well have been based on newely discovered documents or information that wasn't known until now.

[Skybird]

The documentary might might well have been based on newely discovered documents or information that wasn't known until now.
Indeed that is how I understood it, plus reports from NVA officers, and porvate notes by mieleke that should have been destroyed along with the warplans, but for some reasons were not destroyed - probably some secretary had just overseen them, or they had dissappeard in some collection of Mielke's private things.

[August]

The GDR was obsessed with taking westBerlin, and this obessession was maintained with German precison... even when Moscow wanted them to stop it, they still continued to prepare for it. Was it irrational? Maybe. The whole idea of WWIII was irrational.

What was the West Germans feelings about Berlin? Would they have allowed Berlin to fall to the Commies without a fight?

[Skybird]

Hard to say, I was a teen back then and as a teen your perception of what goes on around you can be somewhat strange ;)

The real question would have been if the Westgerman Bundeswehr would have had the potential to send two or three of its eleven divisions 300 kilometers through the GDR, against combined NVA and Russian resistance, and knowing that this would inevitably mean WWIII and total destruction of all germany. I think the answer clearly is Nay. By training, doctrine and even design of many platforms and weapons, it was a defensive army anyway - you can even see that in the differences in designs for the Leo-2 and the M1, in the way the put different püriorities on what parts of the tanks need more protection. To go on the attack, after WWII simply has become unthinkable in Germany - even back then, even over Berlin (that'S why German thinking about it's engagement in Afghanistan was so seriously messed up and unrealistic from the very beginning on). Also, the Westgerman government was probably not free in making such a decision, depending on Londown, Paris and Washington to support that decision to laucnh WWIII.

I think none of these four governments would have been eager to trigger a whole world war for sure over Berlin, once it had fallen and the Berlin brigades had given up. The French would have needed to set a new defensive line at their own borders. The Brits would have beehn effetcoey kicked of the continent again. The US would have lost it's major foothold in europe. Germany was wanted as a buffer by everyone - and as the battleground to make sure any possible war would be fought not on British or French territory. Maybe time would have been a factor: the more devastating the takeover would have been and in the less time it had been completed, the more unlikely a Western military reaction on such a scale like an all out world war would have been. I cannot see that NATO ever has had any offensive potentials in continental europe against the WP - the soviet reaction always would have caused costs that would have outclassed any gains when attacking eastward first.

And in german thinking,m terms like "Commies" did not and do not play such a role like in American thinking. It still were less the commies and more the Soviets that were thought aboiut, in terms. And the hope for reunification never was given up, thinking of the Eastgermans as Germans that "we" needed to help. the left opposition was massively infiltrated and controlled by Moscow, we know today, also the peace movement did not do anything without Moscow having it's hands in it. This also helped to prevent a bit a thinlking that tried to see the WP as an allput black, a total evil. Thinking lefty was en vogue for many. the explicitly theatralic rethoric in the Reagan years and the debate around the SS-20s and Pershings and Cruise Missiles did their share to prevent a thinking that was allout and one-sided pro Germany or pro-US, and against the WP. the war for influ8encing public opinion, was waged quite successfully by Moscow, asn what made Reagan popular in the Us, made sure that in Germany he was not only mocked about, but was almost hated, especially by the younger ones. I think for Americans that is not easy to understand.

[Der Schoenradt]

It seems that you left out one feature of the defenses of West Berlin that you would of course have not way of knowing about, since it was classified until recently. The allies had an early warning system that could have detected an attack on West Berlin long before it took place. There is an article about Operation Stoss, Bordkante, and other exercises and plans for the invasion of West Berlin by the WP, and according to these plans 15 minutes were needed in order to keep Berlin Brigade and allies from sending for reinforcements. In the first 15 minutes all communications and intelligence sites would need to be destroyed. Another feature of the invasion is that success depended on complete surprise....which means the Berlin Brigade would need to be engaged before it was alerted. This was nearly impossible due to the men and women who served on Teufelsberg at Field Station Berlin. Unfortunately I cannot tell you anything else about this legendary unit, since all details are classified.

Too bad I missed the conversation. I enjoyed reading all of the posts.

[Freiwillige]

What fascinates me is how East Germany could become so fanatically communist after years of anti Communist propaganda under the National Socialists. Surely even in east Germany many a German had lost family in the maelstrom of the eastern front. For so many German minds to turn pro soviet has to be a propaganda coup of the century. Because many in the west remained pro Nazi although quietly years after the fall of the regime.

But back on Topic. I believe that West Berlin would have fallen quickly and would have been an acceptable loss to the west who would have far deeper issues at that point like the defense of the rest of west Germany!

[Gerald]

:salute: and thanks for an interesting perspective!

[Jimbuna]

It seems that you left out one feature of the defenses of West Berlin that you would of course have not way of knowing about, since it was classified until recently. The allies had an early warning system that could have detected an attack on West Berlin long before it took place. There is an article about Operation Stoss, Bordkante, and other exercises and plans for the invasion of West Berlin by the WP, and according to these plans 15 minutes were needed in order to keep Berlin Brigade and allies from sending for reinforcements. In the first 15 minutes all communications and intelligence sites would need to be destroyed. Another feature of the invasion is that success depended on complete surprise....which means the Berlin Brigade would need to be engaged before it was alerted. This was nearly impossible due to the men and women who served on Teufelsberg at Field Station Berlin. Unfortunately I cannot tell you anything else about this legendary unit, since all details are classified.

Too bad I missed the conversation. I enjoyed reading all of the posts.

Cheers....time for further research me thinks :up:

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