armored warfare in the PTO during WW2

[Torvald Von Mansee]

Does anyone have any links about this?

I find it amusing that the Sherman was the king of the battle field in this theater, while it was a death trap in Europe.

[OneToughHerring]

I remember having a tough time fighting M3 Lee's (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M3_Lee#Combat_performance) with my Japanese troops in Steel Panthers. :)

Although to be truthful the Americans didn't use them in any great numbers in the PTO.

[TLAM Strike]

http://users.swing.be/tanks/edito/japonais.htm

That link might interest you.

All in all Tank battles were very rare in the PTO. Japanese tanks were very lousy and only had success in China. Against US and latter Russian tanks (in Manchuria) they were totally outmatched.

[tater]

Yeah, jap tanks were crap. They had little in the way of artillery, either, actually. WTF were they thinking?

The Sherman was indeed not a great tank, but it did not exist in a vacuum. Nothing on the battlefield does. The Germans made many designs, and didn't make any of them in enough quantity. They also lacked reliability. The US tankers, being Americans, were used to cars, too. Look at the stats on vehicle ownership/familiarity before the war. Most US troops has first had experience keeping a car of that era running (since they could only afford "clunkers" that needed plenty of shade-tree work to keep running). Others were farm boys who had to fix engines as a matter of living on a farm. The Sherman fit well into that milieu. They were easy for our boys to keep running, and at least were not too slow.

And, as was said during the war: quantity has a quality all its own.

[TLAM Strike]

Yeah, jap tanks were crap. They had little in the way of artillery, either, actually. WTF were they thinking?

The Sherman was indeed not a great tank, but it did not exist in a vacuum. Nothing on the battlefield does. The Germans made many designs, and didn't make any of them in enough quantity. They also lacked reliability. The US tankers, being Americans, were used to cars, too. Look at the stats on vehicle ownership/familiarity before the war. Most US troops has first had experience keeping a car of that era running (since they could only afford "clunkers" that needed plenty of shade-tree work to keep running). Others were farm boys who had to fix engines as a matter of living on a farm. The Sherman fit well into that milieu. They were easy for our boys to keep running, and at least were not too slow.

And, as was said during the war: quantity has a quality all its own.

The Japanese I think simply made the best of limited resources. Against Infantry their tanks worked fine (assuming they had no AT Weapons which the Chinese lacked). The IJA was still a foot and bayonet army of the 19th century.


Another advantage of the Sherman was size, it was designed to fit right in to the hold of a transport ship. Can't say the same of an M1A1.

[tater]

True. Look at US amphibious equipment and doctrine during the war vs, well, the entire Axis. None of them had the first clue. The Germans thought invasion would be a morning with high tide at dawn, lol. Clueless.

They should be glad they didn't ever get past the "sort of thinking about it" stage with Sea Lion.

[TLAM Strike]

True. Look at US amphibious equipment and doctrine during the war vs, well, the entire Axis. None of them had the first clue. The Germans thought invasion would be a morning with high tide at dawn, lol. Clueless.

They should be glad they didn't ever get past the "sort of thinking about it" stage with Sea Lion.

Same could be said about their Airborne Forces as well.

The Japanese Navy, sure great idea jump out of a plane from 300-500 feet on to a tiny island. I'm sure that reserve chute on your chest will cushion the fall when you're main fails! :rotfl2:

The US Paras jumped from 800-1000 feet BTW.

Most of the time the Japanese Para were simply used a normal Lt. Inf. slogging their way though the jungles of the South Pacific.


The Italian guys were tough SOBs but where totally ill equipped and eventually destroyed in North Africa.

We all probably know about the lousy design of the German Fallchirmjager parachute harnesses and how it kept them from carrying anything heavy like say a gun... Yea that FG-42 maybe an awesome bit of firepower but when its not attached to a paratrooper its just a hunk of metal.

Gory, gory what a hell of a way to die! :03:

[August]

THE RULE OF LGOPs

(LGOP = Little Groups of Paratroopers)

"After the demise of the best Airborne plan, a most terrifying effect occurs on the battlefield. This effect is known as the rule of the LGOPs. This is, in its purest form, small groups of pissed-off 19-year-old American Paratroopers. They are well-trained, armed-to-the-teeth and lack serious adult supervision. They collectively remember the Commander's intent as "March to the sound of the guns and kill anyone who is not dressed like you...""

[Torvald Von Mansee]

Yeah, jap tanks were crap. They had little in the way of artillery, either, actually. WTF were they thinking?

The Sherman was indeed not a great tank, but it did not exist in a vacuum. Nothing on the battlefield does. The Germans made many designs, and didn't make any of them in enough quantity. They also lacked reliability. The US tankers, being Americans, were used to cars, too. Look at the stats on vehicle ownership/familiarity before the war. Most US troops has first had experience keeping a car of that era running (since they could only afford "clunkers" that needed plenty of shade-tree work to keep running). Others were farm boys who had to fix engines as a matter of living on a farm. The Sherman fit well into that milieu. They were easy for our boys to keep running, and at least were not too slow.

And, as was said during the war: quantity has a quality all its own.

I remember seeing a statistic that the Sherman required 4-5 man hours of maintenance for every hour of service. For comparison, the KV series required like 16 hours of maintenance for every hour of service. The T-34 had a record similar to the Sherman's, and the Tiger one similar to the KV's.

I wonder: did the Soviets use the IS-3 in the '45 Manchurian campaign? I would feel EXTREMELY safe in that machine at that time and place. Of course, it probably drank fuel like a beast and was not really needed, so it probably wasn't.

Did you know that Lesley McNair had plans before him allowing for the mass production of the Pershing as of 1943, and he vetoed it? And than he got killed by friendly fire the next year. Sometimes karma strikes early.

[Jimbuna]

I'm certainly no expert on Japanese military doctrine but what has always amazed me is the fact that a country who had as much time as they required to work out their plan/strategy for the conquer and domination of south east asia they failed in two vitally important areas in terms of the means they would carry out their plans.

1. The IJN was designed to wage a surface war backed up by a proficient air assault component yet lacked a sufficiently potent ASW capability to protect the transportation of its army to the lands it conquered.

2. (As already pointed out) A lack lustre armour and artillery element to support the army in holding the conquered territory.

[Schroeder]

I guess the Japanese thought that tanks would be to heavy to operate on jungle islands. :hmm2:
Your tank is useless if you have to go into the swampy jungle.

[tater]

I guess the Japanese thought that tanks would be to heavy to operate on jungle islands. :hmm2:
Your tank is useless if you have to go into the swampy jungle.

Except that the IJA didn't care about jungle. Their primary interest was China. Given their poor outcome with the Russians, and subsequent fear of Soviet involvement, you'd have thought they would have worked on better armor.

Or artillery.

[Sailor Steve]

I find it amusing that the Sherman was the king of the battle field in this theater, while it was a death trap in Europe.
That was true in the air of the P-38 as well. The highest-scoring US aces ever flew them against the Japanese. In Europe and North Africa they were average at best.

[Raptor1]

I remember seeing a statistic that the Sherman required 4-5 man hours of maintenance for every hour of service. For comparison, the KV series required like 16 hours of maintenance for every hour of service. The T-34 had a record similar to the Sherman's, and the Tiger one similar to the KV's.

I wonder: did the Soviets use the IS-3 in the '45 Manchurian campaign? I would feel EXTREMELY safe in that machine at that time and place. Of course, it probably drank fuel like a beast and was not really needed, so it probably wasn't.

Did you know that Lesley McNair had plans before him allowing for the mass production of the Pershing as of 1943, and he vetoed it? And than he got killed by friendly fire the next year. Sometimes karma strikes early.

IIRC there are unconfirmed reports of a tank regiment equipped with the IS-3 in Manchuria, but there have certainly been IS-2s in action and the Japanese didn't really have anything that could touch that one either.

The one time I remember tanks proving a decisive weapon in the PTO (Except for Manchuria, obviously, and Khalkhin Gol if it counts) was during the Battle of Meiktila and Mandalay at the end of the Burma campaign. IV Corps' Sherman-equipped 255th Indian Tank Brigade, together with 17th Indian Infantry Division (Which has been converted to be entirely motorized), blitzkrieged and captured Meiktila in little over a week following the start of the advance from the Irrawaddy bridgehead. The tank brigade was then used highly successfuly to meet besieging Japanese units and destroy them before they could organize a proper counteroffensive and again during the drive to Rangoon, where the brigade enveloped the Japanese 33rd Army and completely tore it apart with the help of infantry units.

The Japanese had nothing that could actually take on these tanks by this phase of the war and they had to employ their artillery in dangerous frontline positions in order to have some degree of defence against them, which greatly decreased their ability their infantry.

[tater]

That was true in the air of the P-38 as well. The highest-scoring US aces ever flew them against the Japanese. In Europe and North Africa they were average at best.

Another major plus with the P-38 was two engines. In the Pacific, long flights over water were required. Loss of an engine was very very dangerous. That's why the bulk of PTO aircraft were radials, since air-cooled engines are far more robust. The '38 got around that by having a spare engine. So any trade offs were worth it in terms of pilot survivability.

[TLAM Strike]

Another major plus with the P-38 was two engines. In the Pacific, long flights over water were required. Loss of an engine was very very dangerous. That's why the bulk of PTO aircraft were radials, since air-cooled engines are far more robust. The '38 got around that by having a spare engine. So any trade offs were worth it in terms of pilot survivability.
IIRC they made a pod (basically a converted drop tank) that was hung under one of the wings of the P-38 so that could carry a mechanic with the plane to service it on isolated airstrips.

[Weiss Pinguin]

That was true in the air of the P-38 as well. The highest-scoring US aces ever flew them against the Japanese. In Europe and North Africa they were average at best.
And basically for the same reasons. For instance, the Zero, although lighter and more agile than most Allied aircraft, was lightly armed (I remember reading one story about a flight of Zekes that emptied all their magazines into a B-17 in a prolonged fight, only for the bomber to surive the trip back to base [albeit in horrible condition]), even more lightly armored, and lacked self-sealing fuel tanks, which meant that many times just a quick burst was enough to light one on fire. Even though they were fairly modern craft at the beginning of the war, from the mid-war on they were outclassed by their Allied counterparts.

Although the army did have some pretty good aircraft... they had several types throughout the war that were just as good as the aircraft they went up against, and late-war models closed the gap even more, although by then they had about as much effect as Germany's experimental U-boat models. So actually maybe it wasn't all that similar overall, except when it came to the IJN. :p2:

[Raptor1]

I wouldn't classify the Zero as lightly armed, it was pretty much equal in firepower to the German Bf 109E with dual 7.7mm MGs and dual 20mm cannons (Curiously, these guns were based off the same Oerlikon FF that the 109's MG FF was). While this was probably sufficient against fighters, the B-17 was notoriously hard to take down, which was one of the main reasons the Germans switched their cannons to much larger 30mm guns.

The lack of armour, self-sealing tanks and a proper replacement was fatal though.

[Weiss Pinguin]

Maybe inadequate would be a better word. IIRC the Zeroes had somewhat smaller magazines (Or maybe it was just for their cannons), and American aircraft for the most part were sturdy and well protected.

[Jimbuna]

IIRC they made a pod (basically a converted drop tank) that was hung under one of the wings of the P-38 so that could carry a mechanic with the plane to service it on isolated airstrips.

Now that is extremely interesting....never knew that :up:

[tater]

The Zero is as grossly over rated in popular history as Admiral Yamamoto, or General Patton are.

It was a fine aircraft against lesser air forces (in quality or numbers), but it was effectively the ultimate plane for the wrong war. It was like a ww1 plane on steroids.

It NEVER sustained a positive kill ratio vs the USN/USMC, for example, not over any period of time long enough to include a decent number of engagements (read both of Lundstrom's excellent First Team books for details of virtually every single encounter for the first year of the war). The rest of the world was already moving to higher wing-loading, faster planes—"energy" fighters, not turn and burn.

[Raptor1]

The Zero is certainly overrated in popular culture, but it certainly had it's advantages. For example, the Zero outclassed all Allied carrier aircraft in range, a critical factor in carrier warfare.

[Torvald Von Mansee]

IIRC they made a pod (basically a converted drop tank) that was hung under one of the wings of the P-38 so that could carry a mechanic with the plane to service it on isolated airstrips.

http://i166.photobucket.com/albums/u115/rcbaker87/Not_sure_if_serious.jpg

[Torvald Von Mansee]

I wouldn't classify the Zero as lightly armed, it was pretty much equal in firepower to the German Bf 109E with dual 7.7mm MGs and dual 20mm cannons (Curiously, these guns were based off the same Oerlikon FF that the 109's MG FF was). While this was probably sufficient against fighters, the B-17 was notoriously hard to take down, which was one of the main reasons the Germans switched their cannons to much larger 30mm guns.

The lack of armour, self-sealing tanks and a proper replacement was fatal though.

I can tell you when I've played a Battle of Britain map in a Spitfire in IL-2, my lack of a cannon is a real downer. I've emptied all my ammo into various German bombers and they wouldn't go down.

[nikimcbee]

The Jap tanks armor is measured in MM:o. I think a bb gun penetrate them.:o
IE: Type 89a max armor: 17mm:o
Panzer iv: max 50mm
Panther: 100mm

[antikristuseke]

Niki, it takes about 8mm of steel to stop a 7.62mm round, but yeah, japanese tanks in WW2 were underwhelming in all aspects.

[TLAM Strike]

http://i166.photobucket.com/albums/u115/rcbaker87/Not_sure_if_serious.jpg

Standard Lightnings were even used as crew and cargo transports in the South Pacific. They were fitted with pods attached to the underwing pylons, replacing drop tanks or bombs, that could carry a single passenger in a lying-down position or cargo. This was very uncomfortable way to fly; some of the pods weren't even fitted with a window to let the victim see out or bring in light. One fellow who hitched a lift on a P-38 in one of these pods later said that whoever designed the damn thing should have been forced to ride in it. Source:
http://www.vectorsite.net/avp38_2.html

[Platapus]

TThey are well-trained, armed-to-the-teeth and lack serious adult supervision. They collectively remember the Commander's intent as "March to the sound of the guns and kill anyone who is not dressed like you...""


Sounds like a pretty good doctrine. :yeah:

2Lt Rice: Looks like you guys are going to be surrounded.
Winters: We're paratroopers, Lieutenant. We're supposed to be surrounded. :)

[Torvald Von Mansee]

Source:
http://www.vectorsite.net/avp38_2.html

Well, ok, than.

Sounds like a strange way to travel, and possibly dangerous.

I couldn't find any images of it w/a quick Googling.

[Task Force]

Just imagine if the pilot pulled the release switch.:o

[Weiss Pinguin]

Pulled the release switch? Imagine if the landing gear failed! :o

[Torvald Von Mansee]

Imagine if the P-38 got jumped by some Zeros, and had to make a series of hard turns!!

(Actually, a P-38 could just outrun them, probably)

[TLAM Strike]

(Actually, a P-38 could just outrun them, probably)
That is exactly what US pilots did against the Zero. Those hit and run tactics were called "Zoom and Boom". :know:

[tater]

Bong's rule was to never let his airspeed drop below 300.

The trick is to keep your E state. Dive, attack, shallow climb away at high speed. Turn (gently), rinse, repeat.

Zero had issues with controls getting heavy at speed, which reduced it's ability to attack in this way. Still, a zero using good energy tactics is tough to beat since it had such a great ROC.

That's where the COST of its performance comes into play. It was incredibly vulnerable. The closest US plane was the F4F. Depending on the version, the F4F was slightly fast or slower at sea level. All had a lower ROC. All were far more survivable (some pilots lived through literally hundreds of rounds poured into their aircraft from a zero).

The ability to make a mistake, and LIVE to learn from it was priceless. Jap pilots in effect got to make NO mistakes, usually.

Their pilot training was excellent, but rejected too many pilots, and as a result, they could not afford to lose ANY aircrews since they didn't make new pilots fast enough.

The IJNAF in effect built exactly the wrong airplane. The US could make planes fast. The US could make pilots fast. WE could have afforded planes that did not protect the pilot in favor of other factors. The IJNAF needed to preserver PILOTS at all costs. Instead, they gave them an entirely offensive weapon that resulted in unsustainable losses of trained aircrews.

Note that this "offensive at all costs" philosophy was endemic to the jap navy at large.

[Torvald Von Mansee]

That is exactly what US pilots did against the Zero. Those hit and run tactics were called "Zoom and Boom". :know:

Heh...I am VERY familiar w/those tactics!!!!:|\\

[Weiss Pinguin]

That is exactly what US pilots did against the Zero. Those hit and run tactics were called "Zoom and Boom". :know:
From what I've read, slashing attacks were probably more common than the dogfighting seen in movies, etc., or at least were more popular with many of the great aces of the war. And from my experience in the virtual world, one pass from high altitude on an unsuspecting/vulnerable target is much more preferable to several minutes of both parties maneuvering into a firing position. It might look cool, but it can get way out of hand in a hurry.


Hmm, I need to get a decent joystick again, I haven't played Il-2 in so long it almost hurts :nope:

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Note that this "offensive at all costs" philosophy was endemic to the jap navy at large.

A large part it probably came from the Washington Naval Treaty (the whole 10:7, 5:3 thing), which according to contemporary calculations basically doomed the Japanese naval combat potential to a level that ensures certain defeat in the scenario of a battle (never mind long war) with the United States, in short, there is zero combat stability. The so-called Fleet Faction has good cause to be unhappy.

The usual response, that maybe they shouldn't mind so much because the United States can outbuild them by much more than 5:3, I think, is weak. Naval warfare in the battleship era is the most attritionist of combat, so the change in percentage of success from 10:7 to 10:6 is much larger than the change from 10:6 down to say 10:3.

Given that, gambling that American internal politics would de facto prevent the fleet from going above 10:7 rather than being locked down by treaty to a 10:6 may have seemed attractive to the Fleet Faction. If they lose, it doesn't make much real difference.

Indeed, for much of the 20s and 30s America didn't work hard to build to its full allotment, suggesting this may be a better gamble than commonly credited.

Further, it would seem if not for the whole intercept thing, and the failure of Americans to remember that anything that a "bottom line" position as presented in the backroom (not even in public) to an ambassador represents a compromise that probably left at least half of the opposing cabinet in various states of dis-satisfaction, the Americans would have agreed to the 10:7 ratio.

I've yet to meet a source that tries to justify the American 10:6 stance beyond managing to crack codes, making it a moronic case of "We pushed because we can" rather than because of true strategic national interest. One can argue the Fleet Faction actually got the sum right from the angle of evaluating American interests and lines, only to be foiled by random American opportunism and greed.

Anyway, since then, the only crack out of a bleak situation is to increase strike potential within combat potential and hope for good rolls of die, which means, of course, "offensive-mindedness".

[Jimbuna]

Pulled the release switch? Imagine if the landing gear failed! :o

How embarrassing when they landed if he got caught short mid flight :doh:

[tater]

I agree that the ratio played into the IJN's broken, Mahanian dcotrine, but face it, the Washington Treaty mostly affected Japanese morale. They simply did not have the capacity, or treasure to build a fleet any bigger than what they did.

IMHO, had the treaty been abrogated any earlier than it was, it would have made zero difference as they were spending more money than they had regardless.

[August]

Sounds like a pretty good doctrine. :yeah:

2Lt Rice: Looks like you guys are going to be surrounded.
Winters: We're paratroopers, Lieutenant. We're supposed to be surrounded. :)

:up:

They're not well known outside the Paratrooper community but there were several Airborne operations in the PTO. The one to retake Corregidor Island was as tough as anything in the ETO.

[TLAM Strike]

:up:

They're not well known outside the Paratrooper community but there were several Airborne operations in the PTO. The one to retake Corregidor Island was as tough as anything in the ETO.

:yep:

Interestingly the USMC fielded its own Paratrooper unit for a while during the war. I think these are the folks your talking about. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramarines)

[August]

:yep:

Interestingly the USMC fielded its own Paratrooper unit for a while during the war. I think these are the folks your talking about. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paramarines)

Actually I was talking about these guys:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/503rd_Parachute_Infantry_Regiment

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

I agree that the ratio played into the IJN's broken, Mahanian dcotrine, but face it, the Washington Treaty mostly affected Japanese morale. They simply did not have the capacity, or treasure to build a fleet any bigger than what they did.

IMHO, had the treaty been abrogated any earlier than it was, it would have made zero difference as they were spending more money than they had regardless.

I'm not so sure whether it is a matter of Mahanian doctrine that no armed force wants to be treaty-bound into a position where it doesn't have a chance of winning against the "likely opponent" even in theory. As it is, the 10:7 they pushed for was supposed to give them only a calculated 50% defensive success chance, which is hardly the probability you want when you are on the defensive, even not counting the fact your enemy has much more industry. The fact the Fleet Faction was willing (apparently) to accept that says that (at least at that time) any nationalism they have is well-tempered by their realistic appraisal of their limitations, politically and economically. It is not asking too much to be given a 50% chance to defend the country, and the politicians denied them this.

As for their ability to exploit a 10:7 if it was given to them, it would only have been one or two battleships difference, and they were already building said battleships so I don't think it is going to break them. Besides, if what you say is true, and the Americans knew or even suspected it at the time, it makes them even more idiotic to have made a push that merely alienates.

Finally, no American should be dissing either Mahan (in any case, his ideas were very popular at that time and have not really been pushed out entirely even today) or the idea of spending more than they have :D

[tater]

The Japanese misread Mahan. This was their mistaken obsession with "decisive battle" while losing the notion of control of the sea.

They simply did not have the economy to do much better than they did. I suggest reading Kaigun, and there is some treatment of this in Combined Fleet Decoded as well as I recall (both are excellent books, regardless).

10:7 was after all the total USN at 10, and we had to split between 2 navies. While a few BBs might have brought them up to snuff, what difference does that make? It's be like the IJA adding elephant troops, lol.

What they needed was control of the seas. Destroyers and other escorts would have been a far better use of their VERY limited resources.

It's not just money, BTW, but raw materials. Short of a treaty, the US would likely have curtailed critical trade with Japan. Steel, and oil. Than means fewer ships as well. If we judged them to be massively building their navy, we'd have built more as well. They'd never catch up.

Could the IJN have built a few more ships, but the outcome would have been no different. The US built over 100 carriers during the war, nearly 800 DDs and DEs, the list goes on and on. The IJN could not have hoped to compete with the USN.

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

Regrouped slightly.

The Japanese misread Mahan. This was their mistaken obsession with "decisive battle" while losing the notion of control of the sea.

....

What they needed was control of the seas. Destroyers and other escorts would have been a far better use of their VERY limited resources.

Which they arguably won't have anyway if they lose the decisive battle - instead of having it pecked away with submarines, after the hypothetical enemy wins the battle it can simply impose the blockade with the fleet like Britain did to Germany.

I'm not sure if they read Mahan right or not (and in any case, surely any attempt to incorporate a foreign naval theory into your own defensive strategy will involve modifying it to suit your perceived requirements, so is there really a right or wrong?), but IMO the obsession with the "decisive battle" is partly because they are very well aware this is their best chance with their realities.

They did have a good number of destroyers, though they were strike-oriented rather than ASW-oriented. The lack of ASW emphasis, BTW, is endemic to a greater or lesser extent in every major navy.

10:7 was after all the total USN at 10, and we had to split between 2 navies. While a few BBs might have brought them up to snuff, what difference does that make? It's be like the IJA adding elephant troops, lol.

In the context of the 1920s, it would have bought them a 50:50 chance (by calculation) of winning operationally at sea. While of course, strategically the US could have rebuilt even if they lost, it'll still have been much better deterrence than a fleet with a (almost) zero percent chance by calculation, with corresponding greater available movement. And all for a ~10%-20% shift.

They simply did not have the economy to do much better than they did. I suggest reading Kaigun, and there is some treatment of this in Combined Fleet Decoded as well as I recall (both are excellent books, regardless).

It's not just money, BTW, but raw materials. Short of a treaty, the US would likely have curtailed critical trade with Japan. Steel, and oil. Than means fewer ships as well. If we judged them to be massively building their navy, we'd have built more as well. They'd never catch up.

We are talking the 1920s, not 1940. While they know they had competing interests, at that point it seems that the US is very far from "curtailing critical trade" or the like.

I'm well aware of the limitations of the Japanese economy. On the other hand, we are not talking about them "massively building their navy" to be say twice as large as it historically was. We are talking a ~10%-20% change, agreed by treaty, and the shift composed of ships they are actually already building, so it is more like the money wasn't completely wasted.

Could the IJN have built a few more ships, but the outcome would have been no different. The US built over 100 carriers during the war, nearly 800 DDs and DEs, the list goes on and on. The IJN could not have hoped to compete with the USN.

That's the kind of philosophy I've been arguing about in my first post. True, in a LONG war they are f*cked, but that was always true. The treaty, however, dooms them to lose even a short war, according to the mathematics. That's the perceived problem that IMO is a big part of the whole offensive-mindedness in the first place.

[tater]

The whole notion of a quick win for Japan was wrong-headed from the start. Even the IGHQ thought this to be true (1960s interview, quoted in Combined Fleet: Decoded).

The Washington Treaty was modified in 1930, and again in 1936 by the London Treaties (when the Japanese pulled out anyway). So 1936 is sort of my baseline anyway. More ships built in 1923 after the Wash. Treaty would not have changed much. It;s not like they were ready or willing to go to war at that point anyway.

Look at the reality. They went to war in 1941 because the US had just passed a new naval building program through Congress (Stark plan), scheduled to start putting ships at sea in 1943. This after the Vinson plan for brining the USN to treaty limits from 1934 to '42. The ships that started to really swamp the IJN in 1943 were for the most part already ordered before the war started. The IJN decided that they needed secure oil (their 10 million barrel strategic reserve was inadequate to wage war with, and mostly came from the US), and they realized that starting in 1943 they'd never have any hope of naval victory.

So 1922 changes little, IMO. They'd not have been ready, or even highly motivated to wage war in the 20s.

Regardless, the USN was already engaged in the 1916 building program in 1922. This 1916 program would have given the USN 50 first line BBs to the UKs 42. Japan's unrestricted plan was the eight-eight-eight fleet with 3 groups of 8 BBs and BCs. 24 ships (they only ever started the 8-8 plan of 16, however, 8-8-8 was their dream fleet). The Washington Treaty limited mostly the USN. While it was a problem for the 8-8-8 fleet, Japan decided it was more sensible to sign than get into an arms race they could not possibly win with the US. They were entirely right.

[tater]

BTW, WRT the 1916 plan, I should have said BBs and BCs, not just BBs (for the 50 and 42 US/UK ship numbers).

[Kazuaki Shimazaki II]

The whole notion of a quick win for Japan was wrong-headed from the start. Even the IGHQ thought this to be true (1960s interview, quoted in Combined Fleet: Decoded).

I hadn't read Combined Fleet: Decoded yet, but I must wonder what the justification was, and to what extent they thought that at the time versus post hoc when the result was known.

Beforehand, the idea of psychologically "shocking" America out of the war with a "quick win" was optimistic thinking, but incorporating and gambling on the surprise and the psychological (either in shock or endurance) as a factor is a neverending ploy by the inferior side in material that nevertheless feels they have to fight - and often it succeeds, especially if you are willing to bleed: Russo-Japanese War is a example that's closer to shock, and Vietnam and Afghanistan more of the endurance category.

Look at the reality. They went to war in 1941 because the US had just passed a new naval building program through Congress (Stark plan), scheduled to start putting ships at sea in 1943. This after the Vinson plan for brining the USN to treaty limits from 1934 to '42. The ships that started to really swamp the IJN in 1943 were for the most part already ordered before the war started. The IJN decided that they needed secure oil (their 10 million barrel strategic reserve was inadequate to wage war with, and mostly came from the US), and they realized that starting in 1943 they'd never have any hope of naval victory.In other words, right up until 1940 or 1941 or so (when even a moron can see a war's going to be on), America was going well under capacity, thus suggesting that in fact, America may be restrained from its full military potential by its own internal politics about as well, perhaps even better than a treaty.

So 1922 changes little, IMO. They'd not have been ready, or even highly motivated to wage war in the 20s.I take a longer view of all this than you do and see 1922 as one of bigger "buttons" in a series that America got to push that affected Japan's development, a strategic version of a early branch-choice in a AVG that looked relatively harmless but winds up dumping you to a Bad End. Besides, the 1922 Treaty became the basis of the 1930 Treaty and then 1936 and so on. The 1922 settlement was settled in terms more favorable to Japan, then it is likely the position would be better than 1930, then there would less pressure to quit the treaty, less chance of feeling obliged to leave the international community, less chance of war ... etc.

Regardless, the USN was already engaged in the 1916 building program in 1922. This 1916 program would have given the USN 50 first line BBs to the UKs 42. Japan's unrestricted plan was the eight-eight-eight fleet with 3 groups of 8 BBs and BCs. 24 ships. The Washington Treaty limited mostly the USN. While it was a problem for the 8-8-8 fleet, Japan decided it was more sensible to sign than get into an arms race they could not possibly win with the US. They were entirely right.Oh, restricting the Americans by a treaty isn't such a bad idea. Agreeing to the 10:6 instead of the 10:7 (which America would apparently have went along with if not for them getting ideas that they can push for a 10:6) is a crummy idea. By the naval theory of that time, a 10:6 isn't much better than the ~10:5 or worse that you suggest would have happened in an unrestricted scenario.

If anything, ironically perhaps going there would have resulted in yet another sea-change in Japanese naval employment now that the possibility of winning using strike tactics is cleanly eliminated.

(As a nitpick: 50 "first-line" US BBs would have been pretty optimistic. Assuming they finish both the Lexingtons and the S. Dakotas, that'll still only make 60 BBs and BCs made by the US. To get 50 "first-line BBs" you'll have to reach all the way back to about BB-11, which is the predreadnought Missouri...)

[tater]

The IJN was actually better off post 1922 than it would have been without the treaty. The Diet was being stingy with funds, the Tokyo earthquake required massive (expensive) rebuilding, etc.

The IGHQ stuff was interesting. In meeting before ww2, they IGHQ estimated the chances of Japanese success in a war with the US at 10%. They concluded that losing was likely to result in (their own words), "national death." Yamamoto was in no way alone in thinking that war with the US was not a good idea. They felt backed into a corner WRT naval power. The Stark Plan was the death-knell of any chance at meeting the US on acceptable terms, and even that assumed great success in the attrition strategy (picking off USN elements heading West, then "decisive battle" in home waters). Had there been no treaty limitations, the IJN would have built more, and bigger ships in the 20s and 30s perhaps, but that would have triggered USN building even earlier. As it was, the US wasn't even up to Treaty limits during that period. The IJN pulling out in 1936 sealed the deal for USN increases.

Starting the war was a helluva roll of the dice.