Secrets of the Bismark

[Brag]

Heraing I was interested in history and did espionage research, a fellow I've met recently told me an interesting story.

The Bismark was the most advanced engineering project of its time. The hull construction techniques were way superior to anything any other nation has built to date.

Toward the end of WWII, to prevent the Bismark secrets from falling into Allied hands, the engineering drawings were spirited out of Germany to South America.

This fellow said he will show me the drawings sometime in the near future.

True or not, I don't know, but it makes an interesting story.

:sunny:

[Freiwillige]

The Deutschland class pocket battleships (Lutzow, Admiral Scheer and Graf Spee) were the first to have an all welded hull construction. Bismark followed.

Nothing other than that sets it apart. In fact as great of a ship as she was, the compartmentalization was terrible and overly spacious. Space without bulkheads fill with water, Water is heavy, too heavy and it wont float!

Still she was better than anything the British had available in Battleships and only The Yamato and some late war American class Battleships could match her.

So in essence I'm calling foul. Could be wrong though, Its happened before!

I found this last night and its cool as all hell.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuTNJ2oz1aE

[Cohaagen]

The welding on large German warships was actually defective. Several of them suffered catastrophic failures which led to the loss of their stern (including Bismarck). Lutzow, Prinz Eugen and Scharnhorst all suffered similar failures. Bismarck's armour scheme was also antiquated, and several inches thinner than contemporary British battleships.

There is still a strong belief, especially in the UK, that German engineering is superior to anything else - the British Army called this "BMW Syndrome" when trialling successors to the Challenger 1. After they found flaws in the turret armour of the Leopard 2, its supporters in the army still refused to accept that a German product could be anything less than materially perfect.

This feeds into assertion that Bismarck was scuttled, therefore clawing back a "victory" for the Kriegsmarine. I wonder if the supporters of that particular theory would then accept that the Royal Navy could equally claim that HMS York, Exeter, Sheffield, Sir Galahad, Ivanhoe, Encounter, etc. were not sunk by enemy action :03:

[Freiwillige]

How could the Bismark scuttling herself be considered "Clawing out a victory"?

She was a floating wreck reduced to hull only as all of her superstructure had been blown away.

There is no doubt that the Bismark was beaten. Although one must contend that with the rudder jammed and her steaming in circles and unable to maneuver it was like fighting with one hand tied behind her back.

One can also contend that even know she was pummeled beyond recognition
she was still afloat.
No less than 6 torpedo's had been fired into her at the end of the battle not counting the two from the swordfish attacks that jammed her rudder.

This from the Net...


Almost two hours had elapsed since the battle had begun, and the Bismarck had shown a formidable capacity of resistance. The British first struck Bismarck at 0902, and ceased fire around 1016. For 74 minutes, the Bismarck received a continuous hammering that no other warship could have taken. We need not forget that the Hood sank six minutes after the first German shells were fired only three days earlier. Moreover, neither the main belt nor the armour deck were seen to be penetrated during the combat, and in the end it was her own crew who scuttled the ship. During this last engagement 2,876 shells were fired at the Bismarck. They are itemised as follows:

380 of 40.6 cm from Rodney
339 of 35.6 cm from King George V
527 of 20.3 cm from Norfolk
254 of 20.3 cm from Dorsetshire
716 of 15.2 cm from Rodney
660 of 13.3 cm from King George V


It will never be known how many of them did actually hit (400, 500, 600, maybe more), but taking into account the short distances in the last phase of the combat, it is assumed that many shells hit.
At 1100, only 20 minutes after the sinking, Winston Churchill informed the House of Commons gathered at Church House about the operations against Bismarck: "This morning shortly after day-break, the Bismarck virtually immobilized, without help, was attacked by British battleships that pursued her. I don't know the result of this action. It seems however, that Bismarck was not sunk by gunfire, and now will be sunk by torpedoes. It is believed that this is happening right now. Great as is our loss in the Hood, the Bismarck must be regarded as the most powerful enemy battleship, as she is the newest enemy battleship and the striking of her from the German Navy is a very definite simplification of the task of maintaining effective mastery of the Northern sea and maintenance of the Northern blockade." Mr. Churchill had just sat down when he was given a note, the Prime Minister rose again and said: "I have just received news that the Bismarck is sunk." The cheers were loud and long.

And as for the 35 feet of stern breaking off. I doubt that was poor construction as a 55 ton ship hitting the seabed would easily explain the stern breaking off.

[Iranon]

Comparing the Bismarck to other capital ships does not really work.

Germany was trying hard to appear as nonthreatening as possible on paper (despite a blatant disregard for the restrictions placed on them in the treaty of Versailles).
Making heavy use of welding to save as much weight as possible made sense in that context, as did choosing relatively small-calibre but higher-velocity guns (the British tried the latter and weren't impressed; not sure if the Germans did have a technological edge or whether they simply saw no alternative for diplomatic reasons).

Nations who didn't have equally strong reasons to deviate from proven technologies didn't.


*

The claim that the Bismarck's armour scheme was obsolete comes up quite frequently but I'm not convinced. The British and Americans sacrificed superstructure armour for more protection over critical parts of the ship for more survivability. This makes perfect sense if you expect your battleships to slug it out with their equals.

Germany had no illusions about rivaling the great naval powers. Her battleships were supposed to avoid direct confrontation with their equals and to focus on sinking merchants. Their secondary use was to keep several times their worth of capital ships busy, who would be trying to force such a confrontation.
As such, a more balanced armour scheme made sense: The main concern wasn't to stay afloat at all, but to not be hurt by inferior opponents to the point of requiring extensive repairs.

*

The following applies less to shipbuilding but the attitude towards German engineering of the time period: It's easy to overestimate it. Germany faced serious shortages of material and industrial power (especially the capacity to produce precisely machined parts in sufficient numbers). At the same time, ambitious projects were approved and engineers had a lot of leeway - arguably too much, because a lack of standardisation was a big problem.

So on one side there are brilliant (or at least deliciously overengineered) feats of technology, on the other it's tempting to explain away the failures by adverse conditions.
They were, however, a natural consequence of pushing known technology to its limits.

[Randomizer]

The Bismarck design is included in Anthony Preston's book "The World's Worst Warships" and she had a number of inherent design flaws including but not limited to:

Triple screw propulsion - an undesirable feature of her direct design ancestor, the 1914 Bayern Class battleships;

Twin main gun turrets - three triple turrets would have been about the same weight allowing fewer hull openings while providing an extra tube. the Bismarck's were the only capital ships designed post WW1 where the main battery was exclusively located in twin mounts;

Single purpose secondary guns - The 15cm twin batteries were exclusively surface weapons whereas all Bismarck's counterparts (except the equally flawed Yamato's) had dual purpose secondary guns and so could dispense with the weight-wasting tertiary 10.5cm twin mounts;

Poor AA gun control and arrangement - the 10.5 cm batteries had seperate forward/aft controls rather than port/starboard fire control. Although her only air targets were slow flying Swordfish and a Catalina and despite much shooting, she failed to shoot down a single plane. The tired canard that the targets were too slow for the director settings lives on in myth but since the directors were actually dual purpose this excuse seems entirely bogus;

Although Bismarck proved difficult to sink she was very easy to knock out and she had stopped firing within 20-minutes in her last battle. There is evidence that the design was too rigid and prone to internal shock damage and the given her own guns knocked out her forward radar with the opening salvo against Norfolk and Suffolk and the loss of a couple of boilers from one of the non-penetrating torpedo hits from the first air attack this is certainly possible.

Of course posting anything negative about Bismarck, darling battleship of the Internet Forums is likely to result in accusations of trolling and flaming but it's a chance to take. The objective evidence indicates that Bismarck was an inferior design sailing on a doctrinally flawed and poorly executed mission while being badly handled in action to boot. The myth of Bismarck makes her a super-ship in some sort of Wagnarian drama that came within a hair's breadth of winning the war at sea. Readers choice...

[Freiwillige]

I can agree with some of what your saying and disagree with other parts.

Like this example....

Contrary to what some authors have suggested, the origin of the design of the Bismarck Class battleships had nothing to do with the Bayern Class of World War I except for the fact that they were also equipped with eight 38cm guns in four twin turrets and a three-shaft propulsion plant. The battleships of the Bismarck Class were the product of a warship development that had begun with the construction of the pocket battleships (Panzerschiffe) of the Deutschland Class in the late 20's and early 30's under the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles.

"Twin main gun turrets - three triple turrets would have been about the same weight allowing fewer hull openings while providing an extra tube. the Bismarck's were the only capital ships designed post WW1 where the main battery was exclusively located in twin mounts"

4 more 15" guns seems like allot more weight to me. And the "Fewer hull openings"???

Love it or hate it the Bismark and Prince Eugen sunk the Hood and damaged the Prince of Whales so badly it had to retreat. Only Lütjens insistence that the
Bismark and Eugen stay their coarse and not pursue the Prince Of Whales saved the damaged ship.

The Bismark class was more than capable of holding her own toe to toe with any vessel the British fielded.

[Torplexed]

Of course posting anything negative about Bismarck, darling battleship of the Internet Forums is likely to result in accusations of trolling and flaming but it's a chance to take. The objective evidence indicates that Bismarck was an inferior design sailing on a doctrinally flawed and poorly executed mission while being badly handled in action to boot. The myth of Bismarck makes her a super-ship in some sort of Wagnarian drama that came within a hair's breadth of winning the war at sea. Readers choice...

Yup. I agree. The old Japanese battleship Hiei (1914) took a hit to the steering gear during the confused night battle off Guadalcanal in 1942 and spent a full day circling helplessly northwest of Savo Island, enduring up to 70 aerial attacks by US torpedo and dive bombers before sinking during the night. It's still not know whether she sank from scuttling or torpedoes or the prior night's surface gunfire. But you never see her mythologized for stubbornly staying afloat the way the Bismarck is.

[Sailor Steve]

Bismarck's armor layout was indeed based on Bayern and Baden. It was designed for close in fighting, still retaining the WW1 concept of a sloping armored deck behind the belt armor. Her torpedo protection was also good, but nothing is perfect. After all that pounding, Bismarck was not only a floating wreck, but was also observed by Rodney to be listing heavily. It is likely she would have sunk within a few hours whether or not the cruisers fired extra torpedoes, and whether or not the Germans used the scuttling charges.

I"Twin main gun turrets - three triple turrets would have been about the same weight allowing fewer hull openings while providing an extra tube. the Bismarck's were the only capital ships designed post WW1 where the main battery was exclusively located in twin mounts"

4 more 15" guns seems like allot more weight to me. And the "Fewer hull openings"???
Three triple turrets means only one more gun, not four. And three triple turrets weigh less than four twins. I do agree with the last though, as a barbette doesn't go through the hull at all.

[Snestorm]

Once built, the best role for Germany's heavy surface units was:
A Fleet In Being.

As long as one has assets to threaten his/her/their enemy,
that enemy is forced to tie up a larger number of resources in defense.

Sometimes the threat of action is stronger than action itself.

[Freiwillige]

4 turrets with one gun added = 4 guns. That's how I was looking at it anyways.

On researching the the battle I found it amusing that once the Hood opened fire lutjens refused to return fire all the while English shells were landing perilously close. Capt. Lindemann finally fed up with lutjens failing to respond gave the order to return fire with this quote "I'm not just gonna sit here and wait for my ship to get shot out from under my ass!"

Lutjens had orders not to engage any capitol ships, but to sail blindly along while shells are landing all around you seems a bit unreal.

Lutjens also vetoed Lindemann's request to pursue and finish the Prince of Whales much to Lindemann's aggravation.

Another interesting fact is that Norway was allot closer than Brest France.
Why the Bismark chose France is beyond belief as the road back to Norway was open.

[Freiwillige]

Criticism of the Bismark
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antony_Preston_%28naval_historian%29)

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antony_Preston_%28naval_historian%29)
Preston (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antony_Preston_%28naval_historian%29) claimed that the design was an enlarged reworking of the World War I Bayern class (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayern_class_battleship) battleships and retained old-fashioned features particularly in respect of the Armour layout, regarded as outdated by the Royal Navy and United States Navy.[/URL] Authors like Jack Brower (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_battleship_Bismarck#cite_note-51) or William H. Garzke and Robert O. Dulin have claimed this is not true in their books The Battleship Bismarck and Battleships: Axis and Neutral Battleships in World War II: "This...resulted in some speculation that the Bismarck-class battleships were mere copies of these older ships. This is false; the new ships had to be faster and have more protection, range and firepower; and the percentages allocated to Armour protection, firepower and propulsion were not the same as Bayern. The triple-shaft arrangement and the distribution and caliber of the main armament were the only major similarities." (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_battleship_Bismarck#cite_note-53)
The low location of the main Armour deck, in the same position as that in WWI ships, left the two decks above the Armour deck exposed to plunging fire and bombs, which the British and Americans reduced by positioning the main Armour decks one deck higher. The Bismarck class battleships were designed to fight in the North Sea and the North Atlantic. In these waters poor visibility, especially during the winter, meant relatively short ranges of engagement, typically 10-15,000 m, were expected; the emphasis was, therefore, on close-range protection. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_battleship_Bismarck#cite_note-55) The dual armored decks were chosen by the Kriegsmarine to guarantee that shells and bombs burst upon contact with the upper armored deck, rather than penetrating deeper into the ship's vitals.
Some communication systems, including her main damage-control center and fire-control rooms, were beneath the main armored deck and the cables from bridge and rangefinders were routed through the three armored shafts between these stations and the rooms beneath the main armored deck. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_battleship_Bismarck#cite_note-57)
The provision of both a secondary armament of twelve 5.9-inch (150 mm) guns and the inclusion of a separate battery of sixteen 4.1-inch (100 mm) high-angle (anti-aircraft) guns was also criticized on the grounds that fitting two types of weapons required more deck space than the dual-purpose secondary armaments of Allied ships. These weapons enabled both air and surface targets to be engaged, thereby saving on weight used elsewhere in their designs, eliminating the need to carry two sizes of secondary ammunition and facilitating simplified fire-control. The use of dual-purpose armament might possibly have increased the number of anti-aircraft guns but might have weakened the ship's defense against destroyer attacks, which German naval experts deemed more important. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_battleship_Bismarck#cite_note-Preston105-59)The sixteen 4.1-inch (100 mm) AA guns gave good performance early in the war, but against newer and better aircraft types it became necessary to convert the 5.9-inch (150 mm) guns for dual-purpose use against both surface and aerial threats.

[URL="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wehrmachtbericht"] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_battleship_Bismarck#cite_note-61)

[Danelov]

This point mencioned by Cohaagen that was really so; a great number of capital ships and others german ships have loss the stern in combat.Prinz Eugen by submarine torpedo, Deutschland by submarine torpedo, Bismarck(also his hull in the bottom of sea is complet minus stern)Graf Spee(the same complet hull without stern in the bottom of the River Plate).
About the Battle of Denmark Strait and the defeat of the force of Adm Holland must consider also: Prince of Wales was no really 100 % combat ready, there was multiple problems in the artillery and there was also civil specialized personnel working still in the ship this day. The combat dispositive utilised by Holland was far of be ideal and his priority was to put Hood the more near possible of the Lutjens force to evite high incoming artillery rounds. That mean heading direct to the Germans with only half of his main artillery in conditions of use.Sun was also in advantage for Lutjens.
That was a victory for Lutjens , but also must consider, this three hits of 356mm in Bismarck had aborted the complet Rheinübung operation.The worst was in the fuel bunkers and had decided Lutjens to take heading to Brest and the separation of Prinz Eugen.

[Pacific_Ace]

"Why the Bismark chose France is beyond belief as the road back to Norway was open."
This is not hard to understand at all. They wanted BIsmark out in the open oceans doing commerce (convoys) raiding and thats really hard to do from Norway. Their entire strategy from U-boats to Bismark was to strangle England.
Although it happened almost a year later, if you examine the PQ-17 disaster, you see how terrified the Admiralty was of having German Battleships and/or Battle cruisers roaming the open ocean in search of convoys.

Had Bismark made it into the North Atlantic in battle worthy condition the consequences would have been immense and cannot be underestimated. This was 7 months before Pearl Harbor, UK could conceivably have been forced to end the war.

[Randomizer]

Had Bismark made it into the North Atlantic in battle worthy condition the consequences would have been immense and cannot be underestimated. This was 7 months before Pearl Harbor, UK could conceivably have been forced to end the war.

This is one of the great fictions of the Bismarck mythology, cruiser warfare by regular surface warships could never be decisive so any battle squadron sortie into the North Atlantic could never 'win the war' unless Britain just decided to up and quit.

The KM's ability to refuel at sea was vestigal, although better than the RN at least as far as big ships was concerned. Therefore all sorties were supported from ports where submarines, mines and aircraft could concentrate when the raiders returned to refuel. What tankers support there was staged several days steaming from the convoy routes and with ULTRA support killing them was relatively easy.

The probable fate of the surface raider was always that of Emden or Graf Spee (both the Admiral in 1914 and the ship in 1939). Some success might be expected and exploited for propaganda but they could never loiter in the sea lanes, so any stoppage of convoys would be at best temporary. Even the successful sorties of Admiral Scheer and the Scharnhorst twins failed to disrupt convoy traffic for more than a few days.

The German surface raider experiance in WW1 and to May 1941 should have taught them this but instead wishful thinking drove poor planning which created a raider doctrine that could only end in defeat and that defeat came when the war was still less than 2-years on.

Submarines on the other hand, could potentially be decisive because they could hide on the shipping lanes and remain on station for weeks, something no surface warship could ever do successfully.

Far from being nearly crippled Prince of Wales had her fighting power intact (her damage was largely confined to her hanger and bridge) and the defects on all but one of her heavy guns was repaired before she was ordered home - due to a lack of fuel. Hood was lost fighting a tactically mismanaged but doctrinally sound sea control battle whereas Bismarck was destroyed chasing the fantasy of decisive cruiser warfare.

Bismarck (and Tirpitz) would have served the Nazi's far better had she been melted down and turned into U-Boats.

[gmuno]

Concerning the intact POW
After the hunt, POW was drydocked again for finishing works. The dockworkers were quite astonished to find a hole below the waterline and after tracing it, they found a 38 cm dud sitting in a quite crucial sport below turret B. Had it gone boom POW would have also gone boom.

Concerning the faulty aft portion
Lützow and Prinz Eugen got their tails shoot of by torps. The german engineers had overlooked the fact that the keel didn't stretch so far, so it was a strukturly weak spot for almost all german fighting ships. Bismarks tail also broke of during sinking, as the layout of wreckage on the seabed explains.
Scharnhorst got hit a bit foreward, which flooded parts of her engine compartment, the wreck has still gotten his tail (but not the bow - other story).

Concerning self-sinking
Evidence is not conclusive. During Camerons media-expedition it was shown that large parts of the outer hull had been broken of by the impact on the seabed. This allowed an inspection of the torpedo-bulkhead which looked intact. But some parts of the Bismarks are sitting almost to the waterline in the seabed, so until the ship isn't excavacated and raised there might still be some holes of deep running torpedos buried. For the sake of the argument lets say, the Bismark wouldn't have sunk without the British but the Germans have lend a helping hand in sinking this ship.

Guns layout
The german admirality wanted an equal firing cover at 360°. Thats why 4 turrets were installed. For the medium calibers, the Germans didn't have an all-purpose-gun like the Americans with their 5". So different calibers were installed with different goals. Why different bores were installed for the 10,5 cm flak beats me.

Tactical situation
Raeder was an admiral of the old guard. For him battles were fought above the sealevel, not bellow. In the 1930's he had Hitlers ear and Hitler liked big ships (after the war scetches with his initials were found, which showed ships with 60 cm guns). Would the German navy have accepeted her status as cruiser navy and neglected building big ships in favour for subs, the war might have gone otherwise.

[Brag]

Ha! This turned into a good and informative debate--Well done, chaps. :salute::salute::salute:

[Freiwillige]

Allot of the Bismarck's mystique is as much about the situation as it was the ship.

For example the Tirpitz is the same class of ship but her name doesn't compare to the Bismarck in fame and legend.

The Idea that the Bismarck defeated the British navy's very symbol of power.
Then outnumbered and against her will she was forced to sail into the very forces pursuing her, Fighting to the last of her ability!

Its very much like a Wagnerian opera. And a great story because its one of the few cases where honor and glory can be claimed by both sides.

To the KMS Bismarck and HMS Hood :salute::salute::salute:

[Dread Knot]

Had Bismark made it into the North Atlantic in battle worthy condition the consequences would have been immense and cannot be underestimated. This was 7 months before Pearl Harbor, UK could conceivably have been forced to end the war.

Yeah...I love this. One German battleship was magically going to do what 300 submarines under Donitz couldn't do later. Or the existing fleet of German pocket battleships and auxiliary cruisers which sank a lot more ships than the Bismarck ever did. Or the entire German High Seas fleet in WWI either.

I kind of blame the elevation of the Bismarck as some sort of supership on the James Cameron documentary he made after diving on the Bismarck's wreck. In it he characterized the warship as the German equivalent of the "Death Star." (even down to an Achilles Heel exploited by a Swordfish pilot apparently gifted with The Force. ;)) As talented as Cameron is a filmaker and storyteller I don't think he qualifies as a naval historian.

In the big picture I feel Bismarck was a extravagant ship Germany could ill afford and in the end was ill used as a commerce raider. It doesn't take a 15" shell to sink a lowly merchantman.

[Freiwillige]

Yeah...I love this. One German battleship was magically going to do what 300 submarines under Donitz couldn't do later. Or the existing fleet of German pocket battleships and auxiliary cruisers which sank a lot more ships than the Bismarck ever did. Or the entire German High Seas fleet in WWI either.

I kind of blame the elevation of the Bismarck as some sort of supership on the James Cameron documentary he made after diving on the Bismarck's wreck. In it he characterized the warship as the German equivalent of the "Death Star." (even down to an Achilles Heel exploited by a Swordfish pilot apparently gifted with The Force. ;)) As talented as Cameron is a filmaker and storyteller I don't think he qualifies as a naval historian.

In the big picture I feel Bismarck was a extravagant ship Germany could ill afford and in the end was ill used as a commerce raider. It doesn't take a 15" shell to sink a lowly merchantman.

Two myths keep popping up in this discussion.
1. (The Bismarck class was not designed to go against other capital ships.)
WRONG! That is exactly what she was designed for.

2. (She was designed for commerce raiding.)
Her tactical use by the Kriegsmarine due to the war situation against convoys was a valid tactic. When the Bismarck was designed she was designed for a war with England in 1944,45 or 46' under the Z-Plan.

Had the timetable of war been met by the Z-plan then Germany would have had many more capital ships.

Also the Bismarck in the Atlantic would not have been an outright war winner but her influence in the convoy's area could cause dispersal which in turn would leave the U-boats happy pickings.

Another thing I had just found out was that the Kreigsmarine had another plan that lost out. Wait a few more months and send out the Bismarck, Tirpitz, Gneisneau, Scharnhorst, Prinze Eugen, Admiral Scheer and Hipper.

In the End the leadership of the Surface fleet was impatient and decided to act with just the Bismarck and prince Eugen.

Had they sent out the whole fleet the British would have been hard pressed to maintain controll of the Atlantic without sacrificing the Med to keep the Atlantic. Could have been as epic as Jutland!:arrgh!:

[Randomizer]

$0.02 worth of opinion before departing this discussion…

The entire Bismarck episode is certainly an epic worthy of Wagner but the very drama of the common narrative tends to camouflage many aspects of the events. Any novelist taking the story to his publisher would, in all probability, be shown the door, hallway and the street in quick succession.

Every historical event gets spun in a way to benefit the side relating those events. Usually when two sides are compared this spin is considerably different and so discussion centers on the differing points of view. In the case of the Bismarck myth it behooved Britain and Germany to spin the story precisely the same way and so the narratives reinforce each other.

It certainly benefits the German telling that Bismarck was a superior warship capable of wresting control of the sea-lanes from Britain and winning the war. This hides her short legs and design shortcomings since if these are admitted, the question would be: Why was a capital ship so unsuited to operations against commerce be sent on such a mission?

The logistical problems of achieving and maintaining sea-control without a maritime choke point to canalize shipping or air superiority cannot be admitted for the uncomfortable question: How would a single battleship sortie actually stop convoy traffic for long enough to starve Britain into surrender?

The uber-battleship myth allows us to ignore these questions or consider them irrelevant but the actual mechanism by which Bismarck would realistically ‘win the war’ has escaped all but the most rabid Bismarck fanboys. It also allows responsibility for what happened to be placed on Adm Lutjen’s shoulders, effectively absolving OKM and providing the illusion that their strategy was really sound had it been properly executed. Commerce raiding by surface ships could never be decisive without strategic sea-control and German battleships could never establish this in the North Atlantic except on the most local and transient basis.

Ironically the uber-battleship narrative also benefits the Royal Navy for we tend not to look deeper and ask uncomfortable questions such as:

Why was Hood sent into a surface action with some nine tons of rocket fuel stored in sheet metal lockers directly forward of X-turret and on the deck-head over the above water torpedo tubes? (Her 4” UP anti-aircraft rocket ammunition)

Why with two-fold superiority in gunnery firepower and ten-fold superiority in ship-killing torpedoes available, did Adm Holland bungle the action at the Denmark Straights so badly? With almost 15-hours of daylight ahead the precipitous advance on Bismarck and Prinz Eugen was as unnecessary as it was unwise as was detaching his destroyer flotilla during the night. Concentrating on Hood’s alleged weaknesses allow Holland’s actions leading up to the engagement to be ignored.

Why did Adm Wake-Walker handle the shadowing of Bismarck in such a pusillanimous manner? Particularly when compared to the shining examples of Harwood’s pursuit of Graf Spee in 1939 and Kelly shadowing and even actually engaging SMS Goeben and Breslau in 1914 with HMS Gloucester.

How can the Admiralty explain the comedy of errors that was the movement of the Home Fleet following the loss of Hood?

The conventional narrative largely ignores or glosses over these questions and many others probably because the answers might show the Royal Navy operation in a very unfavourable light. There is no disrespect intended but an objective telling should include warts and all however the nature of the Bismarck drama ensures that it has been largely shorn of its warts so that the leadership of both sides emerge with great credit rather than being managers of a complete naval fiasco.

Winston Churchill, who must bear considerable responsibility for the British actions during Exercise Rhine once wrote: “I know History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.”

This is certainly true of the Bismarck myth.

[Freiwillige]

Nice post :up:

[Brag]

@ Randomizer,

What an excellent, well written aeticle to close this discussion!

[sharkbit]

Nice post Randomizer! A lot of good points raised. :yeah:

Any novelist taking the story to his publisher would, in all probability, be shown the door, hallway and the street in quick succession.


I've always thought the same as the above. The story reads like fiction.
:)

[Black Eagle]

Shall we step back from the analytical?
As SH4 sees its last sunsets, we harken back to May 27, 1941.

Herr Kanug Rolfe Hass experienced the thrill of his naval career. He intercepted HMS Rodney and HMS King George V steering 145 degrees at about 0730 on that morning in force 15 conditions. Exact grid location at first contact:
25km west of the intersection formed by BE29, BE37, BE53, and BE61 (or about 1400km (per the game) west of Brest, France.

His Type IX (at GWX 90% degree of difficulty) used all remaining 6 torpedos on board to dispatch these two British battleships. After surfacing, U124 observed gunfire flashes far to the SSE where Bismark, spared interception by the battleships sunken by Hass, was engaged with other Royal Navy units.

Now here's the really mind-blowing part of this story:
Hass then moved SE towards the area where gunflashes had been seen. To his surprize he sighted the silohette of a large warship....Bismark!!
She was dead in the water, her upper works shattered presumably by 8 inch shellfire. U124 sent its contact report. Soon thereafter BDU sent out its message lamenting the loss of the Bismark. Little would the SH4 designers have known Bismark was still afloat, and deadly!

Hass then decided to stay near the stricken Bismark to see what would become of Germany's flagship. Incredably, two days later a large convoy traveling westerly at 7 knots stumbled upon the Bismark!

Hass then positioned his U124 between Bismark and oncoming escorts.THREE sunken destroyers later and SEVEN shredded merchants approximating 30,000 tons later, Bismark, while motionless in high sea conditions, had survived to fulfill her assignment to attack convoys. Toward the end of this engagement U124 had the incredible experience to witness 15 inch shells slamming into merchant ships, along with attendant explosions and sinkings.
What an unforgettable experience! What a glorious way to close the book on Silent Hunter IV's story!

I'd recommend anyone loving the game to mission in the Atlantic during May one more time. Save your torpedos, and head for the rendevous described above. If you do, you are in for a very unforgettable experience if you can intercept and sink these two British battleships!
Happy Hunting. oblt Rolfe Hass