How about top ten 20th century Commanders.

[Mush Martin]

So its Retirement day for all the military commanders of the
twentieth century.

Who among them could look back with the most satisfaction.
Ike, Yamamoto , Georgei Zhukov

Who would be the top ten nominees?

I for one would nominate General Giap as a good candidate
for a top ten finish, At his retirement party He could look
back on defeating four superior foes in his career, two
colonial powers and two superpowers, Not bad and certainly
worthy of mention on this subject.

Have a go but please read through the thread prior to posting.

Here is the list so far.

Patton
Rommel
Manstein
Boelcke
Donitz
Guderian
Mcarthur
Kesselring
Heinrici
Konev
Kravchenko
Zhukov
Von Paulus
Von Richtofen
Bradley
Eisenhower
Lowenhardt
Von Spee.
Montgomery
slim
Oconner
Student
Heihachiro Togo
Isoroku Yamamoto
Mordechai Hod
Ariel Sharon
Israel Tal
Timoshenko
Nimitz
Woodward
Cpt Fredrick John (Johnnie) walker R.N. , C.B. D.S.O. w/three bars
Monash
Giap
Merril

[Frame57]

Patton! What more can be said?

[Happy Times]

What level? Operational only?

[UnderseaLcpl]

I don't know if you mean army commanders or commanders of all types but I bet they're all Germans.

Rommel, Manstein and Boelcke are all fine examples. The German U-boat aces alone probably produced more "allied war effort destroyed" per person on their craft than any other ace or commander of any kind.
Let's not forget Michael Wittman and Erich Heartman. And Richtofen, who was a flight commander, (or a hunter squadron commander in German).
And Von Shcleiffen, who beat the crap out of the allies after he was dead.

Of course, that is only considering kill/death ratios. If we consider victory there are no German commanders that fit the bill.

I certainly wouldn't nominate Zhukov for the same reason I wouldn't consider Ulysses Grant as a great commander. Throwing troops at the enemy until they die because you have the most troops isn't really a strategy.

[Frame57]

Hmmm! Ok, this puts a different spin on things. Let's see, as stated before, for America-Patton, for Germany-Donitz, for England-Mrs. Butterworth, for France-all cabaret girls and so on. I cannot think of really great military commanders from any other countries other than Germany or the USA

[STEED]

Patton! What more can be said?

Patton...."I shall go though the West Wall like sh*t though a goose."

And did he? Not in my book.

[Happy Times]

Il put a WIP list with no particular order, this is hard.
Did Guderian, no points yet though.:)

Erich von Manstein

Heinz Guderian

Leadership
"In the Invasion of France, he personally led the attack that traversed the Ardennes Forest, crossed the Meuse River and broke through the French lines at Sedan. During the French campaign, he led his panzer forces in rapid blitzkrieg-style advances and earned the nickname "Schneller Heinz" (Hurrying Heinz) among his troops.[5] Guderian's panzer group led the "race to the sea" that split the Allied armies in two, depriving the French armies and the BEF in Northern France and Belgium of their fuel, food, spare parts and ammunition. Faced with orders from nervous superiors to halt on one occasion, he managed to continue his advance by stating he was performing a 'reconnaissance in force'. Guderian's column was famously denied the chance to destroy the Allied beachhead at Dunkirk by Hitler's personal order.

In 1941 he commanded Panzergruppe 2, better known as Panzergruppe Guderian, in Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, receiving the 24th award of the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross on July 17 of that year. From October 5, 1941 he led the redesignated Second Panzer Army. His armored spearhead captured Smolensk in a remarkably short time and was poised to launch the final assault on Moscow when he was ordered to turn south towards Kiev."


Planning

Manstein Plan
"Whilst Von Manstein was formulating the new plans in Koblenz, it so happened that Lieutenant-General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIXth Army Corps, Germany's elite armoured formation, was lodged in a nearby hotel.[9] Von Manstein now considered that, should he involve Guderian in his planning, the tank general may come up with some role for his Army Corps to play in it, and this might then be used as a decisive argument to relocate XIXth Army Corps from Army Group B to Army Group A, much to the delight of Von Rundstedt. At this moment Von Manstein's plan consisted in a move from Sedan to the north, right in the rear of the main Allied forces, to engage them directly from the south in full battle. When Guderian was invited to contribute to the plan during informal discussions, he proposed a radical and novel idea: not only his army corps, but the entire Panzerwaffe should be concentrated at Sedan. And this concentration of armour should not move to the north but to the west, to execute a swift, deep, independent strategic penetration towards the English Channel without waiting for the main body of infantry divisions. This could lead to a strategic collapse of the enemy, avoiding the relatively high number of casualties normally caused by a classic Kesselschlacht or "annihilation battle". Such a risky independent strategic use of armour had been widely discussed in Germany before the war but had not at all been accepted as received doctrine; the large number of officers serving in the Infantry, which was the dominant Arm of Service, had successfully prevented this. Von Manstein had to admit that in this special case, however, it might be just the thing needed. His main objection was that it would create an open flank of over 300 kilometres, vulnerable to French counterattack. Guderian convinced him that this could be prevented by launching simultaneous spoiling attacks to the south by small armoured units. However, this would be a departure from the basic concept of the Führer-Directive N°6.

Von Manstein wrote his first memorandum outlining the alternative plan on 31 October. In it he carefully avoided mentioning Guderian's name and downplayed the strategic part of the armoured units, in order not to generate unnecessary resistance.[10] On 6 November, 21 November, 30 November, 6 December, 18 December 1939 and 12 January 1940, a further six memoranda followed, slowly growing more radical in outline."

Mastery of Logistics

"Guderian was convinced that tanks could not be successful without logistical support. Thus was born the idea of armored divisions to provide the support that allows tanks to fight to their maximum capacity. (36) However, during the creation of the German Armored Force, Guderian's request to motorize heavy artillery battalions was turned down. In his memoirs, he remarked, "The heavy guns remained horse-drawn, with unfortunate results during the war, particularly in Russia." (37)

The key to the blitzkrieg was the army's ability to be mobile, similar to the vision of De Guibert. Guderian stated, "Only movement brings victory." (38) The emphasis for the tanks was appropriately pushed, but not the logistics infrastructure to support them. As early as 1937, Guderian noted that resupply of Panzers was found to be insufficient during validity exercises. He noted that rapid movement of supplies and repair depots were needed. (39)"

Tactical execution

"Toward evening, Guderian sent infantry and engineers across the river in inflatable rafts to blast defenders out of their bunkers and construct pontoon bridges for the tanks and other vehicles. Many of the French units holding the unfinished extension of the Maginot Line in this sector were little more than construction crews and lacked combat training. Their opponents, by contrast, had drilled meticulously for this operation in Germany by crossing the Mosel River under live fire. By nightfall, the defenders were retreating in droves, clogging roads and spreading panic. “Tanks are following us!” they shouted, although no tanks would in fact cross the Meuse before daybreak. Their commander, Brig. Gen. Henri-Jean Lafontaine, wasted precious hours that night shifting his command post rearward and seeking detailed orders from superiors. By the time he counterattacked the next morning, Guderian—who habitually led from the front and made snap decisions—had enough armor and artillery across the river to repulse the belated French challenge and secure his bridgehead.

Guderian then overcame objections from superiors, who wanted to consolidate forces at Sedan before advancing, and pushed ahead with two panzer divisions, leaving a third behind to defend the bridgehead. He was taking a big risk, for Allied warplanes were swarming over the Meuse, and the French were massing heavy armor at Stonne, south of Sedan. Between May 15 and 17, Stonne changed hands more than a dozen times as panzers battled in the streets with hulking French Char B heavy tanks, so thickly armored that shells bounced off them like buckshot. Those gas guzzlers could not operate long without refueling, however, and few had functioning radios. Many eventually fell prey to lighter but more maneuverable panzers and to German artillery, including fearsome 88mm anti-aircraft guns that doubled as tank killers with their barrels lowered. The French were defeated at Stonne, and a spirited effort by Brig. Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s Fourth Armored Division to halt Guderian at Montcornet, west of Sedan, failed as well. “A few of his tanks succeeded in penetrating to within a mile of my advanced headquarters,” Guderian observed, but de Gaulle’s lonely bid faltered for lack of support."4.

Initiative

"Achtung - Panzer! was written in 1936-37 as an explanation of Guderian's theories on the role of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare. It was actually a compilation of not only of Guderian's own theories but also the ideas of other proponents of armored and combined-arms warfare within the general staff, though the bulk of the credit rightly is Guderian's. The panzer force he created would become the core of the German Army's power during the Second World War and would deliver the core of the fighting style known as blitzkrieg. To this day, his contributions to combined arms tactics are studied throughout military schools."
He summarized the tactics of blitzkrieg as the way to get the mobile and motorized armored divisions to work together and support each other in order to achieve decisive success. In his book Panzer Leader[2] he wrote:

In this year (1929) I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies; the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock-ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armor. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions: what was needed were armored divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to fight with full effect."

"Guderian believed that certain developments in technology needed to take place in conjunction with blitzkrieg in order to support the entire theory, especially in communication and special visual equipment with which the armored divisions in general, and tanks specifically, should be equipped. Guderian insisted in 1933, within the high command, that every tank in the German armored force must be equipped with radio and visual equipment in order to enable the tank commander to communicate and perform a decisive role in blitzkrieg."

"In the original Von Manstein Plan as Guderian had suggested it, secondary attacks would be carried out to the southeast, in the rear of the Maginot Line, to confuse the French command. This element had been removed by Halder. Guderian now sent 10th Panzer Division and Großdeutschland south to execute precisely such a feint attack,[52] using the only available route south over the Stonne plateau. However, the commander of the French Second Army, General Charles Huntzinger, intended to carry out at the same spot a counterattack by the armoured 3e Division Cuirassée de Réserve to eliminate the bridgehead. This resulted in an armoured collision, both parties in vain trying to gain ground in furious attacks from 15 May to 18 May, the village of Stonne changing hands many times. Huntzinger considered this at least a defensive success and limited his efforts to protecting his flank. However, in the evening of 16 May, Guderian removed 10 PD from the effort, having found a better destination for this division.

Guderian had turned his other two armoured divisions,1st and 2nd Panzerdivision sharply to the west on 14 May. In the afternoon of the 14 May there was still a chance for the French to attack the thus exposed southern flank of 1 PD, before 10 PD had entered the bridgehead, but it was thrown away when a planned attack by 3 DCR was delayed because it was not ready in time.[53] On 15 May, in heavy fighting, Guderian's motorised infantry dispersed the reinforcements of the newly formed French 6th Army in their assembly area west of Sedan, undercutting the southern flank of the French Ninth Army by 40 kilometres (25 mi) and forcing the 102nd Fortress Division to leave its positions that had blocked the tanks of XVI Army Corps at Monthermé. While the French Second Army had been seriously mauled and had rendered itself impotent, the Ninth Army began to disintegrate completely, for in Belgium also its divisions, not having had the time to fortify, had been pushed back from the river by the unrelenting pressure of German infantry, allowing the impetuous Erwin Rommel to break free with his 7th Panzer Division. A French armoured division (1st DCR) was sent to block him but, advancing unexpectedly fast, he surprised it while it was refueling on 15 May and dispersed it, despite some losses caused by the heavy French tanks."


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_Guderian
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_Gelb
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_3_26/ai_97394770/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1
http://www.historynet.com/blueprint-for-blitzkrieg.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France


Kurt Student

George Patton

Douglas MacArthur

Heihachiro Togo

Isoroku Yamamoto

Mordechai Hod

Ariel Sharon

Israel Tal

[Mush Martin]

Maybe as part of the fun of this Hopefully polite debate why
dont we start by arguing criterion

How fine do we split it

are we talking Johnny frost at the bridge
or George marshall

what should it be?

[Mush Martin]

Hmmm! Ok, this puts a different spin on things. Let's see, as stated before, for America-Patton, for Germany-Donitz, for England-Mrs. Butterworth, for France-all cabaret girls and so on. I cannot think of really great military commanders from any other countries other than Germany or the USA

A Product of a corrupt and biased movie based culture:rotfl:

I am only teasing, although its meant for fun debate I am sure
it will introduce everyone of us to someone new.

[Happy Times]

Maybe as part of the fun of this Hopefully polite debate why
dont we start by arguing criterion

How fine do we split it

are we talking Johnny frost at the bridge
or George marshall

what should it be?

Two lists for land, one from company to regiment and second on top of that, should cover a lot of great commanders.
Maybe only top 3-5 for air and sea.

[Mush Martin]

Sorry for the double post

but the original premise is who could look back on retirement day
with the most satisfaction.

I as a military critic wouldnt put in mcarthur
but I would given the premise above put him in.
What a very very strange trip it must have been
for him to land at leyte again at the apex of his career.
it had to be surreal for him.

[Happy Times]

Sorry for the double post

but the original premise is who could look back on retirement day
with the most satisfaction.

I as a military critic wouldnt put in mcarthur
but I would given the premise above put him in.
What a very very strange trip it must have been
for him to land at leyte again at the apex of his career.
it had to be surreal for him.

I was thinking Korea also with him.

[STEED]

Air/Field Marshal Kesselring
For his defense of Italy 43-45

General Manstin/Field Marshal
Battle of the Crimea 41-42/Retaking of Kharkov 43

General Heinrici
For the defense of the Seelow Heights 45

Marshal Konev
Drive to Berlin 45

General Kravchenko Commander of the Sixth Guards Tank Army
Drive in to Manchuria Aug45

[Mush Martin]

Sergei Zhukhov not just commanded the largest mechanized
succesful offense in history. and succesfully.

I like a bit of support for the nominees not just a list as such though

[Mush Martin]

Maybe as part of the fun of this Hopefully polite debate why
dont we start by arguing criterion

How fine do we split it

are we talking Johnny frost at the bridge
or George marshall

what should it be?
Two lists for land, one from company to regiment and second on top of that, should cover a lot of great commanders.
Maybe only top 3-5 for air and sea.

I think that if we creat a division like that it opens up ten seperate
lists,

lets stick to General Officers Land Naval or Air.
Theatre commanders arent necessarilly infantry.

[STEED]

I support my ones so there.....:yep: :smug: :p

[Happy Times]

Sergei Zhukhov not just commanded the largest mechanized
succesful offense in history. and succesfully.

I like a bit of support for the nominees not just a list as such though

His way of putting troops in to the "meat grinder" takes him from the list in this form for me.
The maskirovka before Bagration and organisation of logistics in -41 gives a lot of points though.

[Mush Martin]

I support my ones so there.....:yep: :smug: :p

Yours were all very worthy picks I can understand:yep:

[Bruno Lotse]

Marshal of the Soviet Union
Georgy Konstantinovich ZHUKOV
1896-1978

1939 summer defeated Japanese troops of Kwantun Army near Khalgin-Gol
1941 summer organized the first large scale tank battle near Dubno (Ukraine).
Panzerwaffe was stopped for a precious two-week period.
1941 July Commanded the first successful Soviet offensive near El'nia (Smolensk battle)
1941 Sept Defense of Leningrad
1941 Dec Defeated German troops near Moscow
1942 Fall Prepared Soviet counterstrike near Stalingrad
1942-3 Winter Blocked German 9th Army and therefore prevented sending reinforcements to save 6th Army in Stalingrad (Operation Mars)
1943 July He was overseeing Soviet defenses and then advance near Kursk (northern sector)
1943-44 Since November Liberation of Ukraine
1944 July Masterminded Operation Bagration when Soviets destroyed Heeresgruppe Mitte.
1945 May Captured Festung Berlin
1945 May 8th - Accepted in the name of the Soviet Supreme Command capitulation of the German Armed Forces.

Accepted in the name of the Soviet Supreme Command the Victory Parade of the Soviet Troops in June 1945.

Marshal of the Victory

[Mush Martin]

Sorry Bruno I hadnt meant to mispell it. in my defense I did at least
mention him.:up:

[Bruno Lotse]

Yeah, the Marshal's first name was Georgy.
It's a Russian version of the English name George.:D

Cheers,
Bruno

[Mush Martin]

Yeah, the Marshal's first name was Georgy.
It's a Russian version of the English name George.:D

Cheers,
Bruno

That Just gets worse for me :rotfl: I mispelled Zhukov
and missed seeing the main error.
Now Sailor Steve can have a laugh on my sorry butt.

[Bruno Lotse]

Here he is
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgy_Zhukov

He is also a WWI and Russian Civil War veteran.

Four Golden Stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union.
The Golden Star of HSU was the highest military decoration at the time.

During WWI he was decorated with two Crosses of St.George
'Знак Отличия Военного ордена святого Георгия (Георгиевский крест)'
for bravery in combat.

His first Cross of St.George he received in Sept 1916 for capturing a German officer.

Cheers,
Bruno

[Mush Martin]

On a more serious note how about we Score it like the tv top ten
on a five point criterion.

Leadership

Planning

Mastery of Logistics

Tactical execution

Initiative


suggestions?

[Bruno Lotse]

Well, if one tries to apply top 10 to Marshal Georgy Zhukov, one has to write a book.
General and later Marshal Zhukov was planning and executing tactical and strategic (mostly strategic) level operations almost non-stop from 1939 to 1945.

About leadership. Once I was reading that whenever Abwehr would learn that in their sector of a front appeared Georgy Zhukov their reaction was like
'Scheiße! It gonna be offensive here!':huh:

[Frame57]

Patton! What more can be said?

Patton...."I shall go though the West Wall like sh*t though a goose."

And did he? Not in my book.Sure! Did he do everthing? No! But I will allow history to magnify his success. Perhaps the greatest General of the era. Any one slaps a coward is a winner in my book.

[August]

IMO these type of threads go a lot better when people avoid making top 10 lists and just confine it to what we like or dislike about a particular commander.

I like Mush's criterion idea though and based upon them I'd like to give my vote to BG Frank Merrill.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Merrill

[Stealth Hunter]

Well, my Top Ten would definitely be:

10: Fredriech von Paulus (planned the Stalingrad attack; early stages went great)

9: Wolfram von Richthofen (cousin of the late Manfred von Richthofen and the brilliant aristocrat who made the Luftwaffe the world's deadliest air force)

8: Omar Bradly (much like his good friend Patton, Bradly had a natural talent for command on the battlefield)

7: Oswald Boelcke (the father of aerial dogfighting and the man who created the Dicta Boelcke)

6: Dwight Eisenhower (hey, the man was in command of US troops on D-Day)

5: Georgy Zhukov (now THAT was a soldier)

4: Erich Loewenhardt (became one of the greatest World War I aces and had a natural talent for flying; also tested out more late war aeroplanes than any other pilot in the Imperial German Air Service)

3: George Patton (exceptional tank commander and battlefield commander)

2: Erwin Rommel (the man who stormed North Africa and intended to keep it; he then turned against Hitler and tried to assassinate him, unfortuantely failing)

1: Maximilian von Spee (to be fair, von Spee's tactics were superb and very advanced for the time; it is unfortunate that his ship went down in late 1914 off the coast of South America)

[Happy Times]

On a more serious note how about we Score it like the tv top ten
on a five point criterion.

Leadership

Planning

Mastery of Logistics

Tactical execution

Initiative


suggestions?

Sounds good, will take time though.

[Stealth Hunter]

INCLUDE WOLFRAM VON RICHTHOFEN, DAMMIT!:stare:

[Happy Times]

INCLUDE WOLFRAM VON RICHTHOFEN, DAMMIT!:stare:

I thought of him, if the creation of Luftwaffe can be atributed enough to him i will include him. Guderian is finished on my list.

[Mush Martin]

INCLUDE WOLFRAM VON RICHTHOFEN, DAMMIT!:stare:
Argue the Case in support :|\\ We were just discussing Von Spee's squadron yesterday
on tarjaks thread Hunt for the Kaisers Cruisers.

[Mush Martin]

I think Omar Bradley was a better Officer and everybit as good a General
as Patton. To my mind when I study the second world war, I come away
impressed with a lot of dudes on all sides. But Omar had his men at heart
not just the victory.

Montgomery was excruciating about trying to keep the blue body
count as low as possible this is an important point, I think
we ought to alter the matrix to reflect preservation of forces
or Cost in lives friendly and enemy.

your thoughts.
M

[Happy Times]

I think Omar Bradley was a better Officer and everybit as good a General
as Patton. To my mind when I study the second world war, I come away
impressed with a lot of dudes on all sides. But Omar had his men at heart
not just the victory.

Montgomery was excruciating about trying to keep the blue body
count as low as possible this is an important point, I think
we ought to alter the matrix to reflect preservation of forces
or Cost in lives friendly and enemy.

your thoughts.
M

I dont know, thats the other extreme to Zhukovs meat grinder and i think Zhukov wins in comparison. Cruel maybe, but victory and the total destruction of the enemy has to be a priority.

[AntEater]

On an operational level, I'd rate Manstein fairly high.
The Kharkov operation was simply genial.
Tactically, Rommel. I mean he was not such a great army commander, but at division size engagements he was really great.
He understood the value of initiative and communication.
But at army level, the russians certainly were top notch. While individual engagements were often fought with much casualties, the mere logistics of moving such a huge army so fast in so few days are daunting.
Montogomery was also quite good at army level command and logistics.
Kesselring would rate quite high as well. His defense of Italy was maybe one of the first successful assymetric wars ever fought.
I wouldn't rate the japanese too highly, they were good at pre-planning, but in wartime they neglected intelligence and communications, often in favor of wishful thinking. Japanese favored extremely convoluted, complicated top-down planning over individual initiative.
The battle of the Marianas is an example.
The only real great leader was Yamashi ta. The Singapore operation was nothing but brilliant. Yamash ita was one of the few japanese leaders who dared to improvise.

Regarding the americans, the whole top echelon was quite good. The logistics of the US war effort were not glamorous, but simply an archievement which was not comparable to any war effort ever undertaken by any nation.
People like Gen. Marshall, Adm. King or Emory Land (father of the Liberty ship) created the largest war machine ever out of a civilian economy basically overnight.
And in doing so, they avoided crashing that civilian economy, instead, they managed to strenghten it.
German sources are usually quite disdainful of any US operational/tactical leader except Patton, but the US simply had a more cautious, firepower-centered approach that was only possible in a "rich man's war" and was never really understood here. Avoiding casualties might be a losing strategy if you are poor, but if you're the greatest industrial power on the planet, you can waste endless amounts of material instead of letting your people get killed.

Lol, Subsim doesn't let me spell the name of the conqueror of Singapore correctly.....

Problem with all operational leaders is Ultra. I only now realized how much codebreaking (on both sides) influenced WW2. Often codebreaking meant the difference between victory and defeat, not a leader's skill

[Mush Martin]

I agree with Von Manstiens inclusion as a worthy in this debate, He
was brilliant. so are most of the others thats why settling up the
matrix is important all these thoroughbreds will be hard to judge finely
and any result will be debatable.

M

[Mush Martin]

Il put a WIP list with no particular order, this is hard.
Did Guderian, no points yet though.:)

Erich von Manstein

Heinz Guderian

Leadership
"In the Invasion of France, he personally led the attack that traversed the Ardennes Forest, crossed the Meuse River and broke through the French lines at Sedan. During the French campaign, he led his panzer forces in rapid blitzkrieg-style advances and earned the nickname "Schneller Heinz" (Hurrying Heinz) among his troops.[5] Guderian's panzer group led the "race to the sea" that split the Allied armies in two, depriving the French armies and the BEF in Northern France and Belgium of their fuel, food, spare parts and ammunition. Faced with orders from nervous superiors to halt on one occasion, he managed to continue his advance by stating he was performing a 'reconnaissance in force'. Guderian's column was famously denied the chance to destroy the Allied beachhead at Dunkirk by Hitler's personal order.

In 1941 he commanded Panzergruppe 2, better known as Panzergruppe Guderian, in Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, receiving the 24th award of the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross on July 17 of that year. From October 5, 1941 he led the redesignated Second Panzer Army. His armored spearhead captured Smolensk in a remarkably short time and was poised to launch the final assault on Moscow when he was ordered to turn south towards Kiev."


Planning

Manstein Plan
"Whilst Von Manstein was formulating the new plans in Koblenz, it so happened that Lieutenant-General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIXth Army Corps, Germany's elite armoured formation, was lodged in a nearby hotel.[9] Von Manstein now considered that, should he involve Guderian in his planning, the tank general may come up with some role for his Army Corps to play in it, and this might then be used as a decisive argument to relocate XIXth Army Corps from Army Group B to Army Group A, much to the delight of Von Rundstedt. At this moment Von Manstein's plan consisted in a move from Sedan to the north, right in the rear of the main Allied forces, to engage them directly from the south in full battle. When Guderian was invited to contribute to the plan during informal discussions, he proposed a radical and novel idea: not only his army corps, but the entire Panzerwaffe should be concentrated at Sedan. And this concentration of armour should not move to the north but to the west, to execute a swift, deep, independent strategic penetration towards the English Channel without waiting for the main body of infantry divisions. This could lead to a strategic collapse of the enemy, avoiding the relatively high number of casualties normally caused by a classic Kesselschlacht or "annihilation battle". Such a risky independent strategic use of armour had been widely discussed in Germany before the war but had not at all been accepted as received doctrine; the large number of officers serving in the Infantry, which was the dominant Arm of Service, had successfully prevented this. Von Manstein had to admit that in this special case, however, it might be just the thing needed. His main objection was that it would create an open flank of over 300 kilometres, vulnerable to French counterattack. Guderian convinced him that this could be prevented by launching simultaneous spoiling attacks to the south by small armoured units. However, this would be a departure from the basic concept of the Führer-Directive N°6.

Von Manstein wrote his first memorandum outlining the alternative plan on 31 October. In it he carefully avoided mentioning Guderian's name and downplayed the strategic part of the armoured units, in order not to generate unnecessary resistance.[10] On 6 November, 21 November, 30 November, 6 December, 18 December 1939 and 12 January 1940, a further six memoranda followed, slowly growing more radical in outline."

Mastery of Logistics

"Guderian was convinced that tanks could not be successful without logistical support. Thus was born the idea of armored divisions to provide the support that allows tanks to fight to their maximum capacity. (36) However, during the creation of the German Armored Force, Guderian's request to motorize heavy artillery battalions was turned down. In his memoirs, he remarked, "The heavy guns remained horse-drawn, with unfortunate results during the war, particularly in Russia." (37)

The key to the blitzkrieg was the army's ability to be mobile, similar to the vision of De Guibert. Guderian stated, "Only movement brings victory." (38) The emphasis for the tanks was appropriately pushed, but not the logistics infrastructure to support them. As early as 1937, Guderian noted that resupply of Panzers was found to be insufficient during validity exercises. He noted that rapid movement of supplies and repair depots were needed. (39)"

Tactical execution

"Toward evening, Guderian sent infantry and engineers across the river in inflatable rafts to blast defenders out of their bunkers and construct pontoon bridges for the tanks and other vehicles. Many of the French units holding the unfinished extension of the Maginot Line in this sector were little more than construction crews and lacked combat training. Their opponents, by contrast, had drilled meticulously for this operation in Germany by crossing the Mosel River under live fire. By nightfall, the defenders were retreating in droves, clogging roads and spreading panic. “Tanks are following us!” they shouted, although no tanks would in fact cross the Meuse before daybreak. Their commander, Brig. Gen. Henri-Jean Lafontaine, wasted precious hours that night shifting his command post rearward and seeking detailed orders from superiors. By the time he counterattacked the next morning, Guderian—who habitually led from the front and made snap decisions—had enough armor and artillery across the river to repulse the belated French challenge and secure his bridgehead.

Guderian then overcame objections from superiors, who wanted to consolidate forces at Sedan before advancing, and pushed ahead with two panzer divisions, leaving a third behind to defend the bridgehead. He was taking a big risk, for Allied warplanes were swarming over the Meuse, and the French were massing heavy armor at Stonne, south of Sedan. Between May 15 and 17, Stonne changed hands more than a dozen times as panzers battled in the streets with hulking French Char B heavy tanks, so thickly armored that shells bounced off them like buckshot. Those gas guzzlers could not operate long without refueling, however, and few had functioning radios. Many eventually fell prey to lighter but more maneuverable panzers and to German artillery, including fearsome 88mm anti-aircraft guns that doubled as tank killers with their barrels lowered. The French were defeated at Stonne, and a spirited effort by Brig. Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s Fourth Armored Division to halt Guderian at Montcornet, west of Sedan, failed as well. “A few of his tanks succeeded in penetrating to within a mile of my advanced headquarters,” Guderian observed, but de Gaulle’s lonely bid faltered for lack of support."4.

Initiative

"Achtung - Panzer! was written in 1936-37 as an explanation of Guderian's theories on the role of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare. It was actually a compilation of not only of Guderian's own theories but also the ideas of other proponents of armored and combined-arms warfare within the general staff, though the bulk of the credit rightly is Guderian's. The panzer force he created would become the core of the German Army's power during the Second World War and would deliver the core of the fighting style known as blitzkrieg. To this day, his contributions to combined arms tactics are studied throughout military schools."
He summarized the tactics of blitzkrieg as the way to get the mobile and motorized armored divisions to work together and support each other in order to achieve decisive success. In his book Panzer Leader[2] he wrote:

In this year (1929) I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies; the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock-ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armor. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions: what was needed were armored divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to fight with full effect."

"Guderian believed that certain developments in technology needed to take place in conjunction with blitzkrieg in order to support the entire theory, especially in communication and special visual equipment with which the armored divisions in general, and tanks specifically, should be equipped. Guderian insisted in 1933, within the high command, that every tank in the German armored force must be equipped with radio and visual equipment in order to enable the tank commander to communicate and perform a decisive role in blitzkrieg."

"In the original Von Manstein Plan as Guderian had suggested it, secondary attacks would be carried out to the southeast, in the rear of the Maginot Line, to confuse the French command. This element had been removed by Halder. Guderian now sent 10th Panzer Division and Großdeutschland south to execute precisely such a feint attack,[52] using the only available route south over the Stonne plateau. However, the commander of the French Second Army, General Charles Huntzinger, intended to carry out at the same spot a counterattack by the armoured 3e Division Cuirassée de Réserve to eliminate the bridgehead. This resulted in an armoured collision, both parties in vain trying to gain ground in furious attacks from 15 May to 18 May, the village of Stonne changing hands many times. Huntzinger considered this at least a defensive success and limited his efforts to protecting his flank. However, in the evening of 16 May, Guderian removed 10 PD from the effort, having found a better destination for this division.

Guderian had turned his other two armoured divisions,1st and 2nd Panzerdivision sharply to the west on 14 May. In the afternoon of the 14 May there was still a chance for the French to attack the thus exposed southern flank of 1 PD, before 10 PD had entered the bridgehead, but it was thrown away when a planned attack by 3 DCR was delayed because it was not ready in time.[53] On 15 May, in heavy fighting, Guderian's motorised infantry dispersed the reinforcements of the newly formed French 6th Army in their assembly area west of Sedan, undercutting the southern flank of the French Ninth Army by 40 kilometres (25 mi) and forcing the 102nd Fortress Division to leave its positions that had blocked the tanks of XVI Army Corps at Monthermé. While the French Second Army had been seriously mauled and had rendered itself impotent, the Ninth Army began to disintegrate completely, for in Belgium also its divisions, not having had the time to fortify, had been pushed back from the river by the unrelenting pressure of German infantry, allowing the impetuous Erwin Rommel to break free with his 7th Panzer Division. A French armoured division (1st DCR) was sent to block him but, advancing unexpectedly fast, he surprised it while it was refueling on 15 May and dispersed it, despite some losses caused by the heavy French tanks."


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_Guderian
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_Gelb
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_3_26/ai_97394770/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1
http://www.historynet.com/blueprint-for-blitzkrieg.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France


Kurt Student

George Patton

Douglas MacArthur

Heihachiro Togo

Isoroku Yamamoto

Mordechai Hod

Ariel Sharon

Israel Tal


Did this post change?

good post.:up:

[Mush Martin]

I like the approach for listing the characteristics and naming the
commander you feel best met this criterion,

that might make it a smoother process if it was done that
way by all.


Hmmmmm:hmm:

[Mush Martin]

I think Omar Bradley was a better Officer and everybit as good a General
as Patton. To my mind when I study the second world war, I come away
impressed with a lot of dudes on all sides. But Omar had his men at heart
not just the victory.

Montgomery was excruciating about trying to keep the blue body
count as low as possible this is an important point, I think
we ought to alter the matrix to reflect preservation of forces
or Cost in lives friendly and enemy.

your thoughts.
M
I dont know, thats the other extreme to Zhukovs meat grinder and i think Zhukov wins in comparison. Cruel maybe, but victory and the total destruction of the enemy has to be a priority.


:hmm:The Acme of skill is not to subdue the enemy with battle
it is to subdue the enemy without battle.

[Happy Times]

I think Omar Bradley was a better Officer and everybit as good a General
as Patton. To my mind when I study the second world war, I come away
impressed with a lot of dudes on all sides. But Omar had his men at heart
not just the victory.

Montgomery was excruciating about trying to keep the blue body
count as low as possible this is an important point, I think
we ought to alter the matrix to reflect preservation of forces
or Cost in lives friendly and enemy.

your thoughts.
M
I dont know, thats the other extreme to Zhukovs meat grinder and i think Zhukov wins in comparison. Cruel maybe, but victory and the total destruction of the enemy has to be a priority.


:hmm:The Acme of skill is not to subdue the enemy with battle
it is to subdue the enemy without battle.

Ofcourse and most what ive listed so far have had great victories with minimal own losses.

[Bruno Lotse]

Sergei Zhukhov not just commanded the largest mechanized
succesful offense in history. and succesfully.
His way of putting troops in to the "meat grinder" takes him from the list in this form for me.
The maskirovka before Bagration and organisation of logistics in -41 gives a lot of points though.


Happy Times, if you don't know what Marshal Zhukov's first name is (Sergei????!!!),
and his last name is (Zhukhov????!!!!)
allow me be VERY skeptical about your 'knowledge' on Marshal Zhukov's
tactics and strategy.

Marshal Zhukov commanded not only Armies ,
he commanded Fronts, i.e. groups of Armies (10-15 armies in one package).

HSU General Pavlov for a loss of the Western Front was shot, i.e. executed by the Soviets in 1941.
HSU Marshal Timoshenko (he broke Mannerheim Line in winter !!! 1940, remember?)
for heavy losses in his South-Western Front in spring-summer 1942 was sacked
and would never receive a command of any front or any army to that matter.

Marshal Zhukov would be given command of a Front,
because the Supreme Command (STAVKA) knew
that Marshal Zhukov would make out of a **** situation an acceptable one,
he would succeed in advance,
he would make defense strong,
and proportionately he would incur less losses then other commanders.

Less losses proportionately - that's why Marshal Zhukov would be appointed
to command 2-3 ml people in one sweep.

Cheers,
Bruno

[Happy Times]

Sergei Zhukhov not just commanded the largest mechanized
succesful offense in history. and succesfully.
His way of putting troops in to the "meat grinder" takes him from the list in this form for me.
The maskirovka before Bagration and organisation of logistics in -41 gives a lot of points though.


Happy Times, if you don't know what Marshal Zhukov's first name is (Sergei????!!!),
and his last name is (Zhukhov????!!!!)
allow me be VERY skeptical about your 'knowledge' on Marshal Zhukov's
tactics and strategy.

Marshal Zhukov commanded not only Armies ,
he commanded Fronts, i.e. groups of Armies (10-15 armies in one package).

HSU General Pavlov for a loss of the Western Front was shot, i.e. executed by the Soviets in 1941.
HSU Marshal Timoshenko (he broke Mannerheim Line in winter !!! 1940, remember?)
for heavy losses in his South-Western Front in spring-summer 1942 was sacked
and would never receive a command of any front or any army to that matter.

Marshal Zhukov would be given command of a Front,
because the Supreme Command (STAVKA) knew
that Marshal Zhukov would make out of a **** situation an acceptable one,
he would succeed in advance,
he would make defense strong,
and proportionately he would incur less losses then other commanders.

Less losses proportionately - that's why Marshal Zhukov would be appointed
to command 2-3 ml people in one sweep.

Cheers,
Bruno

Thats a quote of Mush Martin there. I can see he is your biggest idol but try to hold in your pants.

[Bruno Lotse]

Nope, my idol is HSU Marshal Timoshenko for
breaking Mannerheim line
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mannerheim_Line
in WINTER 1940.:arrgh!:

In reality, I am atheist, therefore don't have any idols.
Marshal Zhukov is called be common people 'Marshal of the Victory'.
Vox populi Vox dei

[Happy Times]

Nope, my idol is HSU Marshal Timoshenko for
breaking Mannerheim line
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mannerheim_Line
in WINTER 1940.:arrgh!:

In reality, I am atheist, therefore don't have any idols.
Marshal Zhukov is called be common people 'Marshal of the Victory'.
Vox populi Vox dei

Let me guess, your another homesick Russian imigrant?
You know, in reality also, that the M-line is a myth?

[STEED]

I just like to add Heinz Guderian also did one heck of a job when he was appointed as Inspector of Panzer Troops and all those rows with Hitler, he did one heck of a job with what he could. ;)

[Bruno Lotse]

Nope.
You're wrong.
Again:rock:

[Happy Times]

I just like to add Heinz Guderian also did one heck of a job when he was appointed as Inspector of Panzer Troops and all those rows with Hitler, he did one heck of a job with what he could. ;)

Very true.:yep:

[Happy Times]

Nope.
You're wrong.
Again:rock:

Well im positive about the M-line, it was no Maginot or even Westwall.

[Happy Times]

Il put a WIP list with no particular order, this is hard.
Did Guderian, no points yet though.:)

Erich von Manstein

Heinz Guderian

Leadership
"In the Invasion of France, he personally led the attack that traversed the Ardennes Forest, crossed the Meuse River and broke through the French lines at Sedan. During the French campaign, he led his panzer forces in rapid blitzkrieg-style advances and earned the nickname "Schneller Heinz" (Hurrying Heinz) among his troops.[5] Guderian's panzer group led the "race to the sea" that split the Allied armies in two, depriving the French armies and the BEF in Northern France and Belgium of their fuel, food, spare parts and ammunition. Faced with orders from nervous superiors to halt on one occasion, he managed to continue his advance by stating he was performing a 'reconnaissance in force'. Guderian's column was famously denied the chance to destroy the Allied beachhead at Dunkirk by Hitler's personal order.

In 1941 he commanded Panzergruppe 2, better known as Panzergruppe Guderian, in Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, receiving the 24th award of the Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross on July 17 of that year. From October 5, 1941 he led the redesignated Second Panzer Army. His armored spearhead captured Smolensk in a remarkably short time and was poised to launch the final assault on Moscow when he was ordered to turn south towards Kiev."


Planning

Manstein Plan
"Whilst Von Manstein was formulating the new plans in Koblenz, it so happened that Lieutenant-General Heinz Guderian, commander of the XIXth Army Corps, Germany's elite armoured formation, was lodged in a nearby hotel.[9] Von Manstein now considered that, should he involve Guderian in his planning, the tank general may come up with some role for his Army Corps to play in it, and this might then be used as a decisive argument to relocate XIXth Army Corps from Army Group B to Army Group A, much to the delight of Von Rundstedt. At this moment Von Manstein's plan consisted in a move from Sedan to the north, right in the rear of the main Allied forces, to engage them directly from the south in full battle. When Guderian was invited to contribute to the plan during informal discussions, he proposed a radical and novel idea: not only his army corps, but the entire Panzerwaffe should be concentrated at Sedan. And this concentration of armour should not move to the north but to the west, to execute a swift, deep, independent strategic penetration towards the English Channel without waiting for the main body of infantry divisions. This could lead to a strategic collapse of the enemy, avoiding the relatively high number of casualties normally caused by a classic Kesselschlacht or "annihilation battle". Such a risky independent strategic use of armour had been widely discussed in Germany before the war but had not at all been accepted as received doctrine; the large number of officers serving in the Infantry, which was the dominant Arm of Service, had successfully prevented this. Von Manstein had to admit that in this special case, however, it might be just the thing needed. His main objection was that it would create an open flank of over 300 kilometres, vulnerable to French counterattack. Guderian convinced him that this could be prevented by launching simultaneous spoiling attacks to the south by small armoured units. However, this would be a departure from the basic concept of the Führer-Directive N°6.

Von Manstein wrote his first memorandum outlining the alternative plan on 31 October. In it he carefully avoided mentioning Guderian's name and downplayed the strategic part of the armoured units, in order not to generate unnecessary resistance.[10] On 6 November, 21 November, 30 November, 6 December, 18 December 1939 and 12 January 1940, a further six memoranda followed, slowly growing more radical in outline."

Mastery of Logistics

"Guderian was convinced that tanks could not be successful without logistical support. Thus was born the idea of armored divisions to provide the support that allows tanks to fight to their maximum capacity. (36) However, during the creation of the German Armored Force, Guderian's request to motorize heavy artillery battalions was turned down. In his memoirs, he remarked, "The heavy guns remained horse-drawn, with unfortunate results during the war, particularly in Russia." (37)

The key to the blitzkrieg was the army's ability to be mobile, similar to the vision of De Guibert. Guderian stated, "Only movement brings victory." (38) The emphasis for the tanks was appropriately pushed, but not the logistics infrastructure to support them. As early as 1937, Guderian noted that resupply of Panzers was found to be insufficient during validity exercises. He noted that rapid movement of supplies and repair depots were needed. (39)"

Tactical execution

"Toward evening, Guderian sent infantry and engineers across the river in inflatable rafts to blast defenders out of their bunkers and construct pontoon bridges for the tanks and other vehicles. Many of the French units holding the unfinished extension of the Maginot Line in this sector were little more than construction crews and lacked combat training. Their opponents, by contrast, had drilled meticulously for this operation in Germany by crossing the Mosel River under live fire. By nightfall, the defenders were retreating in droves, clogging roads and spreading panic. “Tanks are following us!” they shouted, although no tanks would in fact cross the Meuse before daybreak. Their commander, Brig. Gen. Henri-Jean Lafontaine, wasted precious hours that night shifting his command post rearward and seeking detailed orders from superiors. By the time he counterattacked the next morning, Guderian—who habitually led from the front and made snap decisions—had enough armor and artillery across the river to repulse the belated French challenge and secure his bridgehead.

Guderian then overcame objections from superiors, who wanted to consolidate forces at Sedan before advancing, and pushed ahead with two panzer divisions, leaving a third behind to defend the bridgehead. He was taking a big risk, for Allied warplanes were swarming over the Meuse, and the French were massing heavy armor at Stonne, south of Sedan. Between May 15 and 17, Stonne changed hands more than a dozen times as panzers battled in the streets with hulking French Char B heavy tanks, so thickly armored that shells bounced off them like buckshot. Those gas guzzlers could not operate long without refueling, however, and few had functioning radios. Many eventually fell prey to lighter but more maneuverable panzers and to German artillery, including fearsome 88mm anti-aircraft guns that doubled as tank killers with their barrels lowered. The French were defeated at Stonne, and a spirited effort by Brig. Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s Fourth Armored Division to halt Guderian at Montcornet, west of Sedan, failed as well. “A few of his tanks succeeded in penetrating to within a mile of my advanced headquarters,” Guderian observed, but de Gaulle’s lonely bid faltered for lack of support."4.

Initiative

"Achtung - Panzer! was written in 1936-37 as an explanation of Guderian's theories on the role of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare. It was actually a compilation of not only of Guderian's own theories but also the ideas of other proponents of armored and combined-arms warfare within the general staff, though the bulk of the credit rightly is Guderian's. The panzer force he created would become the core of the German Army's power during the Second World War and would deliver the core of the fighting style known as blitzkrieg. To this day, his contributions to combined arms tactics are studied throughout military schools."
He summarized the tactics of blitzkrieg as the way to get the mobile and motorized armored divisions to work together and support each other in order to achieve decisive success. In his book Panzer Leader[2] he wrote:

In this year (1929) I became convinced that tanks working on their own or in conjunction with infantry could never achieve decisive importance. My historical studies; the exercises carried out in England and our own experience with mock-ups had persuaded me that the tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-country performance. In such formation of all arms, the tanks must play primary role, the other weapons being subordinated to the requirements of the armor. It would be wrong to include tanks in infantry divisions: what was needed were armored divisions which would include all the supporting arms needed to fight with full effect."

"Guderian believed that certain developments in technology needed to take place in conjunction with blitzkrieg in order to support the entire theory, especially in communication and special visual equipment with which the armored divisions in general, and tanks specifically, should be equipped. Guderian insisted in 1933, within the high command, that every tank in the German armored force must be equipped with radio and visual equipment in order to enable the tank commander to communicate and perform a decisive role in blitzkrieg."

"In the original Von Manstein Plan as Guderian had suggested it, secondary attacks would be carried out to the southeast, in the rear of the Maginot Line, to confuse the French command. This element had been removed by Halder. Guderian now sent 10th Panzer Division and Großdeutschland south to execute precisely such a feint attack,[52] using the only available route south over the Stonne plateau. However, the commander of the French Second Army, General Charles Huntzinger, intended to carry out at the same spot a counterattack by the armoured 3e Division Cuirassée de Réserve to eliminate the bridgehead. This resulted in an armoured collision, both parties in vain trying to gain ground in furious attacks from 15 May to 18 May, the village of Stonne changing hands many times. Huntzinger considered this at least a defensive success and limited his efforts to protecting his flank. However, in the evening of 16 May, Guderian removed 10 PD from the effort, having found a better destination for this division.

Guderian had turned his other two armoured divisions,1st and 2nd Panzerdivision sharply to the west on 14 May. In the afternoon of the 14 May there was still a chance for the French to attack the thus exposed southern flank of 1 PD, before 10 PD had entered the bridgehead, but it was thrown away when a planned attack by 3 DCR was delayed because it was not ready in time.[53] On 15 May, in heavy fighting, Guderian's motorised infantry dispersed the reinforcements of the newly formed French 6th Army in their assembly area west of Sedan, undercutting the southern flank of the French Ninth Army by 40 kilometres (25 mi) and forcing the 102nd Fortress Division to leave its positions that had blocked the tanks of XVI Army Corps at Monthermé. While the French Second Army had been seriously mauled and had rendered itself impotent, the Ninth Army began to disintegrate completely, for in Belgium also its divisions, not having had the time to fortify, had been pushed back from the river by the unrelenting pressure of German infantry, allowing the impetuous Erwin Rommel to break free with his 7th Panzer Division. A French armoured division (1st DCR) was sent to block him but, advancing unexpectedly fast, he surprised it while it was refueling on 15 May and dispersed it, despite some losses caused by the heavy French tanks."


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heinz_Guderian
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fall_Gelb
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_3_26/ai_97394770/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1
http://www.historynet.com/blueprint-for-blitzkrieg.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France


Kurt Student

George Patton

Douglas MacArthur

Heihachiro Togo

Isoroku Yamamoto

Mordechai Hod

Ariel Sharon

Israel Tal


Did this post change?

good post.:up:

Yes, i added the criterium, no points and ranking yet, names are also subject to change untill i finish.:)

[Kapitan_Phillips]

Rommel, Nimitz and Monty

[Jimbuna]

Admiral Sandy Woodward

[Mush Martin]

Im a bit surprised no one has forwarded either cunningham
or Max Horton. thats the fun of it though isnt it.
so many to choose from, I love this forum.:yep:


Do you think we should split offensive defensive catagories?????.
Mannerheim Chuikov and Giap

vs Rommel or Patton

theirs almost apples and oranges there.

[Mush Martin]

General announcement, lets keep it clean. We are here for opposing
opinions not attitudes.

M

[Jimbuna]

Johnnie Walker (even the scotch variety if you like) :lol:

[UnderseaLcpl]

Rommel, Nimitz and Monty


Monty!? What the bloody hell for? Market Garden? El Alamein? IMO he was worse than useless.

[RickC Sniper]

Rommel, Nimitz and Monty


Monty!? What the bloody hell for? Market Garden? El Alamein? IMO he was worse than useless.

You beat me to it. I'd never vote for Monty just because of Market Garden's failure. It overshadows any good things he did earlier.


Ike has to be considered just for his ability to keep the allies coordinated.

[Platapus]

Ike has to be considered just for his ability to keep the allies coordinated.

I like Ike :)

[Mush Martin]

Rommel, Nimitz and Monty

Monty!? What the bloody hell for? Market Garden? El Alamein? IMO he was worse than useless.
You beat me to it. I'd never vote for Monty just because of Market Garden's failure. It overshadows any good things he did earlier.


Ike has to be considered just for his ability to keep the allies coordinated.


Not to put to fine a point on it but Monty was under Ike's command
for market garden by implication of allocating the resources Ike is
everybit as responsible as monty for it.

However just a point gents. we arent here to disrespect other choices
we are here to promote ours choices.

M

[STEED]

Rommel, Nimitz and Monty


Monty!? What the bloody hell for? Market Garden? El Alamein? IMO he was worse than useless.

You beat me to it. I'd never vote for Monty just because of Market Garden's failure. It overshadows any good things he did earlier.


Ike has to be considered just for his ability to keep the allies coordinated.

Monty was over promoted in my view, don't forget he promised to take Caen on D-Day and look what happen. And he was too cautious as well which probably was the result from El Alamein which was very costly.

[UnderseaLcpl]

Not to put to fine a point on it but Monty was under Ike's command
for market garden by implication of allocating the resources Ike is
everybit as responsible as monty for it.

However just a point gents. we arent here to disrespect other choices
we are here to promote ours choices.

M


Fair enough. I'm sorry I was just overcome with disbelief. Of course, I'm not a fan of Eisenhower either. IMO Market Garden was a travesty.
Honestly I would like to hear a good defense of Montgomery's abilities. Maybe I'm wrong about him, but I have never read otherwise.

At least Kapitan_Phillips and I agree on Erwin Rommel, superlatives do not exist to describe the man's tactical expertise.

[STEED]

I would like to give my support to a great British General W. J. Slim for his operations out in the Far East and the liberator of Burma.

[Jimbuna]

Not to put to fine a point on it but Monty was under Ike's command
for market garden by implication of allocating the resources Ike is
everybit as responsible as monty for it.

However just a point gents. we arent here to disrespect other choices
we are here to promote ours choices.

M


Fair enough. I'm sorry I was just overcome with disbelief. Of course, I'm not a fan of Eisenhower either. IMO Market Garden was a travesty.
Honestly I would like to hear a good defense of Montgomery's abilities. Maybe I'm wrong about him, but I have never read otherwise.

At least Kapitan_Phillips and I agree on Erwin Rommel, superlatives do not exist to describe the man's tactical expertise.

I'm not totally in support of Montgomery, but let us not forget he achieved what his predecessor failed to deliver :hmm:

[Mush Martin]

There are so many greats, slim certainly was a good mention.

I am a fan of monty for many good critical reasons I am a fan
of Ike too.

I could really use some sort of suggestions about the matrix
and how to narrow the field.

I think as Cost v Gain should find a catchword and become
part of the process.

I think that given the multitude that maybe we should also make
it so size matters.

we can always do this again for best allied best axis
best female best non human officer theres a ton of opportunities.
but for the question posed I could use some help on how to narrow
the field a bit.

M

[Mush Martin]

Rommel is full of dash but the campaign while perhaps "The" Classic
armour laboratory. is a very small campaign that should have taken
a much higher priority.

What about Oconner certainly his achievment was tremendous
timely unprecedented and a reversal of fortune for his enemy
and his own.

I am a fan of most mentioned.

once we jump pages I will start compiling a cohesive list
out of it all. we can look at more easily.

I will at that point put the list of "Those already mentioned"
in the OP.

M

[RickC Sniper]

This is like debating the best movie of all time. There is no such thing.

It's based on opinion, and there is no single answer.

[Jimbuna]

This is like debating the best movie of all time. There is no such thing.

It's based on opinion, and there is no single answer.

Agreed :yep:

Things will probably warm up soon though :hmm:

http://img396.imageshack.us/img396/6942/popcorncowtx0.gif

[UnderseaLcpl]

This is like debating the best movie of all time. There is no such thing.

It's based on opinion, and there is no single answer.

Yes, but that's not any fun.

What kind of world would we live in if everyone respected each other's opinions and beliefs?

That sounds a little like the U.S., and everyone hates them unless they need help.

[Mush Martin]

well lets do top ten countries with deluded foriegn policies.
no seriously

thats kind of why the matrix.

because all mentioned have merits and its hard to guauge.
Maybe it will die, maybe it will heat up.

maybe a mysterious stranger will show up and declare
number one should be hitler then we could all have a turn.

[Platapus]

It is interesting that this discussion about the "Top Ten" commanders is centered on those commanders who took part in fighting.

Is fighting a requirement for being a top ten commander?

I would like to offer up Major General Bill Doyle who was SAC IN during the 80's. At some of the hairiest times in the cold war, General Doyle made sure that the various nuclear release authorities had the most accurate intelligence available.

His insistence on complete accuracy along with his forbidding of any embellishment of intelligence for political reasons may have prevented the escalation in some of our more "stressful" situations.

General Doyle was a man who insisted on perfection from his men, and once he got it, he backed them up 100% all the time. To General Doyle, Intelligence meant facts not fears, evidence not emotions.

"Fighting to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the supreme strategy. The supreme strategy is to win without fighting.” Sun Tzu

Perhaps a top ten commander is one who wins without fighting?

[Mush Martin]

What I think I love and what probably is at the root of the thread
is more or less the question what is merit? in this case.

I am commited to operational commanders in the field above
the rank of General officer and below the level of Chiefs of
staff I think.

Armies Brigades Divisions Battallions Squadrons Wings Airforces
Task Groups fleets Divisions. theatres.

a cold war command is still a military command
IMHO the cold war while lamented for no battles
is the most sophisticated full scale war ever fought
using Sun Tzu as a Yardstick.
/\
/\
Statements Like that are what I think I might be hoping to
read more than write in this thread.

(hmmm does that actually preclude five stars and equivalent??????)
M

[UnderseaLcpl]

well lets do top ten countries with deluded foriegn policies.
no seriously

thats kind of why the matrix.

because all mentioned have merits and its hard to guauge.
Maybe it will die, maybe it will heat up.

maybe a mysterious stranger will show up and declare
number one should be hitler then we could all have a turn.


:rotfl:
Actually, I was going to posit Hitler as one of the best until I realized that his victories fell more into the categories of politics. Really, he pulled off some amazing stuff.
I've been reading this book; Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War. How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World
Patrick Buchanan is the author. Although the premise of the book is that ww1 and ww2 were worthless wars that were unnecessary, as the title implies, it goes into great detail over Hitler's diplomatic conquests. Insane as he was, they were quite remarkable. I'd recommend the book, it is well-written, easy to follow, and challenges many assumptions that are regarded as fact. Buchanan makes an excellent case.

Oh dear, I've gotten back into my annoying habit of posting things that are off-topic. I'm going to the special hell.:cry:

Back on-topic, I would like to re-enforce my nomination of Erwin Rommel. Everything about him screams "tactical genius" Do I really have to look up references for this? By the same token, I would refute Montgomery as a nomination for two reasons;
1) Erwin Rommel, and the fact that crushing material superiority hardly makes one a great commander if victory is acheived.
2) I'd still like to hear a good argument for Montgomery. Seriously. I don't see how a commander can be "great" when his operations, even when directed by superiors, cost an inordinate amount of men and equipment.

For the same reason I would refute Zhukov. Commanding a theatre is easy if all you do is throw men against the enemy. There's a reason that the Soviet Union suffered the highest casualty rate of any combatant, and Zhukov is part of that reason.

I don't want to disrespect anyone's views here. In truth, I would welcome a good argument for Zhukov or Montgomery, but I have yet to see one for either.

[bookworm_020]

I'm suprised that no one has put forward John Monash! Consider to be one the best generals of WW1 and the guy who broke the back of the German army.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Monash

He understood the importance of organization, teamwork, planning and the use of all resource that were avaibile to him. The fact that he won the trust of his men and back them fully made a massive difference. He also had some of the best organizational staff at his disposal and used them well.

The Battle of Hamel showed what he could do on a small scale. Then he was let loose on the large scale at Battle of Amiens. It was said by General Ludendorff "August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history of the war". Trench wardare was left behind and success followed success. His breakthrough at the Hindenburg Line signaled the end of the war.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Hamel

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Amiens

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Hindenburg_Line

A excellent example of what a general should be.:rock:

[Mush Martin]

Indeed I think its just because overall less people study
WWI than WWII but I dont really know of course.


any way here is the compliled list of names so far
check to see if I missed any of yours if you posted.

Patton
Rommel
Manstein
Boelcke
Donitz
Guderian
Mcarthur
Kesselring
Heinrici
Konev
Kravchenko
Zhukov
Von Paulus
Von Richtofen
Bradley
Eisenhower
Lowenhardt
Von Spee.
Montgomery
slim
Oconner
Student
Togo
Yamamoto
Hod
Sharon
Tal
Timoshenko
Nimitz
Woodward
Cpt Fredrick John (Johnnie) walker R.N. , C.B. D.S.O. w/three bars
Monash
Giap
Merril

[August]

any way here is the compliled list of names so far
check to see if I missed any of yours if you posted.

Quoting myself from page 2.

I'd like to give my vote to BG Frank Merrill.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Merrill

[Mush Martin]

any way here is the compliled list of names so far
check to see if I missed any of yours if you posted.
Quoting myself from page 2.

I'd like to give my vote to BG Frank Merrill.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Merrill

OOoops Merril will be edited back in strangley I had simlilarly
missed Giap my own first post:rotfl:

[Mush Martin]

You know who should get in as a unit commander.
Bagnall the LRDG campaign was brilliant but doesnt
quite qualify we shall have to do unconventional
commanders someday the tanganyikan campaign
of the first war the lrdg slims men and merrils and
such that will be a good debate all its own.