Skybird
07-29-08, 04:13 AM
How terrorist groups end - lessons learned for countering Al Quaeda.
summary
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741.sum.pdf
full document (260 p.)
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741.pdf
Summary
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? Answers to
this question have enormous implications for counterterrorism efforts.
The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because
(1) they joined the political process or (2) local police and intelligence
agencies arrested or killed key members. Military force has rarely been
the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups
within this time frame achieved victory. This has significant implications
for dealing with al Qa’ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking
post–September 11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
The ending of most terrorist groups requires a range of policy
instruments, such as careful police and intelligence work, military force,
political negotiations, and economic sanctions. Yet policy makers need
to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources
and attention. Following an examination of 648 terrorist groups that
existed between 1968 and 2006, we found that a transition to the political
process is the most common way in which terrorist groups ended
(43 percent). The possibility of a political solution is inversely linked to
the breadth of terrorist goals. Most terrorist groups that end because
of politics seek narrow policy goals. The narrower the goals of a terrorist
organization, the more likely it can achieve them without violent
action—and the more likely the government and terrorist group may
be able to reach a negotiated settlement.
Against terrorist groups that cannot or will not make a transition
to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy
(40 percent). Police and intelligence services have better training and
xiv How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida
information to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations than do
such institutions as the military. They are the primary arm of the government
focused on internal security matters. Local police and intelligence
agencies usually have a permanent presence in cities, towns,
and villages; a better understanding of the threat environment in these
areas; and better human intelligence.
Other reasons are less common. For example, in 10 percent of
the cases, terrorist groups ended because their goals were achieved, and
military force led to the end of terrorist groups in 7 percent of the
cases. Militaries tended to be most effective when used against terrorist
groups engaged in an insurgency in which the groups were large, well
armed, and well organized. Insurgent groups have been among the
most capable and lethal terrorist groups, and military force has usually
been a necessary component in such cases. Against most terrorist
groups, however, military force is usually too blunt an instrument.
Military tools have increased in precision and lethality, especially with
the growing use of precision standoff weapons and imagery to monitor
terrorist movement. But even precision weapons have been of limited
use against terrorist groups. The use of substantial U.S. military power
against terrorist groups also runs a significant risk of turning the local
population against the government by killing civilians.
Our quantitative analysis looked at groups that have ended since
1968 or are still active. It yielded several other interesting findings:
���� Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other
groups. Approximately 62 percent of all terrorist groups have
ended since 1968, but only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups
have ended.
���� Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives. No religious
group that has ended achieved victory since 1968.
Size is a significant determinant ���� of a group’s fate. Big groups of
more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25
percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller
than 1,000 members.
���� There is no statistical correlation between the duration of a terrorist
group and ideological motivation, economic conditions,
Summary xv
regime type, or the breadth of terrorist goals. But there appears to
be some correlation between the size of a terrorist group and duration:
Larger groups tend to last longer than smaller groups.
When a terrorist g ���� roup becomes involved in an insurgency, it does
not end easily. Nearly 50 percent of the time, groups ended by
negotiating a settlement with the government; 25 percent of the
time, they achieved victory; and 19 percent of the time, military
forces defeated them.
���� Terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more
likely to be left-wing or nationalist and much less likely to be
motivated by religion.
Implications for al Qa’ida
What does this mean for counterterrorism efforts against al Qa’ida?
After September 11, 2001, the U.S. strategy against al Qa’ida centered
on the use of military force. Indeed, U.S. policymakers and key
national-security documents referred to operations against al Qa’ida as
the war on terrorism. Other instruments were also used, such as cutting
off terrorist financing, providing foreign assistance, engaging in diplomacy,
and sharing information with foreign governments. But military
force was the primary instrument.
The evidence by 2008 suggested that the U.S. strategy was not
successful in undermining al Qa’ida’s capabilities. Our assessment concludes
that al Qa’ida remained a strong and competent organization.
Its goals were the same: uniting Muslims to fight the United States and
its allies (the far enemy) and overthrowing western-friendly regimes in
the Middle East (the near enemy) to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate.
Al Qa’ida has been involved in more terrorist attacks since September
11, 2001, than it was during its prior history. These attacks spanned
Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Al Qa’ida’s modus operandi
also evolved and included a repertoire of more-sophisticated improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and a growing use of suicide attacks. Its
organizational structure evolved, making it a more dangerous enemy.
This included a bottom-up approach (encouraging independent action
xvi How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida
from low-level operatives) and a top-down one (issuing strategy and
operations from a central hub in Pakistan).
Ending the “War” on Terror
Al Qa’ida’s resurgence should trigger a fundamental rethinking of U.S.
counterterrorism strategy. Based on our analysis of how terrorist groups
end, a political solution is not possible. Since al Qa’ida’s goal remains
the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, there is little reason to
expect that a negotiated settlement with governments in the Middle
East is possible. A more effective approach would be adopting a twofront
strategy.
First, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S.
efforts. In Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle
East, al Qa’ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be
tracked and arrested. This would require careful work abroad from
such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as their cooperation with
foreign police and intelligence agencies. Second, military force, though
not necessarily U.S. soldiers, may be a necessary instrument when al
Qa’ida is involved in an insurgency. Local military forces frequently
have more legitimacy to operate than the United States has, and they
have a better understanding of the operating environment, even if they
need to develop the capacity to deal with insurgent groups over the
long run. This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all. The
U.S. military can play a critical role in building indigenous capacity but
should generally resist being drawn into combat operations in Muslim
societies, since its presence is likely to increase terrorist recruitment.
A key part of this strategy should include ending the notion of a
war on terrorism and replacing it with such concepts as counterterrorism,
which most governments with significant terrorist threats use. The British
government, among others, has already taken this step and abjured
the phrase war on terror. The phrase raises public expectations—both
in the United States and elsewhere—that there is a battlefield solution
to the problem of terrorism. It also encourages others abroad to
Summary xvii
respond by conducting a jihad (or holy war) against the United States
and elevates them to the status of holy warriors. Terrorists should be
perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors. Our analysis
suggests that there is no battlefield solution to terrorism. Military force
usually has the opposite effect from what is intended: It is often overused,
alienates the local population by its heavy-handed nature, and
provides a window of opportunity for terrorist-group recruitment. This
strategy should also include rebalancing U.S. resources and attention
on police and intelligence work. It also means increasing budgets at the
CIA, U.S. Department of Justice, and U.S. Department of State and
scaling back the U.S. Department of Defense’s focus and resources on
counterterrorism. U.S. special operations forces will remain critical, as
will U.S. military operations to counter terrorist groups involved in
insurgencies.
There is reason to be hopeful. Our analysis concludes that al
Qa’ida’s probability of success in actually overthrowing any government
is close to zero. Out of all the religious groups that ended since
1968, none ended by achieving victory. Al Qa’ida has virtually unachievable
objectives in trying to overthrow multiple regimes in the Middle
East. While Osama bin Laden enjoys some popular support in much
of the Muslim world, this support does not translate into the mass
support of the sort that other organizations enjoy, such as Hizballah
in Lebanon. This is not surprising, since there are few al Qa’ida socialwelfare
services, hospitals, or clinics (a problem of which al Qa’ida’s
leaders are aware). In addition, al Qa’ida continues to expand its list
of enemies. It now includes all Middle Eastern governments, Muslims
who do not share al Qa’ida’s views, western governments, Asian governments
(including those of Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan), the
United Nations, and international nongovernmental organizations.
Making a world of enemies and having unachievable objectives is not
a winning strategy.
I have had the summary, and a first fly over the main text so far.
Worth to think about, and confirming what I am preaching since years: that this term "war on terror" is meaningless and misleading at best, and that Al Quaeda must be fought by policing, and intelligence servicing, and infiltration, and cannot be defeated by military means. For Afghanistan and the Pakistan-supported Taliban that means to reduce the military engagement instead of getting entangled in a more and more maze-like war of limited chances and limited efficiency, and strongly boost afghanistan's capabiltiy to police by it'S own strength, and support a global counterterrorism by intel operations, precise assassinations of key enemies, and infiltration of hostile organisations. the chance that you will ever see the number of troops militaries demand to "pacify" Afghanistan (350 - 400 thousand) is so small that you can completely forget it. It will never come even close to that. It is a giant waste of time, ressources, money, and lives, and ignores the drug problem almost completely since over 6 years. Policies of NATO nations even assisted in raising poppy harvests over the past years - to historic records.
summary
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741.sum.pdf
full document (260 p.)
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741.pdf
Summary
All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? Answers to
this question have enormous implications for counterterrorism efforts.
The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because
(1) they joined the political process or (2) local police and intelligence
agencies arrested or killed key members. Military force has rarely been
the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups
within this time frame achieved victory. This has significant implications
for dealing with al Qa’ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking
post–September 11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
The ending of most terrorist groups requires a range of policy
instruments, such as careful police and intelligence work, military force,
political negotiations, and economic sanctions. Yet policy makers need
to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources
and attention. Following an examination of 648 terrorist groups that
existed between 1968 and 2006, we found that a transition to the political
process is the most common way in which terrorist groups ended
(43 percent). The possibility of a political solution is inversely linked to
the breadth of terrorist goals. Most terrorist groups that end because
of politics seek narrow policy goals. The narrower the goals of a terrorist
organization, the more likely it can achieve them without violent
action—and the more likely the government and terrorist group may
be able to reach a negotiated settlement.
Against terrorist groups that cannot or will not make a transition
to nonviolence, policing is likely to be the most effective strategy
(40 percent). Police and intelligence services have better training and
xiv How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida
information to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations than do
such institutions as the military. They are the primary arm of the government
focused on internal security matters. Local police and intelligence
agencies usually have a permanent presence in cities, towns,
and villages; a better understanding of the threat environment in these
areas; and better human intelligence.
Other reasons are less common. For example, in 10 percent of
the cases, terrorist groups ended because their goals were achieved, and
military force led to the end of terrorist groups in 7 percent of the
cases. Militaries tended to be most effective when used against terrorist
groups engaged in an insurgency in which the groups were large, well
armed, and well organized. Insurgent groups have been among the
most capable and lethal terrorist groups, and military force has usually
been a necessary component in such cases. Against most terrorist
groups, however, military force is usually too blunt an instrument.
Military tools have increased in precision and lethality, especially with
the growing use of precision standoff weapons and imagery to monitor
terrorist movement. But even precision weapons have been of limited
use against terrorist groups. The use of substantial U.S. military power
against terrorist groups also runs a significant risk of turning the local
population against the government by killing civilians.
Our quantitative analysis looked at groups that have ended since
1968 or are still active. It yielded several other interesting findings:
���� Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other
groups. Approximately 62 percent of all terrorist groups have
ended since 1968, but only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups
have ended.
���� Religious groups rarely achieve their objectives. No religious
group that has ended achieved victory since 1968.
Size is a significant determinant ���� of a group’s fate. Big groups of
more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25
percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller
than 1,000 members.
���� There is no statistical correlation between the duration of a terrorist
group and ideological motivation, economic conditions,
Summary xv
regime type, or the breadth of terrorist goals. But there appears to
be some correlation between the size of a terrorist group and duration:
Larger groups tend to last longer than smaller groups.
When a terrorist g ���� roup becomes involved in an insurgency, it does
not end easily. Nearly 50 percent of the time, groups ended by
negotiating a settlement with the government; 25 percent of the
time, they achieved victory; and 19 percent of the time, military
forces defeated them.
���� Terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more
likely to be left-wing or nationalist and much less likely to be
motivated by religion.
Implications for al Qa’ida
What does this mean for counterterrorism efforts against al Qa’ida?
After September 11, 2001, the U.S. strategy against al Qa’ida centered
on the use of military force. Indeed, U.S. policymakers and key
national-security documents referred to operations against al Qa’ida as
the war on terrorism. Other instruments were also used, such as cutting
off terrorist financing, providing foreign assistance, engaging in diplomacy,
and sharing information with foreign governments. But military
force was the primary instrument.
The evidence by 2008 suggested that the U.S. strategy was not
successful in undermining al Qa’ida’s capabilities. Our assessment concludes
that al Qa’ida remained a strong and competent organization.
Its goals were the same: uniting Muslims to fight the United States and
its allies (the far enemy) and overthrowing western-friendly regimes in
the Middle East (the near enemy) to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate.
Al Qa’ida has been involved in more terrorist attacks since September
11, 2001, than it was during its prior history. These attacks spanned
Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Al Qa’ida’s modus operandi
also evolved and included a repertoire of more-sophisticated improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and a growing use of suicide attacks. Its
organizational structure evolved, making it a more dangerous enemy.
This included a bottom-up approach (encouraging independent action
xvi How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida
from low-level operatives) and a top-down one (issuing strategy and
operations from a central hub in Pakistan).
Ending the “War” on Terror
Al Qa’ida’s resurgence should trigger a fundamental rethinking of U.S.
counterterrorism strategy. Based on our analysis of how terrorist groups
end, a political solution is not possible. Since al Qa’ida’s goal remains
the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, there is little reason to
expect that a negotiated settlement with governments in the Middle
East is possible. A more effective approach would be adopting a twofront
strategy.
First, policing and intelligence should be the backbone of U.S.
efforts. In Europe, North America, North Africa, Asia, and the Middle
East, al Qa’ida consists of a network of individuals who need to be
tracked and arrested. This would require careful work abroad from
such organizations as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as their cooperation with
foreign police and intelligence agencies. Second, military force, though
not necessarily U.S. soldiers, may be a necessary instrument when al
Qa’ida is involved in an insurgency. Local military forces frequently
have more legitimacy to operate than the United States has, and they
have a better understanding of the operating environment, even if they
need to develop the capacity to deal with insurgent groups over the
long run. This means a light U.S. military footprint or none at all. The
U.S. military can play a critical role in building indigenous capacity but
should generally resist being drawn into combat operations in Muslim
societies, since its presence is likely to increase terrorist recruitment.
A key part of this strategy should include ending the notion of a
war on terrorism and replacing it with such concepts as counterterrorism,
which most governments with significant terrorist threats use. The British
government, among others, has already taken this step and abjured
the phrase war on terror. The phrase raises public expectations—both
in the United States and elsewhere—that there is a battlefield solution
to the problem of terrorism. It also encourages others abroad to
Summary xvii
respond by conducting a jihad (or holy war) against the United States
and elevates them to the status of holy warriors. Terrorists should be
perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors. Our analysis
suggests that there is no battlefield solution to terrorism. Military force
usually has the opposite effect from what is intended: It is often overused,
alienates the local population by its heavy-handed nature, and
provides a window of opportunity for terrorist-group recruitment. This
strategy should also include rebalancing U.S. resources and attention
on police and intelligence work. It also means increasing budgets at the
CIA, U.S. Department of Justice, and U.S. Department of State and
scaling back the U.S. Department of Defense’s focus and resources on
counterterrorism. U.S. special operations forces will remain critical, as
will U.S. military operations to counter terrorist groups involved in
insurgencies.
There is reason to be hopeful. Our analysis concludes that al
Qa’ida’s probability of success in actually overthrowing any government
is close to zero. Out of all the religious groups that ended since
1968, none ended by achieving victory. Al Qa’ida has virtually unachievable
objectives in trying to overthrow multiple regimes in the Middle
East. While Osama bin Laden enjoys some popular support in much
of the Muslim world, this support does not translate into the mass
support of the sort that other organizations enjoy, such as Hizballah
in Lebanon. This is not surprising, since there are few al Qa’ida socialwelfare
services, hospitals, or clinics (a problem of which al Qa’ida’s
leaders are aware). In addition, al Qa’ida continues to expand its list
of enemies. It now includes all Middle Eastern governments, Muslims
who do not share al Qa’ida’s views, western governments, Asian governments
(including those of Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan), the
United Nations, and international nongovernmental organizations.
Making a world of enemies and having unachievable objectives is not
a winning strategy.
I have had the summary, and a first fly over the main text so far.
Worth to think about, and confirming what I am preaching since years: that this term "war on terror" is meaningless and misleading at best, and that Al Quaeda must be fought by policing, and intelligence servicing, and infiltration, and cannot be defeated by military means. For Afghanistan and the Pakistan-supported Taliban that means to reduce the military engagement instead of getting entangled in a more and more maze-like war of limited chances and limited efficiency, and strongly boost afghanistan's capabiltiy to police by it'S own strength, and support a global counterterrorism by intel operations, precise assassinations of key enemies, and infiltration of hostile organisations. the chance that you will ever see the number of troops militaries demand to "pacify" Afghanistan (350 - 400 thousand) is so small that you can completely forget it. It will never come even close to that. It is a giant waste of time, ressources, money, and lives, and ignores the drug problem almost completely since over 6 years. Policies of NATO nations even assisted in raising poppy harvests over the past years - to historic records.