JALU3
04-13-08, 09:51 PM
For those of you who aren't in the know and/or who haven't been paying attention let me fill you in on some facts about our present military hardware. As for most of the land based systems that are currently deployed by the United States Armed Forces, the vast majority of those systems were procured beginning in the 1980s during the Reagan (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Ronald_Reagan#Cold_War) build-up, and designed in the late 1970s or early 1980s. Exceptions to this rule of thumb as to the age of these systems are few and far between. Thus, although most systems have recieved periodic upgrades and constant maintanance, most chasis are reaching a point where in the past a procurement cycle would have been initiated to look at replacing the present hardware with more advanced and less time worn chasis.
A current procurement cycle has been initiated.
The brain child of then Cheif of Staff of the Army (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_of_Staff_of_the_United_States_Army) General Shinseki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinseki) and then Secretary of Defense (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense) Rumsfeld (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Rumsfeld) was the FCS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Combat_Systems) family of programs. The basic idea was to create a family of vehicles with a base chasis for reduction of maintanance cost which will be light weight enough to transport using the present intratheater transportation aircraft (i.e. C-130 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C-130)) and utilizie advanced sensors, speed, and situational awareness to increase survivability by increasing leathality. This increased leathality was ment to off-set the reduction of armor which would be required to reach the 20 ton weight limit established by the needs of the current C-130s, as armor is where most of the vehicles weight comes from. Thus a moderate sized force could be transported into a theater of operations quickly, hit hard, hit fast, and achieve victory with reduced cost and hopefully reduced friendly casualties.
The interm program, and a work up to this lighter weight system, was the Stryker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stryker). Although it barely meet the 20 Ton weight limit it had its draw backs. Unlike originally invisioned the vehicles were not instantly deployable out of the C-130s, as they required minor reconfiguration in order to fit within the cargo hold. Not all configurations of the Stryker were C-130 deployable. And because of increased payload needs requested by the Army, they increased in size considereable from the smaller LAV-25 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LAV-25) chasis which were chosen because they were so deployable in the first place. This is not to mention the fact that it is non-rapid deployable in the current configuration which it now serves within the Iraqi Campaign.
Now this has been all background information to the actual matter which I am going to discuss.
Field Artillery (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Field_Artillery_Corps) is just one of the many branches that make up the United States Army (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Army). However it has the destinction of being call the King of Battle. The reason for that is that artillery inflicts the most amount of casualties then any other branch of the the Army, regardless of what the Infantry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infantry) or Armored/Cavalry would like you to think. Yet, most of the systems which they use have been in service since the 1970s and the oldest from the early 1960s. Thus as with other items of age this increases the cost of maintanance for these systems.
During the 1990s, looking to address this issue, the US Army contracted for the creation of the XM2001 Crusader (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM2001_Crusader). It was comparobal with other self-propelled artillery which were being designed at the time, and heavily armored in order to advance with the highly mobile armored force. However, citing its weight and other reasons the program was cut to provide additional funding for the FCS program. Thus the Field Artillery was to have to continue to use the aging M109 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M109_howitzer) Palidans for a considerable time to come, and to keep with the needs of the force, had to fund an additional upgrade to the A6 Variant. In replacement of this system the FCS (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fcs.htm) had two variants, initiallly, to fill the needs of the Branch. These were the Non Line of Site Cannon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Line-of-Sight_Cannon) and the NetFire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Line-of-Sight_Launch_System) vehicle.
The NetFire system has been renamed and the NLOS-C continued to be developed. Yet at its present configuration, which it is starting to begin production, it is well over the weight limit required for rapid deployment using the C-130, coming in at 27 tons. Therefore, it does not meet the requirements of the contract, or the need specified.
As we have seen during or most recent campaigns, we have seen that fast and leathal can win wars. However, they do not secure the peace. And there in lies my problem with the FCS system as a whole, and the NLOS-C in particular. The biggest reason for cutting the XM2001 was that it wasn't going to be quickly deployable. However, the NLOS-C wont be any more deployable then the program that was cut. Furthermore, where as the Crusader would have finished its EMD phase by now, and had started to be fielded, the NLOS-C is only beginning its low production initial phase. Moreover, with the entire FCS system, although it creates a lighter weight rapid reaction capable chasis, that is no more deployable do to it not meeting its initial weight requirement, that maybe more lethal, it lacks the design elements and increased armor required to sustain occupation operations in the two areas which we are presently operating in; and no thought has been given to create systems which would follow on the initial FCS rapid deployment vehicles that would provide a heavier, more lethal, stabilising force . . . that unless there is still talk of having the "legacy force" be that follow up.
A current procurement cycle has been initiated.
The brain child of then Cheif of Staff of the Army (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_of_Staff_of_the_United_States_Army) General Shinseki (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shinseki) and then Secretary of Defense (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Secretary_of_Defense) Rumsfeld (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donald_Rumsfeld) was the FCS (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Combat_Systems) family of programs. The basic idea was to create a family of vehicles with a base chasis for reduction of maintanance cost which will be light weight enough to transport using the present intratheater transportation aircraft (i.e. C-130 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/C-130)) and utilizie advanced sensors, speed, and situational awareness to increase survivability by increasing leathality. This increased leathality was ment to off-set the reduction of armor which would be required to reach the 20 ton weight limit established by the needs of the current C-130s, as armor is where most of the vehicles weight comes from. Thus a moderate sized force could be transported into a theater of operations quickly, hit hard, hit fast, and achieve victory with reduced cost and hopefully reduced friendly casualties.
The interm program, and a work up to this lighter weight system, was the Stryker (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stryker). Although it barely meet the 20 Ton weight limit it had its draw backs. Unlike originally invisioned the vehicles were not instantly deployable out of the C-130s, as they required minor reconfiguration in order to fit within the cargo hold. Not all configurations of the Stryker were C-130 deployable. And because of increased payload needs requested by the Army, they increased in size considereable from the smaller LAV-25 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LAV-25) chasis which were chosen because they were so deployable in the first place. This is not to mention the fact that it is non-rapid deployable in the current configuration which it now serves within the Iraqi Campaign.
Now this has been all background information to the actual matter which I am going to discuss.
Field Artillery (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Army_Field_Artillery_Corps) is just one of the many branches that make up the United States Army (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Army). However it has the destinction of being call the King of Battle. The reason for that is that artillery inflicts the most amount of casualties then any other branch of the the Army, regardless of what the Infantry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infantry) or Armored/Cavalry would like you to think. Yet, most of the systems which they use have been in service since the 1970s and the oldest from the early 1960s. Thus as with other items of age this increases the cost of maintanance for these systems.
During the 1990s, looking to address this issue, the US Army contracted for the creation of the XM2001 Crusader (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XM2001_Crusader). It was comparobal with other self-propelled artillery which were being designed at the time, and heavily armored in order to advance with the highly mobile armored force. However, citing its weight and other reasons the program was cut to provide additional funding for the FCS program. Thus the Field Artillery was to have to continue to use the aging M109 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M109_howitzer) Palidans for a considerable time to come, and to keep with the needs of the force, had to fund an additional upgrade to the A6 Variant. In replacement of this system the FCS (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fcs.htm) had two variants, initiallly, to fill the needs of the Branch. These were the Non Line of Site Cannon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Line-of-Sight_Cannon) and the NetFire (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Line-of-Sight_Launch_System) vehicle.
The NetFire system has been renamed and the NLOS-C continued to be developed. Yet at its present configuration, which it is starting to begin production, it is well over the weight limit required for rapid deployment using the C-130, coming in at 27 tons. Therefore, it does not meet the requirements of the contract, or the need specified.
As we have seen during or most recent campaigns, we have seen that fast and leathal can win wars. However, they do not secure the peace. And there in lies my problem with the FCS system as a whole, and the NLOS-C in particular. The biggest reason for cutting the XM2001 was that it wasn't going to be quickly deployable. However, the NLOS-C wont be any more deployable then the program that was cut. Furthermore, where as the Crusader would have finished its EMD phase by now, and had started to be fielded, the NLOS-C is only beginning its low production initial phase. Moreover, with the entire FCS system, although it creates a lighter weight rapid reaction capable chasis, that is no more deployable do to it not meeting its initial weight requirement, that maybe more lethal, it lacks the design elements and increased armor required to sustain occupation operations in the two areas which we are presently operating in; and no thought has been given to create systems which would follow on the initial FCS rapid deployment vehicles that would provide a heavier, more lethal, stabilising force . . . that unless there is still talk of having the "legacy force" be that follow up.