Question abt "Repot Contacts"

[Durkan111]

I was just curious all, is there any point to this. If I report contacts, and then shadow a convoy, will other U boats show up?

[GoldenRivet]

if other u-boats are in the vicinity... whcih they will NOT be in stock, only with mods like GWX... other u-boats may respond but it could take days in the game.

if you are within range of any friendly air base then aircraft might respond to the report and bomb the convoy. this will happen most frequently in the north sea or in the med.

but just as in real life... you will most likley not receive any support.

but you definately wont receive any support if you dont send a report.

[jimmie]

but in the history by the order you're supposed to report contact, and this order takes very high priority even the risk of losing your attakcing opportunity.

[Bridger]

I always try to shadow and report every 8 hours while plotting convoys course and making note of any zigs etc, just feels more realistic, all the while trying to get ahead and into attacking position ready for night attack.

[jimmie]

I always try to shadow and report every 8 hours while plotting convoys course and making note of any zigs etc, just feels more realistic, all the while trying to get ahead and into attacking position ready for night attack.

You're a model captain of der BdU. They need skippers like you.

[K-61]

but in the history by the order you're supposed to report contact, and this order takes very high priority even the risk of losing your attakcing opportunity.

Historically, that is how it was done, once Doenitz had sufficient numbers of U-boats at sea and could try assembling wolf packs to attack convoys. The first U-boat to sight a convoy would radio in a contact report, then shadow the convoy, radioing in updates on course changes. BdU would then relay information to other boats at sea; those with a reasonable hope of interception would then try to rendezvous with the convoy. As they made contact, each one would radio in; once BdU considered enough boats had assembled, it would order them to attack, usually as night fell. The idea of forming a pack was to overwhelm the convoy escorts. As the escorts dealt with an attack from one quarter, other boats might have an easier time to get closer, pierce the perimeter and launch torpedoes. If each boat attacked individually, its odds of success were lower, as the escorts could concentrate on defending against that one boat.

Eventually, the Allies developed ways of countering this. The Achilles Heel of the U-Waffe had always been its need to use radio communication. This made it possible to detect a transmitting set when it keyed up and went on the air. The first HF/DF, or Huff Duff [high frequency direction finding] sets were based at installations ashore, widely separated. When a U-boat keyed its transmitter, these HF/DF stations would triangulate on the radio beacon. The bearings were plotted on a map and the rough location of the U-boat could be approximated. These first sets were not precise enough to pinpoint a U-boat to be used tactically [a plot could be off by dozens of miles,] but determining U-boat locations was still useful; convoys in the area could be directed to alter course and avoid known concentration areas.

Once Allied scientists developed small enough sets to be placed on board convoy escorts, HF/DF could be used at sea with tactical precision. A skilled operator could not only determine the bearing to a transmitting U-boat, but based on signal strength could estimate the distance. This often resulted in a surfaced U-boat suddenly spotting a destroyer coming over the horizon straight toward them at high speed. Given sufficient numbers of high speed escorts [destroyers] one could be detached from the escort group to put down and keep down this first contacting U-boat. If it could be kept under long enough, the convoy could alter course. The shadowing U-boat would then be unable to provide updates, often frustrating the formation of a wolf pack. When aircraft were available, Huff Duff could report that a U-boat was trailing and reporting on a convoy. The aircraft could then make a high speed approach on the U-boat's location. This was valuable, since it meant that a convoy escort need not be detached to put the U-boat under. Given sufficient numbers of escorts, sometimes the trailing U-boat could be hunted to destruction, but this was only possible later in the war, when production of escorts and operational efficiencies allowed for proper U-boat hunts, or if the Asdic contact obtained was so good as to enable an immediate hunt.

When it got to the point that keying up a transmitter brought a cloud of planes down upon themselves, U-boat commanders often made the decision not to radio in contact until the moment they attacked or their presence was known anyway. This still let BdU know of a sighting, but since the initial U-boat was forced to dive to evade, it often wasn't possible for the first boat to shadow the convoy.

[Paajtor]

Interesting read, K-61.

Just out of curiousity...have there ever been Uboats, that took over the radio-callsign from an Allied ship/sub?

If you can pretend to be 1 of them, and use your advantage to report false Uboat-contacts...in a sense, you would be able to send the enemy in the opposite direction of your heading, right?
It's always better, to first have them looking for your elsewhere. ;)

[jimmie]

Interesting read, K-61.

Just out of curiousity...have there ever been Uboats, that took over the radio-callsign from an Allied ship/sub?

If you can pretend to be 1 of them, and use your advantage to report false Uboat-contacts...in a sense, you would be able to send the enemy in the opposite direction of your heading, right?
It's always better, to first have them looking for your elsewhere. ;)
Allies did it, spreading false convoy route, I read so somewhere. But since the communication is Enigma encrpyted they had to be careful not to overdone so BdU wouldn't realize the Enigma had been cracked.

[Paajtor]

I see...

...and was it possible, to determine which hardware was used (by reading the signal's characteristics)?
Tough question, maybe...but it's so hard to find information about this on the net.

[danurve]

This is another fine example of how Greed rules in this game.

To heck with contact reports, they're YOUR targets :arrgh!:

patrol reports on the other hand are good for pre-totaling tonnage.

[Jimbuna]

The U-boat would activate a small transmitting homing beacon for other boats to travel to.
Often the trailing U-boat would be picked up by sea or air or even land based HF/DF (if close enough to land) and forced to dive, which often meant the convoy contact would be lost (especially in bad weather).
The greatest and often most under reported weapon the Allies had in their arsenal was the breaking of the Enigma code for large periods of the conflict.
The Allies became so proficient in the code that they relied heavily on aircraft to attack known U-boat positions so as to give the impression that a 'chance encounter' had happened and not as an obvious breach of Enugma.
The Kriegsmarine long suspected such a breach and carried out 3 separate internal investigations during the war.
Each time, the investigation came to the conclusion that Enigma was safe and secure for use. :arrgh!:


Good post K-61 :up:

http://www.itsnature.org/forums/images/smilies/wolfmoon.jpg



http://i224.photobucket.com/albums/dd320/pasquarade/wolf-38.gif

[K-61]

Interesting read, Jimbuna. The Brits also used Enigma decodes to intercept supplies sailing to the Afrika Korps. Quite a lot of Rommel's supplies never reached him because the Royal Navy and the RAF knew their route at sea. The Brits were quite good at keeping it secret that they were reading the enemy's mail. Before intercepting these convoys, they would always fly a search plane overhead, which was the presumed cause of the interception. As Jimbuna posted, in spite of their suspicions, investigations and confidence in the security of Enigma led to the Germans' continued use of the same. One supply convoy was almost certain to reach Rommel as it sailed in fog. Although the Royal Navy had a reputation for intercepting their convoys, the Italians and Germans thought this particular one would surely get through. The Brits desperately wanted to nail that convoy, but had they done so in that weather, the Axis would have known something was up. The British were prepared to let that convoy get through if that was to be the price of keeping the cracking of Enigma secure. In spite of the odds against them, they sent up search planes, one of which happened to spot the convoy through a clear patch in the weather. The convoy was attacked; as far as the Axis knew, that search plane was the reason for the interception.