Skybird
11-05-07, 08:03 AM
Since longer time I am convinced that the socalled war on terror is only a stinking excuse to systemtically deconstruct civil liberties and freedoms from the Western former democratic societies, to bring political and economic lobbies into position where they can run and manipulate societies to their own personal needs and profit/power interests without needing to fear that the public has any legal means and independant information available to countercontrol these ursupators. And further, the thing is about enforcing a communal collectivism that even tries to make unwanted opinions and resistiong the official policies even almost unimaginable for the individual citizen. "Was ich nicht weiß, macht mich nicht heiß". What I do not know, does not worry my. What I am prevented to know, doesn't worry me either. Because I don't know that I don't know.
Fear of an external enemy and an always present - an omni-present - threat, as well as luring people into material dependecies from their national states (who in the time of economical globalization loose their meaning of beeing national more and more anyway) and free them from all self-responsebilities, are the shield and the sword by which this should be accieved. In different baölances, this is true both for Europe and the US.
I read today that the EU plans to implement the 13 years storing of PNR data of airplane travellers, copying the American model to a wide degree. This is excused by figbhting terror, of course. What else? Governments must be deeply thankful for terrorism. It allows them to do what without terror would have been so many times more difficult to acchieve.
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/nov/01eu-pnr.htm
The data to be collected is almost exactly the same as that being collected under the controversial EU-US PNR scheme. Every passenger's data is to be subject to a "risk assessment" which could lead to questioning or refusal of entry. The data is to be kept for 5 years (EU-US scheme is 7 years) and then for a further 8 years in a "dormant" database (the same as the EU-USA scheme).
(...)
One of the most controversial aspects will be the "profiling" (risk assessment) of all passengers, including visitors from the USA. The "profile" will be updated and held for 13 years. The "profiling" of all passengers raises fundamental questions of privacy, data protection and human rights.
It should be noted that this is a proposal for legislation by the Commission which the Council - in its secret working parties - can change at will (and ignore European Parliament's opinion under "consultation"). So will the scope be extended cover internal EU flights (ie: between EU countries) as well?
Tony Bunyan, Statewatch editor, comments:
"This is yet another measure that places everyone under surveillance and makes everyone a "suspect" without any meaningful right to know how the data is used, how it is further processed and by whom. Moreover, the "profiling" of all airline passengers has no place in a democracy.
We have already got the mandatory taking of fingerprints for passports and ID cards and the mandatory storage of telecommunications data of every communication, now we are to have the mandatory logging of all travel in and out of the EU.
The underlying rationale for each of the measures is the same - all are needed to tackle terrorism. Yet there is little evidence that the gathering of "mountain upon mountain" of data on the activities of every person in the EU makes a significant contribution. On the other hand, the use of this data for other purposes, now or in the future, will make the EU the most surveilled place in the world".
The original EU proposal:
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-com-pnr-proposal.pdf
The worth of such proceedings to tackle terrorism is questionable at best, and this is even being recongized in the US who invented the idea.
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/102407JILOpen.pdf
Some of the concerns stem from the sheer size of the watch list. It contained 158,000 names, including aliases, in July 2004. That grew to 755,000 names by May of this year and now stands at about 860,000 names just five months later. That’s nearly a 500 percent increase in three years. Of course, if there is a good reason to have each of those names there, the increase in the size of the list is good news. But if many of these names are mistakenly there, the credibility of the terrorism watch list and its usefulness will be compromised. (...)
Another concern of the Department of Justice, myself – and the traveling public – is providing an appeal for innocent individuals who are caught in the watch list system because they have the same name, or a similar name, to someone who deserves to be on the list .
In the most famous example, Senator Kennedy was denied boarding on five different airline flights because his name resembled that of an IRA terrorist. It took weeks to get this cleared up.
Since Octobre 2004, 53000 people had been (sometimes repeatedly) questioned becasue they ended up to be on the terror list. A german commentator commented that instead of starting to examine the names on the list and try to keep it as small as possible, so that the names on it actually would have a meaning concerning possible threads, the instead choosen strategy seems to be to blow up the list as big as possible, with theultimate goal of having all people ever travelling on that list. such a project, I conclude, cannot be about identifying terrorist, but necessarily must be about accumulating information for total control of the whole people.
Some critical notes by statewatch:
THE PUI is to analyse the PNR data and reach a "risk assessment" for each passenger" - effectively introducing the "profiling" of all passengers. The criteria of "risk assessment" is to be based on national laws (Art 3.3). So the basis of each "risk assessment" could be different as each member state has different "watch-lists" based on different criteria and different national laws.
We now know that the USA has 755,000 people on its terrorist watchlist. However, it also uses watchlists to apprehend anyone who has broken any US law. How many people are on EU member states' lists? Will names and details be checked against the Schengen Information System (SIS and SIS II) databases whose scope goes well beyond terrorism and organised crime?
(...)
Under Art 4.2 "competent authorities":
"shall only include law enforcement authorities responsible for the prevention or combating of terrorist offences and organised crime"
But will the data be passed to internal/external security and the military defence agencies? The notion that this measure gives power solely to "law enforcement agencies" is nonsense - they may compile watchlists on organised crime but the one for terrorist suspects will be done by the security and intelligence agencies.
(...)
A key issue raised in the consultation process (see below) was which data should be transferred by the PIUs to other national agencies. Should "non-suspects" be screened out and only those presenting a risk passed to other national agencies? Or should there be the bulk transfer of all the PNR data to say MI5/MI6/GCHQ in the UK?
(...)
The Commission's own consultation options observed that a period long than 3.5 years:
"would be seen as excessive and not respecting data protection concerns"
Personal PNR data on every traveller is to be held in an active database for 5 years then a further 8 years in a "dormant" database (the EU-US PNR scheme: data held for 7 years then a further 8 years in "dormant" database).
Data is to be deleted after 5+8, a total of 13 years, except where data is being used for an: "ongoing criminal investigation or intelligence operation"
Why does data on passengers who have been cleared as a "risk" need to be kept for so long? This will involve millions of quite innocent people being kept on record - with the possibility that, in time, the scope of the measure is extend from organised crime, to serious crime then crime in general?
(...)
Art 10.1 says that
"The Council Framework Decision on the protection of data for police and judicial cooperation applies to the processing of data under this measure."
But this measure has not been adopted and is highly controversial having been completely changed by the Council ignoring the Opinions of the European Parliament, the European Data Protection Supervisor, and the EU's Article 29 Data Protection Working (Data Protection Commissioners from all 27 states) Party.
This Data Protection Framework Decision offers little or no "protection" to the individual and allows the unhindered exchange of personal data with third states like the USA. See: Statewatch's Observatory on data protection in the EU (http://www.statewatch.org/eu-dp.htm)
(...)
During the negotiations on the new EU-US PNR agreement the number of categories of data to be transferred was reduced from 34 to 19. However, the 19 items included all the data from the 34 items.
The EU is set to adopt almost exactly the same 19 sets of PNR data to be accessed - which have been criticised by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on more than one occasion.
Consultation process - EU Article 29 Data Protection Working Party "opposed"
In the run-up to this proposal the Commission put out a consultation document listing options. The EU's Article 29 Data Protection Working Party in response was not convinced of the necessity of the measure and concluded that it:
"have not seen any information presented by the Commission that would substantiate the pressing need to process PNR data for the purpose of preventing and fighting terrorism and related crimes or law enforcement"
It further concluded:
"Evaluation of the necessity and proportionality of the measures can only be based on the experiences with the US PNR framework. A lack of available information in this context makes it problematic to assess the necessity, effectiveness and proportionality. Anecdotal information on the processing of API and PNR data by US authorities however concerns mainly passengers incorrectly identified as a risk to air security." and
"For the reasons mentioned above, and until the Working Party is provided with clarification on these fundamental points, the Article 29 Working Party cannot conclude that the establishment of an EU PNR regime is necessary. Therefore, under these circumstances, the Working Party would be opposed to its development."
Their submission further states that:
"To the extent that measures to be developed, be they at EU level or at national level, entail a breach of Article 6 of Directive 95\46\EC and limitation to the right to private life, they should in any case respect the limits of Article 13 of Directive 95\46\EC and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human ~rights.
The Commission will have to substantiate the pressing need for the processing of PNR data' in particular in light of the following:
· The operational need and purpose of collecting PNR data at the entrance of the European Union Territory.
· The added value of collecting PNR data in light of the already existing control measures at the entrance of the EU for security purposes, such as the Schengen system, the Visa Information System, and the API system.
· The relationship with Directive 2004/82/EC. Does the Commission already have information on the implementation of this directive and its effects?
· The added value of the processing of PNR data over the processing of API data.
· The use that is foreseen for PNR data. For identifying individuals in order to ensure air security? For identifying who comes into the territory of the EU? For general negative or positive profiling of passengers? Is there an interest in specific PNR fields for specific purposes of investigating and fighting particular crimes? Would PNR data be the most adequate data for these purposes?"
The future is named "total surveillance state". add to this thread the many examples of data collection, penetration of your private sphere and surveillance that all of you know (at least you should!) from living in your according national countries.
Fear of an external enemy and an always present - an omni-present - threat, as well as luring people into material dependecies from their national states (who in the time of economical globalization loose their meaning of beeing national more and more anyway) and free them from all self-responsebilities, are the shield and the sword by which this should be accieved. In different baölances, this is true both for Europe and the US.
I read today that the EU plans to implement the 13 years storing of PNR data of airplane travellers, copying the American model to a wide degree. This is excused by figbhting terror, of course. What else? Governments must be deeply thankful for terrorism. It allows them to do what without terror would have been so many times more difficult to acchieve.
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/nov/01eu-pnr.htm
The data to be collected is almost exactly the same as that being collected under the controversial EU-US PNR scheme. Every passenger's data is to be subject to a "risk assessment" which could lead to questioning or refusal of entry. The data is to be kept for 5 years (EU-US scheme is 7 years) and then for a further 8 years in a "dormant" database (the same as the EU-USA scheme).
(...)
One of the most controversial aspects will be the "profiling" (risk assessment) of all passengers, including visitors from the USA. The "profile" will be updated and held for 13 years. The "profiling" of all passengers raises fundamental questions of privacy, data protection and human rights.
It should be noted that this is a proposal for legislation by the Commission which the Council - in its secret working parties - can change at will (and ignore European Parliament's opinion under "consultation"). So will the scope be extended cover internal EU flights (ie: between EU countries) as well?
Tony Bunyan, Statewatch editor, comments:
"This is yet another measure that places everyone under surveillance and makes everyone a "suspect" without any meaningful right to know how the data is used, how it is further processed and by whom. Moreover, the "profiling" of all airline passengers has no place in a democracy.
We have already got the mandatory taking of fingerprints for passports and ID cards and the mandatory storage of telecommunications data of every communication, now we are to have the mandatory logging of all travel in and out of the EU.
The underlying rationale for each of the measures is the same - all are needed to tackle terrorism. Yet there is little evidence that the gathering of "mountain upon mountain" of data on the activities of every person in the EU makes a significant contribution. On the other hand, the use of this data for other purposes, now or in the future, will make the EU the most surveilled place in the world".
The original EU proposal:
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-com-pnr-proposal.pdf
The worth of such proceedings to tackle terrorism is questionable at best, and this is even being recongized in the US who invented the idea.
http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/102407JILOpen.pdf
Some of the concerns stem from the sheer size of the watch list. It contained 158,000 names, including aliases, in July 2004. That grew to 755,000 names by May of this year and now stands at about 860,000 names just five months later. That’s nearly a 500 percent increase in three years. Of course, if there is a good reason to have each of those names there, the increase in the size of the list is good news. But if many of these names are mistakenly there, the credibility of the terrorism watch list and its usefulness will be compromised. (...)
Another concern of the Department of Justice, myself – and the traveling public – is providing an appeal for innocent individuals who are caught in the watch list system because they have the same name, or a similar name, to someone who deserves to be on the list .
In the most famous example, Senator Kennedy was denied boarding on five different airline flights because his name resembled that of an IRA terrorist. It took weeks to get this cleared up.
Since Octobre 2004, 53000 people had been (sometimes repeatedly) questioned becasue they ended up to be on the terror list. A german commentator commented that instead of starting to examine the names on the list and try to keep it as small as possible, so that the names on it actually would have a meaning concerning possible threads, the instead choosen strategy seems to be to blow up the list as big as possible, with theultimate goal of having all people ever travelling on that list. such a project, I conclude, cannot be about identifying terrorist, but necessarily must be about accumulating information for total control of the whole people.
Some critical notes by statewatch:
THE PUI is to analyse the PNR data and reach a "risk assessment" for each passenger" - effectively introducing the "profiling" of all passengers. The criteria of "risk assessment" is to be based on national laws (Art 3.3). So the basis of each "risk assessment" could be different as each member state has different "watch-lists" based on different criteria and different national laws.
We now know that the USA has 755,000 people on its terrorist watchlist. However, it also uses watchlists to apprehend anyone who has broken any US law. How many people are on EU member states' lists? Will names and details be checked against the Schengen Information System (SIS and SIS II) databases whose scope goes well beyond terrorism and organised crime?
(...)
Under Art 4.2 "competent authorities":
"shall only include law enforcement authorities responsible for the prevention or combating of terrorist offences and organised crime"
But will the data be passed to internal/external security and the military defence agencies? The notion that this measure gives power solely to "law enforcement agencies" is nonsense - they may compile watchlists on organised crime but the one for terrorist suspects will be done by the security and intelligence agencies.
(...)
A key issue raised in the consultation process (see below) was which data should be transferred by the PIUs to other national agencies. Should "non-suspects" be screened out and only those presenting a risk passed to other national agencies? Or should there be the bulk transfer of all the PNR data to say MI5/MI6/GCHQ in the UK?
(...)
The Commission's own consultation options observed that a period long than 3.5 years:
"would be seen as excessive and not respecting data protection concerns"
Personal PNR data on every traveller is to be held in an active database for 5 years then a further 8 years in a "dormant" database (the EU-US PNR scheme: data held for 7 years then a further 8 years in "dormant" database).
Data is to be deleted after 5+8, a total of 13 years, except where data is being used for an: "ongoing criminal investigation or intelligence operation"
Why does data on passengers who have been cleared as a "risk" need to be kept for so long? This will involve millions of quite innocent people being kept on record - with the possibility that, in time, the scope of the measure is extend from organised crime, to serious crime then crime in general?
(...)
Art 10.1 says that
"The Council Framework Decision on the protection of data for police and judicial cooperation applies to the processing of data under this measure."
But this measure has not been adopted and is highly controversial having been completely changed by the Council ignoring the Opinions of the European Parliament, the European Data Protection Supervisor, and the EU's Article 29 Data Protection Working (Data Protection Commissioners from all 27 states) Party.
This Data Protection Framework Decision offers little or no "protection" to the individual and allows the unhindered exchange of personal data with third states like the USA. See: Statewatch's Observatory on data protection in the EU (http://www.statewatch.org/eu-dp.htm)
(...)
During the negotiations on the new EU-US PNR agreement the number of categories of data to be transferred was reduced from 34 to 19. However, the 19 items included all the data from the 34 items.
The EU is set to adopt almost exactly the same 19 sets of PNR data to be accessed - which have been criticised by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party on more than one occasion.
Consultation process - EU Article 29 Data Protection Working Party "opposed"
In the run-up to this proposal the Commission put out a consultation document listing options. The EU's Article 29 Data Protection Working Party in response was not convinced of the necessity of the measure and concluded that it:
"have not seen any information presented by the Commission that would substantiate the pressing need to process PNR data for the purpose of preventing and fighting terrorism and related crimes or law enforcement"
It further concluded:
"Evaluation of the necessity and proportionality of the measures can only be based on the experiences with the US PNR framework. A lack of available information in this context makes it problematic to assess the necessity, effectiveness and proportionality. Anecdotal information on the processing of API and PNR data by US authorities however concerns mainly passengers incorrectly identified as a risk to air security." and
"For the reasons mentioned above, and until the Working Party is provided with clarification on these fundamental points, the Article 29 Working Party cannot conclude that the establishment of an EU PNR regime is necessary. Therefore, under these circumstances, the Working Party would be opposed to its development."
Their submission further states that:
"To the extent that measures to be developed, be they at EU level or at national level, entail a breach of Article 6 of Directive 95\46\EC and limitation to the right to private life, they should in any case respect the limits of Article 13 of Directive 95\46\EC and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human ~rights.
The Commission will have to substantiate the pressing need for the processing of PNR data' in particular in light of the following:
· The operational need and purpose of collecting PNR data at the entrance of the European Union Territory.
· The added value of collecting PNR data in light of the already existing control measures at the entrance of the EU for security purposes, such as the Schengen system, the Visa Information System, and the API system.
· The relationship with Directive 2004/82/EC. Does the Commission already have information on the implementation of this directive and its effects?
· The added value of the processing of PNR data over the processing of API data.
· The use that is foreseen for PNR data. For identifying individuals in order to ensure air security? For identifying who comes into the territory of the EU? For general negative or positive profiling of passengers? Is there an interest in specific PNR fields for specific purposes of investigating and fighting particular crimes? Would PNR data be the most adequate data for these purposes?"
The future is named "total surveillance state". add to this thread the many examples of data collection, penetration of your private sphere and surveillance that all of you know (at least you should!) from living in your according national countries.