Skybird
10-03-07, 05:24 AM
Before switching off early and think it's just another of these stories, read on a bit.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-508800,00.html
It was a "life on the garbage dump," one member of the KSK 1st Contingent noted in his mission diary in early January 2002: "The mood in the camp is very tense."
The poor accommodations and provisions quickly took their toll. Many KSK soldiers fell ill. "Two mission soldiers collapsed today during roll call," one soldier wrote. Other sources spoke of "vitamin deficiency with scurvy-like symptoms."
During this initial period the KSK troops were fighting less against terror and more for their own survival. Moreover, they lacked their own helicopters and airplanes, or even vehicles suitable for the desert. The Germans didn't exactly get the impression that the US troops in Kandahar had been waiting desperately for them to arrive.
The US troops, who were charged with giving the KSK soldiers their assignments, were guarding a strongly secured prison camp on the FOB and initially kept their distance from the Germans. The KSK troops "often had to beg to be given assignments," and even then were given only "low-level targets," one KSK soldier recalls. The German troops were really "just a burden" on the US forces, he adds.
Ed H., a US soldier stationed in Kandahar from December 2001 onward, confirms this impression. "Basically, the Germans were not allowed to do anything," he recalls. "They looked around for things to do. They were incredibly bored." He remembers one frustrated German soldier killing time by explaining to him all the finer details of the German pension system.
But then the Germans' reputation abruptly changed. A rumor spread among US troops that at least one thing was worthwhile in the German unit -- its supply of alcohol.
For the US troops, Kandahar -- located in the midst of Muslim Afghanistan -- was a so-called "dry camp." Beer and wine were strictly prohibited. But in the German zone, an e-mail with the subject line "BEER DAY" had already been sent around as early as Jan. 12, 2002. The e-mail explained that the commanding officer had approved "the following beer days: Saturday, Monday, Wednesday, Friday."
The commanding officer allowed every soldier a maximum of two cans of beer on these days and added that he expected "modesty in times when the forces must renounce beer consumption due to preparations for deployment." Moreover, a stock of 120 cans was to be held back for the troops.
According to a "shipment expectation" dated Jan. 5, 2002, the soldiers could expect the arrival of 2,000 cans of beer, 48 bottles of red wine and 24 bottles of white wine -- in addition to 150 bottles of Desperados, a tequila-flavored beer.
Word about the arrival of the German beer spread quickly in Q-Town. And soon enough a veritable beer bazaar developed, with KSK soldiers trading their lager for warm socks, long underwear, T-shirts and US army paraphernalia.
"Beer was like a currency," says one US soldier, who stocked up on the beverages provided by the KSK troops. "To us, the German beer supplies were Big Rock Candy." And the German and US troops also bonded over their beers. The KSK troops were especially interested in socializing with US reconnaissance troops. By drinking with them, they obtained access to confidential situation reports, and even satellite photographs and intelligence reports. Sometimes they were able to make phone calls using US satellite facilities. Even helicopter flights and other transportation services were traded for beer. One source says the KSK used the alcohol trade to "creatively compensate for the material deficits of the German forces."
And so the frugal lifestyle of the German troops gradually improved. There were even parties. And the "expectations" of the Americans were high, one commander noted in his daily report, number 42/02, urging the Germans to help "materially with the allocation and provision of German specialties (beer, canned sausages, Black Forest ham, etc.)."
If I were a leading commander: to say I would be worried, would be an understatement. It escapes me how our chief idiots in Berlin could dare to send our troops onto a mission with such dangerously incompetent logistic preparation.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,druck-508800,00.html
It was a "life on the garbage dump," one member of the KSK 1st Contingent noted in his mission diary in early January 2002: "The mood in the camp is very tense."
The poor accommodations and provisions quickly took their toll. Many KSK soldiers fell ill. "Two mission soldiers collapsed today during roll call," one soldier wrote. Other sources spoke of "vitamin deficiency with scurvy-like symptoms."
During this initial period the KSK troops were fighting less against terror and more for their own survival. Moreover, they lacked their own helicopters and airplanes, or even vehicles suitable for the desert. The Germans didn't exactly get the impression that the US troops in Kandahar had been waiting desperately for them to arrive.
The US troops, who were charged with giving the KSK soldiers their assignments, were guarding a strongly secured prison camp on the FOB and initially kept their distance from the Germans. The KSK troops "often had to beg to be given assignments," and even then were given only "low-level targets," one KSK soldier recalls. The German troops were really "just a burden" on the US forces, he adds.
Ed H., a US soldier stationed in Kandahar from December 2001 onward, confirms this impression. "Basically, the Germans were not allowed to do anything," he recalls. "They looked around for things to do. They were incredibly bored." He remembers one frustrated German soldier killing time by explaining to him all the finer details of the German pension system.
But then the Germans' reputation abruptly changed. A rumor spread among US troops that at least one thing was worthwhile in the German unit -- its supply of alcohol.
For the US troops, Kandahar -- located in the midst of Muslim Afghanistan -- was a so-called "dry camp." Beer and wine were strictly prohibited. But in the German zone, an e-mail with the subject line "BEER DAY" had already been sent around as early as Jan. 12, 2002. The e-mail explained that the commanding officer had approved "the following beer days: Saturday, Monday, Wednesday, Friday."
The commanding officer allowed every soldier a maximum of two cans of beer on these days and added that he expected "modesty in times when the forces must renounce beer consumption due to preparations for deployment." Moreover, a stock of 120 cans was to be held back for the troops.
According to a "shipment expectation" dated Jan. 5, 2002, the soldiers could expect the arrival of 2,000 cans of beer, 48 bottles of red wine and 24 bottles of white wine -- in addition to 150 bottles of Desperados, a tequila-flavored beer.
Word about the arrival of the German beer spread quickly in Q-Town. And soon enough a veritable beer bazaar developed, with KSK soldiers trading their lager for warm socks, long underwear, T-shirts and US army paraphernalia.
"Beer was like a currency," says one US soldier, who stocked up on the beverages provided by the KSK troops. "To us, the German beer supplies were Big Rock Candy." And the German and US troops also bonded over their beers. The KSK troops were especially interested in socializing with US reconnaissance troops. By drinking with them, they obtained access to confidential situation reports, and even satellite photographs and intelligence reports. Sometimes they were able to make phone calls using US satellite facilities. Even helicopter flights and other transportation services were traded for beer. One source says the KSK used the alcohol trade to "creatively compensate for the material deficits of the German forces."
And so the frugal lifestyle of the German troops gradually improved. There were even parties. And the "expectations" of the Americans were high, one commander noted in his daily report, number 42/02, urging the Germans to help "materially with the allocation and provision of German specialties (beer, canned sausages, Black Forest ham, etc.)."
If I were a leading commander: to say I would be worried, would be an understatement. It escapes me how our chief idiots in Berlin could dare to send our troops onto a mission with such dangerously incompetent logistic preparation.