Differences between German and American submarine life and combat

[U-96]

German U-Boats and their American counterparts had similiar technology which was common in world war two before the entering of the type XXI Electroboot.

But also I would imagine their tactics, philosophies, etc were different. Germany's U-Boats formed the bulk of their navy, However only a small percentage of the U.S. navy were Diesel Submarines. (I tend to call any diesel sub U-Boats but most don't so this terminology is to avoid confusion)

So the question being, What did they do differently? The only one that comes to mind is that I've noticed that American subs tend to keep their distance while German U-Boats would try and get in close.

Also Americans seemed stricter on their dress code while on U-Boats the crew wore mostly their home clothes. I've never seen photos of returning American crews with beards.

I find U-Boats more facinating in both the technology and the lifestyle however I'd be interested in knowing how it was for Americans as well.

[Quagmire]

German U-Boats and their American counterparts had similiar technology which was common in world war two before the entering of the type XXI Electroboot.

But also I would imagine their tactics, philosophies, etc were different. Germany's U-Boats formed the bulk of their navy, However only a small percentage of the U.S. navy were Diesel Submarines. (I tend to call any diesel sub U-Boats but most don't so this terminology is to avoid confusion)

So the question being, What did they do differently? The only one that comes to mind is that I've noticed that American subs tend to keep their distance while German U-Boats would try and get in close.

That was the USN doctrine. Until a man named "Mush" broke out of that mold!

Also Americans seemed stricter on their dress code while on U-Boats the crew wore mostly their home clothes. I've never seen photos of returning American crews with beards.

Well that is because the USN fleet boat was a luxury yacht compared to the U-Boat. Much larger, many more comforts of home (can you say ICE CREAM MACHINE). Also with air-conditioning and showers you have no excuse not to keep that face shaven sailor!

I find U-Boats more facinating in both the technology and the lifestyle however I'd be interested in knowing how it was for Americans as well.

Yes the Germans were on the cutting edge of technology. They actually set the stage for modern warfare as it has evolved today. However, the mass production of tried and true technology won the day in the end.

The Russians have a saying to that regard "There is a certain QUALITY in QUANTITY." How true...


Highlights are by me obviously. I am sure others will chime in.
.

[Julhelm]

On the subject of shaving, it is my stated opinion that shaving for submarine crews should be strictly verboten. Submariners should have large beards, and that's it.

Just imagine a returning boomer crew after a 6 month cruise during which their beards have been steadily growing, growing and growing.

[Hitman]

It was a different warfare, mainly because of the very different theater of operations, Atlantic versus Pacific. Americans started with much of their doctrine based in lessons learnt from the germans of WW1, adapted to their own needs. The "Fleet submarine" was called like that because it was expected to work with the fleet, as scouting unit (Thus the required high speed on surface), when Mahan's doctrine was still considered and a clash of battleships was expected. Pearl Harbor and the subsequent carrier battles changed that dramatically, and the Navy discovered the potential of Fleet subs as surface raiders, though it took a long time to allow the use of aggressive tactics, like Morton showed. In the end of the war, americans also made surface attacks at night going really close, and they operated in wolfpacks with devastating success. The difference came when the younger commanders pushed their way, tearing appart the older ones who had distinguished themselves during peace time keeping clean subs. Germans instead built an elite submarine fleet in great secrecy, with aggressive young officers from the beginning, trained in daring tactics. If you are interested in comparing the difference of philosophy, a recommended reading is the U-Boat commander's handbook http://hnsa.org/doc/uboat/index.htm versus the official US submarine doctrine http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ref/SS-Doct/index.html There you will see the differences in cautiousness :)

In technology I would not say that germans were more advanced. True, they had the german way of building things (Allowing their subs to go deeper then their US counterparts), but ultimately americans had a much better TDC and of course the radar, something the germans only could start dreaming of towards the end of the war. Plus a heavy punch with their large numbers of torpedo tubes. Only the faulty MK14 torpedoes ruined an otherwise mighty pack :hmm:

Dress code: True the dress code was not as relaxed aboard US subs (Although pics of crewmen in underwear or without shirt are not rare, due to the heat), but overall the relation between officers and crew was way less relaxed on U-Boots.

Hope that clarifies some points :yep:

[U-96]

Quagmire, You say that yet more then 570 Type VIIC U-Boats were built, And by 1943 they were being sunk in appallingly high numbers. So I figure a balance must be struck between quantity and qualitiy. The Type VIIC was amazing in 1939 and obsolete by 1943 so advances and upgrades were needed. Though in the self destructive Nazi bureaucracy it only impeded research and advancement to which the Germans already had the edge.


Hitman, you make a good point, A lone American (fleet sub) as they're called did pack a large number of tubes. But I wouldn't go so far as to say the Americans had a much better TDC, U-Boat hit rates were high, considering the proportion difference as well of U-Boats and U.S. Subs, unfortunately faulty early war torpedoes made this excellent hit rate rather moot. But the tactics were different as well, Germany built their subs with the idea of 'wolfpack tactics' in mind. So the boats were built relatively small and bare. While in the pacific were the subs were expected to operate alone and in small numbers, The large amount of torpedo tubes and torpedoes on board were necessary to have any effectiveness, but as you correctly point out the faulty MK.14 torpedo did ruin a powerful package.

Thanks for the reading material as well. Very informative and interesting

[AVGWarhawk]

German U-Boats and their American counterparts had similiar technology which was common in world war two before the entering of the type XXI Electroboot.
True but the Americans improved their techology when German unexploded torpedoes were found on the beaches of the US east coast.

But also I would imagine their tactics, philosophies, etc were different. Germany's U-Boats formed the bulk of their navy, However only a small percentage of the U.S. navy were Diesel Submarines. (I tend to call any diesel sub U-Boats but most don't so this terminology is to avoid confusion)

So the question being, What did they do differently? The only one that comes to mind is that I've noticed that American subs tend to keep their distance while German U-Boats would try and get in close.

One difference was the US skippers were not instructed in night time surface attacks. As far as close, I believe they were instructed to fire only we in 1000 yards from the target. A lot of the skippers were quite gutzy and got closer. I believe the aggressivness was about the same. But, this only happened after many skippers from the old Navy school doctrine of playing safe were removed for more aggressive skippers.

Also Americans seemed stricter on their dress code while on U-Boats the crew wore mostly their home clothes. I've never seen photos of returning American crews with beards.


As mentioned, showers and air conditioning. Most skippers would leave it up to the crew if they wanted to grow a beard. Most made a contest out of it for the thickest longest beards.

I find U-Boats more facinating in both the technology and the lifestyle however I'd be interested in knowing how it was for Americans as well.

There is a bit more alure and mystique with the U boats but you will find the boys in the Pacific had their challanges and tribulations.

[mrbeast]

Sub crews had a bit of a tradition of growing beards while on patrol even if they could shave them off. Even though fleet boats had showers and better washing facilities the crew only got one shower a week if that. Water usage was always kept to a minimun, you never know when enemy action or malfunction might cut supplies. On the S boats facilities were a lot more basic and I think they generally had a more relaxed attitude to dress etc and as they were not air conditioned it wouldn't be unusual to see the crew wearing just a pair of shorts and some light footware. I'm not sure if many of the photos of US crews were somewhat staged with crews in regulation dress. I've seen some images of US crews looking pretty casual, dresswise. But ultimately it would boil down to what the skipper tolerated.

[U-96]

AVGWarhawk.

Oh don't get me wrong, I never meant to convey that the Americans had it easy. Especially against a country where it's Navy got most of it's country's military resources (that being Japan). I just meant to say it was different and the lore, the technology and frankly the mentality of the German Kriegsmarine with their U-Boats interests me more then their U.S. counterparts. However the Pacific and the Atlantic were very different theaters of operations. Would German U-Boats have been more successful against the Japanese? And American Subs suffer the same losses were they in the German's situation in the Atlantic?

They were just very different was all I was trying to show, But the U-Boats simply interest me more then the American Submarines.

[TheSatyr]

I don't think the US boats would have been any more sucessful in the Atlantic than the Uboats were,but they wouldn't have taken anywhere near the losses the Uboats did either. The SD and SJ radars on the US boats would have alerted them to danger alot sooner than the Uboat reliance on MkI eyeballs.

[mookiemookie]

I don't think the US boats would have been any more sucessful in the Atlantic than the Uboats were,but they wouldn't have taken anywhere near the losses the Uboats did either. The SD and SJ radars on the US boats would have alerted them to danger alot sooner than the Uboat reliance on MkI eyeballs.

This is the reason why the snorkel was installed on US boats only after the war. It wasn't really needed due to the effectiveness of the fleet boat's radar.

[AVGWarhawk]

AVGWarhawk.

Oh don't get me wrong, I never meant to convey that the Americans had it easy. Especially against a country where it's Navy got most of it's country's military resources (that being Japan). I just meant to say it was different and the lore, the technology and frankly the mentality of the German Kriegsmarine with their U-Boats interests me more then their U.S. counterparts. However the Pacific and the Atlantic were very different theaters of operations. Would German U-Boats have been more successful against the Japanese? And American Subs suffer the same losses were they in the German's situation in the Atlantic?

They were just very different was all I was trying to show, But the U-Boats simply interest me more then the American Submarines.

I did not take it in the wrong way. No issue here. Both fronts for the subs/Uboats had very different challenges. Admittedly the Uboat ASW was absolutely devastating once the Allies got their heads together. It is a well known fact that the Japanese got onboard with effective ASW very late in the game. The most effective tool IMO was the radar. Targets were picked up miles away and tracking for the kill commenced. We must also look at were each skipper had to take their boats to meet the enemy. Uboat afforded the open ocean in most if not all instances. Submarines had the open waters for a while but then resorted to raiding ports and having to stay close to the shores as the merchants began hugging the coastline for protection. A very hair predicament for a sub in only 80 fathoms of water. We can say one thing for sure, both German skippers and US skippers had a large set of nuts to do what they did and with the tools at hand to accomplish what they set out to do. If the Germans had the radar set up as the US subs one can only wonder if English would have been brought down. There are more factors in that statment to consider such as how many keels Donitz requested to be layed and how many he was given. Things of that nature. The Atlantic is vast and Donitz realized that. He never had the amount of boats patrolling as he would have wished. Possibly yet another military blunder on Hitlers part not to listen and provide what Donitz requested.

Do I believe the Uboat would have been just as effective in the PTO, hell yes. These men like most adapt and change to meet the problem. Certainly no slackers in the bunch.

[U49]

Subtechnology was established to follow the doctrine it should support. And those approaches where realy different betweeen both countries.

1)
I'm not sure about the american development, but german sub doctrine was NOT fixed (proven, commonly accepted by high ranks) until later in the war, when the successes could not be denied. Dönitz hat his ideas straight, but was not supported by his "bosses" in early years.
You can test this with the pre-war constrcution orders of submarines which is a fought-out compromise betweeen
a) more type IX in the role of a fleet supporting sub
b) more VII in the publicly acknowledged role of recon or what Dönitz intended: a method to enforce a trade blockade
I remember right when i say 1 IX equals approx. 1.5 to 1.75 VII into ressource allocation?
And you can also see the uncertainity in the task that the uboat force should accomplish..

2)
There is a REAL difference in the way that the boats where run. The Kriegsmarine was set up into a rigid disciplin (especially in a dictatorship) with the uboats as a elite corps which was allowed personal freedom. (i.e. see famous photos of the "uniforms" of submarine commanders, when they recieved their Ritterkreuz)
This freedom was proving to the whole crew that they where elite.
In such a scenario you can demand more from them as if they where only taking part in an "important" role

[greyrider]

"the difficulty in planning against american military doctrine is that the americans dont read thier
doctrine, dont follow it, and worse, feel they have no need to."
soviet military tradoc.

"the reason why the american army does so well in combat is because war is chaos, and the american
army practices chaos on a daily basis."
german field marshall

"american parachutists- devils in baggy pants- are less than 100 meters from my outpost line.
i cant sleep at night, they pop up from nowhere and we never know when or how they will strike next.
seems the black hearted devils are everywhere."
found in the diary of a good german officer, good and dead, who opposed the 504th parachute infantry regiment
at anzio

do you really believe technology wins wars?:rotfl:

[CDR Resser]

It may only serve as a measure of my own ignorance, but would the Type VII U boat had the "legs" to patrol in the Empire areas from bases as distant as Midway and Pearl Harbor. Certainly the Type IX would have.

Respectfully Submitted;
CDR Resser

[mrbeast]

It may only serve as a measure of my own ignorance, but would the Type VII U boat had the "legs" to patrol in the Empire areas from bases as distant as Midway and Pearl Harbor. Certainly the Type IX would have.

Respectfully Submitted;
CDR Resser

I've always thought it was wrong to compare a generic 'U boat' to US fleet subs. Fleet boats can really only be compared to TypeIX U boats as long range ocean going vessels. The TypeVII doesn't really have a counter part in the USN, I suppose its somewhere between an S Boat and a Fleet Boat in USN terms.

[Hitman]

It may only serve as a measure of my own ignorance, but would the Type VII U boat had the "legs" to patrol in the Empire areas from bases as distant as Midway and Pearl Harbor. Certainly the Type IX would have.

Respectfully Submitted;
CDR Resser


It could eventually go there and back, however it would patrol about 5 minutes in the assigned area before needing to go back in echonomical speed :lol: And in case he found enough targets -say a convoy, which is difficult since they were smaller than allied ones- he would only have 16 eels to spend in salvoes of 4, against 24 in salvoes of 6 in the US feelt subs :lol:

As I said many times, different tools for different purposes :yep: Type VII subs were good for what they were deisgned, so were fleet subs for their purposes.

You can only compare directly a Type IXD/2 with a fleet boat, and nothing else. In that case, the german design gets better diving depth as only advantage, versus similar diving times, higher surface speed in US subs, and more punch in the latter. And then again you have the radar, something that makes the difference :up:

[the_belgian]

On the subject of shaving, it is my stated opinion that shaving for submarine crews should be strictly verboten. Submariners should have large beards, and that's it.

Just imagine a returning boomer crew after a 6 month cruise during which their beards have been steadily growing, growing and growing.

http://img76.imageshack.us/img76/9229/nieuw1gj0.jpg (http://imageshack.us)

[Uber Gruber]

For me at least, the Pacific Theatre was a "Carrier War" with both adversaries having a substantial naval force. The goal being to control air superiority whilst battling for pacific islands (which in turn can be considered carriers, albeit stationary ones).

The Atlantic Theatre was an attrition war, with both adversaries having completely different naval forces. The Axis goal was to restrict the supply lines to Britain (itself a stationary carrier of sorts) and hence starve it into submission or at least ineffectivness. In this regard, the U-Boat was the dominant Axis sea weapon. Likewise, the Allies used the Destroyer, and later Air power, with equal zeal.

The two theatres are really not comparable in my oppinion, neither are the general goals and aims of the participating submarine forces.

This is my oppinion, any likeness with anyone else's oppinion is purely coincidental. :yep:

[Rockin Robbins]

For me at least, the Pacific Theatre was a "Carrier War" with both adversaries having a substantial naval force.

Well, that's how the Japanese saw it. So they ignored the necessity of escorting their merchant fleet. The British understood the most dangerous threat and acted accordingly with the convoy system and the escorts from hell. The Japanese remained seduced by sexy battleships and carriers, not realizing that there are losses in war and those losses must be replaced with materials brought in with your mrechant fleet if you are an island nation like the UK or Japan. The Japanese never did understand that battles and wars are won by logistics, not just fancy weapons.

But had they understood that they never would have begun their war. They would have worked hard to prevent it, realizing that their supply lines were not tenable.

[TheSatyr]

(Deleted by TS due to the belief that some of my facts may have been wrong...re-researching to get more definitive facts).

[Rockin Robbins]

(Deleted by TS due to the belief that some of my facts may have been wrong...re-researching to get more definitive facts).

The mark of an honest man. Go get 'em and bring 'em back right!

[Ducimus]

So the question being, What did they do differently?

At the start of the war the US sub service were viewed as scouts for the big fleet. Submarine warfare against merchants wasnt even on the agenda. The subs were meant to be kept "with the fleet", hence the term, "fleet boat". With the distruction of the pacifc fleet at pearl harbor, the role of these boats changed.


The only one that comes to mind is that I've noticed that American subs tend to keep their distance while German U-Boats would try and get in close.

Early war, this was true by way of prewar doctrine, which proved to be patently absured. Once the submarine war in the pacific picked up, the doctrine took a complete reversal. Aggressiveness was encouraged, arguably to an extreme in some cases. skippers not aggressive enough were quickly releived of command.

Also Americans seemed stricter on their dress code while on U-Boats the crew wore mostly their home clothes.
True. Even today you still stay in uniform. Uniform restrictions may be relaxed, but you still wear the uniform.


I've never seen photos of returning American crews with beards.
Look around and you WILL find some. Infact the only way they look any differernt the german submariners is that they are still wearing their uniforms, but the beards are fully grown.

I find U-Boats more facinating in both the technology and the lifestyle however I'd be interested in knowing how it was for Americans as well.

Once you familirize yourself with more of the pacifc and what went on there, you'll find that alot of the exploits that people like to do in sh3, are acutally borne from stories of pacific submarines. US subs engaged in more surface actions, and raided harbors/anorages with more regularity then the germans.

[Ducimus]

the Germans were on the cutting edge of technology.

Not really. Like the US, they excelled in some areas, but lacked behind in others.

[U-96]

the Germans were on the cutting edge of technology.
Not really. Like the US, they excelled in some areas, but lacked behind in others.

Admittingly the Americans encouraged the developpment of new technology while the Nazi party who took operational control of the Kriegsmarine, interferred very often impeding developpment. So many new technology came alot later then it should have (Radar, Radar detectors, The type XXI, etc) But in terms of pure technological marvel the Germans were in front, Nazi beaureaucracy just delayed their arrivals endlessly.

It is estimated the type XXI Electroboot would have been out as early as 1942 and it was far more advanced the the U.S. Balao class sub (Which is considered the US Navy's best submarine of the war.) But it was still pretty similiar to the technology of the time. Though to the Americans Radar and active sonar, was common tech and implimented early in their subs. The type XXI Electroboot impressed so many, that the Americans, Brits and Russians researched heavily into them as a base of subsequent Submarine design. The huge submerged speed and range was unheard of to the allies even at the end of the war, Not only the submerged performance but also the hydraulic torpedo loading system which took less time to reload all 6 of their tubes then loading just one on a conventional sub / U-Boat

But in terms of their conventional submarines, you're right. Both sides had their strengths and weaknesses. The American subs had wonderful means of detection, a large array of tubes and many torpedoes and amenities for their crew. German U-Boats had the advantage in surface speed in alot of cases, smaller profiles, agility and diving depth. Crush depth for a U.S. sub was a yellow zone for German U-Boats. However U-Boats suffered from fewer tubes and torpedoes, very squalid living conditions for the crew and a lack of Radar and active sonar technology which proved fatal. Though Ironically enough, the food seemed to be better on German U-Boats.

[Rockin Robbins]

The strategy comparison is the most interesting aspect for me.

The German strategy was cooperation between U-boats to gang up on convoys to overwhelm the escorts and kill most of the merchies. They set up screens across a suspected convoy route. When a submarine detected the convoy they radioed base, which coordinated available U-boats to form a wolfpack attack on the convoy. This strategy was fatally flawed as it assumed that there could not be enough direction finding equipment close enough to compromise the positions of the U-boats. They also were so convinced of the superiority of the German mind that it was inconceivable that enemies could decode their messages. Throughout the war, they never tested the integrity of either system, even after inexplicable losses should have sounded the alarm. So the German method was "Design an attack system and work it to death." Unfortunately, the death was their own.

American strategy was......... um..........er...........no stragegy at all! OK, no strategy left, as the fleet boat was supposed to be the eyes and ears of the fleet, seeking the showdown at the OK Corral with the Japanese Navy. How would that have worked out? Not too good! Fortunately, the Japanese sank our contribution to the showdown, forcing some new thinking as the old strategy was busy attracting fishies to their new homes. At that point all we had left was submarines and some bright person noticed that was all the Germans had to begin with! Why not copy their battle plan? We did exactly that with some important refinements. We assumed that all radio transmissions endangered the submarine and all messages could be understood by the enemy. Therefore German wolfpack tactics were willfully sacrificed in favor of secrecy. The submarine program was top secret to avoid the wonderfully helpful publicity the Nazis gave their submarine successes. While it bolstered home spirits and succeeded in some demoralization of the enemy, we gleefully learned much information that resulted in death for many U-boat crews. In the final analysis, though, American strategy was based on imitating the strengths of German efforts and attempting to avoid the negatives the Germans were never aware of.

The German story will always be more compelling for several reasons. First, the German sub captains were the rock stars of the war, even surpassing pilots in glamor and excitement. Therefore their exploits are much better known, even to this day. Any information we know about the American efforts was published after the end of the war. Also, the German experience was truly a Shakespearian tragedy. What made them strong was what brought them down, their dependence upon compromised communication to concentrate their attacks on well-defended convoys. Their hubris, so believing in their mental superiority that they considered their Enigma code impregnable, was the final piece in their puzzle of complete anihilation. In spite of the failure of their commander, crews remained faithful, captains courageous to the end. What a story! It's better than Thermopylae! Who can resist identifying with it?

[Ducimus]

In terms of technology, on the whole, the germans did develop alot of firsts. The first jet fighter (me-262), the first assault rifle (SG44), the MG42 is still in use today if you look at the linage of various machine guns, or their actions. The first missles, in the V rockets.

But in terms of technology in submaines, in reference to the type 21, its not even a factor. The type 21 isn't so much a WW2 submarine, as it is a product of lessons learned from WW2. The type 21 never fired a shot in anger, and i beleive only 1 acutally made it on patrol before Nazi germany surrendered. By mid to late war, it woudlnt have made a difference anyway.
http://www.uboat.net/men/interviews/files/topp_xxi_role.wav

[Rockin Robbins]

The type 21 never fired a shot in anger, and i beleive only 1 acutally made it on patrol before Nazi germany surrendered. By mid to late war, it woudlnt have made a difference anyway.
http://www.uboat.net/men/interviews/files/topp_xxi_role.wav

Great find! Who better than Topp to answer that question? It could be answered that wolfpack tactics were not necessary for submarine victory, but Topp sounds like he couldn't think beyond that. Obviously with a weapon as different as the Type XXI, new tactics would have to be developed. Topp seems oblivious to that fact. But developing those tactics would have taken even more time that the Germans did not have. Maybe that is why he felt bound to a return of the happy hunting times.

If you read Admiral Daniel Gallery's "U-505" you'll discover the jeep carrier hunter killer groups' compasses were entirely capable of drawing larger circles and they had enough planes to cover those larger circles so that no submarine, once detected, could escape. The Type XXI was defeated before the first one was launched, no matter if that date had been one year sooner.

Even worse for the U-Boat effort, there were only a very few months where Allied losses exceeded their production capacity, even when the U-Boats were most productive. No matter how successful they were, there were not enough boats to sink enough ships fast enough. It was just like the tank situation on the continent. American tanks were crap and the German tanks supreme. It didn't matter because we put tanks and crews in the field quicker than the Germans could destroy them. The Allies could afford the losses, the Germans couldn't. End of story.

It's like the cops and robbers situation. The cops don't have to catch Mr. Bad Guy every time he commits a crime, only once and he's out of business. The cops can afford mistakes, the thief cannot. Who wins there?

I am curious that no one has jumped on my heresy of blaming Donitz for the failure of U-Boats. What gives? I can think of a lot of points to quibble with that one.:yep: (That's OK, I blame Robert E Lee for Confederate failure in the American Civil War, too!:roll:) I have come to the conclusion that the only possible way Germany could have won WWII was to keep the United States out of the war. There was no way to use unrestricted submarine warfare against Britain without fighting the United States. Therefore, once again, the central strengths of the German plan contained the seeds of its own unavoidable destruction. (Play the ominous music here, preferrably some Wagner)

[mrbeast]

Ok I'm going to jump!!

Donitz wasn't to blame for the failure of the U boat war, though he was to blame for other things. Donitz understood the correct strategy to use but was crippled by Germany's pre war obsession with big gun, prestiege surface vessels therefore he never had enough U boats to isolate Britain swiftly and decisively.

The key to the strategy was speed. Germany needed to bring Britain to her knees before the US could justify entering the war. Donitz could not be blamed for the logistical failure of German ship yards to produce enough U boats for the strategy to achieve critical mass.

Donitz, however, was to blame for the deaths of hundreds of young U boat crews. His persistance in continuing the strategy long after it had failed contributed greatly to the needless suffering of people on both sides.

[mookiemookie]

Doenitz isn't completely blameless. Yes, he recognized that he needed more U-boats than the Reich was willing to give him but one of the single largest blunders of the U-boat war and the one that arguably lost it for them was his chattiness and micromanagement of the boats on station.

Between HF/DF and giving the Allies enough messages to use as fodder in cracking the Engima code, the boats never stood a chance when their chief weapons, stealth and surprise, were taken away from them.

[Ducimus]

If you read Admiral Daniel Gallery's "U-505" you'll discover the jeep carrier hunter killer groups' compasses were entirely capable of drawing larger circles and they had enough planes to cover those larger circles so that no submarine, once detected, could escape

If you read Hans Goebellers, "Steel boat, iron heart" he cites that U-505 initially did escape "the noose" as he called it by doing something unexpected. Surfacing in daylight (something uboats didnt do anymore in 1944), and made a mad dash out of the area. According to Hans, it worked, and it was blind fate that brought the two together again a bit later.

As for uboats losing the battles. Ive always thoguht it fell on 3 things.
1.) code breaking
2.) advances in electronic warefare by the allies, and lack thereof by the axis.
3.) shear raw, industrial capabilities of the US to outproduce the axis. (Sadly in modern times i dont think were capable of this anymore.


Numbers 1 and 2 are also some of biggest reasons for US submarine successes in the pacific.

[Rockin Robbins]

If you read Hans Goebellers, "Steel boat, iron heart" he cites that...
Wow! The Holy Grail of submarine books: the one I'd most like to find and read. It seems to me that Admiral Gallery also talks about the incident. Time for me to do some reading to see what his take on it was.

One point about the stealth of the Type XXI. It occurs to me that a torpedoing is simply an extreme detection of a submarine's position. Assuming he is undiscovered before that point, his location is known pretty precisely now. Time to draw the maximum range circle and the hunt begins. Did they have any primitive sonarbuoys in WWII? More reason to submerge into Gallery's book. Take her deep!

[Ducimus]

>>Did they have any primitive sonarbuoys in WWII?

I *think* so, im not sure. I know they had airdropped homing torpedo's though.

[AVGWarhawk]

Yes, in the later part of the war planes did drop sonar bouy. FIDO did the rest. No matter how you cut it, it was a losing situation in the last year of the war.

[Captain Vlad]

The two theatres are really not comparable in my oppinion, neither are the general goals and aims of the participating submarine forces.


Japan, as an island nation, shares similar vulnerabilities with the United Kingdom. The US Submarine campaign in the Pacific and the German in the Atlantic both had the same overall aim: The isolation of the enemy nation by the destruction of it's merchant shipping.

[AVGWarhawk]

The two theatres are really not comparable in my oppinion, neither are the general goals and aims of the participating submarine forces.

Japan, as an island nation, shares similar vulnerabilities with the United Kingdom. The US Submarine campaign in the Pacific and the German in the Atlantic both had the same overall aim: The isolation of the enemy nation by the destruction of it's merchant shipping.

Very good point and observation!

[Hartmann]

Allied ships production> high
japanese merchant production >low

Allied Asw/sonar development/radar> high
Axis asw /radar>low

And sume to the balance the breaking of the enigma code, and the intensive use of planes equiped with radar .

the result is the difference in submarines losses and finally the war

[Takeda Shingen]

Japan, as an island nation, shares similar vulnerabilities with the United Kingdom. The US Submarine campaign in the Pacific and the German in the Atlantic both had the same overall aim: The isolation of the enemy nation by the destruction of it's merchant shipping.

Yes, but with one great difference: The USN campaign was far more centered on the cutting of supply lines to the offensive Japanese ground and air forces spread throughout the Pacific, where as the British were clearly on the defensive in the Atlantic. Starving out the Japanese at home was not really critical until later in the war. In this case, the oft used ladder metaphor is much more applicable to the Pacific, as the geographic reality was that Donitz did not have to contend with a sprawling defensive front. The European war, in that regard, was far more compact than the Pacific, making comparisons difficult at best.

[Rockin Robbins]

The two theatres are really not comparable in my oppinion, neither are the general goals and aims of the participating submarine forces.

Japan, as an island nation, shares similar vulnerabilities with the United Kingdom. The US Submarine campaign in the Pacific and the German in the Atlantic both had the same overall aim: The isolation of the enemy nation by the destruction of it's merchant shipping.
But Japan and Britain were utterly different in one regard: Japan stood on its own. Stopping supplies to Japan shut down their industrial capacity and won the war.

Britain, however, received its supplies from the United States on American ships. Blockading Britain did not reduce American industrial capacity at all! And limiting British industial capacity depended on sinking American merchies, resulting in a lost war for Germany. That is why submarines were the weapon that lost WWII for the Germans. As such, they were largely just wasted resources which could have been used to actually win the war. (Am I a heretic or what???:up: U-96's gotta jump on that one!)

American subs in the Pacific were the instruments of Allied victory. German subs in the Atlantic were a primary cause of German defeat. Is that different enough for you?:lol:

Level-headed strategy to win WWII for Germany (no charge, I'm of German heritage and there aren't any WWII Germans who can use it anyway): First, If America joins the war, Germany loses. Subs are out except for coastal defense. Second, Britain, once evicted from the continent is merely isolated and ignored. Resources that would have been used to build at least half the subs actually built in WWII are diverted to fighter, bomber, tank and AA gun production. Russia is not attacked until after the British accept the status quo of a harmless Germany owning the continent. Make a treaty with Britain and only THEN (if it blows Hitler's skirt up) attack Russia. Kiss all those Russkies goodbye, kill Stalin and his buddies. Declare victory and drink altogether too much Lowenbrau.

But a Hitler smart enough to do that would have been smart enough not to kill 6 million Jews and other assorted scapegoats. He would have used them as prime assets to prosecute the war, giving him an important advantage he chose to forego. In a real sense, his insanity destroyed any chance. His was a truly insane suicidal impulse from the first shot, and part of him just must have known it. There was no sense, and no advantage for the German people in anything he did. It is even doubtful whether Japan would have risked war if the US, Britain and the Dutch were not distracted in Europe.

I have gored enough oxen for one day! A heretic I will always be and a conventional thinker never be.:arrgh!:

[Baracuda]

ive been playing sh4 awile now and one day when i loaded the game all the sub models are popoise class. i no a balao and a gar look nothing like one. Any ideas?:-? :doh: :huh:

[Captain Vlad]

Yes, but with one great difference: The USN campaign was far more centered on the cutting of supply lines to the offensive Japanese ground and air forces spread throughout the Pacific, where as the British were clearly on the defensive in the Atlantic.

The reasons the USN and Kriegsmarine both utilized unrestricted submarine warfare against enemy merchant shipping might have been different, but they still both conducted a submarine interdiction campaign against their respective enemy, with the aim of destroying his maritime supply capability.

Hence, the two campaigns are quite comparable. Sure, there are plenty of differences in detail. That's why it's educational to compare them.:D

[Iron Budokan]

Interesting thread, guys. :up:

[Rockin Robbins]

Hence, the two campaigns are quite comparable. Sure, there are plenty of differences in detail. That's why it's educational to compare them.:D
Yup, comparable. Submarine stragegy was appropriate vs Japan and inappropriate to the point that it lost the war for the Germans. That was all a command decision above the level of Donitz and the whole U-Boat service. A stupid command decision.:down: (I just contradicted myself, didn't I? Think I just let Donitz off the hook!:up:)

[Torplexed]

Also Americans seemed stricter on their dress code while on U-Boats the crew wore mostly their home clothes. I've never seen photos of returning American crews with beards.

Here's a picture of the crew of the S-44 circa August 1942. Those guys look like they'd be at home in the Kriegsmarine. :D

http://www.neptoonsorbit.com/BeardedAmericanSailors.jpg

[LukeFF]

Here's a picture of the crew of the S-44 circa August 1942. Those guys look like they'd be at home in the Kriegsmarine. :D

Some of those guys look like they'd fit in perfectly on a Civil-War era ship! :p

[Torplexed]

Some of those guys look like they'd fit in perfectly on a Civil-War era ship! :p
Yeah...you're right. They look like they would be quite at home languishing on the deck of the USS Monitor in 1862.:)

Here's one more from the galley of the USS Bullhead showing quite a mix. At least you're spared shirtless guys playing SH4.

http://www.neptoonsorbit.com/MessRoom.jpg

[Rockin Robbins]

Some of those guys look like they'd fit in perfectly on a Civil-War era ship! :p
Yeah...you're right. They look like they would be quite at home languishing on the deck of the USS Monitor in 1862.:)

Here's one more from the galley of the USS Bullhead showing quite a mix. At least you're spared shirtless guys playing SH4.

http://www.neptoonsorbit.com/MessRoom.jpg It's a sobering thought I had looking at these guys my wife's grandfather probably knew from being aboard Kraken in a wolfpack with the Bullhead. The Bullhead didn't come home...

[U-96]

This is going to be a long one. As I'm abit late in contributing here. So bare with me. But you're all sub captains so patience is in your blood.

I believe Topp and alot of people underestimate the significance of the type XXI U-Boat. It would have made a difference for two reasons. a) It was designed to operate alone. b) it was be a more effective convoy killer. The main problems with the conventional U-Boats was it needed to be surfaced in order to persue and manuver into a good position to attack a convoy. Second was the rather small armament. 4 bow tubes, And only one salvo of which could be used against the convoy since it took an average of 15 minutes per tube to reload. Which is why Wolfpack tactics were needed with conventional U-Boats to make any significant impact on convoys. The U-Boats themselves unfortunately were designed with the Wolfpack idea in mind. The type XXI had 6 tubes which could be completely reloaded in less then 10 minutes. Especially with wakeless torpedoes, it could strike again and again at a convoy, most of the time without the need to see it thanks to the Neibelung SONAR technology installed on it before Escorts would know where to look. And last but not least a very large stock of torpedoes. So yes it would have made an impact and life hell for convoys if they were deployed in significant numbers. But alone it wouldn't have won the war it's the case of (It can't win the war for you, BUT you can't win without it)

Rockin Robin is right on many cases and makes a good case. However there are a few points of contention.

On the subject of Karl Doenitz. He shares a good portion of the responsibility of the appaling losses, But not for the loss of the battle of the Atlantic. Doenitz recognized that Battleships and large surface ships were obsolete. Unfortunately more conservative bureaucrats did not. So there were very few U-Boats available, even fewer ready for patrols. Infact the impact they had for their meagre numbers is quite astounding. But Doenitz's pride and carrear took precidence over tactical necessity. Doenitz's insistance on constant communication (especially status reports complete with their exact locations) proved fatal for many U-Boats. The Wolfpack tactic proved to be very destructive BUT it was easily countered. Once Anti-Submarine warfare was booming, Doenitz was too stubborn to do anything about it and just sent his men to their deaths. Many men's only crime was having a commander more concerned about the braids on his sleeve then their well being. Had Doenitz been listened to early on, There would have been enough U-Boats for a blockade. However when things turned bad by 1943 there's alot of blood on his hands.

Robin is also right that resource wasting proved fatal for the Germans, BUT for the wrong reasons. The U-Boats were far from a waste of resources before the war, they were infact the needed technology. Instead Hitler and a very conservative Nazi bureaucracy insisted on building Bismarck and Tirpitz. Collectively 120 000 tons of obsolete ships. The time, resources and men needed for those would have netted 130 Type VII or 110 Type IX U-Boats alone, That's not counting the ones already produced. Also the potential of these subs hampered by bureaucrats being too confident of their technology rather then expanding on them. So the lack of Radar and active SONAR only hampered the U-Boat's effectiveness.

The U-Boats were designed with the wolfpack idea in mind, The type VII's especially with a rather light torpedo count and only 5 tubes (4 bow, 1 stern). The type IX had a very respectable amount of Torpedoes, But again most of them stored externally and with only 6 tubes (4 bow, 2 stern) And the reloading by hand only made things worse since it took forever to reload. All a U-Boat could hope for attacking a convoy would be 3 ships at most. Since most U-Boat commanders would aim for two torpedoes per ship. A convoy attack from a single boat would net 2 ships per sucessful attack. So a U-Boat needed wolfpack tactics to inflict significant losses and it worked for a time. One of the very few examples of the U.S. the Germans should have followed was to design subs to operate alone instead of depending on wolfpack tactics, Also the swift acceptance of Radar as viable technology would have aided the Germans immensely. The type XXI solved these problems.

I admire the Kriegsmarine, But I have nothing but scorn for the Nazi party. The Kriegsmarine had some of the most able sailors the world known, and they had the misfortune of very lousy leadership. The war was lost before the first shot was fired for the simple reason that the Nazi party was a self destructive regime. It encouraged internal strife and backstabbing rather then harmony and respect for the chain of command. The Nazis (And I say Nazis since they were in power and calling the shots at the time, The word is not interchangable with 'Germans') were as much at war with each other as they were with everyone else. Hitler should have seen that the U.S. being tied up in the Pacific was a godsend for him, instead he stupidly declared war on the U.S. while having enough trouble with England and Russia.

The Americans were blessed with a technologically stagnant Japan in the Pacific which is why their subs were so successful. And American subs were designed to operate alone, as well as mounting radar. Still they had their own failing, Even the Baolo class couldn't dive too deep, and suffered from very lousy torpedoes for much of the war. But the roles were reversed in the Pacific with the subs constantly evolving while their target remained complacent and stagnant rather then vice versa which was the case of the U-Boats in the Atlantic.

So the U-Boats were not the cause of Germany's defeat, The Nazi party did that on their own. The effectiveness of German U-Boats is what made things hell for England in the first place. And for the Americans in 1942. But the Allies evolved and the Germans were too proud and complacent. Hitler was not smart, He was actually rather mediocre of intelligence. But he was a gambler and it often paid off at first, Just because he was lucky did not make him smart and the U-Boat men paid a very heavy price for that.

[Hartmann]

Also XXI type has another decissive differences.

c) high underwater speed, so avoid depth charges at 200 meters at 13 knts is easier that running at 2 knts in a VII . and more with a silent running of 6 knts

d) High underwater endurance

e) luxurious things for the crew like fridge or air aconditionated.

f) more diving depth.


Some high performance technology exist before WWII but germany believe that they will won the war in 1942 so it was no used, and when the situation was really a disaster was too late to try develop an effective XXI force.

The situation could be different using all boats, including IX-B and C in a blockade around britain withouth the use of the U-boat situation repports or communications.

[Torplexed]

Doenitz was also a victim of Hitler's weird intuition. Hitler constantly forsaw an Allied invasion of Norway, so badly needed U-Boats were frittered away from the Battle of the Atlantic guarding against an invasion they probably couldn't have hindered anyway. Then there were Hitler's constant attempts to shore up Mussolini in Italy. Which meant wasting U-Boats fighting in an inland sea from which they could not be recovered.

The US Navy suffered from something similar in the Pacific. General MacArthur was constantly diverting submarines to dubious tasks like supplying guerillas and acting as a taxi service for agents. But at least the submarine could do it's job while in transit.

One important thing about the Type XXI is it didn't come into existence in a vacuum. It was burgeoning growth of Allied airpower to a saturation level and the increasing effectiveness of radar that brought about the need for a Type XXI as a solution. The importance of these events and the impact they would play on submarine warfare simply weren't forseen by Doenitz before the war. Or, if they were they were discounted.

[U-96]

Doenitz was also a victim of Hitler's weird intuition. Hitler constantly forsaw an Allied invasion of Norway, so badly needed U-Boats were frittered away from the Battle of the Atlantic guarding against an invasion they probably couldn't have hindered anyway. Then there were Hitler's constant attempts to shore up Mussolini in Italy. Which meant wasting U-Boats fighting in an inland sea from which they could not be recovered.

The US Navy suffered from something similar in the Pacific. General MacArthur was constantly diverting submarines to dubious tasks like supplying guerillas and acting as a taxi service for agents. But at least the submarine could do it's job while in transit.

One important thing about the Type XXI is it didn't come into existence in a vacuum. It was burgeoning growth of Allied airpower to a saturation level and the increasing effectiveness of radar that brought about the need for a Type XXI as a solution. The importance of these events and the impact they would play on submarine warfare simply weren't forseen by Doenitz before the war. Or, if they were they were discounted.
Thanks for adding more to my point. The type XXI was on the drawing board even before the war started. The U-Boats were extremely successful in WWI so the technology was being researched. However the type XXI of pre WWI only had in mind the hull and the advanced electric engines. The events of the war prompted pattern running and acoustic guided torpedoes, The Neiblung SONAR, The NAXOS radar detector and the Schnorkel (pronounce it correctly people :P) amoung other things.

The ridiculous redeployments were a victem of Nazi bureaucracy, And so was this advanced technology.

[mookiemookie]

Another point to add to your point...the Type XXI was put on the back burner during the "Happy Times" when the night surface attack was still a viable strategy. At the rate of success the U-boats had at that point, the Nazis believed the war would be won before development was completed. By the time they realized it was indeed needed, it came too late to the party.

What would have been the impact of a Type XXI available in late 41-early 42? Good question...

[nikimcbee]

Keep in mind, the Germans had more ships to shoot at than the US.

We had ULTRA. US communication was (more/less) one-way.

Donitz micromanaged the u-boats, which created tons of useless radio traffic...enter HF/DF. Enigma code was comprimised, and the Germans were in denile about it being broken.

The allies learned the lessons on WWI submarine warfare...
...that chapter the Japanese totally underestimated submarine warfare. (It's true purpose- anti-commerence.

[Takeda Shingen]

The reasons the USN and Kriegsmarine both utilized unrestricted submarine warfare against enemy merchant shipping might have been different, but they still both conducted a submarine interdiction campaign against their respective enemy, with the aim of destroying his maritime supply capability.

Hence, the two campaigns are quite comparable. Sure, there are plenty of differences in detail. That's why it's educational to compare them.:D

According to this logic, the uboat war in the Atlantic, the USN's submarine campaign in the Pacific, the Soviet's guerrilla war on the eastern front, Sherman's March to the Sea, Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry raiders and the minutemen of the American Revolution are all directly comparable, for they all sought the same ends: Disruption of the enemy's supply.

So, I think that if Donitz would have paid more attention to Sherman, he would have been more successful.

[Hitman]

Here's a picture of the crew of the S-44 circa August 1942. Those guys look like they'd be at home in the Kriegsmarine. :D


Why? I see nobody holding a U-Boat special cocktail :hmm:

j/j ;)

[Torps]

I did a report back in HS in the mid 90s on what single weapon in the German military could of changed or altered the course of the war. It was the .....

Type XXI U-Boat.

This Hypothetical project speculated bringing the type XXI into the war in January 1942. I concluded on this report that the United States would of had to divert fast resources to the Atlantic.


I. come up with an American version of the type XXI, armed with modified


II. modified acoustic homing torpedos that was specifically designed to lock on
to the type XXI engine noise. (AIRCRAFT AND DD's)

III. increase speed of merchants to were they can go beyond 20 knots between
the continents none stop.


At the end it was concluded if Britian survived the type XXI/ or if they surrendered Unless the US was invaded and work on the atomic bomb was slowed or stopped the US would of used it until Japan and Germany surrendred unconditionally.

[Rockin Robbins]

I agree that the type XXI was a very interesting boat with revolutionary capabilities. However, Topp's statements reveal that sub captains didn't have any concept of how to fight their new weapon. I agree that he is off-base, but that means he would have been ineffective as a Type XXI captain as well. Topp does bring up that much time-comsuming training (time they did not have) would have to come before deployment of the Type XXI. Given the urgent necessities of the war, none of that was possible.

But how about my central argument: that the Japanese and British theaters were fundimentally different because although sinking Japanes shipping starved Japan, in order to starve Britain you had to sink ships of a neutral nation: the United States. Since the US could and did produce ships faster than the U-Boats could ever sink them, the war was lost just as soon as the US joined the war, no matter how effective the U-Boats were at sinking ships. Therefore all U-Boat production above that necessary for coastal defense and warship supression was wasted resources. Also all German surface ship expenditures were wasted as well for the same reason. Keeping the US out of the war and defusing Britain were the keys to a lasting peace decided after German victory.

However, you've hit on the central fact behind my observation: the Nazi party, without which there would have been no war at all! No war means there is no way the Germans could possibly win the war that never was.:know:

[Penelope_Grey]

One thing I know with certainty is that American submariners made use of and adapted German U-boat attack strategies to their own ends.:up:

[Rockin Robbins]

One thing I know with certainty is that American submariners made use of and adapted German U-boat attack strategies to their own ends.:up:

Because before the war, American stragegy was to use the subs to scout out the location of the IJN so the main battle fleet could find 'em, attack 'em and get their tails whipped by a superior enemy. That was a bad strategy.

Fortunately the Japanese took the American battlefleet and securely stored it on the bottom of Pearl Harbor so we wouldn't lose the war with it, a charitable act indeed:up:. We went shopping for a strategy for the only navy we had left, our carriers and subs, as shazaam! there were the Germans spilling their guts about their whole program, running a US Navy training program just for our benefit. And it was a free course too! As I've said before, we analyzed the defects in the German scheme, mitigated them and went to war.

A prime irony of the war is that submarines could not win the war of the Atlantic, but without their losing efforts and German need to publicize their exploits, we would have not had a strategy to use in the Pacific, where submaries COULD win a war. War, like politics, makes strange bedfellows.

[Torplexed]

If Germany had come up with the Type XXI earlier in the war it certainly would have given Britain and her allies a hard time. However, I think as always happened in the Battle of the Atlantic the inevitable countermeasures would have come into being. You probably would have seen a crash program in the manufacture of sonobuoys, the laying of sonar arrays on the bottom of the ocean, faster development and deployment of MAD gear to detect U-Boats from the air whilst they are running submerged. Possibly sooner development of helicopters with dipping sonar to run ahead of a convoy. All these Cold War ASW devices were born in the latter days of WW2 or on the drawing board. Plus, the building of all escorts and escort carriers cancelled in 1945.

Now assuming a brillant U-Boat triumph in the Atlantic I think the result still wouldn't have been Springtime for Hitler. Germany was already losing it's unequal struggle in the East regardless of any naval triumphs elsewhere. Assuming the U-Boats held off or delayed an Allied landing, you probably would have seen Stalin's domain extended all the way to the Atlantic. Somebody pass the borscht. :cool:

[FIREWALL]

Some of those guys look like they'd fit in perfectly on a Civil-War era ship! :p
Yeah...you're right. They look like they would be quite at home languishing on the deck of the USS Monitor in 1862.:)

Here's one more from the galley of the USS Bullhead showing quite a mix. At least you're spared shirtless guys playing SH4.

http://www.neptoonsorbit.com/MessRoom.jpg

Didn't know GROUCHO MARX was a Submariner :D :rotfl:

[FIREWALL]

Fleet boat secret weapon: Icecream machine.:rotfl: :rotfl:

[Torplexed]

Didn't know GROUCHO MARX was a Submariner :D :rotfl:
You betch yer life. ;) Kept his seegars in tubes one thru two. Harpo, Zeppo,Chico and Gummo in tubes three thru six.

[Captain Vlad]

According to this logic, the uboat war in the Atlantic, the USN's submarine campaign in the Pacific, the Soviet's guerrilla war on the eastern front, Sherman's March to the Sea, Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry raiders and the minutemen of the American Revolution are all directly comparable, for they all sought the same ends: Disruption of the enemy's supply.

USN: Unrestricted submarine warfare campaign targetting enemy merchant shipping from 1941-1945.

Kriegsmarine: Unrestricted submarine warfare campaign targetting enemy merchant shipping from 1939-1945.

[Takeda Shingen]

USN: Unrestricted submarine warfare campaign targetting enemy merchant shipping from 1941-1945.

Kriegsmarine: Unrestricted submarine warfare campaign targetting enemy merchant shipping from 1939-1945.

Nathan Bedford Forrest: Unrestricted guerrilla warfare targeting enemy supply lines from 1861-1865.

Red Army Militia: Unrestricted guerrilla warfare targeting enemy supply lines from 1941-1943.

All four use the same cycle of ambush and displacement. All four involve use lightly armed units designed for stealth and escape. All four primarily engage soft targets. All four are now directly comparable.

Let the discussion open.

[Rockin Robbins]

USN: Unrestricted submarine warfare campaign targetting enemy merchant shipping from 1941-1945.

Kriegsmarine: Unrestricted submarine warfare campaign targetting enemy merchant shipping from 1939-1945.
Nathan Bedford Forrest: Unrestricted guerrilla warfare targeting enemy supply lines from 1861-1865.

Red Army Militia: Unrestricted guerrilla warfare targeting enemy supply lines from 1941-1943.

All four use the same cycle of ambush and displacement. All four involve use lightly armed units designed for stealth and escape. All four primarily engage soft targets. All four are now directly comparable.

Let the discussion open.
Nathan Bedford Forrest (1861-1865): Targeted enemy supply lines, nobody around but enemy. War lost because foreign help never materialized, but not because of Forrest. Here the Union side understood what the Germans did not in WWII.

Red Army Militia (1941-1943): Targeted enemy supply lines and soft military targets. No enemy but Germans. War won.

USN Submarines (1941-1945): Targeted enemy supply lines and military targets. Only Japanese shipping to contend with. War won because of submarines.

German U-Boat Atlantic Campaign (1939-1945): Targeted enemy supply lines, but because supplies were shipped on neutral bottoms causes entry of United States into the war. War lost because of American/British/Russian superiority when war with the US could have been avoided, war with Britain could have ended with a treaty and victory would have been possible. War lost because of inappropriate use of submarines.

A 10mm open end wrench is a fine tool. But when you try to use in on a ¾" bolt, it isn't going to accomplish anything good. The Germans not only failed to notice that their tool didn't fit, but persisted in using it until they broke the tool and killed the mechanic.:down:

How's that for discussion? ;)

[Takeda Shingen]

Nathan Bedford Forrest (1861-1865): Targeted enemy supply lines, nobody around but enemy. War lost because foreign help never materialized, but not because of Forrest. Here the Union side understood what the Germans did not in WWII.

Red Army Militia (1941-1943): Targeted enemy supply lines and soft military targets. No enemy but Germans. War won.

USN Submarines (1941-1945): Targeted enemy supply lines and military targets. Only Japanese shipping to contend with. War won because of submarines.

German U-Boat Atlantic Campaign (1939-1945): Targeted enemy supply lines, but because supplies were shipped on neutral bottoms causes entry of United States into the war. War lost because of American/British/Russian superiority when war with the US could have been avoided, war with Britain could have ended with a treaty and victory would have been possible. War lost because of inappropriate use of submarines.

A 10mm open end wrench is a fine tool. But when you try to use in on a ¾" bolt, it isn't going to accomplish anything good. The Germans not only failed to notice that their tool didn't fit, but persisted in using it until they broke the tool and killed the mechanic.:down:

How's that for discussion? ;)

Magnificent. Now, can we work in the Battle of Hastings? How does Donitz stack up against Edward the Confessor?

[U-96]

Nathan Bedford Forrest (1861-1865): Targeted enemy supply lines, nobody around but enemy. War lost because foreign help never materialized, but not because of Forrest. Here the Union side understood what the Germans did not in WWII.

Red Army Militia (1941-1943): Targeted enemy supply lines and soft military targets. No enemy but Germans. War won.

USN Submarines (1941-1945): Targeted enemy supply lines and military targets. Only Japanese shipping to contend with. War won because of submarines.

German U-Boat Atlantic Campaign (1939-1945): Targeted enemy supply lines, but because supplies were shipped on neutral bottoms causes entry of United States into the war. War lost because of American/British/Russian superiority when war with the US could have been avoided, war with Britain could have ended with a treaty and victory would have been possible. War lost because of inappropriate use of submarines.

A 10mm open end wrench is a fine tool. But when you try to use in on a ¾" bolt, it isn't going to accomplish anything good. The Germans not only failed to notice that their tool didn't fit, but persisted in using it until they broke the tool and killed the mechanic.:down:

How's that for discussion? ;)
Magnificent. Now, can we work in the Battle of Hastings? How does Donitz stack up against Edward the Confessor?

The Battle of Agincourt is much more intrigueing :P

[Rockin Robbins]

Nathan Bedford Forrest (1861-1865): Targeted enemy supply lines, nobody around but enemy. War lost because foreign help never materialized, but not because of Forrest. Here the Union side understood what the Germans did not in WWII.

Red Army Militia (1941-1943): Targeted enemy supply lines and soft military targets. No enemy but Germans. War won.

USN Submarines (1941-1945): Targeted enemy supply lines and military targets. Only Japanese shipping to contend with. War won because of submarines.

German U-Boat Atlantic Campaign (1939-1945): Targeted enemy supply lines, but because supplies were shipped on neutral bottoms causes entry of United States into the war. War lost because of American/British/Russian superiority when war with the US could have been avoided, war with Britain could have ended with a treaty and victory would have been possible. War lost because of inappropriate use of submarines.

A 10mm open end wrench is a fine tool. But when you try to use in on a ¾" bolt, it isn't going to accomplish anything good. The Germans not only failed to notice that their tool didn't fit, but persisted in using it until they broke the tool and killed the mechanic.:down:

How's that for discussion? ;)
Magnificent. Now, can we work in the Battle of Hastings? How does Donitz stack up against Edward the Confessor?
The Battle of Agincourt is much more intrigueing :P
No, I would have to disagree with both of you. I would hold up the Battle of the Atlantic as the most complex, most far-reaching, most consequential, most brutal, most protracted and most interesting battle in history. It has more plot twists than a James Bond movie, more great and interesting characters on both sides than the Illiad, more tragedy and triumph than Thermopolae, more sacrifice than Picket's charge at Gettysburg. This was a battle that rendered any possible comparison meaningless in its insignificance.:roll:

[Takeda Shingen]

No, I would have to disagree with both of you. I would hold up the Battle of the Atlantic as the most complex, most far-reaching, most consequential, most brutal, most protracted and most interesting battle in history. It has more plot twists than a James Bond movie, more great and interesting characters on both sides than the Illiad, more tragedy and triumph than Thermopolae, more sacrifice than Picket's charge at Gettysburg. This was a battle that rendered any possible comparison meaningless in its insignificance.:roll:

More than the Battle of Badon Hill, where Brave Sir Robin personally wet himself?

[Torplexed]

Oh well...at least Agincourt gave us some Shakespeare and the St. Crispin's Day speech. :cool: "We few...we precious few...we Band of Brothers."

http://www.wsu.edu/%7Edelahoyd/shakespeare/henrycrispin.jpg

[Rockin Robbins]

No, I would have to disagree with both of you. I would hold up the Battle of the Atlantic as the most complex, most far-reaching, most consequential, most brutal, most protracted and most interesting battle in history. It has more plot twists than a James Bond movie, more great and interesting characters on both sides than the Illiad, more tragedy and triumph than Thermopolae, more sacrifice than Picket's charge at Gettysburg. This was a battle that rendered any possible comparison meaningless in its insignificance.:roll:
More than the Battle of Badon Hill, where Brave Sir Robin personally wet himself?
I forgot completely about that!!!!!!!!

Bravely bold Sir Robin rode forth from Camelot.
He was not afraid to die, O brave Sir Robin!
He was not at all afraid to be killed in nasty ways,
Brave, brave, brave, brave Sir Robin!

He was not in the least bit scared to be mashed into a pulp,
Or to have his eyes gouged out, and his elbows broken;
To have his kneecaps split, and his body burned away;
And his limbs all hacked and mangled, brave Sir Robin!

His head smashed in and his heart cut out
And his liver removed and his bowels unplugged
And his nostrils raped and his bottom burned off
And his pen--


Brave Sir Robin ran away.
Bravely ran away, away!
When danger reared its ugly head,
He bravely turned his tail and fled.
Yes, brave Sir Robin turned about
And gallantly he chickened out.
Bravely taking to his feet
He beat a very brave retreat,
Bravest of the brave, Sir Robin!


Look at him bravely running away
He's turning his back and he's running away!

Bravely, bravely running way
He's bravely brave Sir Robin!


You win. I was completely forgetting. No excuse for it, really...:oops:

[Captain Vlad]

More than the Battle of Badon Hill, where Brave Sir Robin personally wet himself?

Quite comparable to when he nearly stood up to the vicious Chicken of Bristol.

[mrbeast]

More than the Battle of Badon Hill, where Brave Sir Robin personally wet himself?

Quite comparable to when he nearly stood up to the vicious Chicken of Bristol.

Or when he nearly fought the Dragon of Angnor!