WWII after Pearl Harbor

[SUBMAN1]

Can someone please explain to me why the Japanese never hunted down the American carriers after Pearl Harbor in WWII? They had the strength, they had the capability, They had the time, so why did they turn tail? This I really do not understand. They left the Battleships smoldering, but they failed to take out the most dangerous weapons - the carriers.

-S

[Ostfriese]

Because even the carrier task forces were tiny spots in a huge ocean. You can only attack a target if you know where it is, and obviously the japanese did not know. They simply didn't have the resources to search for the carriers, at least not that far away from mainland Japan.

[CCIP]

Eh, it's even more of a mystery why they left after one day of attacks, when they had every opportunity to conduct several attacks over several days and completely devastate everything that was at Pearl, knocking out all the capital ships there for good. But they left.

[GlobalExplorer]

I think subman is right. They had the full strength of the Kido Butai available, the element of surprise, so they should have made a push. And they must have known that situation would never return.

I think Admiral Nagumo was too cautious, and missed a great chance, and I think I remember he was acting against Yamamotos will in this question.

Well, the Japanese would have lost the war anyways.

[U-533]

They wanted to lose...

They were already stretched to the limits of resources and the only honorable way out was to attack a country that would come in and rebuild their country and modernize as they went.

seems like the best way to go... send all males who can fight to die ...thus thinning an already overburdened population... but you have to make it look like your doing it for prosperity in the eyes of your people other wise you will lose your face...

:sunny:

[CCIP]

...now, U-533, I don't think the Japanese were THAT insane :o And knowing them, they certainly would NOT culturally favour either losing or 'bringing in someone else' to do work in their country. No sir, I think you've really no idea how Japanese nationalism worked/works :dead:

Yamamoto, of course, was among those who knew they had no chance, but that was far from the general attitude of their leadership. In retrospect, a more effective execution of the Pearl attack and other early actions, and a lack of blunders committed somewhat later down the road, could really put the US in a much more precarious position.

Whether the Japanese had a chance is an open question, but I would say that in december 1941, they could have turned the pacific campaign decidedly in their favour and achieved their initial goals. The real question is whether the US would have accepted peace terms after that; I don't think they would, myself. But that would have made the war much more difficult and prolonged, and could have had some fairly consequential effects on WWII in general.

[GlobalExplorer]

The Japanese always tried to adhere to overcomplicated plans, plans that required everything to happen exactly as the planned, and they were not very well in reacting to new situations. So in a way, their leadership was lacking, and that accelerated their defeat.

[CCIP]

The Japanese always tried to adhere to overcomplicated plans, plans that required everything to happen exactly as the planned, and they were not very well in reacting to new situations. So in a way, their leadership was lacking, and that accelerated their defeat.

Agreed. They lacked a pragmatic doctrine all over, and that really messed up many of their opportunities at the end. That wasn't the only case where, for no reason other than sticking to plan or being overly cautious, they didn't push their attack beyond an initial success and let their initiative just slip.

[GlobalExplorer]

...now, U-533, I don't think the Japanese were THAT insane :o And knowing them, they certainly would NOT culturally favour either losing or 'bringing in someone else' to do work in their country. No sir, I think you've really no idea how Japanese nationalism worked/works :dead:

Yamamoto, of course, was among those who knew they had no chance, but that was far from the general attitude of their leadership. In retrospect, a more effective execution of the Pearl attack and other early actions, and a lack of blunders committed somewhat later down the road, could really put the US in a much more precarious position.

Whether the Japanese had a chance is an open question, but I would say that in december 1941, they could have turned the pacific campaign decidedly in their favour and achieved their initial goals. The real question is whether the US would have accepted peace terms after that; I don't think they would, myself. But that would have made the war much more difficult and prolonged, and could have had some fairly consequential effects on WWII in general.

The Japanese knew that they could not defeat the US, but they felt the situation would be even worse if they lost any more time. The whole plan was resting on the hope that Germany would defeat Great Britain and Russia, and leave the possiblity of the US forced into some sort of peace treaty.

The timing of the attack was a disaster for Japan. By concidence, in December 1941, German military succeses had also reached their peak, as the russians counterattacked before Moscow. A couple of months later, Japan would not have entered the war any more because it would have been a sure defeat.

[Takeda Shingen]

Also, remember that it was the battleship, not the carrier, that was the centerpiece of the naval group. The carrier-sponsored turkey shoot that was Midway changed the thinking of most of the worlds navies, and changed the concept of the battle group, evolving into what it is today.

In short, carriers were just not that important to the world's naval leaders in December of 1941.

[CCIP]

Yea, good point.

One often wonders, though, why Japan refused to attack the USSR. They could have really messed up the situation in Europe had they gone for Siberia then...

[GlobalExplorer]

The Japanese mentality contributed a lot to ther defeat. A good example is how the lack of armour on their fighters (because they believed anything but a 100% offensive weapon was disgraceful) and their reluctance to rescue "dishonored" pilots from the sea cost them the air war, because there were plenty of modern aircraft at the end, but no more experienced pilots who could fly them.

[GlobalExplorer]

Yea, good point.

One often wonders, though, why Japan refused to attack the USSR. They could have really messed up the situation in Europe had they gone for Siberia then...

I think that they had decided on that question several years earlier, that it was in their best interest to stick to a doctrine to pacify Russia and concentrate on Asia.

For sure an attack on Russia would have played into Hitlers hands, but I am not sure that the Japanese Army would have been able to make any impact on Russia as the Navy could against the US. Just look at Russian and Japanese tanks of the era to see what I mean.

[Ostfriese]

Yea, good point.

One often wonders, though, why Japan refused to attack the USSR. They could have really messed up the situation in Europe had they gone for Siberia then...

Battle of Lake Khasan (1938), Battle of Khalkin Gol (1939), Russian-Japanese Neutrality Pact...

[CCIP]

Yea, good point.

One often wonders, though, why Japan refused to attack the USSR. They could have really messed up the situation in Europe had they gone for Siberia then...
I think that they had decided on that question several years earlier, that it was in their best interest to stick to a doctrine to pacify Russia and concentrate on Asia.

For sure an attack on Russia would have played into Hitlers hands, but I am not sure that the Japanese Army would have been able to make any impact on Russia as the Navy could against the US. Just look at Russian and Japanese tanks of the era to see what I mean.
Yea, the 'doctrine' thing again. Khalkin Gol must have made up their mind.

Certainly a direct confrontation with the main Russian forces would not play into their favour, you're right about the tanks and in general, the Soviets were far superior at modern, mobile warfare compared to the Japanese. In late 1941, on the other hand (and again in mid-1942), the Soviets were hanging on by their teeth against the German advance, and having to divert any amount of frontline forces to Siberia could have seriously damaged their defense; otherwise, the Japanese would have an open road into Siberia and the indistrial centres there...


Battle of Lake Khasan (1938), Battle of Khalkin Gol (1939), Russian-Japanese Neutrality Pact...
Pacts never stopped anyone :p
You're right about the battles though.

[Ostfriese]

I think that they had decided on that question several years earlier, that it was in their best interest to stick to a doctrine to pacify Russia and concentrate on Asia.

No. They seriously considered breaking the neutrality pact in 1941, when Hitler assaulted the USSR, but decided not to, because they had already lost the two major border fights with the soviets (Lake Khasan, Khalkin Gol).

For sure an attack on Russia would have played into Hitlers hands, but I am not sure that the Japanese Army would have been able to make any impact on Russia as the Navy could against the US. Just look at Russian and Japanese tanks of the era to see what I mean.

East Asia doesn't offer much suitable terrain for tanks. Lots of mountains, hills and other natural obstacles.

[joea]

East Asia doesn't offer much suitable terrain for tanks. Lots of mountains, hills and other natural obstacles.

Didn't seem to bother the Red Army in Manchuria in August 1945. :hmm:

[Sailor Steve]

Eh, it's even more of a mystery why they left after one day of attacks, when they had every opportunity to conduct several attacks over several days and completely devastate everything that was at Pearl, knocking out all the capital ships there for good. But they left.
Not a mystery at all, in either case. Nagumo said himself that he knew the American subs would be looking for their fleet, now that they knew they were there. He cancelled orders for a third attack and headed home.

As simple as that.

[Ostfriese]

East Asia doesn't offer much suitable terrain for tanks. Lots of mountains, hills and other natural obstacles.
Didn't seem to bother the Red Army in Manchuria in August 1945. :hmm:

It did, they took the long way through the Mongolian desert and did three amphibious landings: Korea, Sakhalin, Kuril Islands. They basically did a giant pincer cutting of Manchuko.

[CCIP]

Eh, it's even more of a mystery why they left after one day of attacks, when they had every opportunity to conduct several attacks over several days and completely devastate everything that was at Pearl, knocking out all the capital ships there for good. But they left. Not a mystery at all, in either case. Nagumo said himself that he knew the American subs would be looking for their fleet, now that they knew they were there. He cancelled orders for a third attack and headed home.

As simple as that.

I was under the impression that given the fleet's position and the limited readiness of subs, they still had time and the risk was comparatively low. I don't doubt this was a real factor, though!

[Camaero]

The Japanese mentality contributed a lot to ther defeat. A good example is how the lack of armour on their fighters (because they believed anything but a 100% offensive weapon was disgraceful) and their reluctance to rescue "dishonored" pilots from the sea cost them the air war, because there were plenty of modern aircraft at the end, but no more experienced pilots who could fly them.

Not to mention most of them didn't wear parachutes.

If you were Japan in 1941 and the Nazis were smashing up everything that was in their path you would probably feel pretty good about the outlook of things even if you did leave just two little carriers.

Look how much the japs tore it up in the months to come as well. It looked like the axis were unstoppable. Those were very dark times!

[Sailor Steve]

Eh, it's even more of a mystery why they left after one day of attacks, when they had every opportunity to conduct several attacks over several days and completely devastate everything that was at Pearl, knocking out all the capital ships there for good. But they left. Not a mystery at all, in either case. Nagumo said himself that he knew the American subs would be looking for their fleet, now that they knew they were there. He cancelled orders for a third attack and headed home.

As simple as that.

I was under the impression that given the fleet's position and the limited readiness of subs, they still had time and the risk was comparatively low. I don't doubt this was a real factor, though!
I'm sure you're right. Nagumo, however, was convinced otherwise. It's funny to suggest a movie as a historical reference, but Tora! Tora! Tora! really shows how it was in that respect...and most others. I recommend it for a great overview (and great experience).

[August]

Not a mystery at all, in either case. Nagumo said himself that he knew the American subs would be looking for their fleet, now that they knew they were there. He cancelled orders for a third attack and headed home.

As simple as that.

Well there was also the threat of land based heavy bombers not to mention planes from the American carriers.

Bottom line the Japanese fleet was way out on a limb. They had made a successful attack yes but that would have been worthless if they had lost the carrier group in the process.

[TLAM Strike]

Wasn't the Japanese strike force running low on fuel after the attack? Sailor Steve has the right idea, the Japanese knew that if one of our subs nailed one of the tankers trailing the fleet they would have been in trouble. The fleet would have been required to slow and wait for tankers from Japan or maybe Truk to RV and replenish them leaving the fleet open for attack by anything that survived the attack.

[Heibges]

It seems part of the general pattern of Banzai Charges when the should be playing smart defense, and retreating when they should have persevered.

[Ishmael]

IMHO it was a flawed Japanese foreign policy that doomed them from the start. The rise of the militarists & the change of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere from an economic relationship based on indepedence for Asian nations from colonial rule to a military-based absorption into the Japnese Empire was the fatal flaw. Many forget that, after the Meiji restoration & World War I, Japan was a symbol throughout Asia that Asian people and industry was equal to anything in Europe or the Americas. While Japan used independence movements to some degree to achieve their aims, it was the brutal nature of military occupation & rule that turned the rest of Asia against them.

Colonialism was slowly dying and independence movemements were formed throughout Asia in the inter-war period. Had Japan embraced those movements & worked to form economic alliances with them, They would have been seen as liberators from colonialism and reaped the economic benefits of that policy. Even if they had been serious about setting up independent governments in the territories they occupied They still might have been able to keep much of their early war gains.

I believe that it was the inflexible attitude of the militarists along with an inflated sense of their own superiority that doomed the Japanese war plans from their inception.

[CCIP]

I believe that it was the inflexible attitude of the militarists along with an inflated sense of their own superiority that doomed the Japanese war plans from their inception.

It's true of all of the axis, actually :yep:

[SUBMAN1]

I think this thread pretty much sums it up, and I thank you for your comments. Risking a couple ships to me to return fire is a pretty bad excuse to go home, but so be it if that is the real reason.

-S

[Platapus]

I always wondered why the Japanese did not bomb the fuel storage facilities or the repair facilities

[August]

Risking a couple ships to me to return fire is a pretty bad excuse to go home

It wasn't just a couple of ships, it was their carrier fleet. BIG difference.

[TLAM Strike]

I believe that it was the inflexible attitude of the militarists along with an inflated sense of their own superiority that doomed the Japanese war plans from their inception.

It's true of all of the axis, actually :yep: And most of the Allies too... ;)

[AntEater]

You have to keep in mind not what actually was there, but what Nagumo knew.
He had no reason to suspect that the worst he might have gotten from US Subs would have been a spectacular show of prematuring torpedoes.
Also, he did not certainly know he was NOT detected. He had no idea about what US carrier planes could do (or at the time, better could not do).
In hindsight, there was nothing capable of seriously damaging the Kido Butai there, not even the US carrier groups.
Except for a Midway-like suprise attack by SBDs (half the number, without self sealing tanks and fogging gunsights) it is hard to imagine any threat to Nagumo.
However, Nagumo did not know this. Even with the usual japanese arrogance, he had to assume that his enemy was at least capable of hurting him.
Also, he was surely running low on fuel and had to withdraw towards his oilers anyway, and given that RAS was still a new science to the IJN, he preferred to do it while not engaged. The Kido Butai was every real carrier Japan had (its hard to imagine the Darwin or Ceylon attacks conducted by Ryujo, Zuiho and Hosho and such). There would be no replacements for them until at least 1943, and his first priority was to preserve these ships, even hurting the enemy only came second.


In a way, Nagumo's decision to withdraw after the second wave is comparable to Fletchers decision to withdraw after the Landing on Guadalcanal. Or Jellicoes decision not to pursue at Skagerrak.
In hindsight, these decisions appear too cautious, but the respective Admirals had no perfect picture of the situation and a heavy burden of responsibility.