WWII - Uboat Threat Factor

[Stoli]

I just checked out the Uboat Fates section on uboat.net.

After reading the fates of Uboats during WWII, it seems that most Uboats only sank a couple of ships (if any) during thier careers. Is this an accurate history of the Uboats in WWII? Where the Uboats accomplishing thier goals of interupting shipping in the Atlantic?

[spork542]

Yes, this would be an accurate history. Most of the boats sank very little to nothing. They did not accomplish their goals, probably owing to not enough boats available at sea for convoy attacks.

[Heibges]

Doenitz evaluated Uboat performance based on the ratio of tons/day at sea.

He wasn't so much worried about the sinkings of a single uboat, but the performance of the Ubootwaffe as a whole.

This is like the way www.82games.com (http://www.82games.com) evaluates basketball teams. Not based on a single players stats, but stats on how a particular group of 5 players performs together. Eric Dampier is the perfect example of this. His last year with the Warriors he was averaging over 30 points per game. But when he was on the floor, overall team scoring was down.

At the beginning of the war, Doenitz estimated he would need 300 submarines to starve out the British. But by the time he got 300, he needed 900.

[P_Funk]

At the beginning of the war, Doenitz estimated he would need 300 submarines to starve out the British. But by the time he got 300, he needed 900.
I also read that the Ubootswaffe estimated that they would need to average something over 700 000 tons per month to starve out England. Now I think that there was only a 3 or 4 month period when they even came close. So in reality, despite the appearance of a threat, England won just by not losing in the first few years.

[robbo180265]

At the beginning of the war, Doenitz estimated he would need 300 submarines to starve out the British. But by the time he got 300, he needed 900.
I also read that the Ubootswaffe estimated that they would need to average something over 700 000 tons per month to starve out England. Now I think that there was only a 3 or 4 month period when they even came close. So in reality, despite the appearance of a threat, England won just by not losing in the first few years.

I'd like to add that air superiority must have been a large factor too;)

[P_Funk]

I'd like to add that air superiority must have been a large factor too;)
Just look at the number of sunk u-boats in Biscay. That'll tell you all you need to know.:yep:

[sandbag69]

The main purpose of U-Boats should not have been to just clock up Tonnage but to cut off the supply lines to Britain. Thsi was never done. Throw a U-Boat cordon around the Western Approaches and you win the war. The Royal Navy took years to gain the necessary experience to combat the U-Boat.

Only 2% of ships in Convoy were sunk. 98% got through and delivered the cargos.

It wasn't all Donitz fault. The Luftwaffe chose to bomb London when it shoudl have concentrated on the British Docks and shipyards.

The bottom line is the Germans and Japs don't know how to win wars. :rotfl:

[Brag]

Doenitz evaluated Uboat performance based on the ratio of tons/day at sea.

He wasn't so much worried about the sinkings of a single uboat, but the performance of the Ubootwaffe as a whole.

This is like the way www.82games.com (http://www.82games.com) evaluates basketball teams. Not based on a single players stats, but stats on how a particular group of 5 players performs together. Eric Dampier is the perfect example of this. His last year with the Warriors he was averaging over 30 points per game. But when he was on the floor, overall team scoring was down.

At the beginning of the war, Doenitz estimated he would need 300 submarines to starve out the British. But by the time he got 300, he needed 900.

Doenitz had only 18 type VII boats at the beginning of the war.
As the number of boats grew, experienced officers and crew became in short supply.

We have now, even as beginner U boat commanders, a lot more information on what worked and what didn't than the original U boat Kaleuns had. And of course nothing was learned from a boat that didn't return.

[robbo180265]

@ Brag numbers of UBoats at the start of the war seems to be a big factor. Nearly every book I've read on the subject say as much.

Technology is a big factor too, seems to me that the German UBoats were always re-acting rather than acting - if you know what I mean.

[Foghladh_mhara]

Tradition kind of weighed against the Germans as well. Britain is an island that depended solely on her sea routes to maintain her empire and her day to day needs whereas Germany was a continental power with a small coastline but with land access to a vast area and a relatively small overseas Empire. The German High Seas Fleet of WW1 was only a pale reflection of the Royal Navy because it really had no purpose other than 'They have one we will have one too.' The respective priorities were always at odds with each other. That carried on to the next bash. The German Army and the Luftwaffe were always gonna get priority because they were the offensive and defensive elements. The Kriegsmarine were only spoilers that kept the RN occupied

[TarJak]

The bottom line is the Germans and Japs don't know how to win wars. :rotfl:

I don't think it's just them. If you look at the countries that started major wars throughout history, they also came second in those wars.

[firouz]

Later in the war the Uboats became a pawn in the bigger game. It says alot for the morale of the service that they continued to recruit and go out to a likely death, just to tie down Allied resources. The hope was that the sacrifice would create enough time to get the new generation of Uboats into action, that of course would sweep the seas :roll:
I wonder how much the poor success rate of the boats reflected this reality rather than lower calibre commanders/crew. By 1944 Prien and his kind would have struggled too. In fact the Aces didn't make it to '44.