Abraham
01-06-07, 03:11 PM
"Triumph and Tragedy" is the title of the last part of Winston Churchill's 6 book series on the Second World War. He describes that in victory there's never just triumph, but always tragedy as well, even on the side of the conquerors...
This title struck my mind when I saw Pres. George Bush on TV declairing to finish the final consultations of his new Iraq policy and heard the reaction from opposition forces.
And it strikes me over and over again that the Americans feel so desperate over the Iraqi war - or 'situation' may be a better description. To generalise; it seems that Americans expect a war to be won - which happened - and then there's a big party with parades and flags et voilá; - just like a wedding day - 'happy ever after in the marketplace'.
But surrender isn't much more than the militairy suppression of resistance. Conflicts don't end with waving a white flag or signing an Instrument of Surrender.
It's thén that the hard work starts, building bridges between former enemies. This can take many years. History teaches us that often low intensity conflicts flare up in conquered or 'liberated' territory.
The problem in unstable regions like the Balkan and - parts of - the Middle East is that the concept of souvereign nations is weak. States in the Middle East often have borders that are not much more than straight lines drawn by former colonial powers. The inhabitants of such nations iareusually made up by tribesmen or ethnic mirorities that have a long history of feudal rule and violent animosity between themselves. Such states almost need strong - if not dictatorial - rulers to keep them more or less stable.
'Liberating' such countries is practically impossible. Regime change, like the death of Tito or the removal of Saddam Hussein, leads to internal weakness and consequently to internal power struggles, often resulting in civil wars along tribal ethnic lines.
Only after such a struggle is settled the country can try to stabilise again, which it finally will. This is because war leads to national poverty as even the most bitter insurgent will one day find out, given the general growth of the world economy.
Therefor an internal power struggle should be allowed the burn out in a 'controlled' way, how sad this might be. There is hardly another option. Separations of regions and reshaping of borders should be allowed. The fixation on the absolute immunity of borders in international law, especially those that are not determined by natural geographical and/or historical features, should be a thing of the past.
Of course many US policymakers know that wining the war is sometimes easier than winning the peace.
The tragedy is that the US public was getting prepared for fighting a war against a tyrant, but was not getting prepared for the bloody aftermath of winning that war. Ultimately the highest policy maker, the President of the United States, is to blame for spreading only half the message.
The tragedy is also that although there were legitimate reasons for a regime change in my opinion, the seemingly more convincing but not thoroughly checked (i.e. the wrong) reasons were presented as most important to win the US public over for this war.
That was the first step that later created doubt and let to the crumble of bipartisan support for the war and its aftermath.
But does that mean that the war is a total loss?
Far from that.
A regional military power was utterly crushed by relatively small US & Coalition forces in just three weeks, which sends a clear message to rogue states.
From the point of view of reactionairy regimes the fact that after the regime change the country turned into a mess is hardly any consolation, given that they might be the next regime to be changed...
Nevertheless, the positive influence of this point is severely diminished by some US political and military decisions that gave relatively small forces of Al Qaida the opportunity to turn Iraq into the battlefield of the US War against Terrorism.
Al Qaida can never win that war, but the US might loose it! That would mean a political victory for Al Qaida with far reaching consequences for both Muslim extremism and the US foreign policy.
My personal opinion is that in the end this war and regime change were necessairy for Iraq to start a new chapter in its history. I'm pretty sure that otherwise one of the sons of Saddam might have been his successor and the misery of the Iraqi people would continue for another generation.
Iraq is too much of a state, too important for the world economy and has too much potential to whither away im a puddle of misery. Ten or fifteen years from now Iraq - may it be in a different shape - will be part of the world community.
It is to the Iraqi people to decide what kind of Iraq that will be.
At least they'll have a choise...
This title struck my mind when I saw Pres. George Bush on TV declairing to finish the final consultations of his new Iraq policy and heard the reaction from opposition forces.
And it strikes me over and over again that the Americans feel so desperate over the Iraqi war - or 'situation' may be a better description. To generalise; it seems that Americans expect a war to be won - which happened - and then there's a big party with parades and flags et voilá; - just like a wedding day - 'happy ever after in the marketplace'.
But surrender isn't much more than the militairy suppression of resistance. Conflicts don't end with waving a white flag or signing an Instrument of Surrender.
It's thén that the hard work starts, building bridges between former enemies. This can take many years. History teaches us that often low intensity conflicts flare up in conquered or 'liberated' territory.
The problem in unstable regions like the Balkan and - parts of - the Middle East is that the concept of souvereign nations is weak. States in the Middle East often have borders that are not much more than straight lines drawn by former colonial powers. The inhabitants of such nations iareusually made up by tribesmen or ethnic mirorities that have a long history of feudal rule and violent animosity between themselves. Such states almost need strong - if not dictatorial - rulers to keep them more or less stable.
'Liberating' such countries is practically impossible. Regime change, like the death of Tito or the removal of Saddam Hussein, leads to internal weakness and consequently to internal power struggles, often resulting in civil wars along tribal ethnic lines.
Only after such a struggle is settled the country can try to stabilise again, which it finally will. This is because war leads to national poverty as even the most bitter insurgent will one day find out, given the general growth of the world economy.
Therefor an internal power struggle should be allowed the burn out in a 'controlled' way, how sad this might be. There is hardly another option. Separations of regions and reshaping of borders should be allowed. The fixation on the absolute immunity of borders in international law, especially those that are not determined by natural geographical and/or historical features, should be a thing of the past.
Of course many US policymakers know that wining the war is sometimes easier than winning the peace.
The tragedy is that the US public was getting prepared for fighting a war against a tyrant, but was not getting prepared for the bloody aftermath of winning that war. Ultimately the highest policy maker, the President of the United States, is to blame for spreading only half the message.
The tragedy is also that although there were legitimate reasons for a regime change in my opinion, the seemingly more convincing but not thoroughly checked (i.e. the wrong) reasons were presented as most important to win the US public over for this war.
That was the first step that later created doubt and let to the crumble of bipartisan support for the war and its aftermath.
But does that mean that the war is a total loss?
Far from that.
A regional military power was utterly crushed by relatively small US & Coalition forces in just three weeks, which sends a clear message to rogue states.
From the point of view of reactionairy regimes the fact that after the regime change the country turned into a mess is hardly any consolation, given that they might be the next regime to be changed...
Nevertheless, the positive influence of this point is severely diminished by some US political and military decisions that gave relatively small forces of Al Qaida the opportunity to turn Iraq into the battlefield of the US War against Terrorism.
Al Qaida can never win that war, but the US might loose it! That would mean a political victory for Al Qaida with far reaching consequences for both Muslim extremism and the US foreign policy.
My personal opinion is that in the end this war and regime change were necessairy for Iraq to start a new chapter in its history. I'm pretty sure that otherwise one of the sons of Saddam might have been his successor and the misery of the Iraqi people would continue for another generation.
Iraq is too much of a state, too important for the world economy and has too much potential to whither away im a puddle of misery. Ten or fifteen years from now Iraq - may it be in a different shape - will be part of the world community.
It is to the Iraqi people to decide what kind of Iraq that will be.
At least they'll have a choise...