| SUBSIM Review |
Five Colors of Time 100 years of submarine design in Russia |
Many science fiction writers tried to visualize the 21st century. Quite recently, the 20th century contemporaries wondered what the future will be like and what color history will paint it. The much-awaited century has begun. What does it hold in store for Russians? Perhaps, only prophets can answer this question and in a very general way at that. Submarine designers are concerned over specifics: what submarines should the Russian Navy have in the new century? What capabilities should they have? What problems must be solved for submarines to meet the challenges of the times?
Many science fiction writers tried to visualize the 21st century. Quite recently, the 20th century contemporaries wondered what the future will be like and what color history will paint it. The much-awaited century has begun. What does it hold in store for Russians? Perhaps, only prophets can answer this question and in a very general way at that. Submarine designers are concerned over specifics: what submarines should the Russian Navy have in the new century? What capabilities should they have? What problems must be solved for submarines to meet the challenges of the times? The questions are not as easy as they seem to be: to answer them, we must analyze the whole history of submarine design in Russia, which marked a centennial on January 4, 2001. Exactly 100 years ago, the Russian government set up a special commission for designing submarines, supervising their construction and testing them. That commission was a precursor to the Rubin Design Bureau, an acknowledged leader in designing submarines for the Russian Navy. Looking back at submarine design in Russia, we inevitably encounter the problem of its history periodization. But how can one fit the continuous flow of design thought into a formal framework and divide it into periods? One could attempt division using the dates of appearance of «landmark» vessels, but again, what should be considered the birth of a vessel - laying-down, launching or flag-hoisting? Another point is that the ideas incorporated in a vessel design were nurtured long before it was built. Also, what submarines will qualify for landmarks? Those boasting every possible innovation? Such submarines, if they were actually built, only brought more problems to the crews. Or submarines featuring reasonable conservatism in design and a balanced combination of innovations and time-tested technologies? Such ships have been the backbone of the Russian submarine fleet, but few, if any, were described as «landmarks.»
Of course, any attempt to periodize history is fairly conventional and lacks mathematical precision. People often periodize history relying on their emotions rather than mind, and visualize it in various colors. To me, the century of sub design in Russia is painted five different colors, each designating a certain historic period. The present article divides submarine design in Russia into the following periods: - white period (1901-1925): design and building of the first domestic combatant submarines; development of theoretical groundwork for submarine design; - red period (1925-1945): design and building of Soviet submarines that fought in World War II; - blue period (1945-1955): design and building of ocean-going submarines; - golden period (1955-1990): design and building of nuclear-powered submarines, development of sea-launched missiles, design and building of strategic submarines; - gray period (1990-2000): design and building of submarines in the years of political and economic crises in Russia. The five stages cover 100 years of sub design in Russia. Now a new stage is beginning. I am not sure yet what color it will be, but it will apparently be bright and rich. Before proceeding to historical facts and their analysis, I would like to make several notes. First, Russia is an acknowledged sea power, not just because of its geographical location and the length of its sea borders, but also because of its seafaring interests, such as maritime trade, fishing, and extraction of mineral resources in offshore zones. To understand the significance of Russia’s maritime interests, it is sufficient to imagine the situation in which it will find itself if it loses access to the sea. It was acces to the sea that made Russia one of the world powers. This factor was far more important than the size of its territory and population and remains equally significant at present. Russia’s integration into the global economic system is impossible without free shipping. Free navigation is not only a moral concept but also an economic notion. The way to this freedom is a strong navy. Russian politicians, from Peter the Great onwards, were well aware of that. Now this axiom has been rediscovered by politicians of the latest generation.
These considerations show that the destinies of the fleet and the country are inseparable. But what is a modern fleet and what role do submarines play in it? Sub crews often say, «Submarines can accomplish almost everything, except for showing the national colors.» Indeed, modern submarines accomplish a range of combat missions – from tactical to strategic ones, while their concealment – the impossibility to parade the national flag at foreign shores – is a weapon having a stronger political effect than an open show of force. It is therefore logical to assume that submarines have been and will remain the most important element of an evenly balanced navy. Next, submarines have always been among the most sophisticated products. Only well-developed states could afford submarine designing, and the number of submarine developing countries is still limited. It slightly exceeds ten, whereas just five countries possess the technologies for designing nuclear-powered submarines (Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China). The ability to engage in submarine design does not only show a country’s technological level, but also indicates its potential. A submarine can be compared to a locomotive engine pulling the development of the most advanced technologies. So the government must provide conditions for this locomotive not to pull empties, i.e. underwater technologies should be introduced in other spheres too, not necessarily related to the sea. Political and technological aspects were decisive in the evolution of Russian submarines. The national maritime policy set objectives to the navy, the navy formulated its requirements for the industry, while researchers, submarine designers and builders and equipment suppliers developed the required technologies. This process underlies every submarine project. Perhaps, it was not obvious to all parties involved in the designing – a majority just did their jobs well, making drawings, doing calculations, working out manuals or methods, and attending sea tests. But all contributed to the national school of submarine design and enriched its theory and practice. Over the 100 years, this school has trained thousands of people, and presently it involves fourth- and fifth generation specialists. All of them have contributed to designing submarines for the Russian Navy. They all deserve praise – those who pioneered submarine design in Russia, people who designed World War II subs, designers of nuclear missile submarines and developers of future projects. White period (1901-1925) Professional submarine design in Russia dates from the establishment of a Construction Commission which included senior assistant shipbuilder I. Bubnov, assistant to senior mechanical engineer I. Goryunov and electrical engineer Lieutenant M. Beklemishev. Of course, it does not mean that there had been no attempts to build underwater craft in Russia before 1901. Russian archives keep a tremendous amount of records of such attempts made continuously from the early 18th century. Those were experiments by enthusiasts of underwater navigation who lacked deep understanding of basic principles of ship design. The state did not display much interest in their attempts which were not systematic and which failed in most cases. It was only by the beginning of the 20th century that the necessary conditions appeared for professional submarine design in Russia. From that time onward the development of such vessels became consistent. The white period was the time when submarines were learning to sail as submarine designers did everything from scratch. In heraldry, white means «purity of thought,» and Russian designers, who were quite enthusiastic about the new work, devoted their lives to it. That was a period of intensive searches for an optimum submarine architecture. Russian designers worked out a unique architectural type of a submarine - a single hull with a buoyancy reserve concentrated in the main ballast tanks located at the ends. This design became internationally known as «the Russian type.» Dolphin, the first Russian-type submarine, was designed by the Underwater Navigation Department and built at the Baltic Shipyard. Actually, that was an experimental vessel which demonstrated the feasibility of developing underwater ships in Russia. Building on the Dolphin experience, the designers set themselves a greater task - developing a submarine for series production. That was a very bold plan as the combat characteristics of a new submarine were to significantly excel Dolphin’s. The six Kasatka-class vessels built at the Baltic Shipyard had a better dived speed, sea-keeping, range and weaponry. Improvement of Kasatka’s tactical and technical characteristics that gave it an edge over Dolphin inevitably caused an increase in displacement. The designers discovered a relationship between displacement and combat characteristics, which would later be repeatedly confirmed in practice. They also stepped up efforts to improve submarines’ surface sailing qualities. At that time, submarines could submerge for a rather short period of time in certain combat situations. Most of the time, they remained afloat, which made them similar to surface ships. The first submarines in the Russian Navy were listed as destroyers. Working on a combat submarine project, designers sought to give its hull the shape of a destroyer: a pointed forward end, a distinguished stem line, a length-to-beam ratio of about 9, and a well-developed superstructure with a flat deck. The conning tower, primarily intended for convenient surface sailing, also made a submarine look like a surface ship. I. Bubnov, who designed Kasatka-class submarines, initially put the conning tower closer to the bow, together with the bridge and helm, but that resulted in a trim by the stern when submerging. To balance the tower buoyancy, a float was installed at the stern of the first submarine, but later the designers gave up this idea and moved the tower closer to midship instead. That was an optimal solution used in all subsequent designs. Dolphin had three pairs of horizontal planes - bow, midship and after planes. However, as Dolphin’s tests showed, the midship planes turned out excessive and therefore not installed on Kasatka-class vessels. Russian designers were gaining experience fast. For example, the first Russian submarines, Dolphin and Kasatka, had pressure hulls which comprised frames and outer longitudinal reinforcing stiffeners. The stiffeners were joined with larch boards plated with galvanized tin. The wooden planking was believed to protect the submarine from a close mine explosion or impact on the ground. However, hull planking was given up after the first trial blasts, and frames remained the only means of reinforcing pressure hulls. Surface-run motors turned out a real headache for designers. The first submarines had unsafe petrol engines - the Dolphin which was shipped to the Far East, sank right at the base in an accident caused by ignition of petrol vapors. An alternative kerosene motor was more fire- and explosion proof, but it featured a small specific power and low reliability. Due to the insufficient power of surface-run motors, Russian submarines were unable to fully use their excellent sea-going abilities. The situation changed for the better with the appearance of diesel engines which were far more suitable for underwater craft. Minoga was the first Russian submarine equipped with a diesel engine. All subsequent domestic submarines were powered by this type of engines. Weaponry posed one more problem for submarine designers. What kind of armaments should a submarine have and where should they be placed? Russian submarine designers were the first in the world to realize the necessity of a powerful torpedo salvo. As regards observation equipment, an early 20th century submarine was very imperfect. In sailing at periscope depth, the commander was unable to determine the exact distance to a target and motion parameters, due to primitive equipment, so he needed to fire a salvo to hit the target. In addition, the first torpedoes were not reliable enough - some of them failed to reach the target. These considerations probably prompted Russian designers to install lattice torpedo launchers of the Dzhevetsky and Dzhevetsky-Podgorny systems. The number of lattice torpedo launchers steadily increased from project to project. The Dolphin-class vessels had two, Kasatka and Akula - six, and Morzh, Bars and Lebed - eight. Salvo power increased together with ammunition load. All these factors enhanced submarines’ combat effectiveness, but only theoretically, as keeping torpedoes in sea water (the design of lattice torpedo launchers envisioned their installation only outside the pressure hull) made them less reliable. An obvious solution to this problem was to use torpedo tubes. Originally, they were added to lattice torpedo launchers, and then completely replaced them. Submarine-based minelaying systems developed fast too. Krab, the world’s first minelaying submarine, was designed by railroad technician M. Nalyotov, an oustanding Russian submarine designer. An underwater navigation enthusiast and a talented person, Nalyotov was not a professional shipbuilder, but his contribution to domestic submarine design is difficult to overestimate. His Krab submarine had a tremendous influence on the development of Russian minelaying submarines. Nalyotov’s arrangement of mine ammunition on a submarine was approved by designer Bubnov and used in the Yorsh and Forel submarines. These were but a few challenges that the first Russian submarine designers had to meet. They had to think about crew accommodation, maintenance of a normal gas content of the air inside a submarine, and crew and damage control. The first Russian submarine designers laid a firm foundation for the domestic design school, which was further developed. On March 11, 1906, the Russian Navy received a new type of vessels for service – the first seven submarines. On December 19, 1995, to mark the event, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy established Submariner’s Day, observed every March 19. Red period (1925-1945) This period dates from the Soviet government’s decision on submarine design and construction. In December 1926, the Labor and Defense Council approved a six-year program for building up the Navy, which provided for building new vessels, including 12 submarines. Political and economic changes in Russia boosted the role of the Navy in general and submarines in particular in the national defense system. Technological progress and the new conditions encouraged Soviet submarine designers to revise tsarist Russia’s naval engineers’ heritage. Perhaps, red is the best color for this truly revolutionary period. In heraldry, red is a symbol of courage - indeed, submarine designers of those times needed much courage to follow imperial canons or, vice versa, reject them in the atmosphere of excessive suspicion on the part federal and local authorities. Submarine architecture was the first to undergo revision. Bubnov’s Russian-type design (a single-hull submarine without transverse bulkheads) was rejected completely. New vessels (except for small displacement submarines) incorporated double-hull or side-tanks architecture intended to ensure their unsinkability if part of the pressure hull was flooded. Transverse bulkheads that divided the pressure hull into compartments provided for surface unsinkability, significantly increased survivability, and protected crew in a damaged submarine lying on the sea bottom at critical depth. Looking for a new submarine design for the Soviet Navy, designers analyzed the previous Russian experience, as well as foreign submarine projects. Open to progress and creative thinking, they summed up domestic and international experience and formed a solid basis for developing submarines that rivaled or even excelled foreign vessels. Like "white period" designers, the designers of the 1920s and 1930s, when they developed a good submarine, sought to further improve it. This trait of the Russian design school manifested itself most graphically in the creation of the "evolutionary chain" of the Morzh-Bars-Lebed submarines designed under Bubnov's guidance, and of the Leninets-class (II, XI, XIII, XIII-bis series) and Shchuka-class (III, V, V-bis, V-bis-2, X and X-bis series) submarines. This "evolutionary" approach was widely used in later periods too. Russian designers also borrowed from international experience. Already in developing submarines of the 1st series, they studied Italian, British and German submarines. In building the 2nd series, Russia extensively used Britain's experience in building its L-55 submarine. Also, Russian designers derived much benefit from cooperation with German colleagues (submarines of the IX and XI-bis series). The navy assigned a broad range of missions to submarines, which required a large number of submarine types and was among the decisive factors that shaped the Russian design school. Even in Bubnov’s time, submarines were classed into large (Akula, Morzh and Bars) and small submarines (Minoga) and underwater mine-layers (Krab and Yorsh). More classes appeared in the Soviet period – medium-size (Shchuka and S-class), fleet (Pravda-class) and cruiser (K-class) submarines. A large number of submarine classes provided for effective combat missions but made their operation more complicated. On the other hand, from the point of design school development, it was a positive factor as it provided designers with invaluable experience. In developing different types of submarines, the designers exchanged ideas, concepts and technical solutions. The best of them were incorporated in subsequent projects. This factor became especially significant after World War II, when the range of submarine missions became very broad. «Red period» submarines underwent rigorous trials in WWII battles and inflicted a considerable damage to the enemy. According to official statistics, confirmed by foreign sources, Soviet submarines sank 157 enemy transport vessels with an aggregate tonnage of 460,000 register tons, and destroyed 33 ships and auxiliary vessels of Nazi Germany and its allies. Blue period (1945-1955) The end of World War II dramatically changed the world, and the balance of naval forces in particular. The ocean actually went over the control of the United States and the United Kingdom which had maintained and strengthened their positions on the sea. The losers – Germany and Japan – fell out from the group of great sea powers for years. In the new conditions, the USSR’s navy, and navies of other countries, began to look for a new place in the national defense system. It was also necessary to determine the navy’s role and place with regard to military-political blocs. New military doctrines emerged, followed by new strategies and tactics of using navies in a war. The specific military and geographic position of countries and their technological level were the main factors in developing different kinds of national land and naval forces. When the international climate worsened in the early 1950s (especially after the establishment of NATO), Russia made significant changes in its military priorities. The Cold War made it revise the established relationship of sea aviation, surface vessels and submarines. Possible war scenarios and Russia’s geographic location required that the navy provide support to land forces and aviation. One of its main tasks was to disrupt enemy sea communications in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. This mission was assigned mainly to submarines. To accomplish it, they needed ocean-going capabilities. The blue color for the period between 1945-1955 reminds of the color of the ocean. In heraldry, it is a symbol of loyalty. Russian designers remained faithful to the traditions begun by their predecessors. Prewar submarines were unable to accomplish the new operational, tactical and strategic missions. The new submarine projects had to take into account the war experience gained by the Soviet Navy and former enemies and allies. An analysis of the use of submarines in WWII helped formulate the requirements for submarines of the 1950s. The installation of radars on ships and aircraft was the first major factor that influenced submarine design. A breakthrough in endurance was badly needed: according to WWII statistics, submarines stayed dived 70 percent of their combat cruise time. The second factor that promoted the improvement of tactical and technical elements of the first postwar submarines was further development of active and passive sonars of surface ships and their arming with depth-charge launchers, which made submarine hunters more effective and deadly, enabling them to attack at a great distance. To dodge such attacks, submarines needed a dramatic increase in dived speed and diving depth. As WWII experience showed, fast aircraft of maritime or ship-borne aviation with effective antisubmarine search equipment were the major threat to surfaced submarines. Antisubmarine patrol aircraft made the anti-submarine search much more efficient and created problems for submarine deployment. Antisubmarine planes could not only detect a submarine, but also destroy it with its weapons. Reports showed that even emergency diving did not help. If an air attack failed, the plane guided an antisubmarine surface combatant group to the target. Another problem faced by submarines was that they had to leave their patrol areas in order to recharge storage batteries undetected. At that time, the only possible solution was to feed air to running diesels while cruising at periscope depth (snorkel device). A snorkeling submarine was practically invisible to enemy radars; it could only be detected visually, which reduced the effectiveness of antisubmarine aviation almost to zero. However, submarine speed at snorkeling was twice as low as the cruising speed. Since anti-submarine aviation patrolled huge ocean areas, it significantly increased submarine’s area-to-area passage time, reduced the effectiveness of their actions, and required a large number of submarines in enemy sea communications areas. The problem could be partially solved by increasing submarines’ endurance which was envisioned in the first postwar designs. The above factors served as the «conceptual basis» for new submarine designs - Project 613 (medium displacement), and Project 611 (large displacement). The hulls of these submarines were optimized to reach maximum submerged speeds. They had fewer appendages and a smoother shape, and served as a standard for subsequent projects. Aft stabilizers were installed for the first time to ensure stable horizontal plane movement. Compared with prewar submarines, their maximum diving depth increased more than twofold. Other endurance problems were also solved, for example, a garbage ejector was designed to avoid surfacing for trash removal. he submarines designated for missions at great distances from bases were fitted with new, powerful radios with highly sensitive reception channels. New radio aerials were fixed on masts to enable radio communication at periscope depth. Snorkels became part of standard submarine equipment. There was a breakthrough in ultrahigh-speed radio communications, coding devices and torpedo directors. Weapons, navigation equipment and sonars were further improved. The combat missions for Project 613 (Whiskey) and Project 611 (Zulu) envisioned the use of torpedoes but these submarines also could lay mines using torpedo tubes. Owing to developing mine weapons and the navy’s desire to have multimission vessels, submarines took over the functions of minelaying submarines. The unification of submarines’ equipment and weapons reduced their cost and simplified their technical maintenance. One of the ways to improve submarine characteristics in the 1950s was to increase their dived speed and endurance – the key concealment and combat stability parameters. Upgrading traditional power plants could only provide a limited increase in submerged endurance and speed, so designers looked for basically new powerplants. The available options were steam-gas turbine plants designed by German engineer Walter, and air independent propulsion (AIP) diesel plants. The powerful Walter plants, new for the Soviet Navy, ensured high speeds, but for a limited time. AIP diesels were developed on the basis of designs tested in the U.S.S.R. before WWII. That type of engines was rather efficient and hence could ensure high submerged endurance. The new power plants were much more sophisticated and expensive than traditional power plants of diesel-electric submarines. The Navy could adopt them for service only if they dramatically improved submarines’ effectiveness. The steam-gas turbine plant had a trial run on a Project 617 submarine, while AIP diesels were tried on Projects 615 and A615 submarines. Submarines with nontraditional power plants with heat engines were developed on a large scale. Aside from Projects 615, A615 (Quebec) and 617 (Whale), there were other projects that were never implemented. Operational experience showed that power plants with heat engines could not ensure a breakthrough in submarines’ combat characteristics. Experts and researchers then turned to nuclear power engineering. Nuclear power plants ensured high dived speeds and practically unlimited endurance. This marked the end of the first stage in the development of AIP power plants. Further efforts were based on other design solutions. Golden period (1955-1990) The golden period is the longest in Russian submarine design and the richest in achievements. The size of a magazine article does not allow me to describe all historic events that took place within that time span. Submarines began to use nuclear power plants, new types of weapons and state-of-the-art electronics. They probed Arctic regions and made long-distance cruises while struggling to stay undetected. Basically, it was the time of confrontation between two superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States. In the ocean, it was a standoff between submarines. The world ocean – a new global theater of military operations – was setting new requirements for submarines. Technological rivalry between the two powers was part of the confrontation. All military construction priorities changed rather abruptly. It was assumed that the one better developed technologically would be the winner in a potential war. As a result, the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of submarine fleets were altered – the rivals cut the number of vessels but achieved a manifold increase in the firepower of each submarine. The large number of highly effective Soviet submarine, adopted for service with the U.S.S.R. Navy in the early 1950s, influenced the development of potential enemies’ navies, foremost the U.S. Navy. Realizing that the struggle against submarines could not be won once they slipped in the ocean, the United States and its NATO allies changed the concept of navy actions, basing it on the following principles: - use of new types of anti-submarine ships (above all, hunter-killer submarines); - preemptive strikes at Soviet naval bases to destroy submarines before they deploy in the ocean, and land-based infrastructure providing maintenance and repair of submarines; - setting up antisubmarine barriers to the deployment of Soviet submarines in the ocean. The Soviet Union responded by adjusting the strategy and tactics of its Navy and further upgrading its submarines and their bases. The construction of concrete shelters to protect submarine at bases, similar to the bunkers built for German submarines in occupied France at the end of World War II, was expensive and ineffective. It was more preferable to cut submarines’ stay at bases, i.e. reduce the repair and maintenance time and increase endurance. However, this set higher requirements for equipment reliability. Stand-by equipment largely solved the problem, and this approach was widely used in the future. As the potential enemy fielded new hunter-killer submarines, the Soviet Navy sought ways to reduce the signature of its submarine fleet and design anti-submarine torpedoes, as well as new sonars to detect enemy submarines. Upgrading the existing submarines could not dramatically improve their characteristics, and the Soviet Navy launched new submarine projects for ocean missions. It wanted faster vessels, and the solution was found in nuclear power engineering. There is a tremendous amount of publications about the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine (Project 627 November). Projects 627 and 627A had obvious advantages over diesel-electric submarines: their dived speed was 1.5 to 2 times higher, while the range at this speed reached 30,000 kilometers (a 60- to 75-fold increase over diesel-electric subs cruising at economical speed). Higher speed and range were achieved by increasing displacement – and cost of the new vessels. Combat conditions for U.S. and Soviet submarines in the 1960s were practically identical. There were no effective means yet to fight high-speed nuclear submarines or sonars capable of detecting and tracking fast-moving targets and their 3D maneuvers. The navies also lacked fast target designation systems and submarine-against-submarine tactics. In this conditions, the use of diesel-electric and nuclear-powered submarines in littoral zones yielded better results than the sole use of nuclear submarines. The navy therefore preserved both. For example, Project 627A nuclear submarine (SSN) were built simultaneously with Projects 641 (Foxtrot) and 633 (Romeo) diesel-electric submarines (SS), which replaced Projects 611 and 613 submarines. Competition between nuclear and diesel-electric submarines ceased to be an issue, as each subclass was intended for its specific missions. The situation in the 1960s, which the West described as an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) crisis, could not continue indefinitely. By the 1970s, Soviet and U.S. researchers had found effective means to combat submarines. This necessitated further improvement of technical characteristics of submarines and their shape. In 1967, the Soviet Navy received the first SSN of Project 671 (Victor I). It also needed a new SS project. Project 641B Tango, based on Project 641, featured reduced signature and new sonars. Its technical characteristics enabled it to take on antisubmarine missions. The SS and SSN projects continued to develop simultaneously. Project 671 multipurpose SSN submarines were followed by Projects 671RT (Victor II), 671RTM (Victor III), 971 (Akula) and 945 (Sierra), while SS submarines of Project 641B were followed by Project 877 (Kilo) and its modifications. The Soviet-U.S. confrontation in the ocean continued throughout the «golden period» in Russian submarine design. Submarines’ concealment and mobility made them indispensable launch platforms for strategic weapons. The Soviet Union simultaneously developed SS cruise-missile submarines (Project 644 Whiskey Twin-Cylinder) and SSN ballistic-missile submarines (Project B-611 Zulu IV). Nuclear power plants made a breakthrough in missile submarine development. Project 658 (Hotel) SSN ballistic-missile submarine and Project 659 (Echo I) cruise-missile submarine marked a new, revolutionary stage in domestic submarine design. As SSN submarines had advantages over diesel-electric analogs (high submerged endurance, high speed enabling them to avoid contact with enemy vessels, and long range), the development of new ballistic-missile diesel-electric submarines was stopped as inexpedient. Project 658 submarines were followed by more powerful vessels – strategic submarine cruisers of Projects 667A (Yankee), 667B, 667BD, 667BDR, and 667BDRM (Delta I, II, III, IV). Each submarine incorporated experience gained in building previous vessels and featured more advanced missile systems. As the United States began to work on the Trident missile system and Ohio-class submarines, the Soviet Union responded with Project 941 (Typhoon) strategic submarine cruiser. In terms of their capabilities and technical characteristics, Projects 941 and 667BDRM submarines crowned the «golden period» in Russian strategic submarine design. Unlike strategic submarines, cruise-missile submarines were alternatively equipped with nuclear and conventional power plants. SSN Project 659 was followed by Project 675 (Echo II) and its modifications, and SS Project 644 was followed by Project 651 (Juliett). Attacks on well-protected sea targets, such as strike aircraft carriers, had to be launched from a maximum range, which prevented submarines from using their own target designation sonars or radars. They needed information from external sources, such as aircraft equipped with onboard surface target acquisition radars and transmitters to relay the radar data to submarines. The large range and high speed of aircraft ensured an effective search for enemy surface ships and their attack by submarine missiles from outside the kill area of an enemy naval force’s ASW system. Combining aircraft and submarine capabilities helped accomplish combat missions, whereas the surface launch of missiles had certain limitations. The appearance in the Navy of nuclear-powered and diesel-electric cruise-missile submarines strongly influenced the tactics of U.S. attack aircraft carrier forces and forced American designers to further upgrade U.S. aircraft carriers and escort ships. These submarines gave birth to the notion «antimissile defense» in naval sailors’ lexicon. Subsequent Soviet cruiser SSN submarines – Projects 949 and 949A (Oscar I, II) – were basically new vessels, featuring higher performance and more powerful missile systems. They multiplied the Soviet Navy’s threat to U.S. attack carrier forces. The last phase of the «golden period» was marked by efforts to reduce submarines’ noise signature. The solution of this problem made Soviet submarines a match for potential enemy submarines. Gray period (1990-2000) This period in Russian submarine design in Russia looks really gray, a cheerless color with no place in heraldry. The collapse of the U.S.S.R., an economic crisis, an acute issue of submarine disposal and cuts in defense spending were just a few problems plaguing Russian submarine designers in the 1990s. In those conditions, the main objective for the Russian submarine design school was to retain experienced designers in the industry. Despite the difficult situation, Russian designers implemented many of their ideas. They developed a new strategic missile submarine cruiser (Yuri Dolgoruky-class) and a multi-purpose SSN submarine (Project 885), which are now under construction at the Sevmash production association. Other implemented projects include Project 636 diesel-electric submarine which evolved from Project 877. Working on Project 636, the designers made the impossible – they achieved a breakthrough in technical characteristics without changing the traditional hull shape. Project 636 submarines are fitted with sophisticated electronic and other equipment, have a lower noise signature and a greater range of detecting low-noise targets. Their weaponry includes cruise missiles. The high qualities of Project 636 submarines promptly won them a foreign market. Diesel-electric submarines of the next project, now being built at the St. Petersburg-based Admiralty Shipyards, will be even more advanced. These are submarines of the St. Petersburg class (built for the Russian Navy) and Amur class (built for foreign customers). These projects required almost a decade of tremendous efforts. 21st century submarines Submarine projects started in the «gray period» give us hope for the future. Russia’s submarine design school has remained professional, cooperative and businesslike. Its century-old record shows that submarines were an indispensable tool of the Russian Navy for resolving various tasks. In the 21st century too, national defense remains a top priority task. The design of submarines to be built in the first few decades of the new century will hardly differ significantly from 20th century vessels, but subsequent submarines will. Changes in the geo-political situation have caused reductions in the strategic fleet, making each combat vessel more valuable. A loss of even one strategic arms carrier can seriously weaken the potential of deterrent forces. This is why a new strategic vessel – aside from higher combat effectiveness – should also feature enhanced stealthiness and reliability. Such a vessel must spend most of its service life in the sea, seeking to preserve its weapons for a retaliatory strike. It is very difficult to detect such a vessel in the ocean, so the enemy will try to start tailing it as it exits the base. Designers will have to dramatically increase submarine endurance which, in turn, will require new life-support solutions. The development of a future multipurpose submarine is as difficult a task. The dynamics of confrontation raises the need for a truly universal submarine capable of waging ASW; attacking single surface ships, naval groups, including carrier forces, and shore-based facilities; and fulfilling reconnaissance missions. Russian designers must make multipurpose submarines very flexible and capable of adapting to a specific task on a mission. Facing new serious challenges, Russian submarine designers cannot afford dissipating their efforts. They should consolidate the entire design potential. Several factors facilitate these moves. First, submarine building in Russia is concentrated in two shipyards – the Sevmash production association (SSN projects) and Admiralty Shipyard (SS projects). This factor alone calls for building strategic and multi-purpose nuclear submarines using the same base model, so that not only equipment and weapons, but also hull structures have the highest level of unification, in order to reduce the cost of vessels and the cost of their life cycle. These SSN submarines, in effect, should be designed to uniform requirements, differing only in some aspects. Some may argue that consolidated design will eliminate competition. I cannot agree with this argument because I am convinced that competition should exist not between submarines as complete units but between the designers of submarine elements (which is not always economically justified, either). The main factor in the development of competitive submarines is rigid requirements and competence of the customer (the Russian Navy). Competition between submarines must only apply to opposing countries. International practices show that such sophisticated objects as submarines are designed in a single center. To sum up, I would like to say that each Russian submarine project is a product of its times, a kind of fusion of the Navy’s requirements and industrial capabilities. The designers’ task is to find optimal engineering solutions meeting the Navy’s stringent requirements. The 100 years of submarine design allow us to say with confidence that Russian 21st century submarines will fully comply with the requirements of times. The last century showed that submarines were an indispensable tool of the Russian Navy for resolving various tasks. In the 21st century too, national defense remains a top priority task. |
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Fig.1 Bubnov,
senior assistant to shipbuilder, 1901
