The Initiative

[TankHunter]

I think that you fellas may find this of interest, and/or of use in game. Hope that it will be of use. It is a bit long winded, I admit.

The Initiative
It’s Importance in Warfare and Historical Examples of Initiative Being Used in Warfare



When it comes to warfare, the concept of “initiative� is of great importance. It can be used by a lowly sergeant, or by a theater level commander to help win a battle or a war. The best definition of the concept that I know of is from the Marine Corp War Fighting Manual. “All actions in war, regardless of the level, are based upon either taking the initiative or reacting in response to the opponent. By taking the initiative, we dictate the terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet us on our terms. The initiative allows us to pursue some positive aim even if only to preempt an enemy initiative. It is through the initiative that we seek to impose our will on the enemy.� In other words the initiative allows an inferior force to be able to defeat a more powerful force. The gaining of the initiative allows one to out maneuver and then break the will of your opponent. One can gain the initiative in warfare by reacting faster than an enemy commander and by being more aggressive than the enemy (for one still needs to take the initiative). If a commander seeks to gain the initiative, he would first have to have more information on where his opponent is, and at the same time keep his opponent from knowing where your own forces are; a concept called “friction.� It is also defined as making the easy seem difficult and the difficult seem impossible. Thus reducing the opponent’s ease in resupply, reinforcements, movement, etc would also be necessary. A good commander tries to reduce his own friction while he increases that of the enemy. Keeping the opponent from knowing where you are weakest and where you are strongest is the key for if he does know he can gain the initiative by attacking at your weak points. In other words surprise is essential. One would also need to react faster than the enemy commander a concept called the “Boyd Cycle.� It revolves around the theory that before a commander can react he needs to observe, orient, decide then act (also known as the OODA Loop). If one can get into an opponent’s “decision cycle� one is then at a great advantage in gaining the initiative.

Put simply, you must know more about where the opponent is than he does about you, and react faster then he can. If you can do that, you are in a much better position than the opponent is in.

Let me point to something that we all know and understand; chess. In it both sides can move one piece at a time, and then after you move one of your pieces you must allow the other side to move their piece. How do you win? This can be done by making it so that each move accomplishes the following goals. Developing your pieces (put them forward in areas where they can be used effectively), taking the center of the board, and gain the initiative. If you can think of the next few moves, and the opponent is still thinking of his current move, you can easily gain the initiative. Once he is reacting to you, he has lost. For he is in effect a few moves behind you. That is what one hopes to archive when one tries to gain the initiative. By forcing the opponent to react to you, then you have a great advantage over the opponent because if done correctly he will not be able to succeed in the fight.

One historical example of one commander gaining the initiative and his opposition failing to do so is the battle of Khalkhin Gol. This is a little known battle between the Japanese and Soviets in 1939. Both the Japanese and Russians laid claim to the region just east of the river Halha. In May the Mongolians had some cavalrymen who were in the disputed territory. The Japanese pushed them out. In response the Mongolians sent more troops in to push the Japanese out. This escalated when a Japanese divisional commander sent large elements of his force to kick the Mongolians out.
The Japanese were able to do that, but a week later part of the Japanese force, which contained the force’s reconnaissance element, was surrounded and destroyed. The Japanese commander in the area then moved his entire division into the area to push the Soviets and Mongolians out. The Japanese were able to gain the initiative for a period of time, but a very competent Russian commander by the name of Zhukov was able to blunt the Japanese offensive by sending in a mechanized force to stop the Japanese advances. The conflict then degenerated into a battle of attrition. The Japanese were unable to advance, and the Russians were building up their forces. Zhukov ordered an attack into Japanese held territory. The Japanese were not prepared for the attack. Zhukov was able to keep the Japanese from knowing that he was preparing for an offensive. The Russian forces made little headway initially in the northern part of the front, but in the south the Russians were able to break through and were pushing north. Whereas the Japanese, not knowing which attack was the main thrust sent reinforcements to the north, to block an already bogged down attack. After four days the Russian forces in the northern part of the front were able to break through, and encircle what was left of the Japanese. The Japanese were then defeated completely.

The Japanese lost because they failed to reduce their friction (increasing what they know of where the enemy is, what their objectives are, etc), which allowed the Russians to gain and keep the initiative. That caused the Japanese forces to be surrounded. Had the Japanese reduced their own friction, they could have sent their reinforcements to block the Russian breakthrough in the south.

The next example is Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Russians even though they had the largest military in the world at that time were at a disadvantage. They had for the most part inferior equipment and were still suffering the after effects of Stalin’s purges.

The initial attack was a surprise for the Russians. The Russian intelligence service STAVKA did give a warning to all Russian troops on the frontier about an imminent attack, but the warning did not get to any of the Russian formations. The Germans were able to gain the initiative right off the bat, just because of the mass of forces involved in the attack. The Russian commanders were overwhelmed. The Russians also were not willing to react to the initial German attacks. They didn’t react to a very fluid situation, reactions such as falling back. This resulted in entire Russian Army’s being cut off and destroyed.

The Nazi leadership believed that they would be able to reach Moscow by the time winter set in, which did not happen. The winter did two things. It caused serious problems for the Germans equipment wise (equipment would literally freeze solid) and because the Germans were unprepared for the winter, they suffered heavy loses from attrition. The Russians took advantage of this by engaging in attacks against the German forces. Even though the Russians took extraordinarily high losses, the attacks took the initiative away from the Germans. This resulted in the Germans being stalled just outside of Moscow. After the Russians stopped the Germans outside of Moscow, the Russians were able to push the Germans back away from the Soviet capital.

The Germans were able to gain the initiative by overwhelming, and then out maneuvering the Russian forces. Because of the lack of Soviet strategic depth, the Germans had little to worry about after they broke through Russian lines. Thus even if the Russians didn’t have orders from Stalin to hold where they were; the Germans still would have had the initiative. The Russians would have been reacting to the Germans behind the Russian lines. The Russians were able to keep complete disaster from happening when they took advantage of what the weather gave them and attacking the Germans. This made it so the initiative was up for grabs and the Russians were able to retake the initiative long enough to give Moscow some breathing room.

The following example is not necessarily an example of what happens when one side gains the initiative, but more of an example when neither side does. The example is of the opening offensive of the Iran-Iraq War. A war that had the objective of gaining land from Iran in a quick conflict, but it only ended up becoming a war of attrition which lasted for 8 long years spanning from 1980 to 1988.

The Iraqi objective was simple, go into Iranian territory and take land that Iraq wanted; after that go on the defensive and work out a truce. This involved taking the towns of Abaden, Khorramshahr, Susangerd, Musian, and Mehran.
All of these towns were well within 100 kilometers from Iraq. Saddam Hussain wanted to reduce the casualties that Iraq would suffer so he only wanted to make limited gains; instead of trying to destroy the Iranian military and toppling the nation’s government. The Iraqis had few problems in obtaining these limited objectives.
In fact the objectives were obtained within a week of hostilities starting. The bulk of the Iranian forces were by the nation’s northern border. All that was able to combat the Iraqis initially were light infantry which gave the Iraqis few problems except when it came to urban combat; besides that the Iraqis rolled right through Iranian defenses. Because the Iraqis were able to obtain their limited objectives they didn’t push any further. Even though they had the initiative they didn’t take advantage of it and they did not utilize it, thus giving the Iranians time to react and build up their forces along the front. This resulted in attrition warfare. The Iraqis were never able to gain the initiative again in the strategic sense. They also lost all of the gains in the Iranian territories that were made at the start of the war due to the launch of a series of Iranian offensives in 1982.

Normally a nation or military fails to gain the initiative due to poor equipment, bad communications, or bad intelligence, but the case of the Iran-Iraq war is of pure incompetence. Iraqi leadership was so casualty adverse that they allowed themselves to lose the initiative and let the Iranians react. This proved to be a disaster for the Iraqis.

In conclusion, the initiative is one of the most important things in warfare. It can at times be even more important than the forces involved in the fighting.
Even if a superior force fails to gain and hold the initiative, they will at least have a very difficult time to win or they will find themselves in a battle of attrition. At worst they will lose decisively.

[TteFAboB]

Sun Tzu 101 for people with enough time. The former resumed all that in one sentence. Interesting examples nonetheless.

[Skybird]

Same thought on my mind: Sun Tzu. But I wouldn'T have been able to nail it down to the precise chapter en passant.