100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 22, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 18:15

Meeting of the Council of Four


...

[Jimbuna]

23rd May 1919

Aftermath of War

Estonians within 30 miles of Petrograd.

American soldiers conduct combat drills with tanks at Camp Meade, Maryland.


A Red Cross camp in Warsaw feeding Polish, Russian, German, and Austrian refugees.


Raymond Orteig, a New York hotel owner, offers a $25,000 prize ($383,000 today) for the first nonstop flight from New York to Paris (it is eventually won by Charles Lindbergh in 1927)

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


...

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:30

Meeting of the Council of Four with experts on Austria-Hungary


...

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers


...

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 23, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


...

[Jimbuna]

24th May 1919

View of Kabul, Afghanistan as British planes bomb the city as part of the Third Anglo-Afghan War.


Sweden grants women the right to vote. Women suffragists in Gothenburg.


Ship Losses:

Alexander (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Battle of Yelabuga: The transport was shelled and sunk on the Kama River by artillery.
Roshal (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Battle of Yelabuga: The gunboat was shelled and damaged on the Kama River by HMS Kent ( Royal Navy) and beached.
Terek (Soviet Navy Red Movement) Battle of Yelabuga: The gunboat was shelled and damaged on the Kama River by British and White Russian ships and beached. Captured by Whites and refloated ten days later.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


(M Tardieu and Mr Headlam-Morley are introduced.

1. Mr Headlam-Morley reports that, after further consideration, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the two replies to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau’s letters of May 13th and May 16th, approved by the Council on May 22nd, and which had been prepared somewhat hastily, were susceptible of improvement in drafting. They had therefore ventured to incorporate the two replies in a single draft, which he now submitted. He and M Tardieu were in complete agreement and Dr Mezes had approved it in place of Dr Haskins, who was away.

(The revised reply is approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to the Secretary-General, as superseding the reply forwarded on May 22nd, and for the following action:

1) To prepare a reply in French for M Clemenceau’s signature and for dispatch.

2) To communicate to the Drafting Committee in order that the necessary alteration may be made in the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

3) For publication as soon as signed and dispatched.

(M Tardieu and Mr Headlam-Morley withdraw.)


2. The Articles regarding the return of Prisoners of War, approved on the previous day for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria are initialed by the four Heads of Governments.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them through the Secretary-General to the Drafting Committee.)


3. The Air Clauses approved on the previous day for inclusion in the Treaty of Peace with Austria, were initialed by the four Heads of Governments.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Drafting Committee through the Secretary-General.)


4. President Wilson asks that the clauses in regard to Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, recorded as approved on the previous day, might not be submitted for initials. He wishes to reserve them for the present, as he is inclined to think that United States officers ought not to take part.


5. After M Clemenceau, President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George have initialed the General Clauses, namely, Articles 47 to 50 of the Military, Naval, and Air Terms with Austria, S Orlando withholds his initials, on the ground that the Armistice of 3rd November, 1918, which had been drawn up hastily, had been found to omit certain of the islands included in the Treaty of London, and he wishes to have the Clauses re-examined by his military advisers.

(Note: There is a meeting between the Council of Four and their Economic Experts. That meeting is apparently not recorded, and this meeting continues after that one.)


6. President Wilson reads the following memorandum which he has received from Dr Mezes, pointing out alterations made by the Drafting Committee in Articles 102 and 104 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany:

“The Articles as drafted and as they appear in the Germany with the Treaty are given below in parallel columns, the divergences of importance being underscored:

Draft Treaty
Article 2. Article 102.
The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers undertake to establish the Town of Danzig together with the rest of the territory described in Article I as a free city. The City of Danzig, together with the rest of the territory described in Article 100 is established as a free city and placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

Article 4. Article 104.
The Five Allied and Associated Great Powers undertake to negotiate a Treaty between the Polish Government and the Free City of Danzig, which shall come into force at the same time as the establishment of said free city. A Convention, the terms of which shall be fixed by the principal Allied and Associated Powers shall be concluded between the Polish Government and the free city of Danzig.

The effect of the changes is to bring Danzig into existence as a free city as soon as the Treaty is signed. According to the draft, Danzig comes into existence as a free city only after its representatives and representatives of the Five Principal Powers have worked out its constitution, and further have negotiated a satisfactory Treaty between it and Poland. It may well be more difficult for the Five Great Powers to provide Danzig with a constitution drafted with the general interest in view, and also difficult, maybe impossible, to negotiate a satisfactory Treaty between Danzig and Poland if the former is set up as an autonomous and going concern immediately upon the signing of the Treaty and without further need of assistance on the part of these Powers.

If these points are well taken, it is important that the articles of the Treaty above set forth, should be modified so that they may accord with the draft.”

M Clemenceau, after consulting the French text, says that it is obviously a translation from the incorrect English text.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it possible that the Germans will make a strong resistance to the whole of the Clauses of the Treaty of Peace dealing with Poland. This will give an opportunity to the Allied and Associated Powers to make a correction.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should be instructed to revise the articles in the final erratum or in the final Treaty of Peace handed to the Germans.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to prepare an instruction to the Drafting Committee for the initials of the four Heads of Governments in the afternoon.)


7. President Wilson says that he has sent a copy of Mr Philip Kerr’s draft despatch to Mr Lansing, who had replied that he considered the statement right, and that the United States were justified in joining in it. Mr. Lansing would have preferred to withhold the dispatch until a reply had been received from Mr Morris, who had been sent to Omsk. He himself, however, does not agree in this. He agrees, however, to the following addition to the paragraph numbered “fifthly”, at the top of page 5, which Mr. Lansing has proposed:

“and that until such settlement is made, the Government of Russia agrees to recognize those territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between the Allied and Associated Governments and the de facto Governments of those territories.”

(This is accepted.)

(It is agreed to discuss the question in the afternoon.)


8. President Wilson reads a despatch from the American Diplomatic Representative in Warsaw, showing Mr Paderewski still to be strongly favorable to the views of the Allied and Ukrainian Associated Powers, ending with a message that he had strongly defended President Wilson’s views.

Mr Lloyd George reads telegrams showing that General Haller’s Army is now being moved from the Ukraine to the Polish front, and that the Ukrainians had sent envoys to negotiate peace with the Polish Government.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon says that the first question on the Agenda Paper relates to the withdrawal of the German troops from the Baltic Provinces and Russian Polish Front. The question was raised by Marshal Foch in a letter dated 13th May 1919 which had been circulated on the 17th May 1919. He would call on Colonel Georges to state the facts of the case.

Colonel Georges says that in a letter dated the 9th May 1919, General von Hammerstein, the President of the German Armistice Commission, had informed the President of the Inter-Allied Armistice Commission that the German Government would, within a short time, withdraw all the fighting forces from Lettland and Lithuania. General von Hammerstein’s letter goes on to state that the German Government has already taken preparatory measures with a view to bringing about a suspension of arms with a consequential Armistice with the troops opposed to them: that the withdrawal of the troops would take place within a period sufficient to assure the security of the property of the German Empire in Lettland and Lithuania; and that the responsibility for the consequences following upon the evacuation of Lettland and Lithuania would fall upon the Allied and Associated Powers.

At the same time, the Polish National Committee had requested the Allied and Associated Governments to intervene with Marshal Foch in order that he might summon the German troops to evacuate the territories of Grodno and Suvalki and to retire within the territories of Germany.

Both these demands had reference to the interpretation to be given to Clause 12 of the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918, namely:

“All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Romania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1st, 1914, and all German troops at present in the territories which before the war formed part of Russia must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable having regard to the internal situation of those territories.”

It appears, therefore, that on the one hand the Germans threatened to withdraw their troops from the territories in question; whilst on the other hand, the Polish Government on the strength of Article 12 of the Armistice, called for the evacuation of the zone at the back of the Polish forces.

Mr Lansing inquires whether the zone of Vilna was at present occupied by the Poles.

Colonel Georges replies that Vilna itself is at present occupied by the Poles; at the back of Vilna existed a zone which was traversed by railway lines, which were necessary for the despatch of supplies from Poland to the Polish forces on the Vilna front. It was an interesting fact, calling for serious consideration, that the Germans had remained in occupation of those railway lines, and that they had lately concentrated considerable forces in that quarter.

Mr Lansing inquired whether Colonel Georges referred to the railway line between Vilna and Grodno?

Colonel Georges replies that he would enter into that question in greater detail when dealing with the suggestion for fixing a line of demarcation between the Polish and German zones of occupation.

Colonel Georges, continuing, says that the object Marshal Foch had kept in mind in referring General von Hammerstein’s Note of the 9th May to the Council, had been to obtain a ruling in regard to the conditions which should govern the application of Clause 12 of the Armistice of the 11th November in regard to the Polish-German-Lithuanian front. These conditions are three in number, namely:

Firstly - The immediate evacuation by the German troops of the zone at the back of the Polish Army operating in the Vilna region;

Secondly - To draw the attention of the Germans that it is their duty to maintain their forces on Lithuania and Lettish fronts until the Entente should authorize them to withdraw the same;

Thirdly - To organize with as little delay as possible under an Anter-Allied control, the local forces in Lithuania and Latvia in order to enable these to take the place of the Germans on their respective fronts.

On the 23rd May, an agreement had been reached in regard to questions 2 and 3 above.

Mr Lansing inquires by whom this agreement had been reached.

Colonel Georges replies that the decision had been reached by the Foreign Ministers themselves at the meeting held yesterday.

Mr Lansing maintained that at yesterday’s meeting no mention had been made of Poland. The Ministers had only dealt with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

Colonel Georges agrees. He explains, however, that Poland is in no way involved. He has considered the question as a whole and had divided the same into two parts: the one, dealing with Latvia and Lithuania, which had been discussed and disposed of at Yesterday’s meeting; the other, relating to the Polish zone of occupation in the region of Vilna, which it was proposed should be settled at that meeting.

Mr Lansing inquires whether the question which Colonel Georges raised had anything to do with the dispute between the Letts and the Poles, who were at the present moment furiously fighting with one another.

Colonel Georges replied that the question under consideration was merely a German-Polish one.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the only problem to be brought before the Council on that date related to the withdrawal of the Germans from the territory now occupied by them at the back of the Polish lines.

Colonel Georges replies in the affirmative, since the rest of the problem had been settled on the previous day.

Colonel Georges, resuming, says that the Polish front under consideration begins south of the Lettish town of Vilkomir, then runs in a south-easterly direction, passing 40 miles to the East of the town of Vilna, whence it passes through Soli and proceeds in the direction of Baranovichi. The northern portion of this zone, the region of Vilna, was crossed by two railway lines - the Byelostok-Grodno-Vilna line, and the Suvalki-Olita line, which joins the previous one at Orany. These railway lines constitute the only means of communication between Poland proper and the Polish front in the region of Vilna. It is therefore, absolutely necessary that the Poles should have the full control and the free use of these railway lines. With that object in view, General Henrys had proposed that the Germans should be compelled to withdraw their troops from the territory in question, a line of demarcation, separating the Polish zone of occupation from the German zone of occupation, being laid down to the north, to pass through Lyudvinof, Balverjishki, Dersunishki, Jigmori, Chakiski, and south of Vilkomir. It is hoped that this will definitely put a stop to the concentration of German troops which continues to take place at Suvalki, and at Augustovo in the railway zone.

Mr Lansing says that he has been supplied with a map giving the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys. That line had been referred to the Commission on Polish Affairs by whom it had been rejected. Consequently, he thought, much time would be saved if the proposed line of demarcation between Lithuania and Poland were not discussed further.

Mr Balfour inquires whether the line of demarcation now under discussion constitutes a military or a political line. In other words, is it a line which is to form the actual future political boundary between the States of Lithuania and Poland? Or, was it merely a temporary line which was to be laid down in order to ease the existing military situation? If the line is intended to represent the future political boundary line, he agrees with Mr Lansing that the Council is not competent at present to discuss the question. But, if the line were a purely military one, then he thinks Mr Lansing need feel no anxiety in arriving at a decision.

Mr Lansing holds that if the proposal is to lay down a temporary military line, the question should be referred for decision to the Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments. His information goes to show that the Lithuanians are actually in arms, ready to resist further Polish advances. Consequently, the Council should be very careful in dealing with this question.

Colonel Georges explains that the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys was based solely on military considerations. The Polish front at present extends to the East of Vilna and it is impossible to leave all the lines of communication in possession of the Germans, as it would enable them at any moment to interrupt the flow of supplies to Vilna. Furthermore, in the event of an attack by the Germans, the possession of the lines of communication would at once constitute a serious menace to the Polish troops around Vilna. From a military point of view, the question requires immediate attention; but the solution of the military problem does not in any way imply a solution of the purely territorial question. The German troops occupying Lithuania to the north of the line of demarcation have no reason for occupying the railway to the south serving the Polish front, especially as the region in question was not German. Under these circumstances, Marshal Foch had recommends that the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys should be accepted, thus separating the Polish and German zones of occupation. Marshal Foch, at the same time, proposes certain slight improvements in General Henrys’ line of demarcation, so as to follow more closely the administrative boundaries, especially in the district of Vilkomir. It is extremely urgent, however, that some line of demarcation should be adopted, and that constitutes the problem which the Council has been asked to solve.

Mr Lansing says that he quite understands the position and, in a general way, he accepts the proposals made. Nevertheless, it should be provided that the area around Suvalki and Augustovo, which is Lithuanian, should be occupied only by Lithuanian troops and not by Polish troops. In his opinion the Poles should be prevented from occupying Lithuanian territory just as much as the Germans.

Colonel Georges says that two obstacles could be opposed to Mr Lansing’s proposals. In the first place, the Lithuanians have no troops which could be spared to garrison the territory in question. The Lithuanian forces at the present moment consisted of 4,000 men guarding the Eastern front and 3,000 men at depots in the interior. In the second place, it has been proposed to organize Lithuanian forces in order to defend the Eastern front. Should those troops be employed, as suggested, to garrison the vast territory to be evacuated by the German troops, no troops would be left with which to defend the Lithuanian frontiers against the advance of Bolshevik forces.

Mr Lansing maintains that guarantees should be given that the Poles will not occupy the territory in question after the withdrawal of the Germans.

Colonel Georges explains that the zone to be evacuated by the Germans, including Suvalki, Augustovo and Seini, has been attributed to Poland by the Polish Territorial Commission. On the other hand, the Vilna zone is already occupied by Polish forces, and it is merely proposed that measures should be taken to prevent the Germans from going there. It has been suggested, in order to reassure the Lithuanian Government, that the Allied and Associated Governments should inform it that the occupation of these territories by Polish forces is purely a temporary measure necessitated by the existing military situation and that it would in no way prejudge the final settlement of the territorial question.

Mr Lansing thinks that the Council could accede to the demands made by the Polish Government: but General Henrys’ proposals go a long way beyond the demands put forward by the Polish Government.

Colonel Georges explains that there are two questions to be considered. Firstly, the request of the Polish Government aiming at the occupation and acquisition of the Augustovo-Suvalki-Seini zone. Secondly, the military question which calls for the temporary occupation by the Poles of the areas at present occupied by German troops, situated at the back of the Vilna front, where the Polish forces have set up a strong defensive line against Bolshevism. No reason exists why the zone at the back of that defensive line should be occupied by Germans, and the Allied and Associated Governments are, in accordance with the terms of Article 12 of the Armistice, justified in demanding the withdrawal of the German troops therefrom.

Mr Lansing says he agreed to the withdrawal of the Germans from the Augustovo-Suvalki-Seini zone: but the area so evacuated should, in his opinion, be occupied by the Lithuanians, to whom the territory in question belongs, and not by the Poles.

M Pichon invited attention to the decision reached by the Baltic Commission on this question, which read as follows:

“The withdrawal of the German troops provided for by the Armistice of the 11th November, must begin immediately in the Powyats (Districts) of Augustovo, Suvalki, and in that part of the district of Seini to the west of the river Marycha, districts which will in all probability be comprised within the future frontiers of Poland as well as in the district of Grodno.

“As regards the other territories affected by the line of demarcation of General Henrys, supplementary information should be obtained in regard to the political consequences of a withdrawal of the German troops in so far as the relations between the Lithuanians and the Poles are concerned so that as little really Lithuanian territory as possible may be occupied by Polish troops.”

He thinks that the recommendations therein contained have an important bearing on the objections raised by Mr Lansing.

Mr Lansing says he will accept the proposals made by the Baltic Commission.

Baron Sonnino thinks that the proposals just read likewise give effect to the wishes of Colonel Georges, who had asked that the Germans should withdraw from the Augustovo-Suvalki-Seini zone; the object in view being attained by laying down the line of demarcation proposed by General Henrys. He wishes, however, to inquire from Colonel Georges whether the line of demarcation is intended to ensure free communication with the Lithuanian troops, or with the Polish troops in the Vilna region.

Colonel Georges replies that the line of demarcation is intended to protect the Polish troops on the Vilna front, since the Lithuanians have no troops there. The demarcation line, however, is essential to prevent the Germans from spreading from Vilkomir into the Vilna region, in the same way as they had spread into the Augustovo and Suvalki zone. The acceptance of the recommendations of the Baltic Commission disposes of one part of the question under reference. He would have preferred that a settlement should have been reached in regard to the whole problem. Under the circumstances, however, he asks that a telegram should be sent to General Nudant at Spa to communicate to him the decision taken in regard to the Augustovo-Suvalki region, a copy of the same being sent to General Henrys, in order that immediate effect might be given to the decision taken.

Mr Lansing says that he, personally, will be prepared to go even beyond the recommendations of the Baltic Commission. He thinks the Germans should be instructed to withdraw from the whole of the disputed area between General Henrys’ line of demarcation and the ethnic boundary line, on the understanding that the Poles should not occupy the territories so evacuated.

Colonel Georges understands this to mean that no German should be permitted to occupy territory to the south of the line of demarcation proposed.

Mr Lansing agrees, but he adds that his proposal also implies that no Pole should be allowed to advance north of the ethnic line. The intervening region between the line of demarcation and the ethnic line would, under these conditions, be occupied by the Lithuanians.

Colonel Georges remarks that no Lithuanian troops would be available to occupy that area.

Mr Lansing says that, under those circumstances, the Germans should not be withdrawn. The only solution, therefore, would be to adhere strictly to the recommendations made by the Baltic Commission.

(It is agreed:

1) To accept the resolutions of May 19th by the Commission on Baltic Affairs with regard to the proposals in Marshal Foch’s letter of May 13th concerning the German forces in Latvia.

2) To forward a copy of the following resolution to General Nudant, President of the Permanent Armistice Commission at Spa, and to General Henrys, Head of the French Military Mission in Poland, for necessary action:

“The withdrawal of the German troops provided for by the Armistice of the 11th November, must begin immediately in the districts (Powyats) of Augustovo, Suvalki, and in that part of the district of Seini to the west of the river Marycha, districts which will in all probability be comprised within the future frontiers of Poland as well as in the district of Grodno.

As regards the other territories affected by the line of demarcation of General Henrys, supplementary information should be obtained in regard to the political consequences of a withdrawal of the German troops in so far as the relations between the Lithuanians and the Poles are concerned so that as little really Lithuanian territory as possible may be occupied by Polish troops”).


2. M Pichon says that a memorandum prepared by the British Delegation has been circulated that afternoon in regard to the control of sailings to Northern Russia. The Delegates have had no time to consult their experts. He asks, therefore, that the question should be adjourned to the next Meeting.

Mr Lansing agrees that the question should be adjourned. He wishes to inquire, however, whether the proposals contained in the memorandum, submitted by the British Delegation, apply only to Murmansk and Archangel.

Admiral Hope replies that the proposals relate only to the control of sailings to the White Sea ports.

Mr Balfour says that he understands the American, Italian and Japanese Delegations have no objections to offer to the proposals put forward by the British Delegation. Should the French authorities, after carefully studying the memorandum likewise have no objections to offer, he thinks the recommendations therein contained should forthwith be given effect to, without further reference to the Council.

Mr Lansing agrees to accept Mrs Balfour’s proposal on the understanding that it will not form a precedent.

(It is agreed that the recommendations contained in the memorandum submitted by the British Delegation in regard to the control of sailings to Northern Russia (White Sea ports) should be adopted, subject to the approval of the French authorities, which will be communicated direct to the British Naval authorities.)


3. M Pichon invites attention to a letter dated 16th May 1919, addressed by Dr Benes to M Clemenceau, containing a request from the Czechoslovak Delegation for the insertion of financial clauses in the Treaty of Peace with Austria and Hungary. The proposals of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation had reference to four subjects, namely:

1) the pre-war debt;

2) the war debt;

3) the question of State property of liberated Czechoslovak territory; and

4) the question of Austro-Hungarian bank notes.

Mr Lansing proposes that questions (1) and (2) should be referred to the Financial Commission and questions (3) and (4) to the Commission on Reparations.

(In regard to the note received from the Czechoslovak Delegation, it is agreed to refer the draft dealing with (1) the pre-war debt and (2) the war debt to the Financial Commission, and the draft clauses dealing with (3) the question of State property of liberated Czechoslovak territory and (4) the question of Austro-Hungarian Bank Notes to the Reparation Commission.)


4. M Pichon says that in a letter dated 13th May 1919, M Hymans, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Belgium, had transmitted a demand of the Belgian Government for the restoration of objects of interest now in Austria. He proposes that the whole question should be referred to the Commission on Reparations for report.

Mr Lansing thinks that the request for the return of a picture by Rubens, known as “The Triptyque de St. Ildephonse”, requires some consideration. The work of art in question had apparently been sold to the Vienna Gallery for 40,000 Florins. He fails to see why that picture should now be restored to Belgium. In his opinion objects of value which had been stolen by Austria or taken for safe custody to Vienna should be restored, but he does not think that ruling should apply to objects of Art that had been sold, even under pressure.

Mr Balfour in this connection invites attention to the claim put forward by Belgium for the return of the treasure known as the “Fleece of Gold”. This treasure originally belonged to the ancient Dukes of Burgundy. In the course of centuries part of the Duchy of Burgundy became attached to the Crown of Austria, and accordingly orders were given by the Monarchy of Austria for the removal of certain treasures from the Duchy to Vienna. It does not appear quite clear on what ground Belgium claims to inherit property which had belonged to the Duchy of Burgundy.

Baron Sonnino invites attention to the fact that the question of the delivery of the “Fleece of Gold” to Belgium has already been considered by the Commission on Reparations and the following draft Article had received approval:

“Article XVI. In carrying out the provisions of Article VIII, Austria undertakes to surrender to each of the Allied and Associated Powers respectively, all records, documents, objects of antiquity and of Art, and all scientific and bibliographical material taken away from the invaded territory whether they belonged to the State or to provincial, communal, charitable or ecclesiastical administrations or other public or private Institutions.

Annex II. Objects and documents removed for safety from Belgium to Austria in 1794:

a) Arms, Armour and other objects from the Old Arsenal of Brussels.

b) The treasure of the “Toison d’or” preserved in previous times in the “Chapelle de la Cour” in Brussels.

c) Coinage, stamps, medals, and counters by Theodore van Berckel which were an essential feature in the Archives of the “Chambre des Comptes” at Brussels.

d) The documents relating to the map “carte chorographique” of the Austrian Low Countries drawn up by Lieut. Gen. Comte Jas de Ferraris.”
Under these circumstances he thinks there is no necessity for the Council to consider the demand of the Belgian Government, which had already been admitted by the Commission on Reparations.

(It is agreed that no action is required in regard to the demand of the Belgian Government for the restoration of certain objects of interest now in Austria, in view of the fact that a Clause had already been inserted in the Draft Reparation Clauses of the Treaty with Austria.)


5. Addition as an Annex to the Treaty of Peace With Germany of the French Note Relative to Zones

(The Council decides to adjourn this question without discussion.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

25th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Rising in Kurdistan; British officers captured.

Conditional recognition of General Kolchak's Government by Allies.

Vladimir Lenin addressing troops of the Red Army in Moscow.


Estonian forces capture the city of Pskov after defeating the Estonian and Russian Red Armies. Estonian marines.


Refugees from Odessa, Ukraine fleeing the advance of the Russian Red Army.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, May 25, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

26th May 1919

Aftermath of War

Demonstration by ex-servicemen in London.

Afghan counter-offensive.

Economist John Maynard Keynes resigns as the representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference in disgust of the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty.


German Prisoners of War made to construct the American war cemetery in Romagne, France.


British triplane bomber Tarrant Tabor crashes after its first flight, resulting in the deaths of its two pilots.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. The Council has before them a letter addressed to Colonel House by Lord Robert Cecil, dated 24th May, on the subject of Aerial Navigation. In this letter, Lord Robert Cecil asks for certain amendments to the Covenant of the Nations which should be considered as drafting changes.

President Wilson expresses the view that these might be regarded as drafting alterations.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee should be instructed to make the following amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations:

In several relevant paragraphs the term “military and naval” is replaced by “military, naval and air."

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to prepare an instruction to the Drafting Committee for the initials of the Four Heads of Governments.)


2. With reference to C. F. 30, Minutes 2 & 3,1 the attached errata to the Treaty of Peace with Germany are initialed by the Four Heads of Governments.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate them to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


3. With reference to C. F. 31, Minute 1,2 Sir Maurice Hankey states that the Japanese Delegation has agreed to the draft dispatch to Admiral Kolchak, subject to two very small amendments, namely, in paragraph 2 instead of the words “they are now being pressed to withdraw etc.,” is substituted the following: “some of the Allied and Associated Governments are now being pressed to withdraw etc.,” and paragraph 4 instead of the words “the last year” is substituted “the last 12 months.”

(These alterations are approved and the letter is signed by the Four Heads of State. The letter is then taken by Mr Philip Kerr to the Japanese Embassy, where it is signed by the Marquis Saionji. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate the letter to the Secretary-General with instructions to dispatch it, in the name of the Conference to Admiral Kolchak.

Note. The Marquis Saionji, when appending his signature, asks that the letter should not be published until a reply is received. Sir Maurice Hankey makes a communication in this sense to the Secretary-General.)


4. The general clauses, namely, Articles 47 to 50 of the military, naval and air clauses for inclusion in the Austrian Treaty, which had previously been initialed by the other three Heads of Governments, are initialed by S Orlando, who withdraws his previous objections.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Secretary-General, for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


5. A from the Austrian Delegation at St. Germain contained in is read.

Mr Lloyd George says he thinks a different procedure ought to be adopted with Austria from that adopted with Germany. The two cases are not really comparable. The Austro-Hungarian Empire has broken up, one half is friendly, and the other half, consisting of Austria and Hungary, he believes at any rate is not unfriendly. They are not in the same category as Prussia. Consequently, would it not be worth while, he asks, to give a different reply to what had been given to Germany? In his view, the question of compensation and the question of the military terms could not be ready for some time, perhaps 9 or 10 days. But a good many parts of the Treaty are ready, for example, the boundaries with Austria and with Hungary.

President Wilson says that the southern boundary of Austria is not yet ready.

Mr Lloyd George says it could be settled in a very short time. Ports, Waterways and Railways are ready, as are the Economic Clauses. He suggests that these should be handed to the Austrians, but that the question of reparation and the military clauses should be reserved and that the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers should be asked to meet the Austrian experts in regard to these. He does not mean that the Council of Four itself should meet the Austrians, but that our experts should meet their experts in regard to compensation and the military terms, which they should discuss with them on general lines.

M Clemenceau says that the experts will require very precise instructions.

President Wilson says that we know exactly what the experts think on the subject. He then reads a weekly list of outstanding subjects which has been prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey. He notes Sir Maurice Hankey’s statement that no communication had been made to the Drafting Committee about the boundaries between Italy and Austria.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that these should be settled today.

President Wilson says that, according to his recollection, there has been a general understanding that Austria should be treated somewhat differently from Germany. Consequently, he agreed with Mr Lloyd George’s proposal to get the experts together.

S Orlando asks if it would not be possible to have these questions roughly settled. He thought the outstanding questions could be arranged in 2 or 3 days, and then the negotiations could start. The difference of treatment to the Austrian Delegation would not be well understood in Italy, where Austria had always been regarded as the principal enemy. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had dissolved and the different States forming out of it are regarded with mixed feelings by Italy, some friendly and some otherwise. Austria, however, is regarded as the principal enemy. To adopt a different procedure would create a very painful impression in Italy. It would be felt there that the Italian contest with Austria was not taken very seriously. He agreed that in very rapid decision was necessary, but he did not see why one or two questions should not be left in suspense while proposals as to the remainder of the Peace Treaty were handed to the Austrians. To adopt a totally different procedure would create a very bad impression in Italy without any useful result. If in 3 or 4 days a sufficient portion of the Treaty could be assembled and handed to the Austrians, so as not to give an impression of a piecemeal presentation, he would not object.

Mr Lloyd George says that Italy must really understand the fact that the peace of Austria is entirely different from that of Germany. Supposing Bavaria and Saxony had broken off from Prussia before the war came to an end and had perhaps even fought against Prussia, it would have been impossible for the Allies to take the line they had. For one thing, there would have been no representatives of the German Empire to meet. Consequently, a different line must be pursued and he could not see why Italy should not agree to a different procedure. He doubted if either the question of the military terms or the compensation could be settled in 3 or 4 days. If so, the settlement would be a bad one.

M Clemenceau says that he is ready to make every effort to meet S Orlando, because he had learned from experience that, when the Allies were not in agreement with Italy, the immediate result was anti-French and sometimes even pro-German demonstrations in Italy that were extraordinarily disagreeable. He wants, above all things, to avoid any differences with Italy. When, however, S Orlando suggested that it had been agreed to adopt the same procedure for Austria as that for Germany, this was not the fact. S Orlando had not been present when the decision had been taken, for reasons over which his colleagues had no control. It was in his absence that the new procedure had been agreed on. All he sought was a reasonable agreement in a reasonable way. The Austrian Peace is very different from, and, in many respects, much harder to arrive at, than the German, for the reason that the country had fallen to pieces, raising all sorts of questions of boundaries and there were conflicts arising on the Polish front and elsewhere in the late Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Istria, he learned that trenches and barbed wire were being put up by both sides. President Wilson had come to Europe with a program of peace for all men. His ideal is a very high one, but it involves great difficulties owing to these centuries-old hatreds between some races. We had in Central Europe to give each what was his due not only between them, but even between ourselves. For example, to take the question of disarmament. S Orlando had been good enough to visit him on the previous day to discuss the question of Dalmatia; but the Yugoslavs would not agree to disarm themselves while Italy adopted her present attitude. He, himself, is not in a position to oppose Italy in this matter, because France had put her signature to the Treaty of 1915, but it is not a question that can be decided in two or three days. Referring again to S Orlando’s visit, he says the principal subject for discussion had been the anti-French manifestations in Italy. S Orlando said that there was an improvement, but since then he had received two dispatches from M Barrère which indicate the situation to be worse. There was a pronounced pro-German propaganda in Italy, where enormous sums were being expended by Germany. All this ought to be stopped and there is only one way to stop it. It is necessary to have the courage to tackle and solve the most difficult questions as soon as possible. It is not at all easy to do so and could only be done if S Orlando would take the standpoint that he must preserve the Entente with his Allies. He recalled that, in the previous weeks, he had a serious disagreement with Mr Lloyd George on the question of Syria when both had spoken very frankly. Nevertheless, both had concluded by saying that they would not allow their differences to upset the Entente. The same is not said in certain quarters in Italy. Hence, he maintains that these questions cannot be settled in three days. Consequently, it is impossible to meet the Austrians with a complete Treaty as had been done in the case of the Germans. If S Orlando would agree, he thinks a start might be made by getting discussions between the experts, which would gain time. It was very hard to settle all these extraordinarily difficult questions rapidly. President Wilson adheres to his principles as applicable to the Austrian Treaty. France and Great Britain admitted the principles, but also did not deny that they were bound by their signature of the Treaty of 1915. If S Orlando wanted a settlement, he must discuss it with the supreme desire to maintain the Entente and meanwhile a plan must be found to keep the Austrian Delegation quiet. We should tell them that the Treaty is not ready, but that it would be useful to have certain discussions with their experts. He does not want to embarrass S Orlando in Italy and if this would be the result, he would withdraw every word he had said, but he is very anxious that the Austrian Delegates should not return to Vienna.

S Orlando thanks M Clemenceau most sincerely for what he had said, which was absolutely frank and clear. He does not wish to refer in detail to the troubles in Italy. The impressions he has received from Italy differ from M Barrère’s reports, which, according to his own account, re exaggerated. Nevertheless, he does not deny that the situation in Italy is extraordinarily grave. It could be excused and justified if it was recalled how Mr Lloyd George before his visit to London had informed his colleagues that if he had to return to England without being able to show a considerable step towards peace, the position would be very serious. It is exactly the same now in regard to Italy. The trouble there arises from uncertainty. Once the Italian claims are settled it will be found that Italy is as sincerely loyal to the cause of the Entente as before. He is absolutely sure that the present disquieting phenomena in Italy are due to anxiety and uncertainty. Like M Clemenceau, he, himself, had decided to remain always with the Entente and to run all the personal risks involved. He feels he cannot be accused of adopting too uncompromising a spirit. He has always made every effort to reach an agreement, including the recent conversations with Colonel House and Mr Miller, where he had discussed proposals involving very grievous renunciations by Italy. He thanked M Clemenceau for his courageous words in favour of tackling the main problems, difficult and complex as they were. But, having regard to the excitement of public opinion, he asks why this should be still further excited by questions of procedure. In the present exciting state of affairs and in view of the exasperation in Italy, if questions of procedure are added, an irritation would be caused which would produce an effect contrary to what was desired. This was his only reason for anxiety.

President Wilson asks whether S Orlando in his remarks had not really suggested the way out. He had suggested to say to the Austrians that by Wednesday or Thursday all matters would be laid before them which could be settled directly, but that some questions that could not be settled directly would be reserved.

S Orlando says that President Wilson had correctly interpreted his views and he would accept his suggestions.

Mr Lloyd George says it only remains to divide the Treaty of Peace into two categories.

President Wilson says he had assumed that the only reserved questions would be the military terms and reparation.

Sir Maurice Hankey says that Mr Headlam-Morley had come to him that morning and had told him that the Economic Clauses were based on the assumption that Austria was to be a continuation of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, but that the Financial Clauses were drawn on the assumption that Austria was a new state. He had urged that the whole Treaty of Peace wants examination from this point of view.

Mr Lloyd George questions whether Mr Headlam-Morley’s description of the Economic Clauses is correct.

(It was agreed that the Treaty of Peace should be handed to the Austrians in the course of the present week, but that the military terms and reparation clauses should be reserved for discussion with Austrian experts.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a reply to the Austrian Delegation to give effect to this decision.)


6. President Wilson draws attention to a copy of a letter he had received, which had been addressed by the Secretary-General to Mr Barnes in regard to the participation of Germany in the new Organization contemplated for Labor. From this letter he reads the following extract:

“Consequently, I would be grateful to you for informing the Washington Conference that Germany will be admitted after the closing of the Conference, and under conditions expressed in the letter of May 15th of the Labour Commission.”

This letter, President Wilson points out, does not carry out the decision of the Council, which had merely consisted in a recommendation to the Labor Conference at Washington that Germany should be admitted, but had left the final decision to the Conference.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to call the attention of the Secretary-General to this error.)


7. A letter is read from Marshal Foch somewhat in the Allowing sense:

At the Meeting of the 19th inst. the Council communicated to the Marshal a decision that after May 27th the Army under his command should be ready to advance, in the event of the German reply calling for immediate action. He was instructed to make his dispositions so that the advance might be in the best possible conditions. This implies the following:

(i) Administrative measures to ensure that the effectives were completed, by bringing back personnel on leave.

(ii) Tactical movements; that is to say, concentration of all the necessary forces.

(iii) Not to keep the troops waiting too long in expectation of movements; that is to say, it was desirable to take the last measures as late as possible, and not more than three days before they should be executed.
He recalled that he had been instructed to delay until May 30 the final measures so far as the French Army is concerned. Tactical measures, however, must begin on May 27th, hence it is necessary that he should receive orders before 16:00 today, so that he could either give a counter order or confirm his previous orders. Consequently, he asks to have May 30th confirmed as the date on which he is to resume his march, or otherwise.

President Wilson suggests the reply should be that three days’ notice would be given to Marshal Foch as soon as the Council knows if action is necessary.

Mr Lloyd George and M Clemenceau agree.

(M Clemenceau undertakes to instruct Marshal Foch accordingly.)


8. M Clemenceau says he has received a letter from Dr Benes, who wants to be heard on the Military and Financial questions.

(It is agreed that Dr Benes should be heard, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a reply.)


9. M Clemenceau hands Sir Maurice Hankey a Note prepared for the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers by the Council of Foreign Ministers, dealing with Boundaries in the Banat.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to translate and circulate the Note.)


10. M Clemenceau hands Sir Maurice Hankey a letter received from the Marquis Saionji, asking that in ordinary circumstances Japan might be represented on the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a polite reply to the effect that Japan would be invited whenever questions particularly affecting her were under consideration.)


11. M Clemenceau reads a Note from the Secretary-General, suggesting that the letter forwarded by the German Delegation on May 17th concerning provisions contained in Article 438 of the Conditions of Peace (Religious Missions) should be referred to the Committee appointed to deal with political questions outside Europe, composed of Messrs Beer (America), Macleay (British Empire), de Peretti (France), della Torretta (Italy), Chinda (Japan).

(This proposal is approved, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General accordingly.)


12. A letter from the German Delegation, dated May 24th, on the subject of responsibility for the consequences of the war and reparation, is read.

(It is agreed that the letter should be sent to the Commission dealing with Reparations in the Austrian Treaty, which should be asked to advise the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to the nature of the reply to be sent.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


M Lamont, M Tardieu and S Crespi attend to present the attached note from the Reparation Commission:

26 May, 1919.
[Note From the Reparation Commission to the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers]

The Commission, sitting this morning, has heard the Delegations of the Powers having special interests.

After the departure of these Delegates, the Commission, as a result of an exchange of views between Messrs. Lamont, Lord Sumner, MM Loucheur & Tardieu, think it necessary to ask the Supreme Council:

1. Whether General Smuts and Mr. Keynes, who have not attended this morning’s meeting, have been officially appointed by Mr Lloyd George, in the same way as MM Loucheur & Tardieu have been appointed by M Clemenceau, and Messrs Lamont, Baruch & Davis by President Wilson.

2. Whether the Commission is empowered to discuss the remarks made by the Delegations of the Powers having special interests, and eventually, to present before the Supreme Council new proposals both as regards the Reparation Clauses and the financial Clauses, and particularly as regards the reconsideration of the participation of small Nations in the burden of Reparations.

Mr Lloyd George asks that his decision on the first point might be reserved, as he had received a letter from General Smuts, and wishes to discuss the whole question with him before giving a reply.

In regard to the second point it is agreed that the Commission is empowered to discuss the remarks made by the Delegation of the Powers having special interests, and eventually to present before the Supreme Council new proposals both as regards the Reparation Clauses and the Financial Clauses, and particularly as regards the recommendation of the participation of small Nations in the burden of reparation.

Mr Lloyd George expresses the hope that the question should be re-discussed with an open mind, as though no decision had already been taken. He expresses his intention of instructing the British representatives in this sense.

At this point the members of the Committee on New States were introduced. The proceedings of this part of the Meeting are recorded as a separate Meeting.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 26, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:15

Meeting of the Council of Four with Members of the Committee on New States and Experts


1. The Council has before them the draft articles prepared by the Committee on New States for inclusion in the treaties with Austria and with Hungary. Committee on New States.

It is pointed out that the clauses are the same as those already approved for Poland, except that the special clauses relating to the Jews are not included. These are believed to be unnecessary in the case of Austria, where the situation was different in that respect to the situation in Poland.

President Wilson raises the question whether it would not be better to include these clauses, even if unnecessary, in the Treaty with Austria to avoid giving offence to Poland, but did not press the point.

Mr Headlam-Morley asks whether Austria is regarded as a new State or as an old State, the inheritor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Some parts of the Treaty appeared to have been drafted on the former hypothesis, some on the latter. It is dangerous to treat Austria as possessing the rights formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He produces a Memorandum and some draft articles which he had prepared on the subject.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that there is a good deal in this idea, and proposes that the point should be examined by the Drafting Committee.

S Orlando says that the question will require careful consideration and that at first sight he is not favorably impressed by the suggestion. He thinks it is creating a new precedent.

M Clemenceau entirely supports S Orlando.

President Wilson thinks that S Orlando has not entirely realized the difficulty. The Austro-Hungarian Empire is in an entirely special position.

(It is decided to refer this point to the Drafting Committee who should be authorized either to deal with the matter themselves or to take such advice as might seem to them requisite.)

(The draft clauses relating to minorities are approved).


2. President Wilson says he has received no reply yet from the Luxembourg Government, but he read a press announcement according to which the reply was that the Luxembourg Government is ready to send a deputation to Paris, and would like to know on which day it would be received.

(It is agreed that the Deputation should be heard on Wednesday afternoon, May 28th.)


3. Sir Maurice Hankey says he has consulted the British member of the Drafting Committee, and that the whole Drafting Committee had considered subsequently the question of the date on which the Treaty of Peace could be handed to the Austrians, omitting the Military terms and the Reparation clauses. The Drafting Committee had expressed doubt as to whether the Treaty could possibly be ready by Saturday next. One reason for this is that the printing of the Treaty in the Italian as well as in the French and English languages increases the length of time required by the printers.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that it might be presented in typewritten form.

(It is agreed to discuss the matter with the Drafting Committee on the following day).


4. Sir Maurice Hankey hands round a draft reply which he had prepared under instructions from the Council. Certain amendments are suggested and Sir Maurice Hankey is asked to prepare a fresh draft.


5. S Orlando raises as a point of urgency the fighting which is continuing between the Austrians and Slovenes. He said that the Austrian Delegation at St Germain has made an appeal to the Allied and Associated Powers to intervene. Southern Boundaries of Austria. Carinthia.

(After a considerable discussion, in the course of which the appointment of an Armistice Commission is proposed and rejected, it is agreed that the best plan would be to settle the frontiers of Austria first, and then insist on the withdrawal of both forces behind those frontiers.

It is therefore decided to meet the Foreign Ministers and the Expert Commission which had considered this question on the following afternoon.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to circulate a document communicated by M Pachitch.)

6. Sir Maurice Hankey hands round a copy of a letter addressed by the Ukrainian Delegation to General Botha, together with General Botha’s reply (Appendix II). Polish-Ukrainian Armistice

(It was agreed that this question should not be discussed until Mr Paderewski’s arrival.)


7. M Clemenceau says he wishes to make a last appeal to his Italian colleague. The situation has fortunately not as yet reached the worst point of gravity. Nevertheless, it is necessary to present the terms to the Austrians very shortly, and consequently it is impossible to leave them much longer at St Germain without a conversation. Yesterday he had seen S Orlando, and had explained to him the gravity of the present situation for France as well as for Italy. S Orlando with his usual open-mindedness, had said that some proposal must be made. First, however, some definite conversations must take place. He does not want to anticipate S Orlando’s proposals, but he hopes that some proposal would be made to get out of the difficulty. It would be an immeasurable relief, even if an unsatisfactory solution could be reached, and this relief would extend not only to Governments, but to peoples. If S Orlando is not prepared to propose anything today, he hopes he would do so as early as possible.

S Orlando says that, as he had remarked this morning, it would be a veritable liberation to get a solution, and he is fully in accord with M Clemenceau on this, and he thanks him for raising the question. M Clemenceau had stated his own sentiments perfectly. M Clemenceau had asked what was the decision of Italy? When this question had been discussed here between April 15th and April 20th, a marked difference had been shown between the maximum demands of Italy and the common views of all the Allied and Associated Powers. On April 20th he himself had said that, given the situation in which Italy had to renounce everything outside the Treaty of London, he would insist on adherence to the Treaty of London with all that it involved. He recognised, however, that this would divide him and his Allies from President Wilson, for the Allies stated that they would adhere to the Treaty although they were not perhaps in accord with it. But President Wilson said that he was not in accord with it and not bound by it. Thus, a difference would be created between the United States on one hand, and France and Great Britain on the other, and this was very undesirable. From the Italian point of view, what he desired was some transaction which would involve an agreement, but, failing that, he must claim the Treaty, however undesirable. He would seek every way of conciliation. For example, there had been the proposals of Mr Lloyd George between April 20th and 23rd. Later, there had been the discussions between Col House and Mr Miller and himself. He desires ardently to get out of the difficulty with the agreement of everyone. But, if not, he must demand the Treaty of London.

President Wilson says that he fears they are somewhat in danger of getting into a cul-de-sac. He wants very earnestly to point out to his Italian colleague the situation as it presents itself to him as a whole. We cannot move in two opposite directions at once, and yet the Italians appear to be trying to do so. The Treaty of London was made in circumstances which had now altogether altered. He is not referring now to the fact of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but to the partnership of the world in the development of peace, and the attention which had been directed by plain work-a-day people to this partnership as a basis of peace. When the Treaty of London had been entered into, there had only been a partnership between a few Great Powers - Russia, France, Great Britain, with Belgium and Serbia, against Germany, Austria and Turkey. As Belgian and Serbian soil had been violated, the only voluntary partners were France, Great Britain and Russia. He understood that these Powers had wished to induce Italy to become a partner, and for this reason had entered into the Treaty of London. At that time the world had not perceived that the war was a matter of common concern. He knew this because his own people had gone through this phase. He himself, probably before most of his people, saw the effect that the war was going to have on the future destinies and political development of the world. Slowly, at first very slowly, the world had seen that something was being done which cut at the roots of individual liberty and action. When that was realized, there was a common impulse to unite against the Central Empires. Thus, there came into the war many peoples whose interest was absolutely separate from any territorial question that was European in character. They came in for motives that had no connection with territory or any advantage. They sought only the emancipation of the world from an intolerable threat. Then there came new ideas, and the people of the world began to perceive that they had a common purpose. They realized that it was not only Belgium and Serbia, but all the small States that were threatened. Next there was a realization of the rights of minorities and small groups of all kinds. The light broadened out into a perception of the final settlement that was at hand. It was about this time that he himself had made his address to Congress on the results of the war. His own address had taken place, he thought, three days after Mr Lloyd George’s address to the House of Parliament. The only difference between the two addresses was that he summed up his in 14 points. Both his speech and that of the Prime Minister of Great Britain contained the same line of thought and ideas. They stated in their speeches what was coming into the consciousness of the world. When the Armistice was reached, his own statements had been accepted as the basis not only of the Armistice, but also of the peace. These ideas had by this time taken possession of all the world, and even the Orient was beginning to share them. Then came the League of Nations as a practical thing. Up to then it had been regarded as of academic interest, and the nations of the world desired to achieve peace on that basis; hence, when the Peace conference began, the whole platform of the Peace had been laid down. This platform had no relation to the ideas which belonged to the old order in European politics, namely, that the stronger Powers could dispose of the weaker. Great Britain and France had no right because they were strong to hand over peoples who were weak. The new conception did not admit of this. If these principles were insisted on, they would violate the new principles. There would then be a reaction among the small nations that would go to the very heart of the Peace of the world: for all these small nations, when they saw other nations handed over, would say, “Our turn will come next.” One of the reasons for which the United States people had gone to war was that they were told that the old-fashioned methods were dead. Hence, if Italy insisted on the Treaty of London, she would strike at the roots of the new system and undermine the new order. The United States would be asked under the Covenant of the League of Nations to guarantee the boundaries of Italy, and they could not do so if this Treaty were insisted on. There was one question which would not be susceptible of solution. If Italy insisted on the Treaty of London, as M. Clemenceau had pointed out, we could not ask Yugoslavia to reduce her army below the point necessary to maintain her safety against Italy. Yugoslavia would never do it. It would be impossible to use force against her - against the very power whose violation had caused the outbreak of the present war. This process could not be repeated to accomplish the ends the Italians had in view. If he was to be the spokesman and the spiritual representative of his people, he could not consent to any people being handed over without their consent. But he could consent to any people being handed over who stated that they wished to be. He was willing that Italy should have any part on the eastward slope of the Istrian Peninsula whose population would vote to be attached to Italy. Only he could not assent to any population being attached that did not so vote. He wanted to point out to S Orlando that Great Britain and France could not hand over any part of Yugoslavia to Italy, and that it could not be a legal transaction, except in accordance with the general peace - that is to say, only in the event of all parties being in agreement. It was constantly urged in the Italian Press and by Italian spokesmen that they did not want to abandon the Italians on the other side of the Adriatic. Was it not possible to obtain all she desired by means of a plebiscite? There would be no risk to Italy to leave the operation of a plebiscite to be carried out under the League of Nations. Italy herself would be a member of the League of Nations, and there would be no possibility of her being treated unfairly. If Italy did not take advantage of this, she would be establishing her enemies on her eastern borders. Thus there would be a beginning again of the evils that had arisen in the Balkans. Beyond the boundaries of Italy would be the Yugoslavs with their eyes turned towards the population which had been placed under Italy by the powerful Western nations. It was impossible for Italy to adopt both methods. Either she must abandon the new methods altogether, or else she must wholly abandon the old methods and enter into the new world with the new methods under conditions more hopeful for peace than had ever before prevailed.

S Orlando says he has no difficulty in recognizing that President Wilson’s speech was perfectly logical, provided that his hypotheses were correct. What he disputes, however, is the correctness of these hypotheses. He cannot admit that the Treaty of London is a violation of the principles of justice and right. The Treaty of London had merely anticipated the boundaries which would have to be drawn. All through the present Conference terrible problems have presented themselves, involving ethnical, geographical, strategical and other considerations, and in every case great difficulties have had to be surmounted in order to reach a solution. The Treaty of London had merely anticipated these difficulties. The Treaty of London was indeed a compromise transaction. It was a compromise because of the renunciation by Italy of Fiume and half of Dalmatia. including the Italian towns of Spalato and Trau. It was a compromise because of the admixture of races. Hence, he could not admit the premise of President Wilson that the Treaty of London was, without discussion, a violation of right and justice. Whether it was good or bad, it was a compromise. Experience showed that for Italy it was a bad compromise, because Italy did not get satisfaction on Fiume. He deeply regretted this, but accepted it in a spirit of compromise. However, if the Treaty was not acceptable another solution must be sought. He much regrets that he cannot possibly accept a plebiscite. His first reason for rejecting it is that it would prolong the present state of anxiety in Italy. His second objection is the complexity of the problems. He cannot deny, for example, that on the eastern slope of the Istrian Alps, the majority of the inhabitants are Slavs. Consequently, a plebiscite would not give the right result to Italy. But in this case he had to seek a different principle from the ethnographical principle, namely, that the line of the Alps was the defense of his country. His third reason - and he does not wish to make comparisons detrimental to other peoples - is that there is a different state of culture in Yugoslavia from Italy, because there is a different state of civilization. It is quite true that Italian military authorities had, in many places, got on perfectly well with the inhabitants. But, nevertheless, in these conditions he cannot count with any confidence on the sincerity of the plebiscite. These are the three reasons why he cannot accept the proposal for a plebiscite. He is ready to try and find a solution, but he cannot see one at present. His conclusion unfortunately, therefore, is that an impasse has been reached. In these circumstances, what course is open to him? He has only his Treaty to make an appeal to. He was not a Shylock, demanding his pound of flesh from the Yugoslavs. Great Britain and France had given their adhesion to this arrangement. He cannot say he is satisfied with the Treaty and he regrets profoundly the difficulty it has created with the United States. But as no other way could be found out, he is bound to adhere to this attitude.

President Wilson says that he does not characterize the Treaty in the manner S Orlando had suggested, but only as inconsistent with the new order of settlements, namely, that the ethnical principle should be adopted except where other paramount considerations, such as the existence of the Alps, are introduced. If there is no doubt the principle of self-determination should be followed. He reminds S Orlando that, in the case of the Polish corridor, where very strong strategical considerations had applied, this territory had not been assigned to Poland, because there had been a solid German block, notwithstanding that the essential railway connecting Poland with the sea ran through this corridor. We had not even felt at liberty to assign the Port of Danzig itself to Poland. Moreover, he does not contemplate a plebiscite without effective supervision. If any plebiscite took place it would be carefully observed and overlooked, and no plebiscite under coercion would be accepted. In the most friendly way he wishes to ask whether if he, himself, stated his reasons publicly and made the proposal he had made this afternoon, that is, that the territory between the line of the crest of the Istrian Peninsula and the line of the Treaty of London should be granted a plebiscite, would S Orlando feel equally at liberty and justified in publicly stating his objections?

S Orlando says that he first wishes to dissipate a misunderstanding. When he had spoken of the intimidation of the Slavs, he had not spoken of anything which was likely to occur before or during a plebiscite. He spoke rather of the fears and apprehensions for the future, which would deter people from voting for Italy. Consequently, a genuine vote would not be obtained. It was not at the moment of the plebiscite that he anticipated constraint but in the future. So far as concerned Poland whatever the result of the plebiscite, some 1,700,000 Germans would be assigned to Poland. If the whole of the Italian claims are granted and the Austrian figures, notoriously inaccurate as they are, are taken as true, not half this number of aliens would be assigned to Italy. As regards President Wilson’s last question, he would naturally try and avoid any public statement, particularly at the present time when attempts were being made to reach a solution, but, if President Wilson should make such a public statement, he would reply as he had replied to-day and would give the same arguments.

President Wilson says that he hopes that before S Orlando reaches a final conclusion, he would consult with his colleagues. He hopes he would remember the difficulty of carrying out the Treaty of London, even if it were correct to. He had joined in creating a machine and method that could not be used for that purpose. He hopes that he would discuss the question again and that he is not tired of trying to find some new course.

S Orlando said that he could reply at once that whenever conciliation is proposed, he will not refuse. He therefore accepts President Wilson’s request.

M Clemenceau says that what strikes him is that S Orlando never made a proposal. From the beginning of these discussions he has never once made any definite proposal. He had made a claim to Fiume. He had applied the principle of self-determination to Fiume. But when he came to discuss Dalmatia he had dropped the principle. There was another contradiction in his method. He had claimed the Treaty of London as regards Dalmatia, but when it came to Fiume he had proposed to break the Treaty of London. Yet another argument was that, as President Wilson said, the Treaty of London was not really a solution. Supposing that France and Great Britain gave Italy the Treaty of London. It would not result in peace, and consequently did not provide a solution. Hence, the only solution put forward is not a solution. Hence, he feels that it is necessary for the methods to be changed. It might be a good plan to have a Committee of four people to examine every suggestion. If a conclusion is not reached, the Council would be the laughing stock of the world, and a position of real danger would be reached. The only solution proposed was one that would put the world in anarchy, and he hoped that when that happened nobody could say it was his fault. He cannot agree to a solution that was nothing at all but a continuation of war. Hence, he demands that the discussion should be continued. At the bottom, he is in favour of the maintenance of the Treaty of London. What President Wilson had said about the change of mind of the peoples of the world which had occurred during the war was a very serious consideration. In the earlier parts of the war, people had talked about seizure of territory, but afterwards had come the idea of the liberties of peoples and the building up of new relations. The Italians must recognize this. He is not speaking against the Italian people, but he feels it is time the Italians examined these aspects of the matter, and this is a subject to which he would call his Italian colleagues’ attention.

S Orlando says he is quite agreed to a continuation of the discussion.

M Clemenceau again insists that S Orlando never made a proposal. Today, all he could suggest was the Treaty of London, but this meant anarchy and the continuation of war. He asked S Orlando to make proposals.

S Orlando undertakes to do so.


8. The Articles for inclusion in the Treaties of Peace with Austria committee on New and Hungary, approved earlier in the afternoon, are initialed by the Four Heads of Governments.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Drafting Committee).


9. The Economic Clauses for insertion in the Treaties of Peace with Austria and Hungary, approved on the 24th inst., were initialed by the Four Heads of Governments. Economic Clauses in the Treaties of Peace With Austria & Hungary

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Drafting Committee).


10. The alterations in the Covenant of the League of Nations, approved at the morning meeting,3 (addition of Air to Naval and Military Clauses) are initialed by the League of Nations Four Heads of Governments. Alterations in the Covenant of the League of Nations

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward them to the Drafting Committee.)