100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. President Wilson says that Marshal Foch has been invited to attend the Council in order to explain his plans in the event of a refusal by the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace. The Governments have the responsibility for general affairs, but Marshal Foch has the responsibility for military affairs. If the general affairs are to be conducted correctly the Governments must know what the military plans were.

Marshal Foch says that the military action to be undertaken must have a definite aim. He asks the Governments to say what the object is that he is to provide for. There was no serious enemy force in front of the Allied Army on the Western front, but there was an enemy Government. What result do the Allied and Associated Governments require of military action? They might desire that if the German Government resists, it should be upset and replaced by a Government that would sign. If so, he will examine what the military means are for effecting it. On the contrary, they might desire more immediate and limited objects, such as the occupation of the most productive provinces of Germany, such as the Basin of the Ruhr (in Westphalia). Or again, they might desire chiefly an economic and political result. The military operation must conform to the Government’s desires. When he is given his aim, he will say what military means are available for attaining it.

M Clemenceau says he thinks the Council are already in agreement as to the principles of action. They do not seek an economic result nor a military conquest. What they seek is a political result, namely, that the Treaty of Peace should be signed as soon as possible. Germany is now prostrated, and is in such a state of weakness that as Marshal Foch had said, he has no effective military force in front of him. There are two possible methods, the soft method and the strong method for dealing with Germany. He himself is in favour of the strong method. We ought to take resolute, rough and prompt action to solve the difficulty. If we seem to hesitate, or if we merely occupy certain limited territory, his opinion is that it will give the impression to the Germans that we are weaker than before, and that our demobilization had proceeded too far. Hence, he is in favour of strong measures, and the Council ought to put it to Marshal Foch to say what they should do. For his part, he can think of nothing but a march on Berlin. This will have an immediate result on German public opinion. If this were done, it is not improbable that the present Government would fall and we should have a Government to deal with which will sign. If we do not do this, the Germans will think us weakened and only able to take milder action. He would not like to give this impression. Hence, if the Germans refuse to sign, strong military action must be taken.

President Wilson agrees.

Mr Lloyd George says he was in complete accord.

Baron Sonnino says there is no doubt of it.

Marshal Foch says that the decision is for strong action, and it is not for him to dispute it. The result he has to keep in view is to compel the Germans to sign the Treaty of Peace. To do that, it is necessary to seek out the German Government, if necessary, to destroy it, and to find another Government that is ready to sign. That is the object before him. It is now necessary for him to state the position as regards the means available to achieve this end. Today is the 16th June, 1919. Since the 11th November 1918, demobilization had proceeded far. Now he can dispose of 39 divisions for an offensive operation, namely 18 French, 10 British, 5 American and 6 Belgian. On the 11th November, 1918 he had disposed of 198 divisions. Consequently, the same effort cannot be expected now as if the war had been prolonged then. What is in front of him? The German Army on the Western front is not at all formidable. There was no serious organized military resistance sufficient to stop the advance of his 39 divisions. But Germany has a large population, amounting at present to some 65 millions. These 65 millions, in their male part, consisted largely of trained soldiers who had been demobilized, but are fully experienced in war, and capable of military action in any extemporized organization. Hence, in their advance, the Allied Army will have difficulties of a special nature to guard against. As it advances, it will have to leave garrisons of occupation to keep the population quiet. The territory to be occupied is very vast and there was 65 millions of people to be controlled. The situation is all the more formidable owing to the fact that Germany had a single Government constituting a sole central authority. It might stir up the population and create special difficulties for the Allies to keep it in order. What makes the strength of Germany is German unity. 65 millions of people are animated by the same sentiment, and are scattered over one vast territory. It is this unity that made the population so formidable. To occupy Berlin would mean an advance of 300 miles, which is a penetration of great depth. The armies will have to pass through a very densely populated district, as well as the best organized district, and the one with the strongest military traditions. To the south, this people will have the support of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. It will be a formidable task to keep this population quiet with only 39 divisions, if the German Government really set itself to work up trouble. On the other hand, if steps can be taken by political means to weaken Germany, the situation would be ameliorated. If Southern Germany could be detached by political maneuvers, the population to be kept in order would not be 65 millions, but only 45 millions. If his strategy is directed to that end, and is helped by a separatist policy, it will enable his Armies to reach Berlin. A question he puts, therefore, is as to whether the Allied and Associated Governments are willing to deal with the separate Governments of Baden, Württemberg and Bavaria, which numbers some 12 to 15 millions of people, and thus help on a solution of the military problem. If, on the other hand, he must go forward into the middle of Central Europe, he will find a resistance which might be more or less great, according to which the danger will be more or less great, while the southern flank of his Army will be exposed. Before he can reach Berlin he will have to detach so many men to safeguard the position in his rear that only a very enfeebled Army would reach there, and its southern flank would be seriously menaced. Unless the States of South Germany can be detached, as he had suggested, by some special measures, that is the situation to be faced.

President Wilson asks what Marshal Foch means by special measures.

Marshal Foch says that as these would be the first to be encountered, they should be dealt with immediately.

Mr Lloyd George asks whether Marshal Foch would release Bavaria and Württemberg from their share of the indemnity.

Marshal Foch says he will ask for a certain sum of money and something more later.

Mr Lloyd George asks if the total would be lighter.

Marshal Foch says no.

Mr Lloyd George asks what then Marshal Foch means by special treatment. What was his form of discrimination?

Marshal Foch says that they will have a pistol at their throat at the beginning.

M Clemenceau says that political and strategic questions should not be mixed up. He asks the military chiefs not to intervene in political affairs more than statesmen do in military affairs. Marshal Foch had done right to state the difficulties which he would encounter, and he appreciates the clear statement he had made on them. He ventures to think, however, that he had not put the other side sufficiently strongly. It is true that Germany has a population of 65 millions of people within the borders of the former German Empire. But they are a beaten people and know that they are beaten. Moreover, the reaction of the German people is different from that of the French, as had been proved in the Napoleonic wars. It is true that these millions include many experienced officers and hundreds of thousands, and perhaps millions of men. But they are beaten while we were successful. It is a characteristic of the German people that they cannot resist unless highly organized. He thinks that the comparison of 39 divisions now with 198 in November last is not justified, owing to the fact that we are now confronted by an entirely different military problem. For these reasons, he thinks that Marshal Foch should have put the light in the picture as well as the shade. Moreover, the material of the two forces is not comparable. As to the stories about Germany having manufactured additional war material, these have not been confirmed, and his information is that instead of ordering new material, the Germans had rather sought to sell what they had got. The Allies, on the other hand, have a marvelously complete material. There is a superfluity of motor machine guns, tanks, heavy guns and all the elaborate equipment of modern war. All experts agree that our material equipment is vastly superior. In addition, there are military aspects on which he does not feel qualified to comment in much detail. The communications would of course have to be carefully guarded, and Marshal Foch could be trusted to do that. is it necessary, however, he asks, to weaken the Army by detaching such very large forces in the rear? This of course, is a strategic and military consideration, but as a civilian, he ventures to express doubts. As regards the number of divisions, he points out that the United States divisions are of double strength and counted for two. Moreover, there is the proposed junction with the Czechoslovaks, who number some 10 or 15 divisions and are good soldiers, only lacking munitions. It is true that they were now fighting the Hungarians, but we hope to stop them quite soon. During the march through Germany, it might be possible to send them aircraft, which would help them against the Hungarians. Then there is the Polish side of the question. The weight of the evidence is that Germany means to fight in Upper Silesia. She will probably fight there whether she signs or not. The Poles, he believe, have some 20 divisions. All this leads him to think that the Allies were not in the state of feebleness that might have been inferred from Marshal Foch’s statement. Marshal Foch had spoken of a possible detachment of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. He himself is disposed to agree that it will be good military strategy to sever south Germany from the north. If the Bavarians are attacked by the Italians also, the result will be very quick, and Bavaria could then sign the Treaty on her own account. In fact, it seems to him that this was the proper way to secure the right flank and then to march direct to Berlin, while the Poles should keep on fighting the Germans in Upper Silesia. He himself does not feel very much afraid of the action by individuals, and he cites the experience of Napoleon in support of this view. If Marshal Foch thinks that the risks of marching on Berlin are too great, he will invite him to explain frankly what his views are and make other suggestions. He hopes that Marshal Foch is in favour of the hard method, but he had spoken as though our means were not equal to this, and some other method might be necessary. Strategy is Marshal Foch’s affair, and he hopes he will explain his views. If the plans have to be changed now, action must be taken at once, as only a few days are available.

President Wilson reminds Marshal Foch that a few weeks ago he had explained to the Council his whole plan on a map, and had displayed a well-thought-out plan of advance to Berlin. It had seemed then quite clear to him that a march could be made on Berlin. He asks if anything had happened since then to modify Marshal Foch’s views and expectations.

Marshal Foch points out that since then some time had elapsed. It is incontestable that the Germans might have some organisation by this time, although he had no definite information as to its existence. It is incontestable that material might have been manufactured. It is incontestable that German public opinion had been pulled together.

To return to the subject of discussion, he fears he must have expressed himself badly, for he had been misunderstood both in the ensemble and in detail. The Allies have all the forces necessary for breaking down the German resistance. But forces would have to be left behind for occupying a great part of Germany. This would greatly reduce the forces which could appear before Berlin, and we should cut a poor figure if the occupation of the places in the rear had reduced the Army too far.

His idea had always been to adopt a separatist strategy, but to make certain of this it was necessary that he should be supported by political action. Hence, he would ask the Governments not to insist on pursuing a policy of obtaining the signature of the German Government as a whole only in Berlin, but to allow him to obtain the signature of the different parts, e. g. Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, etc., etc., separately, so as to help him in his campaign. By this means they would weaken the final resistance of Prussia which is the last enemy.

President Wilson says that the suggestion is worth considering as the armies begin to advance. The only question which arises today, however, is as to whether Marshal Foch is prepared to develop the plan he had explained for the march on Berlin.

Marshal Foch says that he could only state that he could do so subject to some reserves. He cannot go very far unless he is able to develop the plan of separatist strategy which he had just explained, or unless other forces are put at his disposal beyond those that were now available.

M Clemenceau says he must frankly state his impression that Marshal Foch’s plan is unacceptable. The situation is too grave for anyone to conceal what he felt. He reminds Marshal Foch that some three weeks ago he had explained very freely and without any reserves his plan, and second that he had then displayed complete confidence as to its practicability. Today, however, he asks that it should be accompanied by political action, otherwise the strategical plan of an advance on Berlin could not be carried out. In fact, when asked what he could do in a military way, he replied by saying: “Give me a good policy and I will give you a good strategy”. Does he ask for negotiations with Bavaria? are the Allied and Associated Powers to send High Commissioners to Munich? Are they to institute a Government there, or what? To do this would be to endanger our prestige, and for his part he could not undertake it. If the march on Berlin is, in Marshal Foch’s opinion, impossible, the question must be discussed in order to see what can be done. He had not been prepared for this, in view of Marshal Foch’s confidence on the last occasion. Marshal Foch now says he must make reservations if a certain policy is not adopted in South Germany. This would be to put the responsibility on to the civilians. He knows, however, that Marshal Foch had never refused to undertake responsibility in the war, and he is certain he would not fail now. Hence, he must ask him to complete his program and say what can be done. As regards the plan he had proposed, he himself must make express reserves. If the Allies devoted themselves to the encirclement of Bavaria, the Germans would fall on the Poles in Upper Silesia, and this was the reason he could not agree. Strategy is not his profession, and he does not desire to oppose his views to those whose lives have been devoted to it. If the situation is as Marshal Foch has described, he would have expected to have suggested the intervention of the Italians. This would have been a good negotiation to undertake. He is prepared to consider and discuss this. In leaving Marshal Foch the other day, however, he had felt that everything was all right. He did not complain if Marshal Foch had reflected over the matter, and now felt some disquietude. He felt it right to say, however, that the time is now pressing. If, in five days time, the Germans refused to sign, and the best reply that the Allies could give was a slow march along the Rhine Valley, he thinks the Germans would not be impressed.

Mr Lloyd George says that Marshal Foch is Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army, that is, of the American and British, as well as of the French Armies. Some weeks ago, he was asked to give his advice as to the military action to be taken. The Council had also asked for naval advice, and both the military and the naval advice had been given. Marshal Foch had then explained the whole situation. How he would advance with one flank on one river valley, and another flank on another river valley, making a corridor right up to Berlin. Marshal Foch had then told the Council exactly what troops were at his disposal. He had never said they were not sufficient. He did say to President Wilson; “please cancel the departure of two divisions” and President Wilson had done so. Then he had explained how the French Army was quite ready and he had turned to him and said “the British are not ready”. He had immediately placed himself in communication with the Secretary of State for War, who was in Paris, and had asked Marshal Foch to see Mr Churchill and General Wilson He himself had felt the matter to be so important that he had sent for Mr Churchill on the same afternoon, and Mr Churchill had replied that he was taking immediate steps to put matters right. He believed that this had been done. If it had not, it would be done at once. Now, Marshal Foch says he had doubts and reservations. President Wilson had asked him, “Supposing the Allies preferred to stick to your old plan, are you ready to march”. He had replied, “No”, that is, he had replied with reserves. It is very strange that he had only just told the Council this. Marshal Foch had said that changes had taken place in Germany. If so, surely Marshal Foch ought to have told the Council before what these changes were. He understands that Marshal Foch had just been to Luxemburg. He had not come back specially to tell the Council all that he had discovered. He had only come to the Council because he was pressed to come. If Marshal Foch thought that the plan he had explained three weeks ago was inadequate, as Allied Commander-in-Chief, it was his business to inform the Council. When had he discovered this inadequacy? Was it in Luxemburg? Or was it last week? The Council had never refused to see Marshal Foch. If he said he had something urgent to speak about, they would always see him. Certainly, if he had said, “I cannot carry out my plan”, they would have seen him. As the representative of one of the Governments which was proud to have its Army commanded by such a distinguished soldier as Marshal Foch, he felt he had a right to complain that Marshal Foch had never raised this question until it was almost too late for the Governments. What he feared was that Marshal Foch was mixing up politics with strategy. He hoped that Marshal Foch would not mind his saying that he feared he was allowing his judgment on political matters to create doubts in his judgment on strategical matters. The Allies had always trusted Marshal Foch, and the events of last year had shown them to be right in doing so, so long as he confined his judgment to purely military matters. He asked therefore, again for a purely military opinion from Marshal Foch. If a wrong decision was taken now, he would meet trouble in the House of Commons, and M Clemenceau would meet it in the Chamber, while President Wilson would also have his troubles. Therefore, he entreats Marshal Foch to give them the military opinion. In so important a matter, he felt it would be best to have a written opinion. He himself agreed with M Clemenceau that we must be prepared to march resolutely. If we are not able to do so, he is prepared to go back to England and to say that the Army needs strengthening, but he must know how much it needed. He is not prepared to advance on Berlin on the strength of anything that Marshal Foch had said today.

President Wilson adds that if Marshal Foch says his forces were insufficient, he is prepared to ask for troops to be sent back from the United States of America, but to enable him to ask for these, he must be able to tell Congress that Marshal Foch declared that 39 divisions was not enough.

Mr Lloyd George then reads extracts from the procès-verbaux of the 10th May and 19th May where Marshal Foch had explained his plans.

Marshal Foch says that things had really been attributed to him that he had never said. The plan decided on between him and the military advisers of the Allied and Associated Governments is still the basis he proposed. Incontestably, the Armies could begin their advance and could capture Weimar. As they advanced towards Berlin, however, their advance would become more difficult owing to the heavy responsibilities imposed upon them.

If some sort of military anemia set in, the march on Berlin would be more difficult, and he must state that he had never said the Armies could reach Berlin. What he had in mind was that the Armies could not get very far unless a separatist strategy was adopted. All he asked for was that his separatist strategy should be supported by a separatist policy. He would say again that he was ready to start with the existing forces but that as the advance proceeded, a separatist policy must follow a separatist strategy. He said he was quite prepared to give his views in writing on this important question.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch should present his views to the Council in writing.)

(Marshal Foch withdraws, the experts on Reparation are introduced, and their discussions recorded as a separate meeting.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:15

Meeting of the Council of Five


The Council had before them the Financial, Economic and Reparation Clauses proposed for insertion in the Treaty with Austria.

1. President Wilson draws attention to a proposal from the American Delegation, which is read by Mr Davis, for the insertion in the Economic Clauses providing for the protection of certain German-Austrian assets in the ceded territories, in the same way that German assets in the districts ceded to Poland had been protected in the Treaty with Germany.

Mr Lloyd George expresses himself as in complete agreement with these proposals. He says he has had a communication from the British representative in Vienna pointing out that Vienna had been and is the financial center of the groups of territories which formed the Austro-Hungarian Empire and that if the Economic Clauses are allowed to stand in their present form the banks of Vienna would collapse. Moreover it is scarcely in the interest of the new States to destroy those banks.

Mr Davis points out that widely extended insurance interests are also in question.

(It is agreed that a Sub-Committee composed of Mr Baruch, S Crespi, M Loucheur, and Col Peel should draft provisions in accordance with Mr Davis’s proposals for insertion in the Economic Clauses.)


2. Sir Maurice Hankey points out that a clause respecting buildings of historical value which had been passed by the Council on June 4th had been omitted.

(It is directed that the clause should be inserted in the Financial Clauses.)


3. M Loucheur then calls attention to the fact that the Reparation Clauses have been passed by the Council subject to the conclusion of satisfactory agreements with the New States as to the payment of contributions by the New States or the adjustment of their claims. M Loucheur explains that he has lately been entrusted with the negotiations to this end. He has approached the Romanians and proposed that they should not be required to take over any of the Austrian war debt or pre-war debt and should not be asked to pay any contribution to the cost of the war and that in return for this they should renounce all claim to reparation. He has not yet had a reply but is disposed to think they will agree. He thinks the Serbians will also agree to an arrangement on the same lines though there will be a balance of payment due to them as their claim for reparation was greater than in the case of Romania. Negotiations in a favorable sense are also in progress with Italy in respect of the Trentino. He has not yet negotiated with those States which have no claims against the enemy, viz:—Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as he wished to settle first with Serbia and Romania. He asks for two days more in which to conclude the negotiations.

Baron Sonnino asks who is, then, to be responsible for the prewar debt and war debt in the ceded Austrian territories.

M Loucheur says that he imagines the Austrian Government will be responsible.

Mr Lloyd George says that he cannot agree with this proposal. He does not understand that it had ever been suggested and he is sure that the Austrian Government is quite incapable of sustaining such a burden.

Mr Davis says that he also had not understood that this proposal was to be made and pointed out that it would involve the re-casting of the Financial Clauses.

(It is agreed that M Loucheur should explain his proposals to the Sub-Committee appointed to consider the amendment of the Financial Clauses.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 17:45

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. The initials of the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are given to the following documents:

(a) Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.

(b) General Clauses.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate these to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


2. The Political Clauses for the Austrian Treaty as submitted by the Committee of Foreign Ministers or their representatives are approved and initialed by the representatives of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The remainder of the Political Clauses dealing with Economic and Financial matters which had been approved on Friday, June 6th, are also initialed.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate both the above to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee.)


3. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to notify the Secretary-General that the various additions to complete the Treaty of Peace with Austria, which had been approved during the day, namely, the Military Clauses and Political Clauses, should be forwarded to the Austrian Delegation as soon as the Drafting Committee had put them into final shape.


4. Baron Sonnino said that at Constantinople there is a Venetian Palace which Italy would like to acquire as part of her share of reparation. The Venetian coat-of-arms is on the Palace and it has been used as the Austrian Embassy in Constantinople. Italy has not been able to claim it under the addition to the financial clauses relating to palaces in transferred territory. The Palace has been occupied by the Italians since the Armistice when the Austrians had gone out of it. They only ask for it as a part of their share of reparation, according to its value. To grant this would hurt no-one and would give great historical satisfaction from a Venetian point of view.

President Wilson says it is introducing a new principle to transfer buildings in foreign territory in this way.

Baron Sonnino reads Article 260 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany to show that the principle is not a new one. He proposes the following draft:

“The ‘Palace of Venice’ in Constantinople, other buildings affeetés for the use of the Embassy, of the Consulate, schools and of the Austro-Hungarian hospital in the same city and their annexes, as well as the church and the convent of Saint - Mary in Draperia, will be given up in Italy in count of repairs."

Mr Lloyd George says that this draft will enable the British Government to confiscate the German Embassy in London. Neither the British nor the American, nor the French Government proposes to confiscate the German Embassy in their capital. It is a great pity this question had not been examined earlier as he has no one to advise him in regard to it.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the proposal of the Italian Delegation should be referred to the Reparations Commission.)


5. M Clemenceau says he has received a reply from the Hungarian Government to the proposals for an armistice. This is read.

(After some discussion it is agreed that the question should be referred to General Bliss to advise as to the proposal of the Hungarian Government that the Military Commanders of the Hungarian Army on the one hand, and of the Czechoslovak and Romanian Armies on the other, should be brought together to confer as to the best means of withdrawing behind the line proposed.

General Bliss should be authorized to confer with the Czecho-Slovak and Romanian delegates in Paris on the subject.

President Wilson asks Sir Maurice Hankey to write to General Bliss on his behalf.)


6. Baron Makino says he is now prepared to agree to the draft declaration in regard to Religious Missions.

Baron Sonnino says he is also prepared to agree.

(It is agreed that those governments who are in diplomatic relations with the Vatican should communicate this declaration to the representative of the Vatican in Paris.

President Wilson asks Sir Maurice Hankey to communicate this decision to Mr Lansing.)


7. Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Venizelos is in favour of the calling of attention to infractions of the articles relating to the rights of Minorities being permissible only to States Members of the Council of the League of Nations.

President Wilson says that Dr Benes is of the same view.

M Clemenceau says he had not asked the question to Mr Vesnitch.

Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Paderewski had written him a long letter on the subject.

President Wilson suggests that a decision should be taken in favour of action only by members of the Council of the League of Nations.

(It is agreed that the right of drawing attention to infractions of the Articles relating to the rights of Minorities should be limited to States Members of the Council of the League of Nations.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, June 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr. Lloyd George’s Residence at 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 18:45

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. There is a short discussion as to the attitude taken up by Marshal Foch in regard to the possibility of an advance on Berlin. Attention is drawn to the contrast between Marshal Foch’s confidence a few weeks ago and his attitude at the meeting earlier in the afternoon. It is generally agreed that nothing had been elicited from the Marshal which gave a satisfactory explanation of this change, which had been felt most to be due to his desire for the adoption of a separatist policy. In this connection it is pointed out that ever since his visit to London after the Armistice, the Marshal had been aiming at certain objects rather on the old fashioned lines of policy.

M Clemenceau asks that a decision as to the action to be taken might be postponed for twenty-four hours as he wishes to consult Marshal Pétain and perhaps Marshal Foch himself.


2. The Declaration by the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France in regard to the occupation of the Rhine Provinces is signed by President Wilson, M Clemenceau and Mr Lloyd George.




Appendix to CF–73A
Declaration by the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France in Regard to the Occupation of the Rhine Provinces

The Allied and Associated Powers do not insist on making the period of occupation last until the Reparation Clauses are completely executed, because they assume that Germany would be obliged to give every proof of her good will and every necessary guarantee before the end of the fifteen years’ time.

As the cost of occupation involves an equivalent reduction of the amount available for reparations, the Allied and Associated Powers stipulate, by Article 431 of the Treaty, that if, before the end of the fifteen years’ period, Germany has fulfilled all her obligations under the Treaty, the troops of occupation should be immediately withdrawn.

If Germany, at an earlier date, has given proofs of her goodwill and satisfactory guarantees to assure the fulfillment of her obligations the Allied and Associated Powers concerned will be ready to come to an agreement between themselves for the earlier termination of the period of occupation.

Now and henceforward, in order to alleviate the burden on the reparations bill, they agree that as soon as the Allied and Associated Powers concerned are convinced that the conditions of disarmament by Germany are being satisfactorily fulfilled, the annual amount of the sums to be paid by Germany to cover the cost of occupation shall not exceed 240 million marks (gold). This provision can be modified if the Allied and Associated Powers agree as to the necessity of such modification.

Woodrow Wilson
G. Clemenceau
D. Lloyd George
16 June, 1919.

[Jimbuna]

17th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Bela Kun agrees to peaceable action in Hungary.

British Royal Navy attack the Bolshevik-controlled cruiser Oleg in Kronstadt, Russia and sinks it.


At Epsom, England, several hundred Canadian troops riot after two of their numbers were incarcerated. Their clash with police results in the death of one British police officer Thomas Green (pictured).


Fernando Figueroa, former President and military ruler of El Salvador, has passed away.


Ship Losses:

Cairnside (United Kingdom) The cargo ship ran aground in the North Sea off Aldeburgh, Suffolk and was wrecked. Her crew were rescued by Vaunter ( United Kingdom).

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Salle de l’Horloge, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 11:00

Meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers

United States America
President Wilson
Hon. R. Lansing

British Empire
The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour

France
M. Clemenceau
M. Pichon

Italy
Baron Sonnino
Marquis Imperiali

Japan
Baron Makino
Viscount Chinda

Turkey
S. A. Damad Ferid Pacha
S. E. Riza Tewfik Bey
S. E. Tewfik Bey


M Clemenceau, addressing the Delegates of the Government of the Ottoman Empire, says that they have been good enough to request leave to submit their views in regard to the questions before the Peace Conference concerning the Turkish Empire. The Allied Representatives hasten to reply to their request in the sense that they are at the disposal of the Ottoman Delegates. The latter have been good enough to undertake the journey, and it is hoped that it might be a useful one for all the parties concerned. The Ottoman Delegates are requested to be so good as to state their views.

His Highness Damad Ferid Pacha then reads out the following statement:

“Gentlemen, I should not be bold enough to come before this high Assembly if I thought that the Ottoman people had incurred any share of responsibility in the war which has ravaged Europe and Asia with fire and sword.

I apologize in advance for the development which I must give to my statement, for I am in point of fact defending today before the public opinion of the whole world and before history a most complicated and ill-understood case.

In the course of the war, nearly the whole civilized world was shocked by the recital of the crimes alleged to have been committed by the Turks. It is far from my thought to cast a veil over these misdeeds which are such as to make the conscience of mankind shudder with horror for ever; still less will I endeavor to minimize the degree of guilt of the actors in the great drama. The aim which I have set myself is that of showing to the world, with proofs in my hand, who are the truly responsible authors of these terrible crimes.

We are under no illusions in regard to the extent of the dissatisfaction which surrounds us; we are absolutely convinced that a mass of unfortunate events has made Turkey appear in an unfavorable light; however, when the truth has once been brought to light, it will warn civilized nations and posterity against passing an unjust judgment on us. The responsibility for the war in the East - assumed, without the knowledge of the Sovereign or of the people, in the Black Sea, by a German ship commanded by a German Admiral - rests entirely with the signatories of the secret Treaties, which were unknown alike to the Ottoman people and to the European Chanceries. These agreements were concluded between the Government of the Kaiser and the heads of the revolutionary Committee, who at the beginning of 1913, had placed themselves in power by means of a coup d’état. I call to witness the official dispatches exchanged between the representatives of France and Great Britain and their respective Governments during the three months which preceded the outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and the Empire of the Czars. When war had once been declared, the eternal covetousness of Russia as regards Constantinople was skillfully represented to the people as an imminent danger, and anxiety for the preservation of national existence thereupon rendered the struggle a desperate one. Our archives are moreover, thrown entirely open to an inquiry which would enable the statements which I have the honor to make to this high Assembly to be amply confirmed.

In regard to the other tragic events I beg leave to repeat here the declarations which I have repeatedly made to the Ottoman Senate. Turkey deplores the murder of a great number of her Christian co-nationals, as much as she does that of Moslems, properly speaking. In point of fact, the Committee of Union and Progress, not content with the crimes perpetrated against Christians, condemned to death by every means three million Moslems. Several hundreds of thousands of these unfortunate beings, hunted from their homes, are still wandering about today in the middle of Asia Minor without shelter and without any relief for their very existence; and even if they returned to their provinces they would find themselves just as destitute, for a large number of towns and villages, both Moslem and Christian, have been completely destroyed. Asia Minor is today nothing but a vast heap of ruins. The new Government notwithstanding its vigilant care, has been as yet unable to mitigate the disastrous effects of the cataclysm. It will always be easily possible to confirm my assertions by an inquiry undertaken on the spot. It is necessary, however, to dismiss any theory of racial conflict or of any explosion of religious fanaticism. Moreover, the Turkish people, at a time when violence could strive successfully against right, showed itself able to respect the lives, the honor and the sacred feelings of the Christian nation[al]s subject to its laws. It would be fairer to judge the Ottoman nation by its long history as a whole rather than by a single period which shows it in the most disadvantageous light.

Whatever be the names by which they are called, the principles and the methods of both the Russian and Turkish revolutionaries are the same, namely to destroy society in order to seize its ruins by putting its members out of the way and taking possession of their property. Europe and America are endeavoring at the cost of immense sacrifice to deliver the Slav people, whose ostensible attitude towards the Entente is scarcely different at the present time from that of the Turks, for both have been reduced to silence and both paralyzed by an unheard of tyranny. The Turks, who thus find themselves, under the domination of the Committee, in the same situation as that of the Russians under the Terrorists, deserve the same sympathy and the same humanitarian and kindly assistance at the hands of the rulers of the Great nations which hold the destinies of the world in their hands.

Latterly the truth has begun to filter through into European public opinion. The great trial of the Unionists at Constantinople has proved the responsibility of the leaders of the Committee - who all of them occupy high positions in the State - for the war and the other tragic events; that is the rehabilitation of the Ottoman nation.

Thus rehabilitated in the eyes of the civilized world, our mission will henceforward be that of devoting ourselves to an intensive economic and intellectual culture in order thus to become an useful factor in the League of Nations. The Ottoman People hope that the chaos in the East, fostered as it is by this abnormal state of affairs which is neither war nor peace, may at last be replaced by order, and it likewise desires to see the end of the continued occupation of its territories in spite of the Armistice. This occupation has in fact resulted at Smyrna in the most deplorable excesses which have been committed to the hurt of the defenseless Moslem population.

It desires with equal earnestness the maintenance, on the basis of the status quo ante bellum, of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which, during the last 40 years, has been reduced to the least possible limits. It lastly wishes to be granted in Thrace, to the North and West of Adrianople where the Mohammedan population is in an overwhelming majority, a frontier line which will render possible the defense of Adrianople and Constantinople.

What we ask for thus is, moreover, completely in conformity with President Wilson’s principles, which we invoked when requesting an Armistice, being convinced that they would be evenly applied in the interests of the peace of the world. On the other hand a fresh parceling out of the Ottoman Empire would entirely upset the balance in the East.

The ranges of the Taurus are moreover nothing more than a geological line of demarcation. The regions situated beyond those mountains, from the Mediterranean up to the Arabian Sea, are, although a language different from the Turkish language is spoken there, indissolubly linked with Constantinople by feelings which are deeper than the principle of nationality; on either side of the Taurus the same ideals, the same thoughts, the same moral and material interests bind the inhabitants. These form a compact block and its disintegration would be detrimental to the peace and tranquility of the East. Even a plebiscite would not solve the question, for the supreme interests of more than three hundred million Moslems are involved, and they form an important fraction of the whole of the human race.

The conscience of the world could only approve conditions of peace which are compatible with right, with the aspirations of peoples and with immanent justice.”

M Clemenceau, after thanking the Turkish Grand Vizier for his communication, proposes with his leave to adjourn the meeting for a few moments in order to deliberate, and undertakes to make to him a quarter of an hour later whatever communication is decided on.

(The meeting is adjourned at 11:30 and resumes at 11:55.)

M Clemenceau, addressing the Ottoman Delegates, says that he has been requested by the Heads of Governments and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Allied and Associated Powers to inform them that the statement made by the Grand Vizier has been listened to with the utmost attention, that it is intended to subject that statement to detailed examination and to make a reply as soon as one is ready. He adds that the Heads of Governments and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, in view of the occupations which then absorb their time, will be unable to make their reply before Saturday; and that one of the Heads of Government is leaving Paris that evening and will only return on Friday. He therefore proposes that a meeting should be held on the following Saturday at 11:00 for the presentation of the Allied reply. He further states that if the Ottoman Delegates have any comments to offer or requests to make or anything to say in regard to the program which he has just outlined the Allied representatives will be glad to hear them.

His Highness Damad Ferid Pasha says that the Ottoman Delegation is preparing a memorandum which will be forwarded as soon as it is ready.

M Clemenceau inquires on what day it will be sent.

His Highness Damad Ferid Pasha says that it will be sent on Friday evening.

M Clemenceau says that the Allied representatives will defer their reply until after the receipt of the Turkish memorandum, and will then fix a date for the next meeting.

His Highness Damad Ferid Pasha expresses his agreement.

(The meeting is adjourned at noon.)

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Mr Lloyd George’s Residence, 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. Mr. Lloyd George shows to his two colleagues a memorandum written by General Sir Henry Wilson.

M Clemenceau says that he had seen Marshal Petain in the morning. He had told him exactly what had occurred with Marshal Foch on the previous day. Marshal Petain had says he is not surprised. Marshal Foch had communicated to Marshal Petain part of his plan and Marshal Petain thought it rather rash in parts. Of course, M Clemenceau comments, their natures are quite different. Marshal Petain is wise, prudent, square and rather on the cautious side. He recalls that, when Marshal Foch had been appointed, Marshal Petain had advised him to insist on seeing his plans before they were carried out, but when he had shown to Marshal Petain a year ago the plan that Marshal Foch worked out for a continued offensive against the Germans, he had replied that it was a very fine thing, and that with Marshal Foch’s initiative and drive it ought to work out. Marshal Petain’s view on the present situation is that Marshal Foch’s plan should be executed, but with prudence; but, in making this observation, he had remarked that he only knows the French Army’s part in the plan and does not know the part of the British and American Armies.

Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson say that neither do they.

M Clemenceau says he had then asked Marshal Petain to return to Chantilly, where he had a first rate Chief of the General Staff, and study the plan with great care as far as he knew it and then come back to report to him. Later in the day, he, himself, had received Marshal Foch’s plan.

Marshal Foch’s plan is then read aloud.

After the reading of the plan, President Wilson says that it leaves the Council exactly where they were yesterday, with the substitution of an armistice for the previously proposed separatist policy. An armistice is not the business of the Governments but of the military authorities.

M Clemenceau agrees, and does not think the Council could take any part in it. He remarks that, when Marshal Foch had been told yesterday that Mr Lloyd George and President Wilson would, if it were essential, ask their Legislatures for more troops, Marshal Foch had not replied. He is particularly anxious not to have any trouble with Marshal Foch before the Germans have given their reply and hence he sees no need to rush matters. He asks if, in the meanwhile, the British Navy could prepare to do something against Danzig.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has already inquired into this when there was a question of landing the Poles there, and he had been told that it was heavily fortified and that the ships could do nothing. He suggested that orders to Marshal Foch should be carefully prepared and signed by the Council of Five, instructing him that his objective in the event of the Germans refusing to sign was Berlin and the object to get peace signed. It should be stated that the aim of the Allied and Associated Powers is to get peace signed, and that the center of Government is to be the military objective. Copies should be given to General Pershing and General Robertson. He suggests that someone with a military mind should prepare it, in order that it might be framed like a military order with an unmistakable meaning, such as Marshal Foch would understand.

M Clemenceau undertakes to prepare a document and to let his colleagues have it on Thursday night.


2. In reply to a question by Mr Lloyd George, President Wilson says that if the Germans sign the peace he proposes to return to the United States as soon as possible, in order to get the Treaty through the Senate.

Mr Lloyd George says he has received a well-considered memorandum from a Member of the British Delegation Staff, urging that the Austrian Treaty should be amended with the object of detaching Austria from Germany. He undertakes to give a copy to President Wilson.

[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. (It is agreed that the Convention in regard to the Rhine should be published.)


2. The Council has before them a Draft Treaty with Poland submitted by the Committee on New States.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that the Council ought to hear a long memorandum he has received from Mr Paderewski on the subject.

President Wilson then reads Mr Paderewski’s memorandum.

After the reading of the memorandum, Mr Lloyd George says that this is a fundamental challenge to the whole of the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to Small States. He does not feel himself competent to examine it in detail and suggests it should be referred to the Committee on New States.

President Wilson says that the point about the memorandum which strikes him is the statement that we are claiming more for the Germans in Poland than for the Poles in Germany. This is a serious indictment. He recalls that some years ago, the United States had denounced a Treaty with Russia at considerable inconvenience, because of the ill-treatment by Russia of Jews who were citizens of the United States. They had taken this action on the ground not that Jews had been maltreated but that American Jews were being maltreated, that is to say, distinctions were being made between American citizens which were not recognised in the United States. Here, there was a danger of imparting to the Jews a corporate capacity.

Mr Lloyd George says there is also something in the contention that a separate organisation for Jewish schools would tend to create a separate nation of the Jews in Poland rather than unity. This would lend itself to German intrigue.

President Wilson then puts the other side of the question. There is no doubt that Romania has done disgraceful things to the Jews in spite of the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin. If the minorities could be ill-treated without provision for appeal, they would derive no advantage from the Treaty. Romania has broken the Treaty of Berlin in this respect again and again with impunity. Hence, it was necessary to provide for some appeal. In reply to Baron Sonnino, he says that if these provisions were adopted Jews in the United States would be able to bring sufficient influence to bear to call the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to the matter. What these people feared was interference with their internal affairs.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Poland and Czechoslovakia have been called into existence by the Great Powers and cannot live without these Powers. Consequently, they were not quite in the position of the old established States.

(After some further discussion, it is agreed to refer Mr Paderewski’s memorandum to the Committee on New States to consider the objections raised to their Treaty and to see whether some of these objections could not be met.)


3. The attention of the Council is drawn to the alternative drafts put forward in regard to Article 13 of the draft treaty with Poland.

(It is agreed that States only, and not individuals should have the right of appeal to the Permanent with Poland Court of International Justice, and consequently that the draft proposed by the French, British and Japanese Delegations should be adopted.)


4. Baron Sonnino suggests that the Memorandum Further Questions, which he reads, should be referred to the Committee on New states.

(This is agreed to.)


5. The Council has before them a note from the Supreme Economic Council raising the question as to whether, after the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany, measures are still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary.

President Wilson points out that a legal blockade cannot be established after peace has been made.

Mr Lloyd George points out that Germany would receive all the hides and flax of Russia which are important to all the nations of Europe. This raises the question as to whether the whole of the commerce of Russia is to be left to German exploitation. If he were quite convinced, which he is not, that the Bolsheviks could be crushed in the present year, he might be willing to make a special effort. This leads to a discussion on the subject of the prospects of the Bolsheviks, in the course of which President Wilson reads a note from General Bliss pointing out that Kolchak’s troops had evacuated 15,000 square miles and were steadily retreating from the line of the Volga. That the fall of Petrograd is not imminent since the Estonians refused to advance until they are recognised. There had been an uprising on Kolchak’s lines of communication. In Eastern Siberia, Kolchak depends upon Horvat and Semenov, while in Central Siberia he depends on Allied troops.

President Wilson then reads Paragraph 7 of the note from the Supreme Economic Council, in which it is recommended the abstention from any positive measures or public announcement indicating a resumption of trade with Russia.

Mr Lloyd George says the real difficulty is how to answer a question in Parliament or an interpolation in the Chamber. How is a question to be answered “Is it permissible to trade with Russia?” Is he to reply “Yes” or “No” to that question?

President Wilson asks if Great Britain is at war with Bolshevik Russia.

Mr Lloyd George replied that hostilities are going on at Archangel.

President Wilson says that this does not constitute a legal state of war, since there has been no formal declaration of war. Consequently, there is no legal basis for a blockade. His reply to such a question would be that there is no legal warrant for estranging trade, and that the signature of Peace removed the legal basis.

Mr Lloyd George compares the decision to what had occurred in past days between Great Britain and Spain, when we had attacked Spanish colonies and seized their ships, while keeping our ambassador at the Court of Madrid. What would his reply be if he was asked whether British subjects could buy flax and sell boots? If he replies “No”, then the Germans will get the trade.

President Wilson says his reply would be that there is no legal basis for preventing it, but that traders would do it at their risk.

Sir Maurice Hankey asks what answer he is to give to the note from the Supreme Economic Council.

Mr Lloyd George says that an answer must be given. The question arises as to whether a blockade should be maintained in the Baltic. It is necessary to prevent the smuggling of arms from Germany to Bolshevik Russia by sea. It will be difficult for the Germans to send war material across Poland and the Baltic provinces, but it would not be so difficult to send it by sea.

(After some further discussion it is agreed that the answer should be in the following sense:

After the acceptance of the conditions of peace by Germany, measures are not still to be taken to prevent commodities from reaching Bolshevik Russia or Hungary, but the recommendation of the Supreme Economic Council is approved, that there should be an abstention from any positive measures or public announcement indicating a resumption of such trade. The Supreme Economic Council should be asked, however, to examine as to whether, consistently with this decision, means could be found for preventing war material from being carried by sea from Germany to Bolshevik Russia.)


6. Arising out of the previous discussion of the subject of the Blockade, President Wilson says that Mr Hoover had reported to him that the Allied Maritime Transport Council had issued an order that all Allied ships on completing discharge of cargo should leave German ports, and that no more ships of the Allied and Associated Powers should proceed to German ports. One result had been that several United States’ ships had been detained in British ports. These ships were carrying foodstuffs, not for Germany’s use, but for Poland and Czechoslovakia. It had never been found possible to build up ten days’ reserve in Czechoslovakia, and the stoppage of these ships was a very serious matter. He himself had advised Mr Hoover to demand the immediate release of these ships, as his Government were prepared to run the risk of their being held up in German ports. The action that had been taken by the Allied Maritime Transport Council really amounted to a reimposition of the Blockade, notwithstanding that it had been decided that the blockade was not to be imposed unless and until a further order was given.

Mr Lloyd George says he had only heard of the matter for the first time this afternoon. He understands, however, that the Allied Maritime Transport Council is an Inter-Allied body, and that this decision had been taken for the purpose of avoiding the seizure of Allied shipping in German ports, and that the United States representative had been present and had agreed in the decision.

President Wilson says he has just ascertained from Mr Hoover that the United States representative had stated he could not acquiesce without Mr Hoover’s instructions.

Mr Lloyd George says that he cannot understand this action being taken unless at least the United States representative had said he could only agree subject to confirmation.

President Wilson points out that this action had been taken a week before the Germans had to state whether they would sign.

Mr Lloyd George says that unless ample warning is given there will not be time to extricate the ships, since it will take them some time to discharge. He understands that Lord Robert Cecil is the Chairman of this Committee.

Sir Maurice Hankey says he believes the action had been taken by the Executive of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, and not by the Council itself.

President Wilson said it was no good the Council taking decisions in regard to the Blockade, when these subordinate bodies took action without their authority. He had told Mr Hoover that he was to protest against the detention of the American ships, as he was not willing to impose privation on the population of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

M Clemenceau says that the Allied Maritime Transport Council appears to have acted outside its authority, but nevertheless he cannot consider it as altogether unfortunate.

Mr Lloyd George agrees that the threat of the Blockade might provide an additional inducement for the Germans to sign, and he undertakes to make immediate inquiries and to take the necessary action for the release of the United States ships.

Note: Mr Lloyd George immediately after the Meeting instructs his private secretary to telephone to London to order the release of the United States’ ships.


7. The Council has before them a Note from the Superior Blockade Council on the suggested agreement by Austria regarding trade with Hungary and Germany.

(It is agreed that no decision in regard to this can be taken without further explanation of what is intended.)


8. Baron Sonnino says that the Austrian Delegation is already beginning to send in Notes, and this raises the question of the machinery of the Peace Conference for dealing with them.

(It is agreed that the Notes should be referred to the same Commissions as had been established to deal with Notes from the German Delegation.)


9. Baron Sonnino raises the question of the position of the military officers of the Allied and Associated Powers, who had been sent to Klagenfurt. He understands that the Yugoslavs had, notwithstanding the communications from the Allied and Associated Powers, pushed on and compelled the Austrians to accept an armistice, under the terms of which they had to evacuate Klagenfurt. The four military officers had found the Yugoslavs in possession of Klagenfurt. They had no authority to order them to go out. The Yugoslavs were there and would probably refuse to go unless these officers were given general authority to insist upon the execution of the orders of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. If this were not done, it would be very little use arranging for the Plebiscite.

President Wilson says that personally he is of opinion that both forces ought to withdraw. The military officers ought not to be told until the Governments had been communicated with. He suggests that a communication should be made, both to the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to the Austrians, informing them that they were expected to withdraw from the territory in question, the boundaries of which should be stated.

The question having been raised as to who should keep order in the withdrawal of the above forces, Mr Lloyd George says it would be no use to put in Italian troops to keep order, as the Yugoslavs would oppose them.

Baron Sonnino says that Italy has no desire for a permanent occupation of the Klagenfurt region.

President Wilson suggests that the maintenance of order should be left to the local police forces.

(It is agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to formulate a demand to the Government of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to the Austrian Government, informing them that the forces of both States should be withdrawn from the Klagenfurt area, the boundaries of which should be described in the dispatch. A copy of the dispatch should be sent to the military officers on the spot of the Allied and Associated Powers.)


10. President Wilson said that on inquiry he found that it is very difficult for him to send United States troops to occupy Upper Silesia during the plebiscite. Once peace is declared the United States troops have to be withdrawn.

[Jimbuna]

18th June 1919

Aftermath of War

British prisoners in Kurdistan rescued.

President Wilson, accompanied by the King and Queen of Belgium, tour the devastated city of Ypres.


German police protect the British Embassy in Berlin as demonstrators protest the harsh Versailles Treaty.


Future famed actor Humphrey Bogart served in WWl and was honorably discharged June 18, 1919 as seaman second class. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy in 1918 and was a model sailor during his time of service. Much of his time at sea was ferrying troops back from Europe after the Armistice.


Ship Losses:

Oleg (Soviet Navy) The Bogatyr-class protected cruiser was torpedoed and sunk by the motor torpedo boat HM CMB-4 ( Royal Navy) off Kronstadt. Five crewmen were killed, five others wounded.
Leitenant Shestakov (Soviet Navy) The Leitenant Shestakov-class destroyer was scuttled by her crew at Novorossiysk by order of the Bolsheviks.
Kapitan-Leytenant Baranov (Soviet Navy) The Leitenant Shestakov-class destroyer was scuttled by her crew at Novorossiysk by order of the Bolsheviks.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, June 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon says that the Council of Foreign Ministers has been asked by the Council of Four to find a definite settlement of the frontier between the Polish and the Ukrainian territories, in order that the forces of the two countries be ordered to withdraw behind them. He asks M Jules Cambon, as President of the Committee dealing with the subject, to explain what conclusions had been reached.

Mr Lansing observes that he has read the report of the Committee.

M Pichon then asks if any member wishes to address any questions on the subject to M Cambon.

Mr Balfour says the Committee has been ordered to make suggestions, but to give no advice. The result is that the settlement of the question is left to the Council of Foreign Ministers. He has read the report and has talked to his military advisers regarding the situation in Galicia. He concludes that as a basis for discussion it would be preferable to put forward concrete proposals. He has therefore written a memorandum, a copy of which has been furnished to each of the Ministers members of the Council. His justification for writing it is that M Cambon’s Committee did not deal with the military question, which was of vital importance at the moment. The Bolshevists are attacking Galicia and gaining successes, and the Allies, on the other hand, are hampering the action of the Poles. This leads to an unfavorable situation. If a solution favorable to the military action of the Poles is adopted, means must be found of safeguarding the future political status of the country. His memorandum, therefore, aims at meeting the pressing necessity of keeping the Bolshevists out, and of providing an opportunity in the future for the self-determination of the Ruthenian population, which might choose to form part of Poland, or Russia, or federation with one or other, or even independence. He therefore suggests that his memorandum be taken as the basis for discussion.

Baron Sonnino says that the Committee has formulated a number of projects. Among them is one suggesting autonomy for Galicia, under Polish sovereignty. This has the advantage of supplying a definite solution. A plebiscite would lead to agitation and intrigue by all parties with ambitions connected with the final verdict. If, therefore, the Ruthenians could be guaranteed such rights as they require under Polish suzerainty, all these disadvantages will be avoided. But it must not be forgotten that many parties are interested in the decision; for instance, the Poles and Romanians wish to have a common frontier. Russia, which he hopes will ere long be restored, would doubtless wish to induce the Ruthenians to become Russian subjects. This would clash with the ambitions of the Romanians, Czechoslovaks and Poles; and the Hungarians also might wish to have a common frontier with Russia. If, therefore, the whole question could be settled once for all, peace in that part of Europe would be greatly benefited.

Mr Lansing says that his view of the question is based largely on the condition of the Ruthenian population. It must be recognised that this population is 60% illiterate, and therefore unfit for self-government. A period of education is necessary before it could be ripe for autonomy. Its natural connection by blood was with the Ukrainians, but it would seem that its disposition was rather towards the Poles, by reason of the relative stability of the Government in Poland, as compared with the Ukraine. He is therefore in general accord with Mr Balfour’s memorandum, which is that a High Commissioner be nominated by the League of Nations, or pending the constitution of the League of Nations, by the Great Powers, in general control. At the same time, Polish troops will be authorized to extend their operations up to the River Zbruck. It would be notified through the High Commissioner that the occupation by Polish troops was only temporary, until such time as the Great Powers might consider a plebiscite appropriate. Until then, the country would be under Polish military authority, subject to supervision by the Commissioner.

The Ukrainians were commonly called Bolshevik, but he was not sure that this was correct. In some places they appeared to be fighting the Bolshevik. He had received reports from the country, including one from Lieutenant Foster, from Tarnopol, dated 8th June; Lieutenant Foster observed among other things that the great majority of the population was overjoyed by the arrival of Polish troops. Secondly, that the Ukrainian régime had been one of force, and brutality, entirely destructive and not constructive in its character. This report also went to support Mr. Balfour’s solution. He understood that it would have been easy for the Poles to occupy the whole of Eastern Galicia, but for the veto of the Great Powers. The Ukrainians were now extremely aggressive, and the Poles could not stop their operations. All the Military Representatives at Warsaw appeared to take this view.

M. Sonnino said that all the reasons alleged by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing appeared to enforce the desirability of a definite solution, namely, that the country be governed under Polish sovereignty, with guarantees for the Ruthenians. If the population was as ignorant as Mr. Lansing believed, it would be a long time before an intelligent plebiscite could be obtained from them. They would meantime be wooed by Roumanian, Polish, Czecho-Slovak, Hungarian [Page 830]and Russian agitators. Hence, for the very reasons advanced by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lansing, he advocated a definite solution. It would be easy to guarantee the linguistic and educational rights of the Ruthenians under Polish Government. If this were not done, there would be continual unrest and strife, fomented by neighbouring countries with rival interests.

M. Cambon said that he gathered from the observations of Mr. Lansing, Baron Sonnino and Mr. Balfour that there was a considerable measure of agreement between them. The Ukrainian question as such could not be solved, as we did not know what the Ukraine was, nor what its future would be. Further, there appeared to be no ground for trusting any Ukrainian Government, as Ukrainian Governments hitherto had behaved atrociously. Among the neighbours of Eastern Galicia, the only one with a high civilization was Poland. The towns in Galicia were Polish and the best classes throughout the country were Polish. The solution proposed by Mr. Balfour, therefore, appeared to him to be excellent. Polish control would be exercised under the Great Powers, represented by a High Commissioner. Thus, a mandate would be conferred on Poland for the government of the country. He would point out that this was among the solutions proposed by the Committee. He referred to Solution “B” in Report No. III of the Committee. If the Conference left the question open, Galicia would become the arena of every form of intrigue. He thought, therefore, that Galicia, with local autonomy secured, and governed in a liberal spirit by Poland, was the solution. This solution had another advantage. One of the most troublesome questions was the Western delimitation of Eastern Galicia. Two frontiers had been proposed, and both were very questionable. If M. Sonnino’s solution were adopted, it would be unnecessary to trouble any further about the frontier question. Frontier “A” could be adopted, and the whole of Eastern Galicia could be placed under the same régime.

M. Pichon asked whether M. Sonnino’s proposal was complementary to Mr. Balfour’s.

M. Sonnino pointed out that the two solutions were different. He proposed to secure Ruthenian autonomy at once, to give sovereignty to Poland. This dispensed with the High Commissioner and with the plebiscite. In addition, the frontier question was also solved at once, and the struggle concerning Lemberg was equally dispensed with.

M. Pichon pointed out that this would place Lemberg outside Poland.

M. Sonnino said that it would nevertheless include Lemberg in territory attached to Poland.

Mr. Balfour said that there were two inconsistent policies before [Page 831]the Council. M. Sonnino’s suggestion was different to his own. He thought there was much truth in M. Sonnino’s observation that if the question of the future sovereignty of the country were left undecided, the result would be years of intrigue and unrest. At the same time, he thought M. Sonnino a little exaggerated the advantages of his plan. M. Cambon had gone so far as to say the Conference need trouble no more about the frontiers of Eastern Galicia. M. Sonnino said that frontier “A” could be adopted, among other reasons, because the Poles, who objected to handing over Lemberg to an independent Galicia, could not object to including it in a dependent Galicia. He thought this was not quite correct. He was informed that the majority in Eastern Galicia, though doubtless ill-educated, was vigorously anti-Polish, and unwilling to be absorbed. He would like to know exactly what the autonomy offered by M. Sonnino meant.

M. Sonnino said he meant administrative self-government. There were various degrees of self-government and regulations had been proposed in other cases.

Mr. Balfour doubtless knew what he meant when he spoke of Irish Home Rule.

Mr. Balfour said that personally he attributed no meaning to Irish Home Rule. He, however, pointed out that M. Sonnino appeared to confuse self-government with linguistic and educational privileges. If his policy meant nothing more than minority guarantees, he thought it would not satisfy the Ruthenians.

M. Sonnino said that a representative body could be added, as there were many degrees of self-government up to federation.

Mr. Balfour said he ventured to suggest that the matter the Council had to deal with was the Bolshevist threat to Galicia. The Ruthenians would not be satisfied with the safeguarding of their language and schools. He thought, therefore, that the method he had suggested would have to be adopted.

M. Sonnino said that they might be satisfied with the kind of autonomy granted to Finland under Russian sovereignty. Mr. Balfour’s method did not offer the Ruthenians self determination, and practically told them that they must wait for another generation before exercising it.

M. Cambon said that if the presence of Polish troops in Eastern Galicia were held to endanger the rights of the Ruthenians, it was nevertheless difficult to find any other allied troops to police the country. The Poles were the troops nearest at hand and it was for the Conference to determine the limits of Polish control and to safeguard the rights of the Ruthenians. The objection, he thought, would come not from the Ruthenians but from the Ukraine. It was clear that Galicia must not be ceded to the Ukrainians.

M Pichon asks M Cambon to give his opinion as regards Mr Balfour’s scheme.

M Cambon says that as he has not consulted his Committee he can only give a personal opinion. He agrees with Mr Balfour’s first point that the country should be occupied by Polish troops. As to the second point that control should be exercised by the Great Powers through a High Commissioner, he personally prefers Baron Sonnino’s plan. He thinks that anything that would give the impression to the undecided populations of those areas, an indication that the Peace Conference was expressing its final will, would put a stop to unrest and disorder.

Mr Lansing says that he has listened with interest to the views expressed. He is impressed by some of the points made by Baron Sonnino. He sees the difficulty of administering the country through a High Commissioner under whose authority customs and a judicial department would have to be set up. It would be extremely difficult to organize in detail out of nothing a complicated administrative machine. He therefore agrees with M Cambon that it would be more satisfactory to give a mandate to Poland to hold the country under such conditions as might be fixed by the League of Nations or the Great Powers, until such time as these might decide that a plebiscite should take place. His conclusion, therefore, is that Eastern Galicia within frontiers to be determined by the Committee be administered by Poland as mandatory under conditions likewise to be determined by the Committee, until such time as a plebiscite can be taken regarding the ultimate sovereignty of the country. He therefore suggests that the matter be referred to the Polish Committee which would be asked to submit a draft covering all the details required to carry out this policy.

Mr Balfour says that he thinks Mr Lansing’s plan is open to the objections raised by Baron Sonnino, namely, that until a plebiscite has finally settled the sovereignty of the country, there would be an open field for every sort of intrigue. Nor had the plan, he fears, the advantage of his own suggestion which, he admits is based on the hostility of the Ruthenian majority to the Polish minority. If his opinion on this subject were open to doubt, he would be prepared to revise his proposal.

Mr Lansing asks from what source Mr Balfour obtained his information.

Mr Balfour says all the information received tends to produce in his mind the impression that in Western Galicia the majority is Polish or pro-Polish while exactly the reverse prevails in Eastern Galicia. He is quite ready to refer this matter to the Committee if there is any doubt about it.

Mr Lansing said his information is totally different. He therefore thinks it would be well to refer the matter to the Committee.

Mr Balfour says that his conviction is that the Ruthenians do not wish to be ruled by the Polish minority. It would therefore be an abuse of the mandatory principle to give Poland the mandate.

Mr Lansing says that it would be a waste of time to continue the discussion based on a totally different hypothesis. There are three possible hypotheses:

1) That the Ruthenians are hostile to the Poles.

2) That they are friendly to the Poles.

3) That the Council does not know what their feelings are.

His own proposal is based on the theory that the Ruthenians are friendly to the Poles, but with a qualification that he is not quite certain of. It is for this reason that he had proposed that after a certain interval of time, the Ruthenians should have a chance of option. Meanwhile, to avoid difficulties of administration under a High Commissioner, he would give a mandate to the Poles. He is quite ready to refer back to the Committee the question whether the Ruthenians were friendly or hostile to the Poles.

Mr Balfour says that he has no objection. He would like to add that the Committee might, with advantage, examine the Constitution which had been proposed for the part of Ruthenia to be attached to the Czechoslovak State and discuss whether the adoption of a similar plan could fit the case of Eastern Galicia.

M Cambon points out that this solution is one of those suggested by the Committee.

Mr Balfour requests that it be put on record that Polish troops should have full liberty to advance up to the River Zbruck without prejudice to the future status of the country.

(It is decided that M Pichon should communicate this decision in the name of the Allied and Associated Governments officially to the Polish Government and unofficially to the Ukrainian Delegation in Paris.

It is further decided that the Committee on Polish Affairs be asked to report regarding the sentiments of the population of Eastern Galicia and also on the suitability of a scheme of autonomy similar to that devised for the Ruthenians to be attached to the Czechoslovak Republic.)


2. M Pichon says that in accordance with a minute put forward by the British Delegation it will be necessary to appoint an Inter-Allied Commission with a Naval and a Military representative from each of the Powers.

This was agreed to and the following members are nominated:

For the United States of America:
General Bliss.
Admiral Knapp.

For Great Britain:
General Sackville-West.
Admiral Hope.

For France:
General Belin,
and a Naval expert to be nominated later.

For Italy:
General Cavallero.
Admiral Grassi.

Baron Makino says that he will inform the Secretary-General whether Japan wishes to take part or not.


3. M Pichon says that action is required of the Council as a consequence of the following letter:

"17th June 1919.

His Excellency
Monsieur Dutasta;

My dear Colleague,

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, this afternoon, considered the situation which has arisen in regard to the armistice in Carinthia.

The Council were informed that the forces of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in disregard of the demands of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, have pressed forward and occupied Klagenfurt and have forced the Austrians to accept armistice conditions which include the abandonment by them of Klagenfurt.

In these circumstances, the Council decided that a demand should be made for the evacuation of the entire district of Klagenfurt by the forces both of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and of the Austrians.

It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to approve and send a telegraphic dispatch to the Governments of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and of the Austrian Republic demanding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by the forces of both contending parties. The boundaries behind which they were to withdraw will have to be defined in this dispatch. A copy of this dispatch should be sent to the Military Officers of the Allied and Associated Powers who are watching the armistice.

Since the meeting, I have learned that the Commission which has been considering the question of Klagenfurt is holding a meeting tomorrow and I am therefore sending a copy of this letter to Monsieur Tardieu, the Chairman of the Commission, with the suggestion that the Commission should be asked to prepare the boundaries for the consideration of the Council of Foreign Ministers in the afternoon.

I am directed to request that Your Excellency will confirm this action to M Tardieu and will bring the matter before the Council of Foreign Ministers in the afternoon.

At Baron Sonnino’s request, I am sending copies of this letter to the five Foreign Ministers.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

M P A Hankey.”


M Tardieu says that the Committee on Yugoslav Affairs had received a copy of this letter on the previous day. The Committee had discussed the subject and three different opinions had been expressed.

The opinions are as follows (taken from the notes of the Committee Meeting on the 17th):


Note Drafted by the Yugo-Slav Commission:

The Commission has examined the question raised by Sir Maurice Hankey’s letter to M Dutasta, dated June 17th.

The following opinions have been expressed:

1) The American Delegation recommends that the boundaries should be drawn as indicated in the Commission’s Report, in answer to Sir Maurice Hankey’s note dated June 11th, but expresses no opinion as regards the military measures to be taken.

2) The British and French Delegations: Recalling the fact that the Supreme Council has agreed, concerning Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary, that it would be advisable not to assign to military occupation limits that would differ from the definitive boundaries, recommend that the same solution should be adopted concerning the Klagenfurt Basin, i.e. to determine as quickly as possible the political boundaries in accordance with the above mentioned report, the Yugoslavs being authorized to occupy Zone “A” and the Austrians Zone “B”.

3) The Italian Delegation, considering on the one hand that Sir Maurice Hankey’s letter, dated June 17th, deals with the complete evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by both the Yugoslavs and the Austrians, considering on the other hand that the lines proposed by the American, British and French Delegations as boundary lines, are, according to the Italian Delegation, only limits for the zones of plebiscite, which ought not to be considered as political boundaries, is of opinion that the zone which ought to be evacuated by both the Austrians and the Yugoslavs, ought to include the whole basin (Zones “A” and “B”) as previously defined by the Supreme Council.


Baron Sonnino says that in S Orlando’s absence he brings forward the question in the Council of Four. The following is the history of the matter. On May 31st the Council of Four had decided to send to Vienna and Belgrade an intimation to both parties to withdraw from the Basin of Klagenfurt. The Austrians are to withdraw beyond the northern limit and the Slavs beyond the southern limit. The telegram to Belgrade, it would seem, had been delayed in transmission, whereas that to Vienna had arrived in time. On June 5th, Yugoslav troops had advanced on Klagenfurt and had forced the Austrian troops on June 6th to accept an Armistice. When the Allied Generals on the spot had informed the Yugoslav Commanders of the orders of the Council, the latter said that they had received no such orders and would stand by the Armistice. The Allied Officers had not felt competent to order the troops to retire and asked for instructions from the Conference. He had therefore brought up the question in the Council of Four. The Council, on the previous day, had decided that a telegram be dispatched by the Council of Foreign Ministers requiring the evacuation of the Basin of Klagenfurt by both parties.

In his letter Sir Maurice Hankey added a further suggestion that the Commission on Yugoslav affairs should determine the frontiers behind which the opposing Forces should retire. Now these frontiers had been already settled on May 31st when the previous order had been given. The Council of Four had also decided that notice of the decision should be given to the military Officers of the Allied and Associated Powers, in order that they should watch the execution of the order and make any necessary proposals. As the result of Sir Maurice Hankey’s intervention, the Commission now proposes something quite different from the intentions of the Council of Four, namely two zones for a plebiscite, the limits of which should be the lines for the withdrawal of the opposing Armies. This was quite a new feature. M Tardieu’s view was that military lines should as far as possible be the ultimate political frontiers but the limits in this case were not frontiers of this character but only the limits of plebiscite areas. He submits that it is necessary to stand by the decision of the Council of Four, namely that both Armies must withdraw from the whole basin of Klagenfurt. M Tardieu further suggests that the void created by evacuation must be occupied, presumably in the interests of order. He would suggest that a Police Force should be evolved locally. In any case, this is not the business of the Council. All the Council was asked to do was to renew the order of May 31st, and adapt it to the new circumstances. There is no other Mandate binding on the Council and the suggestion made by the paragraph of Sir Maurice Hankey’s letter beginning with the words “Since the Meeting I have learned” has no binding force.

M Tardieu says that if Baron Sonnino is right, the Commission had been called upon to deliberate under a misunderstanding.

M Pichon, reading the letter, says that there is evidently a contradiction. In the first part the instruction was that the whole basin was to be evacuated, in the second it was indicated that boundaries should be fixed.

Baron Sonnino says that in the dispatch of May 31st, no exact definition of the Klagenfurt area had been given. The Council of Foreign Ministers was asked to define the frontier but not to establish new ones. The Council was to repeat the previous order adapted to the present circumstances.

Mr Lansing says that he could find no authorization by the Council of Four to Sir Maurice Hankey for submitting the question to the Commission. It would seem that the Council of Four had only directed the dispatch to be sent.

M Pichon says that all the Council itself has to do is to fix the outer limits of the Klagenfurt basin. This had been done.

M Tardieu says that in his opinion this had not been done. A few days ago the Council of Four had asked the Commission to report on some communications made by the Yugoslav Delegation involving this very question. The Commission had not yet reported, but it might be inferred from this that the exact limits of the Klagenfurt basin had not yet been fixed by the Council of Four.

M Pichon asks whether M Tardieu could furnish his report to the Council of Five instead of the Council of Four.

M Tardieu replies that the report is ready but has not yet been sent in.

Mr Balfour said that he could not understand Sir Maurice Hankey’s letter. Did it mean that the Council of Foreign Ministers was to “approve” without discussion what was suggested? He himself disapproves of leaving the Klagenfurt basin unoccupied. He would require a great deal of convincing argument before he approved of any such thing. Further, the Council of Foreign Ministers was asked to draft a telegram and in his view this was not their business.

Baron Sonnino restates the case as previously explained by himself.

Mr Balfour thinks that if the Council of Four only intended that their previous telegram should be repeated they would not have asked the Council of Foreign Ministers to meet to do it for them. They could presumably do this themselves.

Baron Sonnino points out that the order would not be repeated in the same terms, as in the interval an Armistice had taken place and some notice of this fact was required.

M Tardieu said that he entirely agrees with Mr Balfour. If the question is merely one of repeating the previous telegram no discussion is required. If on the other hand a new definition of the Klagenfurt basin is under consideration, he would point out that two considerable modifications had been suggested. One by the Yugoslav Delegation, namely the addition to the Plebiscite zone of the Valley of Miesthal; the other by the Italian Delegation, namely, the exclusion of the triangle of Assling.

Baron Sonnino says that it is clear that the Council of Five must take some action as the Heads of the Governments are away and the military situation is urgent.

Mr Lansing suggests that the question be adjourned until the Commission had furnished material for a delimitation of the Klagenfurt basin.

(At this stage Mr Balfour withdraws.)

M Tardieu points out that nothing would be gained by delay as the findings of the Commission were not unanimous. He can only present on the following day the same divergences of opinion that he had already explained.

Baron Sonnino further observes that the findings of the Commission, even if unanimous, cannot assign final frontiers to the Klagenfurt basin until these have been accepted by the Council of the Heads of Governments.

(Mr Lansing at this point withdraws.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

19th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Allies ready to occupy German territory if Peace not signed.

Petre P. Carp, former Prime Minister of Romania who collaborated with the Germans when they occupied the country during the war, has passed away.


Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Emanuele Orlando announces his resignation for failing to secure the Croatian city of Fiume for Italy at the Paris Peace Conference. Italian resentment towards the conference fuels the rise of fascism.


Returning from target practice in the Cuban waters of Guantanamo Bay, the USS DELAWARE (BB-28) follows the other battleships into New York Harbor. The “Victory Fleet” also included the USS’ TEXAS (BB-35), NEW MEXICO (BB-40), OKLAHOMA (BB-37), and NEVADA (BB-36).

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, June 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon says that he thinks it would be best to ask M Tardieu to inform the Council of the conclusions of his Committee regarding the limits of the Basin of Klagenfurt for the purpose of the telegram which the Council was requested to send.

M Tardieu says that the answer to this question is to be found in Minute 5 of a note addressed to the Supreme Council by the Commission for Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs. The consequence is that no change is made in Zone A and none proposed in Zone B, and that the boundaries shown on what is known as President Wilson’s map are maintained by the unanimous assent of the Committee.

M Pichon says that if the Council approves the proposal sent to them from the Council of Four, it will follow that a telegram should be sent demanding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin by both sides, the frontiers being those shown on President Wilson’s map excluding the Miesthal region.

Baron Sonnino says that as no alteration is proposed in the frontier, no specification need be made in the message. The telegram of May 31st should be repeated.

Mr Balfour says he cannot quite understand what it is proposed the Council should do. Is it to order that a large tract of country should be left with no troops in it either Austrian or Yugoslav?

M Tardieu observes that the Commission has no remarks to make on this policy as the question has not been submitted to it.

Baron Sonnino says that the Council of Heads of Governments wishes the Military Representatives on the spot to be informed of the order given for the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin. These Officers would then make proposals in accordance with events for maintaining order in the evacuated area. This is the resolution adopted in the Council of Four.

Mr Lansing says that he does not quite follow Baron Sonnino. He reads the letter written by Sir Maurice Hankey on June 17th to mean that entire evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin is to be ordered. At the same time the Council of Foreign Ministers are asked to determine certain limits. Baron Sonnino says these limits have already been laid down. If the outline of the Klagenfurt Basin has already been determined, the letter must mean lines behind which the occupying troops should retire.

Baron Sonnino maintains that this is not the meaning of the resolution of the Council of Four. Seeing that the Commission proposed no change in the outer limits of the Klagenfurt Basin, all that remains to be done is to re-affirm the orders of May 31st.

Mr Lansing points out that the Council of Foreign Ministers is asked to “approve”; for his part he did not.

Mr Balfour also says that he does not approve.

Baron Sonnino says that he has himself raised the question in the Council of Four and asked what was to happen

(a) if evacuation took place

(b) if it did not take place.

He asks whether the Council would authorize the military Representatives on the spot to take action. The Council had decided that these Officers should not take action but should make proposals to the Council.

M Pichon observed that this matter is not within the terms of reference.

Baron Sonnino says that if his Colleagues do not approve the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin in spite of the fact that it had been decided on by the Council of Heads of Governments, he can do no more. In his view the proper thing to do was to send a telegram and ask the military authorities on the spot to make proposals for dealing with the consequences.

M Pichon says that as Mr Balfour cannot approve of the telegram, it clearly cannot be sent. The Council is, therefore, at the very start precluded from doing what Baron Sonnino suggested.

Mr Lansing proposes that a reply be sent on behalf of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the effect that having been asked to approve of the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin, the Council returns the reply that it does not approve of this policy. It will, however, approve of the withdrawal of the opposing troops behind the line proposed by the Yugoslav Commission.

Baron Sonnino says he cannot agree to this. It appears to him quite contrary to the decision of the Council of the Heads of Governments as understood by him.

M Pichon says there is another proposal formulated by Mr Lansing and supported by Mr Balfour. He also concurs with it. All he can do is to put this to the vote. He thinks it would be a wise decision as supplementary information just received reports disturbances in the Klagenfurt area. He quotes a telegram from the French General on the spot saying that Allied troops are urgently required to keep order.

Mr Lansing says that he thinks there must be some mistake in the account given of the matter by Baron Sonnino. The more natural course would have been to consult the military men on the spot before asking the Foreign Ministers for their approval.

(At this stage Mr Balfour withdraws.)

Baron Sonnino says that the news quoted by M Pichon shows the necessity of doing something. He refers again to the history of the telegram sent on May 31st and to the subsequent events.

M Pichon says that, to sum up, as Mr Balfour and he himself supported Mr Lansing’s views, all he can do is to report to the Council of Four that with the exception of Baron Sonnino, all support a withdrawal of the contending armies north and south of the line shown on the map known as “President Wilson’s Map”.

Baron Sonnino says that his view is that a telegram should be sent renewing the order of May 31st for the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin and that the Military authorities should be asked to make proposals for dealing with the consequences. The following resolution is then adopted:

“The Council of the Foreign Ministers decided to reply to the Council of the Heads of Governments that their interpretation of the letter addressed by Sir Maurice Hankey to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference on June 17th, 1919, regarding the evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin was that they were asked to approve the action suggested in paragraph 3.

With the exception of Baron Sonnino, this interpretation was unanimous and, with the same exception, the answer was that the Council of Foreign Ministers could not approve of the total evacuation of the Klagenfurt Basin.

It was further proposed by Mr Lansing, and approved by the other Foreign Ministers, excepting Baron Sonnino, that the troops of the contending forces be ordered to withdraw north and south respectively of the purple line drawn on the map known as President Wilson’s Map.

Baron Sonnino maintained that the duty of the Council was to send a telegram ordering the total evacuation of the Basin and to ask the 4 Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the spot what proposals they had to make to deal with the consequences of the evacuation.”

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Jimbuna]

20th June 1919

Aftermath of War

Britain: Report of Coal Commission presented; published 23 June.

Signor Orlando resigns; Signore Nitti forms fresh Cabinet.

German (Scheidemann) Cabinet decides against signing Peace Treaty, and falls.

German Prime Minister Philipp Scheidemann, who proclaimed Germany as a republic, resigns as the Allies refuse to negotiate the terms of the Versailles Treaty.

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, June 20, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Ministry of War, Paris, 17:00

Meeting of the Council of Four

[Jimbuna]

21st June 1919

Aftermath of War

Turkish army advancing on Greeks in Asia Minor (Aidin).

Germans scuttle their Fleet at Scapa Flow.

Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, head of the German delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, also resigns due to the harsh terms of the Versailles Treaty.


Admiral Ludwig von Reuter orders the German Fleet interned at Scapa Flow to be scuttled instead of it falling to the Allied Powers. 15 capital ships, 5 cruisers, and 32 destroyers are sunk. The Bayern sinking.

(See post below for comprehensive list)