100 Years Ago Today

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:45

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. Lord Robert Cecil states that there are two subjects for consideration; viz.,

(a) A Public announcement indicating the present position of the Blockade of Germany and stating that it would be raised in the event of signature of the Peace Treaty,

(b) a plan of the measures to be taken in the event of it being decided to re-impose the blockade. In referring to this plan Lord Robert Cecil draws attention to the proposal in the last paragraph that the Governments of the neutral countries contiguous to Germany should now be invited to consent to prohibit trade with Germany if called upon to do so. This would make it possible to exercise a more immediate and more effective pressure on Germany, if such pressure should become necessary.


2. Statement with regard to the present position of the blockade.

Mr Lloyd George draws attention to the words in the first sentence of the statement “as soon as the German representatives have signed the Treaty of Peace.” He suggests that after the signature of the treaty the German assembly might repudiate it.

M Clemenceau asks whether it would be necessary to wait for the approval of the Treaty by the Allied Parliaments, before raising the blockade. It was agreed that this would be unnecessary.

President Wilson proposes that the words quoted above should be amended to read:

“as soon as Germany has formally accepted the Treaty of Peace.”

It is agreed that the Statement should be published, subject to this amendment.


3. Measures to be taken in the event of reimposition of the blockade.

President Wilson states that this is not the time to discuss whether we should or should not reimpose the blockade in the event of Germany refusing to sign the Peace Treaty. In his judgment the most suitable means of pressure would be some kind of military occupation rather than blockade measures which would tend to reduce her population to starvation and despair. To have our armies in an area thus starved would not be an edifying spectacle. Blockade would be more terrible than military occupation and presents many inhumane features; if it were reimposed it would presently become distasteful to the world The President expressed grave doubts whether the blockade should be reimposed unless no other course were open.

Mr Lloyd George is of opinion that in any case the application of the blockade would only be necessary for a fortnight or three weeks. An excuse is wanted in Germany for signing the Peace Treaty. The fear of the reimposition of the blockade would provide such an excuse. Haase, for example is afraid of the blockade. There is a pressure in Germany against signing the Treaty, which is a very painful Treaty to sign.

Mr Lloyd George expresses himself as all in favour of a military occupation as a demonstration but not as the only means of pressure. Some parts of Germany would not mind a military occupation. After only a fortnight of the reimposed blockade there would be a general cry to Scheidemann of “Sign, Sign”.


4. On the question of the declaration of a formal blockade.

Lord Robert Cecil draws attention to the statement of the British Admiralty as to objections to such a declaration; he understands that the Admiralty view is that the ships now in commission are insufficient for the maintenance of a strictly “effective” blockade.

President Wilson says that the United States has never admitted the legality of the existing form of blockade. The Admiralty caveat was thus a little unacceptable.

Lord Robert Cecil says that whether the blockade is absolutely effective or not does not matter, what mattered was the general stoppage of trade.

President Wilson adds that there is a difference between blockade breaking and blockade running. Under the conditions indicated by the Admiralty there might be cases of blockade running: but a definite breach of blockade, such as would render it legally ineffective, would require a naval force which Germany does not now possess.

It is agreed that if blockade measures have to be reimposed a formal blockade should be declared. No definite decision is arrived at as to whether blockade measures should or should not be taken in the event of Germany refusing to sign the Peace Treaty: but it is understood that such preparations would now be made as would render it possible to give effect to the blockade measures proposed, in the event of its being necessary to take such action.

In particular it is agreed that the representation to Neutral Governments referred to by Lord Robert Cecil should be made now.



5. Lord Robert Cecil refers to the possibility of exercising economic pressure on countries which were appealing to the Allies for assistance and supplies, and were at the same time fighting with their neighbors in defiance of the wishes of the Council.

He cites the case of Poland which is at present engaged in operations against the Ukraine. He refers also to the food supplies withheld by Serbia in the Banat.

He suggests that the Council might on occasion think it desirable to notify the Supreme Economic Council that economic pressure should be applied in such cases.

It is agreed that this should be done and that the Supreme Economic Council should be free to take such action as seemed to them desirable in such cases.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 12:15

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. S Orlando says that two questions have been raised by the Drafting Committee in regard to the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties. One of these questions concerns responsibilities for the breaches of the laws of war. Naturally, the clause in the German Treaty applying to the Kaiser is not applicable to The Austrian and Hungarian Treaties, and there is no equivalent Article. Where, however, some alteration is required as in the case where subjects of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire had committed crimes and had subsequently assumed some fresh nationality, such as Czechoslovak, or one of the other nationalities. Provision should be made that such persons should not escape trial.

President Wilson points out that no provision inserted in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties could compel the Czechoslovak Government to surrender people accused of crimes.

Mr Lloyd George draws attention to a mistake in Article 227 of the German Treaty, where it was stated that the special tribunal “will be composed of four judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers; namely, United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan”. The number four should, apparently, be five.

Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to call the attention of the Secretary-General to the above mistake, in order that the Germans might be notified.


2. S Orlando says that there is a second point to which he wishes to draw attention, namely, the language of the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties. He had consented to the German Treaty being drafted in the English and French languages, to the exclusion of Italian. In view, however, of Italy’s special position towards Austria and Hungary, he asked that the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties might also be drafted in the Italian language.

M Clemenceau says he has no objection.

President Wilson says he has no objection, provided that the Italian representatives of the Drafting Committee are fully qualified to prepare the necessary drafts.

S Orlando said that they were amply qualified.

(It is agreed that the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties should be prepared in the Italian, as well as in the English and French languages.)


3. The Council has before it a letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, dated May 10th, on the subject of German Prisoners of War and Interned Civilians, together with a draft reply.

Mr Lloyd George says that he has no objection to the substance of the draft reply, but thinks it might be couched in more sympathetic language, particularly in regard to the portion relating to the graves of the fallen.

M Clemenceau asks if Mr Lloyd George would prepare a revised draft.

Mr Lloyd George undertakes to do this.


4. The Council has before it a letter from Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau, transmitting a draft International Agreement on Labor Law, prepared by the German Government, together with a draft reply prepared by the Committee to which the question has been referred.

Mr Lloyd George says it is worth considering whether it would not be desirable to admit the Germans to the Labour Organisation before they were admitted to the League of Nations.

(It is agreed that before the draft reply is approved, the Committee should be invited to express their views on this question.)


5. M Clemenceau reads the attached résumé of three German Notes which have arrived in the night of 13th/14th May, 1919.

(It is agreed that these notes should be referred to the appropriate Committees set up by the Peace Conference to consider such questions.)

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to place himself in communication with the Secretary-General on the subject.)


6. President Wilson reads the following letter which he has received from Mr Lansing, relating to two pamphlets received from the Chinese Delegation:

“The Mission has received from the Chinese Delegation direct and also through the Secretariat-General two pamphlets, one of which sets forth China’s claim submitting for abrogation by the Peace Conference the Treaties and Notes by and between China and Japan of May 25, 1915 and the other presents for readjustment by the Conference a number of important questions, among which may be mentioned ‘the withdrawal from China of Foreign Troops and Police, the withdrawal of Foreign Post Offices and the Abolition of Consular Jurisdiction’.

The first pamphlet deals with a question growing out of the war, and one affecting not only American rights but those of other associated Governments, but it seems unlikely that the Claim can have consideration by the Conference.

The second pamphlet has to do with questions not directly related to the war and questions therefore still more unlikely to be considered by the Conference.

But in view of the present feeling in China in consequence of the decision in the Kiaochow Question, I beg to suggest that the Council of Four send the Chinese Delegation a written statement pointing out that it will be impossible for the Peace Conference to consider these matters, whose importance is fully recognized, and suggesting that they be brought to the attention of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as that body is able to function.”

(Mr Lansing’s proposal is agreed to, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to draft a letter for the signature of the President of the Conference.)


7. Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Arthur Henderson, as Chairman of the Berne Labor Conference, had approached him and asked if the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would receive a deputation from the Conference in regard to the Peace Terms.

He had replied to him that as Chairman of the Labour Conference he had already received a summary of the Peace Terms; that these Peace Terms had now been delivered to the Germans; and that consequently no useful purpose would be served by the deputation. He asked if an official reply might now be sent in the same sense.

(This is agreed to, and Sir Maurice Hankey was instructed to draft a letter, either from the President or from the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.)


8. President Wilson says that since the communication which he had been asked to send to Luxembourg through the medium of an American Officer, no action had been taken in regard to the future status of Luxembourg. He then reads a document, the gist of which was that the people of Luxembourg want the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to receive a delegation, and do not wish to hold a plebiscite until after that.

M Clemenceau says it would be impossible to refuse.

Mr Lloyd George agrees.

President Wilson says the communication had no doubt been addressed to him, rather than to the President of the Conference, because he had been the medium for transmitting the previous communication from the Supreme Council.

(It is agreed that President Wilson should reply that the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be glad to receive a deputation from the people of Luxembourg.)


9. Mr Lloyd George says that he has received from the British Representatives in Siberia reports as to the risk of trouble between the United States forces in Siberia and the Russian troops. The view of the British Representatives, which of course he could not confirm, was that the Russian General Ivanoff had done his best to smooth matters, and that the trouble is largely due to General Graves.

President Wilson says that General Graves was a man of most unprovocative character, and wherever the fault might lie, he feels sure it is not with him. The British representatives were, he would not say partisans of, but at any rate friendly to, Kolchak.

Mr Lloyd George says they might fairly be termed partisans.

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


1. M Pichon says that the Belgian Minister in Paris had come to see him, and had inquired whether the whole Belgian Delegation was to be present at the first meeting on the 19th May, when the revision of the Treaty was to be considered, or whether M Hymans should be present alone. The answer had been, subject to confirmation, that the only Belgian plenipotentiary whose presence was necessary was M Hymans, who might be accompanied by any technical advisers he might consider requisite.

The next question had been whether the Belgian and Dutch Delegations would be called upon to make a statement of their points of view at the beginning of the first meeting, and which of the two would be asked to speak first. The answer had been that Belgium should take the initiative of starting the discussion.

The third question had been whether the Commission, comprising at the first meeting the Foreign Ministers of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, would nominate a technical sub-commission to elucidate the question. M. Pichon had replied to this in the affirmative, subject to confirmation, as in the case of the other replies made, by the Council. As Baron Gaiffier wishes to have a firm answer by the 14th, M Pichon asks whether the Council approves of the replies he had given.

Mr Balfour says that in his view the matter is very largely a question of form, and that he is prepared to leave it entirely to M Pichon as Chairman of the Council.

(This is agreed to, and the replies above quoted are approved.)


2. M Pichon asks which Commissions had dealt with the frontiers of Bulgaria.

M Cambon says that the Commission on Greek Affairs had concluded its work on the common frontiers between Greece and Bulgaria.

M Laroche says that the Serbian Commission is also ready. The Romanian Committee had thought that it was not within its terms of reference to deal with the ancient frontier between Romania and Bulgaria.

M Pichon says that the question to be decided is whether or not representatives of the countries concerned, Greece, Serbia and Romania, should be heard in the Council before the frontiers were settled.

Baron Sonnino asks whether the results obtained by the Committees had been unanimous.

M Laroche says that there had been unanimity except on a small point regarding the frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria. There had been complete unanimity in regard to Romania; there had been considerable difference of opinion in regard to the frontier between Bulgaria and Greece.

Mr Balfour inquired whether representatives of the countries concerned had not been heard by the Committees.

M Cambon replies in the affirmative.

M Pichon suggests that the best plan would be for the Council to hear an explanation of the reports of the Committees, and then if necessary to call in the representatives of the countries concerned.

(This is agreed to, and it is decided that the reports of Committees relating to the frontiers of Bulgaria should be heard on the following Friday at 15:00)


3. Colonel Georges says that on the 3rd April, 1919, the Inter-Allied Control Commission at Berlin had concluded that the retention of prisoners of war was impossible, and that the Germans should be allowed to organize their repatriation in their own way, provided none were forced to return home who might not wish to. This proposal had been submitted to the Allied Governments and accepted. On the 9th April an order had been given that this decision be communicated to the German Government. On the 17th April General Nudant had asked for details regarding the means adopted for carrying out the repatriation. An interchange of correspondence between General Nudant and the Berlin Commission took place on the 21st and 23rd April, and on the 6th May. This correspondence was sent to the Peace Conference by the Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies, together with his remarks. The proposals in question were as follows:

1) A stream of transportation by rail through Poland, on one part and Czecho-Slovakia and Galicia, on the other for Great-Russians and Ukrainians.

2) Transport by coasting vessels for prisoners belonging to the Baltic Regions.

3) Transportation by sea to Archangel, to the Black Sea and Siberia, of other prisoners. The Berlin Commission has drawn up a plan for organizing these various streams of repatriation. This plan, together with the comments made on it, gives prominence to certain points, to which the attention of the Conference must be drawn.

a) The necessity of obtaining the consent of the Estonian Government to the landing of Russian Prisoners of War on its territory. A similar demand would have to be made to the Lettish Government.

b) The necessity of an agreement with the Polish Government regarding the passage of prisoners of war across Polish territory. A month ago the Polish Government had been unwilling, but it appeared by the news brought by General Malcolm, that this attitude had since been modified.

c) It would have to be recognised in principle that part of the tonnage under the control of the Entente Powers should be utilized for repatriation. M Pichon says there might be some difficulty in dealing with the Lettish Government under existing circumstances.

Colonel Georges continuing, observes that the liberty left to Germany of repatriating Russians in its own way, is not exempt from certain risks, the principal of which were the probable massacre of the Anti-Bolsheviks and the reinforcement of the Soviet Armies. This point had been very clearly set forth in a letter of April 19th, giving the views of the British War Cabinet. This decision, however, is based on the unanimous opinion of the representatives in Berlin, who has come to the conclusion on the spot that it is impossible to make a selection among the prisoners, and that it is desirable to act quickly and repatriate them en masse. Since then, the Berlin Commission appears to have modified its views. The proposals made by it appear to admit more and more the possibility of making selections and of organizing, at least by sea, provided tonnage could be found, distinct streams of repatriation for the various categories of prisoner. This being so, it would appear that repatriation should be so carried out as to make use of these possibilities. Humane considerations should also be given weight, and the anti-Bolshevik prisoners of war should not be handed over to the tender mercies of their enemies. There is also a military interest in avoiding any reinforcement of the Bolshevik troops, and in increasing the manpower of all Russian Forces faithful to the Entente. It would follow from this reasoning that an order of urgency should be established regarding the repatriation of these prisoners. Firstly, non-Bolshevik prisoners of war should have priority of repatriation to anti-Bolshevik areas. Anti-Bolshevik areas should be understood to mean the non-occupied portions of the Baltic provinces, Northern Russia, the Kuban Region, the Caucasus, and Siberia. The situation of the Ukraine is still too disturbed to place that country in that category. Secondly, until the situation in Russia becomes clear, repatriation of non-Bolshevik prisoners into a Bolshevik area should be deferred, still more that of declared Bolsheviks and agitators. If these principles were admitted, the following executive measures could be taken.

i) Baltic Provinces. Measures for repatriating about 8,000 men by rail across Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and by coasting vessels to Estonia. This process to begin as soon as the Governments concerned should agree.

ii) Northern Russia. In this direction, North Russians, 10,000; Western Siberians, 17,000; Eastern Siberians, 5,000; and subsequently Great-Russians could be dispatched. The expected junction of the armies of Kolchak and of the Russian Forces in the North would, ere long it is hoped, allow of the transport of the Siberians to their own country, via the Trans-Siberian, a cheaper method than transport by sea to Vladivostok. This plan for repatriation might begin by the dispatch of the Northern Russians as soon as the Conference has accepted in principle the allocation of a tonnage for the purpose, and as soon as the executive Committee has marked off the necessary ships.

iii) Kuban. Caucasus. 2,200 Tartars; 1,400 Cossacks; 2,000 Georgians; 1,000 Romanians, can be sent. The two former to Novorossiisk, the two latter to Batum. This scheme of repatriation is of less importance from a military point of view than the others. It can therefore be undertaken at a later date when tonnage was available.

General Malcolm says that he agrees with the scheme proposed by Colonel Georges in almost every detail. The decision of the Allied and Associated Governments had been taken more than a month ago, and some 1,500 Russians had already gone home. The remainder knew that they were entitled to expect repatriation. By the means suggested, reinforcements could be sent to the friendly forces in Russia, provided ships are supplied to supplement the land transport. This point could only be settled by the shipping authorities. Colonel Georges had suggested that transport by rail should be deferred, and that transport by sea should have precedence. He would suggest that transport by land should continue without interruption. About 600 a week could be repatriated in this manner via Tilsit and Vilna. So far, this had been well carried out under the supervision of British, French and Italian officers. A good effect had been produced, as the men arrived well supplied with food and clothing. This, moreover, had had the effect of putting a stop to trouble in the prisoners’ camps, which had begun to be serious. The number of Georgians and Armenians to be repatriated was small. They could go either via Hamburg or by Fiume, as the Ministry of Shipping might decide. The Georgians, moreover, said that they had a ship at their disposal, which would probably sail from Fiume. It had previously been thought that the Polish Government would object to any transit of Russian prisoners through Polish territory. This attitude appears to have changed. An invitation had been sent to an Allied Commission to come and study the question. It would be easy to send Allied officers in charge of parties of prisoners as far as the break of gauge in the line. The same could be done for Ukrainians through Czechoslovakia.

Mr Balfour says that many people are anxious lest the Bolshevik forces be reinforced by the return of prisoners of war. It is alleged that there are 500,000 Russian prisoners in Germany. If these were all to become Bolshevik troops, it would undoubtedly be a serious responsibility to send them back to Russia. Whether they are Bolsheviks themselves, or whether, on arriving in Russia, they are forced to fight for the Bolsheviks, is from this point of view immaterial. He does not make himself responsible for these arguments, but he would like to know how General Malcolm would meet them.

General Malcolm says that he thinks he could on this point speak not only for himself, but for his colleagues. Had they believed that there were as many as 500,000 Russian prisoners, they would have voted against their repatriation. There are not, however, he believes, more than half that number. Of these 60,000 come from non-Bolshevik areas. This leaves some 190,000 belonging to Central and South Russia. He believes that the Allies can afford to let all these return. Many would refuse to do so, probably as many as 50,000. The remainder would be repatriated by land and by a very slow process. On the other hand, those going by sea to non-Bolshevik areas would reach home much sooner. Our friends would therefore be reinforced before our enemies. Moreover, all these men were very home-sick. Any Government attempting to force them into military service would certainly have great trouble with them. They have been on an average some three years in captivity, and their military value is negligible. This consideration applies, of course, to those returning to North Russia and Siberia, as well as to those returning to Central Russia, but, in view of these considerations, he thinks the criticism alluded to by Mr Balfour is not very strong, and that the Bolsheviks would receive no serious military advantage from the repatriation of Russian prisoners in Germany.

(The proposals outlined by Colonel Georges and General Malcolm are accepted. It is agreed that M Pichon should take the necessary steps on behalf of the Council to obtain the co-operation of the Estonian and Lettish Governments, and that General Malcolm through the British War Office should request the Ministry of Shipping to furnish the requisite tonnage.)


4. Admiral de Bon reads and explains the report titled 'Admirals Report on the Measures Requisite for the Maintenance of Order in Schleswig'. He adds that the Italian Government has not been asked to cooperate in these measures, but that the cooperation of the Italian Navy would be welcomed should Italy wish to send a few light ships to join the Allied Fleet.

Baron Sonnino says that he has not seen the record of the Meeting of the 30th April, and that he is somewhat surprised at the exclusion of Italy from participation in these operations. He thinks it would have been more suitable had Italy been asked whether she would take a share.

M Pichon says that all would welcome Italian cooperation. The omission was due firstly to the absence of the Italian Delegation, and secondly to the feeling that Italy was perhaps not interested in the matter.

(It is commonly agreed that Italian cooperation would be welcomed.)

Mr Balfour says that apparently Fleets alone could not do all that was required. He is in some doubt as to where the additional troops are to come from.

Admiral de Bon says that it had been considered sufficient that each of the nations concerned should furnish one battalion.

Mr Balfour asks whether the respective General Staffs had been consulted. He is in some doubt whether a battalion could be furnished from Great Britain.

M Pichon says that he was about to make the same remark.

Admiral de Bon says that General Desticker had expressed no doubt as to the possibility of finding the troops required. He had only expressed some hesitation as to the quantity of troops required for the maintenance of order. Admiral Benson had said that he could supply 1,000 to 1,500 marines. He suggested that the question of the Commanding Officer should be settled, and that the question of obtaining the requisite troops from the various nations be left to him to negotiate.

M Pichon asks whether it would be necessary to refer the question of command to the Heads of Governments.

Mr White suggests that this question should be settled in the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Admiral de Bon says that the question of command is easy to solve. As the British Fleet would bear the main part, he thought the command should be given to a British Admiral.

Mr White said that he had intended to make the same proposal.

Baron Sonnino says that he also agrees.

(It is agreed that the command of the whole force, both at sea and on land, requisite to maintain order in Schleswig during the consultation of the population, should be entrusted to a British Admiral. It would be his duty to settle with the respective Governments concerned all means required to execute the proposals contained in the Admirals’ report.)


5. M Pichon reads a proposal made by Mr Benes concerning Railway Clauses for Insertion into the Treaty with Austria and Hungary in Connection with the Czechoslovak Republic. He suggests this proposal be remitted to the Committee on Czechoslovak Affairs.

M Cambon thinks that it would be more suitable to refer it to the International Commission on Ports, Railways and Waterways.

Mr Balfour asks whether he is not right in supposing that according to Article 52 of the report of that Commission the first step in obtaining agreement relating to a railway connecting one country and another is that the railway administrations concerned should be asked to come to an agreement among themselves. It was only failing agreement between them that the Commission of experts stepped in. The case under consideration appears to be exactly the sort of case contemplated by the Article.

M Pichon says that he thinks Mr Balfour’s view might be adopted, and he is prepared, if the Council agrees, to tell Mr Benes to ask the railway administrations to work out a solution.

(This is agreed to.)


6. M Cambon explains that the Galician question was a very intricate one. The study of the matter has not been completed, and the Commission is not in a position to make a report. It is unlikely to be able to do so in time for the framing of the Treaty with Austria. As, however, it is desired that Poland should not have a common frontier with Austria or Hungary, it would appear sufficient to insert in the Treaty with Austria an Article to the following effect:

“Austria renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles to those of the territories situated beyond the frontiers of Austria as defined in Article … which previously formed the Province of Galicia.”

He would himself propose a slight alteration of this text. In spite of various efforts, the question of Teschen has not been solved, but, in any case, it is clear that Austria is not to have this region. He would therefore suggest that the last clause should read: “which previously formed the Austrian Provinces of Galicia and Silesia”.

Mr Balfour says that he entirely agrees, but his attention has been drawn to a slight omission. There is a strip of Ruthenia which should be provided for in the Article. This strip intervenes between Galicia and the part of Bukovina ceded to Romania. He would therefore suggest, in addition to the modification suggested by M Cambon, the addition of the words “as well as that part of Bukovina which has not been ceded to Romania”.

(After some discussion, the following draft Article is accepted:

“Austria renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles to those of the territories situated beyond the frontiers of Austria as defined in Article … which previously formed the Austrian Provinces of Galicia and Silesia, as well as to that part of Bukovina which has not been ceded to Romania.”)


7. Eventual Cession to the Polish Republic of a Part of the German Fleet: Mr Balfour expresses the opinion that this matter should be deferred until the Conference has decided on the fate of the German Fleet as a whole. It would be absurd to attribute any portion of it to a particular State before a decision had been taken on the fate of the whole.

(The question is therefore postponed.)


8. Occupation of Armenia by Allied Troops: M Pichon points out that this question is connected with a number of other questions which have not yet been settled. It would be a mistake, he thinks, to investigate this question in isolation from the question of Turkey, Asia-Minor, etc.

Mr Balfour, Mr White, and Baron Sonnino express their agreement.

(The question is therefore postponed.)


9. Request for a Hearing From Essad Pasha (This question is also postponed.)

(The Meeting then adjourns.)

[Sailor Steve]

Wednesday, May 14, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. The Council has before it two resolutions prepared for Mr Lloyd George by Mr Harold Nicolson of the British Delegation.

Mr Lloyd George explains that these proposals have been prepared as part of a comprehensive scheme to be presented to the Italian Delegation.


2. President Wilson says that he would accept the resolution contained in Appendix I in regard to the acceptance of a Mandate by the United States of America for Armenia and another for Constantinople and the Straits, subject to the assent of the Senate. The only alteration he wishes to make is the inclusion in paragraph 2 of the Italian Delegation among the Powers to agree on the frontiers of the mandate in regard to the Straits.

M Clemenceau also accepts Appendix I with this alteration.


3. Mr Lloyd George produces a map which had been prepared by Mr Nicolson of the British Delegation to accompany the resolutions in Appendix II.

President Wilson notes that, in this map, the valley of the Meander is included in the territory to be united to Greece. He agrees that this is the best arrangement. When the United States’ experts had proposed to cut this out of the Greek zone, they had done so in the Turkish interest and on the supposition that there would be an independent Turkish State. The present scheme, however, was not providing for a separate Turkey independent of mandate.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Italians would press very strongly for Scala Nuova.

President Wilson says that it would be inexpedient to have the Italians there in such close contact to the territory united to Greece.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the map does not give Mersina to the Italians. This raises the question of what port Italy was to have.

Sir Maurice Hankey reads the following notes about the ports of Marmarice, Karaghatch and Makri, which had been prepared in the Naval Section of the British Delegation:

“Marmarice. This magnificent harbor is completely land-locked, and affords secure anchorage with good holding ground for a large number of deep draft vessels. It is well adapted for use as a Naval Base. There appears to be no reason why it should not also be equally suitable as a commercial port, provided the communications to the interior were developed.

Karaghatch. This is also a fine harbor, but does not appear to be so suitable as Marmarice for a commercial port, owing to the rugged nature of the surrounding land. Communication with the interior is quite undeveloped.

Makri. This harbor though affording complete shelter is not so large as the two harbors mentioned above, and owing to neighboring marshes, the town is exceedingly unhealthy. It would appear to afford better facilities for reclamation and wharfage than Marmarice and Karaghatch, and communication with the interior is more developed. An Italian Syndicate shortly before the war was considering the question of constructing railways from Makri to Mougla, etc.

He also reads extracts from the “Mediterranean Pilot,” Vol. 5, and produces the charts.

President Wilson urges that the line should be drawn so as not to include the harbor of Marmarice, which he understands to have been the intention on the previous day.

(This is agreed to.)

(Mr Harold Nicolson enters.)

President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George gives Mr Nicolson the necessary instructions for re-drawing the map so as not to include Marmarice in the Italian zone. Mr. Nicolson is also instructed to revise Appendix II, page 2, so as to substitute Makri for Marmarice.

(Mr. Nicolson withdraws.)

President Wilson then reads Appendix II. In Resolution 3, the following sentence: “In view of the fact that the Turkish Government has not shown itself able to protect the interests of Christian populations under its sovereignty” is altered by the omission of the word “Christian” and the substitution of the word “the.” The name “Makri” was substituted for “Marmarice.”

Mr Lloyd George considers that the arrangement is now all right.

M Clemenceau also agrees.

President Wilson says it looked to him all right.

(The resolutions reproduced in Appendices I and II are approved, as the basis of part of an offer to be made to Italy.)


4. President Wilson points out that the boundaries of the Armenian Mandate have not yet been drawn. He suggests that the map in the ante-room, which had been drawn by American experts, provided suitable boundaries.

(The Council then adjourns to the ante-room and studied the map prepared by American experts.)

President Wilson points out that the Southern boundary is drawn so as to leave Alexandretta south of the Silesian [Cilician] boundary.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the Western boundary in the region of the Black Sea differs somewhat from the line prepared by British experts. He hands a map drawn by British experts to President Wilson, who undertakes to consider it in consultation with his own experts.

(The Council returns to the Library.)


5. M Clemenceau says that, in order to make a clean job of it, some arrangement ought to be made between General Allenby and the Emir Feisal. The latter had behaved very well since his arrival in Syria.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that, at the moment, the best plan would be to draw a map of occupation, showing what territories would be occupied by the various Powers concerned He suggested that there should be a small Committee to examine the question.

(M Clemenceau nominates M Tardieu.

Mr Lloyd George nominates General Sir Henry Wilson.)


6. M Clemenceau says that the French experts in the Foreign Office will not hear of any arrangement with the Italians about Djibouti.


7. President Wilson says it has been brought to his notice that the clause intended to have been included in the Reparation Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. Part VIII, Annex 2 paragraph 2, have been omitted. He suggests, therefore, that the only thing to be done is to sign an agreement, of which he reads a draft.

Mr Lloyd George thinks it would be better to reinsert it in the Treaty of Peace.

President Wilson agrees that it might be put in an errata.

Mr Lloyd George proposes that it should be included when the final reply is given to the Germans. He does not like having too many documents on these subjects.

President Wilson agrees.

(The Agreement in Appendix III is initialed, and Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed, after obtaining S Orlando’s initials, to forward it to the Drafting Committee for incorporation in the final Treaty with Germany.)

(S Orlando’s initials are affixed the same evening.)


8. President Wilson informs Sir Maurice Hankey that it had been agreed during an informal conversation on the previous afternoon that the Drafting Committee should only take instructions from the Supreme Council to the principal Allied and Associated Powers in regard to the material for Articles to be inserted in the Treaties of Peace, and that these instructions should be initialed by the Heads of States.


9. Sir Maurice Hankey reads the following note from Mr Hurst, on behalf of the Drafting Committee:

“The present intention of the Drafting Committee is to insert the Covenant of the League of Nations and the draft Labour Convention and Resolutions in the Treaty of Peace with Austria in exactly the same with Hungary manner as has been done in the draft Treaty of Peace with Germany. If this is not in accordance with the wishes of the Council of Prime Ministers, we should be glad if you would let us know. I have ascertained from Lord Robert Cecil and Mr Barnes that the above is in accordance with their views. Some of the Allied and Associated Powers represented at the Peace Conference are not at war with Austria, but we are making them all parties to the Treaties and modifying the language of the first clause, so as to bring in statements as to the termination of the war and the resumption of the relations being not inconsistent with their being parties; consequently, it is quite feasible to insert the Covenant of the league of Nations without any alteration, as the signatories to the Austrian Treaty and to the German Treaty will be the same; no alteration, therefore, will be required in Article I and in the Annex to the Covenant.”

(The above is approved and initialed. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to forward it to Mr. Hurst, after obtaining S Orlando’s initials.)


10. Austria and the League of Nations President Wilson expresses the hope that M Clemenceau’s proposal would be adopted and that Austria would be inserted in the list of Nations invited to adhere to the League of Nations. He, himself, was strongly in favour of this proposal He doubted, however, whether the Supreme Council had the right to decide this without consulting a plenary meeting.

M Clemenceau says it ought not to decide in the absence of the Italian Representatives.

President Wilson agrees.


11. Mr Lloyd George asks what was the nature of the mandate contemplated for the Italians in Anatolia.

President Wilson says he has in mind the Moslem feeling about not wiping out the Turkish race. His idea had been Turkish State in the north of Anatolia and to put it under the supervision of France. He pointed out that, under the scheme of mandates as originally devised, there are three classes. One class consists of nations which were on the verge of being able to run themselves and only required a very loose mandate, a second class provides for less developed countries, and a third class provides for wholly dependent countries.

M Clemenceau asks what differences he contemplates in regard to the Turkish population in the Italian and French mandates in Anatolia.

President Wilson says he had understood that in the north the population was more purely Turkish.

Mr Lloyd George says that this was not the case outside the coastal districts.

President Wilson says that the awkward question to decide is that of sovereignty. If what Mr Lloyd George says is correct, it would be better not to extend the sovereignty of Northern Anatolia over Southern Anatolia, otherwise both France and Italy would have advisers at the Turkish capital dealing with different parts of Turkish territory.

Mr Lloyd George says that that is the great argument against dividing Anatolia.

M Clemenceau asked what sort of mandate is contemplated in each case.

President Wilson says it is substantially the same.

Mr Lloyd George read a memorandum which has been prepared by Mrs Balfour in consultation with experts in the Foreign Office, in which some sort of a condominium is contemplated.

M Clemenceau says that a condominium will never do. It is bound to give rise to difficulties and might even give rise to wars. He was reminded by Mr Lloyd George that there had been great trouble between France and Great Britain in Egypt, which might have resulted in war between the two countries but for his personal intervention.

Mr Lloyd George continues to read Mr Balfour’s memorandum, in which some international body for finance was proposed.

President Wilson is altogether opposed to that. In regard to a proposal in the memorandum providing for prior claims in regard to concessions for the mandatory Power, he points out that this is contrary to the principle provided for in the League of Nations’ Covenant for equal opportunity to all Nations in mandated territory. This does not mean that the United States of America would rush in everywhere. Direct American enterprise is certainly not to be expected in Anatolia. There would certainly be a natural priority to the Mandatory but there should not be a priority of claim.

Mr Lloyd George quite agrees and points out that it would be very unfair if the Italians had a priority of claim in Southern Anatolia when the British were compelled to give equal opportunity in German East Africa.

President Wilson says that his object all along has been to avoid even an appearance of grabbing. These considerations brought us face to face with the problem as to the form of political unity which was to exist in Southern Anatolia. His idea would be to organize it as a self-governing unit, to elect its own Governor-General with Konia as its capital. Otherwise, there would be the difficulty of a single capital in which the representatives of both Mandatories would live.

Mr Lloyd George says that another scheme is that the Sultan should remain in Constantinople exercising supervision over the whole of Turkey. France would then overlook one part of Anatolia, Italy another part, Greece a third, while the United States overlooked the Sultan. If Brusa is in the French Mandate and the Sultan ruled over the whole of Anatolia, it would create a very awkward situation for the Italians.

President Wilson says that Southern Anatolia would have to be constituted as a separate unit.

M Clemenceau asked who would appoint the Governor?

Mr Lloyd George suggested the Sultan under advice.

President Wilson asks if the Turks could not elect a Governor.

Mr Lloyd George says this would make it a Republic.

President Wilson says he has no objection to this.

Mr Lloyd George thinks that difficulties would arise in connection with the Khalifate in this case.

M Clemenceau said his objection to any scheme by which the Sultan nominated the Governor or to any scheme of election was that there would be a French and an Italian candidate and this would always give rise to friction and difficulty. He suggested that a Prince should be drawn from the Sultan’s family and appointed to rule in Anatolia. In any other scheme, there would be trouble all the time.

President Wilson suggests that the Italians should be left to choose a member of the Sultan’s family.

M Clemenceau said that Southern Anatolia would then be an independent State under an Italian Mandate.

(On President Wilson’s suggestion, it is agreed in principle that Anatolia should be separated politically into two parts, the method of separation being left for further consideration. It is also agreed that, as President Wilson had some information to the effect that there is a prospect of the Italians and Yugoslavs coming to an understanding on the Adriatic question and as the proposals in regard to Asia Minor were only part of comprehensive proposals to be presented to the Italian Delegation, the resolutions agreed to should not be presented to the Italian Delegation for the moment.

M Clemenceau undertakes to speak to S Orlando in this sense.)


12. Sir Maurice Hankey read the following letter from Mr Hurst, the British Representative on the Drafting Committee:

“You will remember the instructions that went to the Drafting Committee about the frontiers of Austria and Hungary and of contiguous countries. It is a paper marked Appendix II [III] to C. F. 4.2 The interpretation which we are putting on the second sentence is that the Big Four desire that the frontiers of a country like Romania who should, so far as possible, be set out in the Treaty with Hungary not merely the frontier between Romania and Hungary itself. That is to say, that the Northern frontier of Romania where it joins Russia and the Southern frontier where it touches Bulgaria will both be set out when a decision has been come to as to what that frontier should be. The same would apply even though the State concerned had no common frontier whatever with the enemy before with whom the treaty was made. For instance. Romania. Though Romania will not touch Austria, the Romanian frontiers would nevertheless be set out in the Treaty with Austria. This seems to follow from the second sentence of your paper, but I should like to make sure that we are right in this.”

(After a short discussion, it is agreed that Mr Hurst’s interpretation of the previous decision is correct, and Sir Maurice Hankey is authorized to inform him accordingly.)


13. M Clemenceau signs the following letter to the Head of the Chinese Delegation:

14 May, 1919.

“Your Excellency,

On behalf of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, I beg to acknowledge the receipt from the Chinese Delegation of two pamphlets, one of which sets forth China’s claim submitting for abrogation by the Peace Conference the Treaties and Notes between China and Japan of May 25th, 1915, and the other presents for readjustment by the Conference a number of important questions, among which may be mentioned the withdrawal from China of foreign troops and police, the withdrawal of foreign post offices and the abolition of consular jurisdiction.

In reply I am asked to state that while the Supreme council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers fully recognizes the importance of the questions raised they do not consider that they fall within the province of the Peace Conference and they suggest that these matters should be brought to the attention of the Council of the League of Nations as soon as that body is able to function.

I am
Your Excellency’s Obedient Servant

(Signed) G. Clemenceau

His Excellency Mr Lou Tseng-Tsiang,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.”


14. M Clemenceau signs the following letter to Mr Arthur Henderson:

14 May, 1919.

“Sir,

I am asked by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to inform you that they have considered your request, transmitted verbally through Mr Lloyd George, that the Supreme Council shall receive a deputation from the International Trades Union Conference in Berne.

In reply I am asked to state that as the summary of the Peace Terms is already published and has been communicated to the German plenipotentiaries, it is felt that no useful object would now be served by the proposed deputation.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) G Clemenceau

The Rt. Hon. A. Henderson.”


15. Sir Maurice Hankey reminded the Council that before the Meeting with the German Delegates the question had been raised as to the recognition of Montenegro, and that it had been agreed that a decision ought to be taken in regard to Montenegrin representation before the Austrian settlement was concluded.

Mr Lloyd George says that according to his recollection early in the Conference it had been agreed that the United States should send a Commissioner to investigate and report on matters in Montenegro.

(Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to investigate this question.)

[Sailor Steve]

Thursday, May 15, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Four


...

[Sailor Steve]

Friday, May 16, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

M Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris 15:00

Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers


...

[Jimbuna]

17th May 1919

Aftermath of War

British Naval force defeat Bolshevik warships near Kronstadt.

French Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, visits occupied Cologne, Germany.


British artillerymen in action in the Third Anglo-Afghan War.


British soldiers lower their heads at a burial of one of the comrades during the Third Anglo-Afghan War.


Members of the Polish Murmansk Battalion at Archangelsk, Russia being inspected by British Major General Frederick Poole, Commander of the North Russia Expeditionary Force against the communists.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


1. Attention is drawn to the draft notes circulated by Sir Maurice Hankey on the subject of the proposed mandates in Asia Minor. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to make it clear in the revise of the Minutes that the decision is only intended as provisional, and as part of a proposal that it is contemplated to make to the Italian Delegates.


2. Mr Lloyd George says he has received information from Mr Venizelos sent by the Governor General of Samos, to the effect that the Italians had landed 500 men at Scala Nuova and occupied the Customs House. Consequently, they are now in possession of the whole coast of Asia Minor from Scala Nuova to Adalia. He feels that some immediate representation ought to be made to S Orlando on the subject.

President Wilson suggests that a joint memorandum should be signed by Mr Lloyd George, M Clemenceau and himself, addressed to S Orlando. This will give him an opportunity to look into the matter. He should be told that the independent action on Italy’s part is a matter of serious concern to the Allied and Associated Powers. If his explanations are not satisfactory, he should be told that Italian claims cannot be discussed. A joint communication of this kind would be more formal and more impressive than a verbal remonstrance.

Mr Lloyd George hands round a memorandum from Mr Balfour, which he describes as a powerful one, in regard to provisional decisions taken on the subject of Anatolia. He feels considerable doubt as to whether this provisional conclusion is a correct one. In any case, if the Italians continue on their present lines, it might be better to have only one mandate for Anatolia.

M Clemenceau says for his part he does not want it.

President Wilson produces an ethnographical map of Anatolia, and points out how much more mixed the population is in the southern half of Anatolia than in the north, where it is almost wholly Turkish.

Mr Lloyd George says it has to be borne in mind that the whole Mohammedan world will be aroused by this partition of Turkey, and this affects France just as much as it does Great Britain.

(It is agreed that Mr Lloyd George should prepare the draft of the memorandum for consideration, and possibly for subsequent presentation to S Orlando, on the subject of the Italian landings on the Coast of Asia Minor).


11:10

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. M Clemenceau reports that there is a very strong demand for the publication of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. He was informed that the Germans themselves had published certain portions, so that the text of these portions would soon be in the hands of the Press. Consequently, he had yesterday spoken to President Wilson and Mr Balfour on the subject, and had gathered that they were favorable to publication.

President Wilson says that he had only expressed himself favorable to the publication of those parts which the Germans had already published, and even so, he had insisted that the decision must be reserved until Mr Lloyd George returned.

Mr Lloyd George recalls that only a few days before he had raised this very question in consequence of a telephone message from Mr Bonar Law, and as a result of their discussion, an emphatic reply had been given that the Treaty would not be published. His objection was, that when the Treaty was once published, it was very difficult to alter it, and there might be some details which we ought to concede to the Germans, if it would make it more acceptable to them.

(At this point S Orlando and Count Aldrovandi enter.)

President Wilson says there is a great difference between what was published by the Germans and what we gave officially to our own people. Once we had published them to our own people, the Clauses assumed an official form, and made it very difficult to change.

Mr Lloyd George points out that the original Treaty had been somewhat defective and yet it was rather difficult to publish a different document to what the Germans had received. He was informed by Sir Maurice Hankey that it was physically impossible to publish the Treaty before Tuesday or Wednesday, as it could not be printed in London before then. By Wednesday, however, the German reply was due, and he thought the matter might be postponed until then. He did not like going back on a previous decision.

M Clemenceau says he will do whatever Mr Lloyd George wishes.

(It is agreed that the Treaty of Peace, as handed to the Germans, should not be published at present.)


2. Mr Lloyd George says that on the previous day he had addressed some British troops, and had pointed out to them how disastrous it would be to throw away the results of five years warfare, by not seeing the matter through. He had told them that in certain eventualities, it might be necessary to go to Berlin, and they had shown themselves to a man, quite ready to do so, if necessary. This was a division that had lost nearly 9,000 men in the advances of last year.


3. M Clemenceau hands in a list of material which could be supplied by the French Government, if it were so decided, in order to provide outfits for German Prisoners of War. He says that the remainder of the captured material had already been used to supply the German prisoners.

Mr Lloyd George says he was informed that the quantities that the British Government could supply were very small, but he had no details up to the present.

President Wilson says he had not received his list.


4. M Clemenceau hands to Sir Maurice Hankey for translation and circulation a draft, prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Conference, to Herr Brockdorff-Kantzau’s letter on the subject of the Saar Valley.2

5. Reparation. Reply to Brockdorff Rantzau’s Letter M. Clemenceau handed to Sir Maurice Hankey for translation and circulation a copy of a draft reply, prepared by the appropriate Committee of the Peace Conference to Herr Brockdorff-Kantzau’s letter on the subject of reparation.


6. M Clemenceau draws attention to a Memorandum prepared by Mr W.T. Layton, of the British Delegation, and circulated at the request of Lord Robert Cecil, on the subject of the supply of Armaments to the new States of Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr Lloyd George recalls that during the war the Ministers of Munitions used to confer together on such matters.

M Clemenceau suggests that the first step is to find out what is being done.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that M Loucheur and Mr Layton should confer on the subject.

M Clemenceau agrees.

S Orlando says he will nominate a representative.

President Wilson says that the United States of America has not supplied any armaments, except a few to General Kolchak.

S Orlando asked what the states affected are.

Mr Lloyd George suggests the Poles, Czechoslovaks, Romanians, Serbo-Croats, and he adds that the various nationalities formed out of Old Russia and Siberia should also be considered.

(It is agreed that M Loucheur, Mr W.T. Layton, and an Italian representative to be nominated by S Orlando should report on the facts as to what supplies of armaments or munitions have been or are being sent to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Serbo-Croatia, Montenegro, Greece, and the various States formed or forming out of the former Russian Empire, including Siberia.)


7. Mr Lloyd George points out that the reference to this Committee was closely connected with the reference to the Military Representatives at Versailles to consider the size of the military forces of the new States in connection with the Military Peace Terms of Austria and Hungary.

M Clemenceau said that this is a very difficult question, and it will be necessary in his view to secure the intervention of the League of Nations.

President Wilson thinks it will not be very difficult to get an agreement if all the nations are included in the group.


8. Attention is drawn by Mr Lloyd George to reports he has received to the effect that the supplies promised to Serbia were not reaching the Serbian Army.

(At M Clemenceau’s request, he undertakes to give M Clemenceau a memorandum on the subject).


9. President Wilson says that he has seen a report in the newspapers to the effect that the Polish Diet refused the view of Mr Paderewski in favour of stopping operations on the Ukrainian Ukraine front, as desired by the Allied and Associated Powers. Mr Paderewski had refused to accept the view of the Diet, and threatened to resign. If Poland continued fighting, he thought that the representatives of Poland ought to be asked to withdraw from the Peace Conference. His information, however, was entirely derived from the newspapers.

M Clemenceau doubts if this impression is correct. He has information to the effect that the Polish orders to continue fighting had been recalled.

Mr Lloyd George reads extracts from a telegram received from General Carton de Wiart to the effect that the military preparations are too far advanced, and public opinion is too firmly set for the operations to be stopped from Poland, and that hostilities can only be brought to an end by the direct intervention of the Peace Conference.

He then reads a comment by Lord Robert Cecil, suggesting that the Supreme Economic Council should on Monday inform Mr Dmowski that no further supplies will be sent unless hostilities ceased.

President Wilson said that Mr Paderewski has a letter in his possession from Mr Hoover, informing him that aid will only be extended to Poland so long as he is in charge.

Mr Lloyd George then reads extracts from a letter by General Botha, Chairman of the Polish-Ukrainian Armistice Commission, who points out that, the Supreme Council is being brought into contempt by the neglect of its decisions by the Poles, and that the League of Nations will become nugatory unless the present Conference can enforce its decisions. He points out that the Ukraine is the only state formed out of the old Russian Empire to whom no armaments have been supplied, though they are fighting the Bolsheviks.

M Clemenceau said that the Ukrainians are more than half Bolshevik themselves.

President Wilson agrees with General Botha, and points out the difficulty that there are no means of obtaining exact information.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers is carrying on temporarily, pending the formation of the League of Nations. Its orders cannot be defied without weakening the League of Nations itself.

President Wilson says it is the Conference, rather than the League of Nations, that would be discredited. The Conference is engaged in a final settlement, rather than on these temporary disputes. The fixing of the frontier between the Ukraine and Poland is a very difficult matter.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Ukraine is willing to stop fighting, and that it is the Poles who are making the difficulty.

President Wilson asks if General Haller’s Army is still being transported to Poland? Can the transport of the remainder be stopped? His own opinion was that if 2 Divisions have gone, that is enough for the present.

Mr Lloyd George says that Mr Paderewski ought to be supported, as he is a very honest and loyal man. He should be given an intimation that if the orders of this Council are not carried out, no further support will be given. He would do this through the Foreign Ministers.

President Wilson says it is important not to give even a superficial idea that Mr Paderewski is not being supported. He has played the game straight throughout. The message ought to be sent, not to Mr Paderewski, but to General Pilsudski, the Head of the Polish State.

Mr Lloyd George asks if it is possible to address the Head of the State.

President Wilson says that it is.

M Clemenceau asks President Wilson to draft a dispatch.

(It is agreed that President Wilson should draft for consideration a draft addressed by the Council of the Allied and Associated Powers to General Pilsudski.)


10. During the above discussion the question at arises as to what is the proper designation of the Council of Four.

Sir Maurice Hankey reports that he had been using the term “Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”.

President Wilson demurred to the use of the word “Supreme”, which some of the smaller States disliked.

(It is agreed that in any future communications the nomenclature to be adopted should be “Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers”, but that no announcement should be made.)


11. President Wilson says that on the previous day he had seen Mr Benes and Mr Kramar. Mr Benes had given a very intelligent and unbiased description of the Teschen question. He had explained that the question of coal was only one part of the subject. In any case, most of the coal basin, of which the Teschen coal mines formed a part, must form part of Poland. There was an important question, however, owing to the fact that the only lines of railway running east and west in the north of Czechoslovakia run through Teschen territory.

Mr Lloyd George asks what the population is.

President Wilson says they had not gone into this question. Mr Benes had told him it is impossible for the Poles to agree with the Czechoslovaks as they had been asked to do. The reason is that in Poland it is a party question and no party could afford to give way. This is not the case in Czechoslovakia.

Mr Lloyd George asks if everyone there is agreed to grab all they can.

President Wilson says that one of the strongest arguments in favour of the Czechoslovaks is that this part of Teschen had been the acknowledged boundary of Bohemia in the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He has received a letter from Mr Hoover to the effect that the coal output of Teschen has been reduced owing to the uncertainties of the situation to 25% of the normal. Mr Hoover is urging him to suggest that some temporary international management should be adopted, in order to bring the output of coal up to the normal.


12. The Council has before them Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States.

President Wilson says that the only controversial part of the report arises in connection with Annex B, dealing with the subject of the Jewish Sabbath.

(After a short discussion, the first paragraph of Annex B is agreed to).

(Mr Headlam-Morley enters.)

President Wilson asks Mr Headlam-Morley to give his views on Annex B. He understands that he has been the supporter of this clause, and has stood alone on the Committee.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that he has conferred with representatives of the Jews on this matter. M Lucien Wolff, whom he had found to be the most moderate representative, is against the extreme claims of the Zionists, and was supported by Mr Neymer of the British Foreign Office. They all insisted, however, that the provisions in Annex B were of extreme importance.

President Wilson says that he and his colleagues are quite agreed as to the first paragraph.

Mr Headlam-Morley says the second paragraph had been suggested by Sir Esme Howard, who is himself a Roman Catholic.

President Wilson asks whether the object of this paragraph, which suggests that elections should not take place on a Saturday, was put in to prevent action by the Poles, which otherwise would amount to a virtual disenfranchisement of the Jews.

Mr Headlam-Morley replies that this is the case. He adds that his colleagues feel that this is rather a small matter to insert in a Treaty, and might be provided for by an exchange of Notes. In view of the great importance attached to it by the Jews, however, he himself feels that he would not be doing his duty if he did not bring it before the Council.

President Wilson says that Mr Miller, the American representative on the Committee, had suggested that in view of the Continental practice of holding elections on a Sunday, it would make Saturday rather more sacred than Sunday.

Mr Lloyd George suggests that arrangements might be made for the Jews to record their votes separately on another day.

Mr Headlam-Morley says he presumed an opportunity would be given to the Poles to make their comments on this matter, which was of great importance to them. He suggests that they should be given an opportunity to send a formal note on the subject, in order to place their views on record. If their note was of a favorable character, this might meet the case.

President Wilson thinks it will not. All sorts of technical difficulties would be raised about carrying out this decision. For example, in Romania, by a quibble over the use of the word “citizen”, the Jews had, in effect, been deprived of their rights. He feared that any sanction less formal than a Treaty would be read in such a way as to render it useless. It would be said that the assurances were informal and would be got around somehow.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Committee has left out one clause, which the Jews had suggested, namely, that not only should they not have to work on their Sabbath, but that they should be allowed to work on the Christian Sabbath.

Mr Lloyd George thinks the Committee is right in this. To allow the Jews to work on Sunday would be regarded as an unfair advantage against the Christians. Such, at any rate, was the feeling in England, as regards the opening of Jewish shops.

President Wilson asks whether the last word of the first paragraph should not be “Saturday” instead of “Sabbath.”

Mr Headlam-Morley says that Sabbath was the correct word, but that the word before - “the” - is a misprint for “their”. The report is being reprinted, as it contains several inaccuracies.

President Wilson says that he, personally, is converted to the inclusion of Annex B.

Mr Lloyd George says it should be submitted to the views of the Poles.

President Wilson says he not only has a friendly feeling towards the Jews, but he thinks it is perfectly clear that one of the most dangerous elements of ferment arises from the treatment of the Jews. The fact that the Bolshevist movement had been led by the Jews was partly due to the fact that they had been treated largely as outlaws. They had no affection for a country where they were only permitted to live on tolerance, with every man’s hand against them. He therefore felt it was necessary to put them on a proper footing.

Mr Lloyd George says the proper thing is to do as the Germans are doing, and make an intelligent use of the brains of the Jews. He had noticed that half the German Delegates were Jews.

M Clemenceau says that the Council ought to hear what the Poles had to say about the matter.

Mr Headlam-Morley says that the Committee had suggested that their report should be communicated officially to the Poles, and that the Committee might then be permitted to receive the Polish Delegation and discuss the matter with them. First, however, they wished to have the report approved in principle.

Mr Lloyd George urges that the report should be communicated to the Poles in Poland, as the Polish representative in Paris, Mr Dmowski, did not represent the democratic opinion in Poland.

President Wilson suggests that the Committee should be authorized to present their report formally to the Polish Delegates in Paris, and to discuss it with them while the report should also be transmitted to the Polish Government for observations.

Mr Headlam-Morley raises the question as to the right of appeal by minorities to the League of Nations. They think that this right is reserved nominally only for the Governments of States. They nevertheless feel that it would not be advisable that the Germans in Poland should only have the right to approach the League of Nations through the German Government.

President Wilson points out that one of the Articles of the League of Nations gives the representatives of every State the right to call attention to matters affecting the peace of the world, whether the Government is interested in them or not, and this was not to be regarded as an unfriendly act. By the application of this Article, the Jews of Poland will be able to induce their friends in other countries, such as the United States of America, Great Britain or France, to draw the attention of the League to their position. In any case, however, the League of Nations cannot change the minds of the people. Dislike of the Jews in Poland will continue in spite of everything.

Mr Headlam-Morley asked President Wilson’s permission to send him a memorandum on this subject.

President Wilson says he will be glad to receive it.

Mr Headlam-Morley says he hopes that the economic and financial clauses, which were under Consideration by the experts, will be ready very soon. He says that the Committee is about to proceed to its examination of the Preamble to Czechoslovakia.

(It was agreed:

1) To approve in principle Report No. 2 of the Committee on New States.

2) That the Committee should communicate the Report officially to the Polish Delegation in Paris, and should confer with them on the subject.

3) That the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should telegraph the gist of the Report to the Polish Government, and invite its views.)


13. President Wilson says that Mr Vesnitch, when asked for explanation as to the reports of maltreatment of Montenegrins by the Serbians, replied that King Nicholas was surrounded by bad people. The answer was of course totally irrelevant, since King Nicholas was in France and was not taking any part in the administration of Montenegro. He himself is very anxious to get someone to represent Montenegro at the Peace Conference.

Mr Lloyd George asks what had occurred in regard to the investigations which President Wilson undertook on January 12th to make.

President Wilson says that the investigation had been undertaken, and that he is expecting the report in the near future.

(It is agreed to adjourn the discussion pending the receipt of the report expected by President Wilson).


14. The Council has before them the reply from the Committee composed of Mr Barnes, Mr Shotwell, M Fontaine and M G. de Grunne to the question referred to them by the Council, namely, as to whether Germany should be admitted to the Labour Organisation before she is admitted to the League of Nations.

Mr Lloyd George expresses agreement in the report of the Committee.

M Clemenceau also expresses himself in favour of the proposal that Germany should be admitted immediately after the Washington Conference.

President Wilson agrees, but suggests that it would be preferable to send it to the Washington Conference with a recommendation in its favour.

(It is agreed that the accompanying letter should be remitted to the Washington Conference with a favorable recommendation from the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate in this sense with the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference).


15. At the end of the Meeting a telephone message is received from the Secretariat-General to the effect that Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau is leaving for Spa this evening to confer with his Government and intends to return by Monday evening, May 19th.


16. The following decision is approved as carrying out the intention of the Council and is initialed by M Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George and S Orlando.

(It is agreed that the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference shall not accept any decisions of the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which does not bear the initials of M Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr Lloyd George and S Orlando. Sir Maurice Hankey is instructed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General for the information of the Drafting Committee).


17. At Mr Lloyd George’s request it is agreed to hear the Indian Delegation in the afternoon at 4:30 p.m.

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:15

Meeting of the Council of Four


1. M Clemenceau says that he and his colleagues have been considering the action of the Italian Government in landing forces at Scala Nova and other places on the Coast of Asia Minor without consulting them. They have prepared a document which is now being reproduced, and which he will hand to S Orlando. He then makes a statement identical with the document.

S Orlando says that on the day when his colleagues had announced to him the decision to disembark forces at Smyrna, Mr Lloyd George had asked for details of the Italian landings elsewhere, and he had replied he knew very little about them, which was the absolute truth. He had then said he would consult Baron Sonnino. On the same afternoon, he had visited Mr Lloyd George at his flat, and Baron Sonnino had explained that these landings were carried out for dealing with disorders that had arisen. Nothing more had been said on the matter, which he had presumed to be disposed of. He would receive the communication which his colleagues had to make to him, and would discuss it with Baron Sonnino.

Mr Lloyd George says that on the previous occasion when this subject had been raised, all that had been heard of was a landing to repair a pier at Scala Nova, after which, the Italian forces had been re-embarked. This fresh news, however, was of a far more formidable nature, since 500 troops were reported to have been landed, the Italian flag had been hoisted, the Customs House occupied, and some of the troops pushed some distance inland. The occupation of Marmarice had only been reported by the Italian fleet, but these last reports were of definite landings. Moreover, they had occurred at a time when the three principal Powers associated with Italy had expressed themselves rather opposed to Scala Nova being in the Italian sphere, and in favour of it being in the Greek sphere. It had been a subject of discussion and no final decision had been taken. It was in this state of affairs that the Italian landing had taken place. In such conditions, it is difficult to take a decision in regard to Asia Minor or anywhere else. If such a thing were to happen in any dispute between France and Great Britain, it would create a most difficult situation. What he specially regretted was that this action tended to prejudice a discussion which he thought was going very well. He and his colleagues had been sincerely anxious to meet the views of Italy as far as they could, and he thought it was a very grave matter that this action should be taken, as it were, to jump the claim, when the matter was under discussion.

S Orlando says he quite understands the feelings of Mr Lloyd George, and thinks, giving the interpretation placed by him on this action by Italy, that he was dissatisfied. He, himself, had not the intention which Mr Lloyd George had suggested, and he deplored it. He had believed this landing to be merely a repetition of the same sort of thing as had occurred before, namely, a disembarkation to meet some local difficulty. He did not know of any serious landing of any considerable forces. He knew nothing of the landing of troops, the seizure of the Customs House, or the hoisting of the Italian flag, in fact, he had believed this to be a landing without any intention of prejudicing the future disposition of this territory. It is necessary, however, to preserve respect for each other’s opinions, and he repeats that he will study the memorandum and take whatever dispositions are necessary.

Mr Lloyd George says that he would like to add that he and his colleagues had deliberately kept Greek troops away from Scala Nova, because they thought it would be unfair to Italy for them to land while the question was sub judice.

(At the end of the meeting, the memorandum is communicated to S Orlando).


2. President Wilson says he has received a report of a great victory by General Denekin on the Czaritzen front. He claims to have captured 10,000 prisoners, 128 machine guns, and 28 field guns, which ought to account for a large part of the Bolshevist forces on this front.

Mr Lloyd George says that coming at the same time as the capture of Samara by Kolchak, this is news of great importance.

Sir Maurice Hankey calls attention to the expression of opinion by the Foreign Ministers that the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should consider the question of policy towards Russia.

President Wilson says he has communicated with the United States Ambassador at Tokyo, in order to arrange for the dispatch of Mr. Morris as promised.

(At this point the Council adjourns to the room upstairs, in order to hear the Indian Delegation, which is dealt with separately in a stenographic report. On the withdrawal of the Indian Delegation there is some conversation in regard to mandates in Asia Minor).

[Sailor Steve]

Saturday, May 17, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 16:30

Meeting of the Council of Four with the Delegates from India


Hon. E. S. Montagu: Mr. President and Gentlemen, I think I can first express our heartfelt thanks for this opportunity of stating our case, because we feel deeply that you gentlemen, who are pursuing the peace of the world in this room, are likely to endanger for a long time to come the peace of the world in the East unless you realize the strength of Mohammedan feeling against the sort of peace that we hear rumored as a result of the war with Turkey. The Government of India feel this particularly strongly; but I would propose today, with your permission, that you should hear the case from my Indian colleagues. The case is always the more forceful when presented by the inhabitants of the country itself, than by one who is privileged to represent them. I am accompanied here this afternoon by my two colleagues on the Imperial British Indian Delegation who are both Hindus. Their object in coming here this afternoon is to demonstrate by the words which they will address to you subsequently the depth and reality with which Hindu Indians sympathize with the case of Mohammedan Indians. I would ask you first to hear His Highness, The Aga Khan.

H. H., The Aga Khan: Mr. President and Gentlemen: As you are aware, there are seventy million Mohammedans in India; and if you include the countries that border India and are in relations with India intimately, there are seventy-five million. I am quite sure that in this particular subject of Turkey and the sort of peace that is concluded in the Mohammedan states, which unfortunately were led into the war by German machinations, they are deeply interested; and in this particular subject I think I am right in saying that we have the full sympathy of our Indian fellow-citizens who are not Mohammedans but who are Hindus, of which class both of my friends here are members. As you are aware, the fall of Turkey was a great deal due to our efforts from India. The larger number of troops sent against Turkey were Indian troops. It was Indian blood and Indian treasure, Mohammedan blood and Mohammedan treasure, which was shed and used to bring about that great result, and while that war went on, we were convinced, and we are still convinced, in spite of rumors to the contrary, that this war was a real crusade for modern principles of justice and fair play towards all men, and that behind the hatred and death of this war, lay the principle that you were preaching. That was the principle behind it. Now, we maintain that this principle of nationality is a sacred one and does not apply to one country and not to another, to big countries and not to small ones.

For these reasons we pray that where the Turkish race has its home, where it has been for centuries and centuries, such as Asia Minor, Thrace, the town of Constantinople and Asia Minor proper, which is the home of the Turkish-speaking race, we pray that that country should remain Turkish. We appeal to the principle of nationality. We appeal to your speeches. We appeal to the interests, the vital interests, of France and Italy in the development of their future commerce and industry in those countries, that the final break with these Mohammedan nations should not take place. We appeal to No. Twelve of, your Fourteen Points, Mr. President, and to the speeches that you have made, sir. We beg of you to bear in mind the principles for which we have fought, like all of you, and to apply them without fear or favor wherever they can be applied, and we believe that they can be applied, if you will put into this, our case, a judicial mind.

I will not go into other points which I am leaving for my friends here, but there are one or two points which I desire to mention. Germany will be invited sometime into the League of Nations. The German races, wherever there have been no mandates appointed for the Germans, have been promised that they will enter the League of Nations in the fullness of time. Now, the same ought to be promised to the Turkish races in the same condition. It does not matter whether Turkey is small or great, but if they are a nation, if they are one language, you mustn’t punish the future generations still unborn for the sins of the people of this generation.

Another point which I bring before your notice is the Eastern provinces of Turkey, the Northeastern provinces of Turkey, and the Southwestern provinces of the Caucasus of Russia. They are Armenians, Mohammedans, Kurds, Turks - they are so to speak the real Macedonia of the Eastern races. The frontier between Turkey and Russia even before 1877 was a purely political frontier. It was not an ethnological or geographical frontier south of the Caucasus. We appeal to you, sir, that whatever the form of government which is to be established for what is called Armenia, it should at least apply to the whole of those areas, and that it should be equality for all races, all religions and all peoples within those confines. There have been undoubtedly in the past in these countries terrible bloodshed and fighting and so on, but let us at least see that those things do not happen to the Armenians or to the other people. I don’t care particularly to mention them, but nobody now tries to decimate or reduce the Mohammedan population there, and they should have the same equal rights, no fear and no favor, but fair play.

These are the two points which I respectfully bring before you, and I am sure that there are seventy millions of my compatriots who feel them as strongly as I do.

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: May I just intervene to say that I presume you all realize that the Sultan of Turkey has a spiritual authority far exceeding his temporal possessions as Khalif of the Mussulmans, which makes his destiny and the fate of his people of peculiar and particular interest to the Mohammedans of the world, even though they are not connected with Turkey?

H. H. The Aga Khan: Especially in India. That relationship has been very intimate, and it has never been severed even during the war. While Mohammedan troops have been fighting against the Turks, they have been praying for the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif at the same time. They fought because they believed they were fighting for principles above that.

Nobody has proposed to punish the Germans, who are the main offenders of this war, by taking Berlin from them. The Austrian Germans are to have Vienna. Why should the Turks alone have their capital taken from them?

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: Mr. Aftab Ahmad, who comes from the Indian frontier, and who is a lawyer now, was a member of the Council of India.

Mr. Aftab Ahmad: Mr. President and Gentlemen, With your permission I shall observe that I feel the honor of being given this privilege of expressing my views on this momentous question,—the future of the Turkish Empire. I, as an Indian Mussulman, beg to say that the seventy millions of the Mussulmans of India occupy a special place in the great British Empire, which has played such a prominent part in bringing this war to a triumphant close. As citizens of the Empire the Indian Mussulmans have shed their blood and contributed their full share for the service and success of their Empire and the Allied cause. Not only in the other theaters of war, but even against Turkey herself, the Mussulmans of India fought for the principles of justice, freedom and self-determination - principles to which the great Allied Powers are definitely committed and to the benefit of which all races and creeds are equally entitled.

Having stood successfully the most severe test during a long period of trial and trouble, the Mussulmans of India are now naturally and, I think, rightly interested in the future settlement of the Turkish Empire, the only surviving Mohammedan power in the world and the seat and center of the dearly cherished Khalifate. But now it is said that the Turk is to be turned out of Constantinople, and that Asia Minor is to be cut up into pieces and distributed among France, Italy and Greece. We have also heard that Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine are to be placed under non-Moslem governments. As regards Constantinople, Thrace and Asia Minor, we would earnestly appeal to the principles proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain as bearing upon their war aims in general, and on this part of the Turkish Empire in particular.

His Highness has already referred to Point No. 12 of your Fourteen Points, and especially to the important speech delivered by our Prime Minister in January 1918, and with your permission I should just like to read a few words from your Point No. 12, that

“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.”

And on the same point the Prime Minister was pleased to say in explaining and defining the principles for which Great Britain was fighting in this war,

“Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominately Turkish in race.”

I may be permitted to observe that these words have gone down deep into the hearts of millions of Mohammedans all over the world and nothing can eradicate them. They have put perfect faith and belief in these words, and they are anxiously waiting for the realization of the things which these words promise.

It is clear from what the Peace Conference has so far decided that the future of the enemy territories is settled upon the principle of nationality. We beg and pray that the same principle may be applied to the case of Turkey. It is needless to point out that these parts of the Turkish Empire are predominately Turkish in race, and it is not only the question of the sovereignty of the Sultan and the Khalifate, but the fate of the whole Turkish race, inhabiting these parts, is involved in your decision. Any such dismemberment of Turkey and subjugation of the Turkish race to foreign domination will be most strongly resented by the Moslems of India and will be regarded by them as due to the fact that Turkey is a Mohammedan power. This is sure to leave a sense of most bitter feeling in India and other parts of the Moslem world. There is no valid reason why Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria should be allowed to keep their capitals and Turkey should be deprived of sovereignty over Constantinople. We earnestly appeal that the Sultan should not only be allowed to possess complete sovereignty, but that in due course Turkey should be admitted to the League of Nations.

As regards Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine, our prayer is that they should continue to be under a Mohammedan government. The Mussulmans in India and other parts of the world are most anxiously watching the settlement with a view to see how far the principles of justice and self-determination are given effect to in the case of these territories. In this connection the essential points which we would earnestly urge before this august body are:

1) Establishment of Mohammedan government, not only in name but in fact, based on the principle of self-determination.

2) Definite and effective provision for their unhampered economic development, protecting their natural resources against foreign exploitation.

3) Definite and effective provision for the spread and extension of modern education of all grades and kinds to secure moral and intellectual advancement of the people.

And, lastly, adequate representation of representative Mohammedans upon any body or institution which the League of Nations should set up for periodical inspection of territories under its mandate, so that in due course these territories may also be admitted to the League.

Such are the tests which Mussulmans will naturally apply to any settlement which the Peace Conference may be pleased to determine with regard to the Turkish Empire. We earnestly appeal that these essential points will be kept in view.

I may, in conclusion, be permitted to observe that upon the issue of your deliberations with regard to the future fate of Turkey depend, to a large extent, not only the future relations between the Indian Mussulmans and the Empire, but the situation in the whole Islamic world. We are most anxious to avoid the causes of that general unrest which is discernible in so many parts of the world at the present time and which may have most disastrous results.

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: Mr. Yusuf Ali was a member of the Indian Civil Service and was a member of the Government of India; and is now resident in London.

Mr Yusuf Ali: Mr. President and Gentlemen: My colleagues who have spoken before you have already placed our case before you from various points of view. There is one point of view, however, in which I think you might be interested and on which I propose to concentrate my attention. I have been a very close student of the vernacular papers in India, and especially the Mohammedan vernacular papers, and I have been struck with the fact that the chief interests of the editors, and therefore presumably of their readers, have been concerned mainly during this war with the doings and the future of the Mohammedan powers concerned. It is well known how much strain was put upon the loyalty of the Indian Mohammedans when Turkey went into the war against us, but I claim, and I venture to think that that claim is justified, that the Indian Mohammedans stood that test steadfastly and loyally; and I think that they are entitled to have a voice in the settlement of the Mohammedan countries that is now before you.

It may be asked, What is their interest? I will not at the present moment go into questions of ethnology and point out that among the various strains which compose the body of Indian Mohammedans there is a good deal of Turkish Blood and Turkish tradition. The word “Urdu” which is the name of the national language of the Indian Mohammedans, called in Europe “Hindustani,” is itself derived from a Turkish word meaning “camp,” showing the origin of that language, how it arose in the camps of the Turks and Tartars, who were a great power in the time of the Mogul Empire in India. To you, sir, it is superfluous for me to refer to the visit, the historical visit of Captain Hawkins in the reign of Jahangir, and how he mentions the language in which he talked to the Mogul court was Turkish. I do not wish to lay any particular emphasis upon this, but it will at least show you that there are Turkish affinities and that the Indian Mohammedans in feeling an interest in the Turks and in their empire are feeling an interest which is quite close to them.

But apart from that we have the Arabian strain and the Persian strain, and the Central Asian strain, and the Hindu strain among the Indian Mohammedans, but whatever the origin, we all feel that we have an interest in our brother Mussulmen. The tie of religion with us is, it seems to me, rather stronger than the tie of religion among many of the followers of any of the other great historical religions. In fact, religion seems to take almost the place of blood or nation, and you can understand and appreciate the position as regards the Indian Mohammedans feeling an interest in Turkey.

And then they also feel that the last Mohammedan power, as my friend Mr Aftab Ahmad has put it, the last remaining Mohammedan power if it vanishes will leave behind very large issues for which we venture to submit the world is not at present prepared. Here again it will be presumptuous for me to refer to the intricate political, economic and international questions which would justify us in making that statement. You gentlemen can deal with that much better than I can, but it is necessary to advert to the fact that this difficulty is present in our minds, and we base some of the arguments for favorable treatment of Turkey upon these very practical considerations.

Then there is the question of the declarations and pledges. Here I should like to say that we must take these declarations and pledges as they were understood by the Indian Mohammedans, as they would have been justified in understanding them, and I think I am right in saying that they universally expected that whatever settlement was arrived at after the war, it would not forever banish the hope of setting the Turkish and other peoples comprised in the Turkish Empire on their legs again.

Then there is the great question of the Khalifate. The Khalifate is a question on which perhaps it is difficult to speak briefly, but nevertheless, with your permission, I shall offer just a few remarks upon its practical aspect. I do not wish to go into history. I do not wish to go into theology. But I do wish to point out that the spiritual influence of the Khalifate, which is acknowledged in India by British subjects and by other subjects in other parts of the world, is intimately bound up with the prospects of educational and moral advancement among all the Moslem people, and if we handle that question in a manner that is prejudicial to the hopes and aspiration of the Moslem people, or if we cut off the whole of the old historical tradition, it is possible, indeed it is probable, that we shall make the advancement of the Moslem people more and more difficult.

Mr Lloyd-George: Is it hereditary?

Mr. Yusuf Ali: It is in theory elective, but in practice it has been hereditary. In India some of the papers recently raised the question of the spiritual organization of the Indian Mohammedans, and various suggestions and proposals were put forward, but I could not help noticing that they all related themselves to the historical growth of the spiritual head of Islam; and if we cut that off, I think that we shall find that the Indian Mohammedans will be placed at a great disadvantage, you may say owing to their own ideas, but they will in fact be placed at a great disadvantage in the race for future progress. We have at the present moment great and promising schemes for the self-development of India, politically, industrially and in other ways, and we wish and hope that the Mohammedans should take their rightful share in that self-development, but we feel that if extraneous causes, prejudices, if you like so to call them, in any way cut them off from taking their proper share as citizens of the British Indian Empire and of the British Empire, it would be a great calamity, not only to our own people, not only to the Indian Empire, but to the world at large.

It seems to us that sometimes Europe is apt to forget Islam, to forget the power that is behind it, to forget the force that it wields; and, at any rate, it is our duty clearly to point out that that power still exists, and if it is forgotten or neglected, it will only mean further complications in the future. We should like, therefore, that full consideration be given to the feelings and sentiments of the Indian Mohammedans on the question of the retention by the Turks of Constantinople and Thrace and Asia Minor, where they have substantially a Turkish population, and that the interests of the Mohammedans in all the other provinces should be so safeguarded that they have a reasonable hope of making further and further progress and entering into that committee of nations which is typified by admission when the time comes to the League of Nations.

H. H. The Maharajah of Bikanir: I should like, as a Hindu Indian, and as the ruler of one of the independent states of India under the King’s protection, to observe that the princes and the people, even though they are non-Moslems, will be found in general sympathy with the aspiration of their brother Moslems in India. And as one who has the honor of representing the Indian Princes at this Conference, I should like to point out that the premier prince in India happens to be a Mohammedan ruler who has influenced for the good not only the activities of his own state, but Moslem opinion throughout India, in favor, of course, of the King Emperor and also of the Allies. I should like to plead also very strongly for the retention of the Sultan in Constantinople, and to strongly deprecate any partition of Turkey proper.

I need not repeat two points which I had put down, but which have been brought out by His Highness, the Aga Khan, points concerning the tremendous loyalty of the Indian Mohammedans who formed a very considerable portion of the Indian Army, whose loyalty was taxed to the utmost. I can testify from having been with them in the field, both in France, where thousands of Indian Moslems lie now, and in Egypt. In Mesopotamia, in East Africa, West Africa, the Shantung Province, and in every theater of war, the Mohammedans have fought, and the point which His Highness brought out is a point which must appeal to all, that though they recognized the Khalif as their spiritual ruler, yet they fought against him: before and after fighting, every day, in the mornings and evenings, they were offering prayers for the Khalif, while still fighting for the King and the Allies in the cause of civilization.

The recent unrest in India is undoubtedly a reflex to a very great extent Of the tremendous feeling of the Mohammedans and their apprehensions in regard to the future of Turkey, about which all sorts of rumors are current, and I would beg with a full sense of responsibility to say that if the Sultan and the Turks are deprived of Constantinople and there is a partition of Turkey, there will be grave unrest, hatred and trouble in the future, not only for India, not only for the British Empire, but for the world at large.

Rt. Hon. Lord Sinha: Gentlemen, I do not think it necessary for me to occupy any of your time after the matter has been so fully dealt with by my colleague, The Maharajah of Bikanir, as well as by the three Mohammedan gentlemen who have had the privilege of addressing you. I can only remind you once again of the fact that there are seventy millions of Mohammedans in India, which comprise, therefore, more than one-fifth of the population of the country. These Mohammedans comprise among them some of the most war-like races in India, and furnish a very large proportion of the Indian Army, of that Army with which the victory over Turkey has been so successfully obtained. I am confident from what I have read and seen as regards the feelings of my Mohammedan fellow-citizens in India, and I am confirmed in that feeling by the discussions I have had both yesterday and today with the three gentlemen who have addressed you just now, that there is grave anxiety in India among the Mohammedans with regard to the rumored dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. The Indian Mohammedan will not understand why, when the German is left in Berlin and the Austrian in Vienna, the Turk should be expelled from Constantinople. He will be apt, and I am afraid he will have reasonable justification for it,—he will be inclined to consider that after all he has fought against his religion and that, notwithstanding the professions of the various eminent statesmen who have declared the war aims and objects with regard to this war which has just terminated, that notwithstanding these declarations after all it has been, like in old times, the war of one religion against another. And what is more, and what is of great consequence to us in India, the Indian Mohammedan will have the belief that he has been made to fight by false promises, made to fight against the spiritual head of his religion and made to fight, therefore, against his own religion himself, which to him is a far more living faith than, I am sorry to say, it is with regard to many others. That is the danger which is such a menace to the British Empire, and therefore I submit it to the world at large, and I do not hesitate for one moment to ask you to give it your full and grave consideration. We in India are likely to be sufferers in the first instance no doubt from this feeling among the Mohammedans, but it will not be confined to India. The peace of the world will be gravely imperiled, and I therefore join my voice with that of my fellow-subjects in earnestly proclaiming that the Turks should not be dealt with more severely or less justly than the other enemies in this war.

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: I should like to give you some information which you may not have heard of the reality of the danger to the peace of the world which is thereby involved. It is only three days ago that I saw a representative of your Government, Mr President, who has been in captivity with the Bolshevists in Turkestan. He has come home after a most perilous journey, involving six sentences of death, and he tells me that all the way he traveled through that vast Mohammedan country he was struck by the various alterations in the tone of the Mussulman towards the Entente since the Armistice. They have heard these rumors of the dismemberment of Turkey, and he was struck by the anti-Entente feeling.

I don’t know whether you have heard of the very serious trouble that we have had in the Punjab in India, where certain Hindu seditionists, largely influenced I believe by outside influences, largely influenced, I believe, by Bolshevik influences, were stirring up the people to resist the laws of the land. The Mosques were thrown open to them, and the non-Mussulman, the non-believer, the Hindu, was invited into the Mohammedan pulpit to preach opposition to the laws of the Indian Government, a thing which never happened before in the history of the world, I should imagine, and it would have been regarded by the old-fashioned Mohammedan as a desecration of their Mosques. Now, this is due, not to one item, but to a whole series of items. The talk about Constantinople began it; the rumors of the landing of Italian and Greek soldiers in Asia Minor, the suggestions that the Mosque of San Sofia should be rededicated as a Christian Church, all these things have brought into these people’s minds the belief that despite what was said to them during the war, this war has turned out to be a war of non-Mohammedans against Mohammedans, a war of non-Moslem faiths against the Moslem faith; and the feeling which has been shown by my colleagues today merely makes me implore you to remember that that feeling, if it is not corrected by the terms of peace, may endanger the peace of the world throughout the East, and may add to the already dangerous elements in Russia.

Mr Lloyd-George: Surely, Mr Secretary of State, the Mohammedans of India must know that most of the fighting has been done among the Christians.

Rt. Hon. E. S. Montagu: The fighting has been done among the Christians, but the peace terms dictated to our Christian enemies will strike them as so much more moderate than the peace terms which lead to the complete disappearance of our only Mussulman state. And did you see that the Turkish newspapers have published a statement that they thought the terms of peace to Germany very fair?

The President: I want to speak of one thing that has been mentioned, though it has not been dwelt upon, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. That is the suggestion that entrance into the League of Nations should be left open as freely to Mussulman Governments as to other. There is really no difficulty upon that point; but I want to call your attention to the fact that the covenant of the League limits membership to self-governing nations, and that Germany is not admitted at once because we are not sure that she is a self-governing nation. It was the opinion among all the conferees on this subject that we must wait until we had conclusive proof that Germany was no longer under the government of a single individual or a small group of individuals, but under the government of her own people, and that therefore her disposition to the rest of the world and her ambitions were altogether altered before she could be admitted into the League. I for my part do not anticipate any opposition to the admission of any government that displays those changes. So that it is not a question of present political relationship.

Mr Lloyd-George: There will certainly be no religious question.

The President: Certainly not. It is merely a question of political form of government.

There is another matter that I would like to make clear in that connection: The whole theory of mandates is not the theory of permanent subordination. It is the theory of development, of putting upon the mandatory the duty of assisting in the development of the country under mandate, in order that it may be brought to a capacity for self-government and self-dependence which for the time being it has not reached, and that therefore the countries under mandate are candidates, so to say, for full membership in the family of nations. I think that is a very important fundamental idea of the whole mandatory conception.

H. H. The Aga Khan (or Lord Sinha): In these Mohammedan countries democracy is really part of their religion in a way. It is a historical fact that in Islam it was common for centuries, while in the Middle Ages it did not exist in many other countries, and those self-governing and democratic principles should be applied to these Mohammedans. They should be allowed to enter the League of Nations, and nothing should be done to prevent their remaining self-governing nations, just as Germany will enter when she changes her spirit.

Mr. Yusuf Ali: We are afraid, sir, that if the arrangements are as rumored, that will delay the process of their becoming self-governing, or will destroy their hopes altogether.

The President: Of course, I think we all recognize that the trouble in Asia Minor has been the rivalry and clash of nationalities and religions, and that the problem is complex because the mixture is so complex and the competition so sharp.

(The Indian Delegation withdraws)


Mr Lloyd George says that he is much impressed by the accumulating evidence of the unrest that would be caused in the Moslem world by the removal of the Sultan from Constantinople. Neither Great Britain nor France, as great Mohammedan Powers, can afford this unrest, and neither can the United States, if she is about to become a Mohammedan Power. If the Turkish capital were removed to Brussa and the Sultan with the Khalifate is established there, there would always be ferment and intrigue. He himself is in favour of keeping the Khalifate at Constantinople. The United States of America, the probable mandatory of Constantinople and the Straits, can be relied on to be absolutely impartial. He feels himself more or less pledged by the declaration he had made on behalf of the Turkish Government. M Clemenceau had sent him a telegram approving this declaration.

M Clemenceau says he cannot recall it.

Mr Lloyd George says he will let M Clemenceau have a copy. The British Empire had nearly a million men fighting the Turks when no-one else had more than two thousand. He asked his colleagues to consider the desirability of keeping the Khalifate at Constantinople.

[Jimbuna]

18th May 1919

Aftermath of War

M. Paderewski resigns Premiership of Poland.

Banquet of the League of Red Cross Societies given at the Hotel Ritz, Paris. May 18, 1919.


Delegations of various organizations lay wreaths upon the statue of Jeanne d'Arc, in the Place de Rivoli. In the background, a corner of the Hotel Regina, the headquarters in France of the American Red Cross. May 18, 1919.


Guido von List, an Austrian occultist and early leader of the Pagan new religious movement of Wotanism, has passed away (his works become influential for occultist members of the Nazi Party and SS)


1919 Copa del Rey concludes with Arenas Club de Getxo defeating FC Barcelona.

[Sailor Steve]

Sunday, May 18, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

There are no meetings today.

[Jimbuna]

19th May 1919

Aftermath of War

General Pilsudski prepares to attack the Ukraine.

Some life returning to the damaged town of Reims, France.


Members of the Women's Royal Air Force (WRAF) boarding tenders to go to their billets in Cologne where they were based as part of the Allied occupation force.


Mustafa Kemal Atatürk lands in Samsun to organize a resistance against Allied occupation of Turkey, starting the Turkish War of Independence.


Ship Losses:

No. 5 (Soviet Navy) Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War: Battle of Troitsa: The floating battery was bombed in the Dvina River by British aircraft, beached, and scuttled.

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:00

Meeting of the Council of Three


Marshal Foch and General Weygand are introduced by M Clemenceau.

Marshal Foch reports that he has visited the Allied Armies in the occupation zone of the Rhine. He had first visited the French Army at Mayence. The French have eighteen divisions ready to march, three of which are in the Belgian zone. Not all these are complete with full cadres, but they have sufficient to start at once. There are a few men on leave who would have to be recalled. The men at the head were in a good frame of mind, and ready to do what is required at once. The army is fully equipped with munitions and transport. In short the French army is ready to march with fifteen divisions, besides three in the Belgian zone and three cavalry divisions.

To the left of the French army is the United States Army at Coblenz. This consists of the First Army composed of three divisions of Infantry, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. After the 27th May, the 3rd Division will be withdrawn; hence the position is that three Divisions were available till May 27th, and thereafter two Divisions. In addition, if necessary, the 4th and 5th Divisions, which are about to be withdrawn, can be made available by countermanding the transport arrangements, which will commence their withdrawal on the 21st. By cancelling these arrangements, five Divisions can be made available. The United States divisions have everything complete; artillery, ambulances, ordnance, munitions. He offered the United States Commander-in-Chief a French cavalry Division, in order that he may maintain communication with the British Army on his left. The only thing which might be insufficient was the number of Divisions.

President Wilson points out that the American Divisions are 27,000 men strong.

Marshal Foch, continuing, says that to the left of the United States Army is the British Army at Cologne. It consists of ten Divisions which, however, are not ready to march without seven days’ warning. The officers who had conducted the campaign were being gradually replaced by young officers, but this process is not yet complete. The British Army lacks certain things, for example, guns on motor carriages and cavalry, but it will be ready to march after seven days’ warning. He asks Mr Lloyd George’s permission to draw General Wilson’s attention to the deficiencies, and to arrange matters with him as rapidly as possible so as to reduce the time within which the army can march.

Mr Lloyd George says that the Secretary of State for War is in Paris, and the best plan would be for Marshal Foch to see him.

Marshal Foch, continuing, said that north of the British Army is the Belgian Army, consisting of six infantry Divisions, and one cavalry Division, with three French Divisions already referred to in support. The Belgian Army is in excellent condition. It had lacked some motor transport, which the French Army had supplied, and it is now quite ready to march. From this review of the situation it resulted that the whole army would be ready to march as soon as the British effectives were completed, and a French cavalry Division moved to the left of the United States Army. At the same time the Polish Army is being rapidly transported. 192 trains have already passed, each conveying a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, or a battery of artillery, or supplies. About 100 trains remain to complete the transport. At the rate of 6 trains a day, 17 or 18 days would be required to complete operations. Hence in little over a fortnight the new Polish army would have been completely concentrated in Poland. It was well constructed with complete cadres. In reply to M Clemenceau he says that it contains at least 600 French officers. It is a new, fresh army, and it will be acting from a very advantageous geographical situation.

As regards the Czechoslovak army, he gathers from the correspondence that it is hoped to send at least one Division in the direction of Nuremberg, which will be able to join with the Allied troops marching eastwards from Mayence.

From the above the conclusion he draws, although it is open to reservation, is that it would be best not to launch the offensive until the whole of the Poles had been transported, as otherwise at the least hint of an offensive by the Allied and Associated Powers, the transport across Germany would cease.

The above is all he had to sas from a military point of view, but he wishes to report that Dr Heim, a representative of Bavaria, had asked a fortnight ago to see someone from GHQ. The day before yesterday he had reported that he was ready to enter into relations with the French representatives. Consequently an officer had been designated to meet him at Luxembourg, with instructions to hear what he had to say, but not to commit himself in replying.

In the course of a short subsequent discussion, Mr Lloyd George put the question as to how soon the Allied troops could march, supposing first that Marshal Foch were to arrange with Mr Churchill in the course of the day to make good the deficiencies of the British Army, and second, supposing the Germans were told on Thursday next that they must sign within five days, or the armistice would expire.

Marshal Foch says that if the British deficiencies are made good, the armies can march at the expiration of the five days.

Mr Lloyd George then authorized Marshal Foch to make any arrangements he could with Mr Churchill, so as to enable the army to march at the end of this period. He feels that if the order were given for them to march, the armies should be in a position to march at once.

(It is agreed that Marshal Foch should see Mr Churchill, the British Secretary of State for War, at once, and make all arrangements with him to put the British Army on the Rhine in a position to march without delay.)

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand withdraw.)

[Sailor Steve]

Monday, May 19, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris 11:30

Meeting of the Council of Three


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