BATTLE: M-1 Abrams Vs. T-90

[Skybird]

During the cold war, the Soviets simply lacked the communication network abilites to orchestrate huge forces to such an individual level like NATO armies train to do. NATO ability to intefere Russian communicatiosn also were estimated to be high. Like Napoleonic armies were amassed in formations that were choreographed simultenously, the Soviets thus used an organsiation form that allowed them to give orders to huge forces with as little communication as possible. Subordinate units must not be conmtacted by HQ since they are trained to fall into their place of a formation controlled by theior superior command unit. The more indiovodually units act and decide, the more communication is needed to keep all these units in a synchronised choreography.

Also, a huge mistrust from top to bottom played a role. Responsibility they were hesitent to give to lower ranks. That'S why small unit leaders had more communication options and freedoms to demand support, than their rank-counterparts on Soviet side.

The Soviets believe in formulas. War results are to be calculated. If you throw so and so much of this and so and so much of that into the formula, the outcome has to be this. It is pretty much a scientifically attitude they had on war, seen that way.

It may not work well against unconventionally fighting enemies. In Georgia, they suffered high losses, also in Chechnya. Usually it is said that poor training was the reason. But I think using a too dogmatic scheme in situations that did not match these schemes, maybe has more to do with it. This especially with regard to their relatively high losses in tanks that were taken out by RPG-style weapons. If you send tanks into a town with threats from roofs but the tanks not able to elevate their weapons that high, than the sticking to a dogmatic plan unfitting for the situation seems to be the most liekly explanation, I believe.

On overwatch, just on a sidenote, some Western armies, the Swedes for example, started to experiment with giving up that concept. The precision of tank guns with tanks on the move allow to have the platoon advanace simuklatenously and thus bear the whole platoon'S firepower quicvker and simulatenously on the enemy, than if you split it up into two sections with half of your forces sitting still behind and the other half somewhere in front running into a fight, with half of the platoon'S guns missing. Also, if ambushed, so the idea, the enemy has to sprad his fire onto more targets, reducing his chnaces to bear overkill chance sonto one target and giving each tank of the targetted force a statistically greater chance to survive and fight back (the basic idea of "overflooding" a defence has something to do with it). - That's the idea. What has come of it so far, I do not know.